HOW A REDUCTION OF STANDARD WORKING HOURS AFFECTS EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS. Summary

Transcription

1 De Economit (2010) 158: The Author() 2010 DOI / Thi article i publihed with open acce at Springerlink.com DE ECONOMIST 158, NO. 2, 2010 HOW A REDUCTION OF STANDARD WORKING HOURS AFFECTS EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS BY PEDRO S. RAPOSO AND JAN C. VAN OURS,, Summary December 1, 1996 a new law wa implemented in Portugal to gradually reduce the tandard workweek from 44 to 40 h. We tudy how thi mandatory reduction affected employment through job creation and job detruction. There wa coniderable regional, ectoral and firm-ize variation in the hare of worker who were affected by the working hour reduction. We exploit thi variation to ae the impact of the workweek reduction. We find evidence that the working hour reduction had a poitive effect on employment through a fall in job detruction. Key word: workweek reduction, policy reform, employment dynamic JEL Code(): J22, J63, J81 1 INTRODUCTION Employment effect of working hour reduction are not eay to etablih empirically and indeed previou tudie examine the impact of working hour reduction on the employment poition of individual but do not addre overall employment effect. The main reaon for the lack of evidence on the overall employment effect concern the lack of information about the number of worker that find new job through the birth of firm. At the individual level it i rather traightforward to ue worker working above the new" tandard hour before the policy change a the treatment group and worker working at or below the new" tandard hour before the policy change a a CentER, Department of Economic, Tilburg Univerity, Tilburg, The Netherland, P.M.SantoRapoo@uvt.nl Correponding author: CentER, Department of Economic, Tilburg Univerity, Tilburg, The Netherland, vanour@uvt.nl Department of Economic, Univerity of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Autralia CEPR, London, UK We are grateful to the Minitry of Employment, Statitic Department, for acce to the QP data. We thank two anonymou referee for helpful comment on a previou verion of the paper. Pedro S. Rapoo gratefully acknowledge financial upport by the Portuguee Foundation of Science and Technology, FCT [SFRH/BD/21906/2005].

2 194 PEDRO S. RAPOSO AND JAN C. VAN OURS control group. However, etablihing the overall employment effect i a nontrivial exercie a there i no control group for firm that were created after the introduction of the policy change. In thi paper we attempt to etablih the comprehenive employment effect by performing an analyi at the level of well defined labor market. In Portugal December 1, 1996 a new law wa implemented aiming to gradually reduce the tandard workweek from 44 to 40 h. The main reaon for implementing thi mandatory reduction of working hour wa to peed up convergence of Portuguee traditionally long hour of work to the European average. In a companion paper we invetigated how the Portuguee working time reduction affected individual job (Rapoo and Van Our 2010). In the current paper we invetigate the overall employment effect. There wa coniderable regional, ectoral and firm-ize variation in the hare of worker who were affected by the working hour reduction. If the reduction in working hour affected employment it i likely to have had a bigger impact when the hare of affected worker wa high. Therefore, we can exploit the variation acro labor market to ae the impact of the workweek reduction. To do o we perform an analyi on the level of labor market defined by indutry, region and firm ize. Thi aggregate approach allow u to tudy job creation and job detruction a well a worker acceion and eparation and thu the net employment effect. 1 The remainder of the paper i organized a follow. Section 2 dicue the reduction of the workweek in Portugal. Section 3 dicue the economic of working hour both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Section 4 preent our data. In Sect. 5 we report the reult of our empirical analyi. Section 6 conclude. 2 THE REDUCTION OF THE WORKWEEK IN PORTUGAL In Portugal, the 1990 were a decade with low unemployment rate; approximately 3 4% point below the EU-15 average. Portugal i conidered to have a regulated and centralized labor market, with minimum wage, trong employment protection, and collective bargaining widely applied (Cardoo 2006). The Portuguee government define by law the limit to the tandard number of hour of work per week. In December 1996, a new law wa introduced with the aim of reducing the tandard workweek from 44 to 40 h. The law wa not paed a a tool to create job and reduce unemployment but wa introduced becaue the newlyelected government wanted to peed up the convergence of Portuguee traditionally long hour of work to the European average (Varejão 2005). 1 In a imilar et-up Stewart (2002) exploit regional variation in wage acro the UK to etablih the impact of the introduction of the minimum wage.

3 STANDARD WORKING HOURS AND EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS 195 The new law implied firt, by 1t December 1996, all workweek above 42 h hould be reduced by 2 h; workweek below 42 h but above 40 h hould meet the new tandard of 40 h per week. Second, by 1t December 1997, all workweek till above 40 h hould meet the tandard. In order to compenate firm for the reduction in working hour the new law introduced ome flexibility. The reduction wa implemented taking into account that the tandard workweek could be defined on a 4 month average. Furthermore, the maximum number of daily working hour could be increaed by 2 provided that it did not exceed 10 h per day and 50 h per week. 3 ECONOMICS OF WORKING HOURS REDUCTION 3.1 Theory Shorter working hour may be introduced through mandatory law or may be the reult of bargaining between union and firm (See alo Boeri and Van Our 2008). A reduction of the workweek can be introduced for everal reaon. Shorter working hour may increae the tandard of living or it may be according to preference of worker. Sometime work haring, i.e. reduction in the length of the working week leading to more job, i motivated a a tool to reduce unemployment. The idea i that if working time per worker i reduced then employment, counted a the number of worker will increae. Thi of coure i only true if the reduction of the working hour doe not affect labor demand too much i.e. if there i a lump of labor which can imply be reditributed at no cot. In a competitive labor market it may be that worker want to organize a reduction in working hour becaue thi would increae their marginal product of labor (Marimon and Zillibotti 2000). The mandatory reduction of working hour would give the worker market power o they could increae their wage. Of coure, individual worker would like to deviate from the agreement and work longer hour at the higher wage in the ame way a producer have an incentive to deviate from a cartel agreement. Another reaon for a mandatory reduction of working hour arie when employer have monopony power. Manning (2003) argue that in a monopony not only the wage rate i le than the value of marginal product but the firm can alo induce the worker to work more than would be optimal for the worker given the monopony wage. In the ame way a a minimum wage can be welfare improving in cae of a monopony, working hour reduction can be welfare improving. Whatever the reaon for a working hour reduction, the quetion arie if there i an employment effect. From a theoretical point of view it i not obviou whether working hour reduction will increae or reduce employment. Let aume that technology i repreented by a Cobb Dougla production function Y = H γ N where 0 <γ <1, which implie that output

4 196 PEDRO S. RAPOSO AND JAN C. VAN OURS i proportional to the number of worker while due to phyical contraint there are diminihing return to hour of work in production. Labor cot per worker are given by W = b + wh + θw(h H )d (1) where H i the tandard working hour, d i a dummy variable that ha a value of 1 if H H and a value of zero otherwie, b repreent the fixed cot per worker that are independent of working hour. Thee are mainly the cot of hiring, firing a well a training cot, w i the hourly wage rate, θ(θ >0) i the overtime premium. Auming a competitive product market with price equal to 1, the expreion for the profit of the firm i given by Π(H, N) = H γ N WN (2) The firm chooe H and N uch that profit are maximized. The firt order condition for a maximum are: Π N = H γ b wh θw(h H )d = 0 (3) Π H = γ H γ 1 N w(1 + θd)n = 0 (4) Solving thee two equation we obtain the optimal number of hour a: H = γ(b θwh d) (5) (1 γ)w(1 + θd) When the tandard number of hour i reduced the employment effect depend on the new optimal number of hour (H ). We ditinguih three ituation: 1. If H < H new, H N = H H = If H new H H old, H N = H H = 0or H N < 0, H H > If H > H old, then H N > 0, H H < 0. Situation 1 occur when the optimal number of hour i below the new tandard; ituation 2 occur when the optimal hour are higher than the new tandard but lower than the old tandard and ituation 3 occur when the optimal number of hour i higher than the old tandard. Under ituation 1 the optimal number of hour i independent of the tandard number of hour. 2 Therefore the change in the tandard number of hour doe not affect the level of employment. If the new optimal hour 2 Note that if in Eq. 5 there are no overtime hour d =0, in which cae the optimal number of working hour i given by H = bγ w(1 γ).

5 STANDARD WORKING HOURS AND EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS 197 choice i in ituation 2 the employment effect depend on the overtime premium and the fixed labor cot (ee alo Calmfor and Hoel 1988). For illutrative purpoe conider the following example. A firm ha N worker working 42 h at a wage w with fixed cot b. So total wage cot are N (42 w + b). Aume that a in Portugal, the tandard workweek i reduced from 44 to 40 h while the total labor input i unaffected. Now the firm ha to chooe between attracting new worker in which cae the total wage cot become N (w 40 + b). Or, the firm doen t do anything, which implie that it ha to pay for overtime work for which premium i 50% (a i the cae in Portugal for the firt overtime hour). Then, the total wage cot become N (40 w w + b). It i traightforward to ee that the firm will expand it workforce if b < 20 w while it will leave hour and employment unaffected if b > 20 w. Note that thi threhold i quite high a it i equivalent to half of the weekly wage. Thi make it very likely that firm will follow the firt trategy, i.e. reduce working hour and expand the workforce. In ituation 3, worker already worked overtime and the hour reduction caue employment to fall. Thi i becaue the hour reduction ha made the employment of a worker more expenive while the price of marginal hour ha not changed. Therefore, firm will reduce the production factor which became more expenive (employee) and will ue more of the input of which price ha not changed (hour). Heterogenou firm may react differently to a reduction in tandard working hour, which make it difficult to predict the economy-wide employment effect. 3.2 Empirical Finding Empirical tudie find little evidence of working hour reduction leading to the creation of job. For Germany, Hunt (1999) find no poitive employment effect of the gradual working time reduction that occurred in the 1980 and Andrew et al. (2005) alo find no evidence of poitive employment effect of working hour reduction in Germany. For France, Crépon and Kramarz (2002) tudy the 1982 reduction of the workweek in France from 40 to 39 h finding that it didn t create job but increaed unemployment. Etevão and Sá (2008) tudy the further reduction of the workweek in France from 39 to 35 h in They find an increae in labor turnover but no effect on aggregate employment. Skuterud (2007) preent an analyi of the Canadian province of Quebec where the tandard workweek wa gradually reduced from 44 to 40 h concluding that the policy failed to raie employment. Varejão (2005) invetigate the effect of a 1996 working time reduction in Portugal uing etablihment level data and finding that firm reaction to the policy i affected by the preence of minimum wage earner and the ue of overtime hour. Chemin and Wamer (2009) explore geographic diparitie to tudy the h reform in France. They ue the hitorical difference

6 198 PEDRO S. RAPOSO AND JAN C. VAN OURS TABLE 1 MEANS OF VARIABLES (ANNUAL PERCENTAGES) e JC JD WA WS of the region Alace-Moelle a control group finding no ignificant impact of the 35-h reform on employment growth. Rapoo and Van Our (2010) analyze the effect of the Portuguee working time reduction on working hour, overtime hour, hourly wage, monthly earning and individual job lo. Thi tudy find that for worker who were affected by the new law working hour decreaed, while hourly wage increaed, keeping monthly earning approximately contant. Furthermore, the working hour reduction reduced the job lo of worker directly affected. Finally, overtime hour hardly changed. In term of our theoretical framework thi implie that ituation 2 i the mot likely ituation: the reduction in tandard hour reduced actual hour. Thu, it eem likely that firm expanded their workforce. Sánchez (2009) tudying the 2001 reduction of tandard weekly working hour from 48 to 45 h in Chile find that thi did not have poitive or negative employment effect. 4 DATA We ue a longitudinal data et matching firm and worker in the Portuguee economy, called Quadro de Peoal (QP Lit of Peronnel ). The Quadro de Peoal data are collected annually by the Minitry of Employment through an inquiry that every etablihment with wage-earner i legally obliged to fill in. Reported data cover all the peronnel working for the etablihment in a reference week in October. Every year QP gather information for more than two hundred thouand firm and two million worker (ee Cardoo 2006) for more detail). Our data cover the period 1994 until In order to etimate the impact of the reduction in hour on the overall level of employment we aggregate the firm to the level of labor market defined by indutry (even categorie), region (four categorie) and ize of the firm (three categorie). Thu, we perform our analyi at the level of 84 labor market. 3 Table 1 how the mean of the variable we ue in the analyi. 3 For ome of thee labor market we didn t ue information about all year. We removed ome outlier, where the change in job creation rate and employment growth wa trongly negative.

7 STANDARD WORKING HOURS AND EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS 199 We define job and worker flow a uual (Davi and Haltiwanger 1999). We denote the level of employment at firm j in period t a e jt ; the average number of employee at the tart and the end of the period. We denote the change of employment at firm j during period t a e jt ; the change i calculated a the difference between the number of worker at the end of the period and the number of worker at the beginning of the period. The job detruction rate (JD) in period t in the univere of firm S i pecified a: JD t = jɛs t ( e jt )/ jɛs t e jt (6) where St repreent the ubet of firm with e jt < 0. In the ame way job creation rate (JC) i defined a: JC t = ( )/ e jt e jt (7) jɛs t + jɛs t where S t + repreent the ubet of firm with e jt > 0. Thee meaure of job flow underetimate the true value of gro job detruction and creation. Even if at the level of an individual firm employment change equal zero there might be ome job creation and job detruction going on. With heterogeneou worker, job and firm making the ditinction between job and worker flow i fundamental. If F i the number of worker that left the firm in a particular period, and H denote the number of worker that entered the firm in that period, worker eparation (WS) in period t in the univere of firm S i defined a: WS t = (F jt ) / e jt (8) jɛs t jɛs t and worker acceion (WA) in period t in the univere of all firm S equal: WA t = jɛs t (H jt ) / jɛs t e jt (9) By definition, it hold that: JC t JD t = WA t WS t = e t (10) A urviving firm i a firm that i reported in our data in both, 1996 and in the current year (t). The birth of a new firm i reported if it i the firt time thi firm i reported in our data. We conider there exit a firm cloure if a firm i reported a having gone out of buine at time t if that year i the firt year it fail to report. Table 2 how that total job creation in the period October wa 17% while in the year thereafter it wa 15%. Job creation increaed

8 200 PEDRO S. RAPOSO AND JAN C. VAN OURS TABLE 2 JOB flows AND WORKER FLOWS; Firm Firm Firm Firm Total job Total job Net Worker Worker new expanion contraction cloure creation detruction employment acceion eparation (1) (2) (3) (4) (1 + 2) (3 + 4) (5) (6) Note: Change in employment between two ubequent date a percentage of the average employment at thee two date; October data to 18% in the period October and October On the other hand total job detruction in the period October and October wa around 14 15% while it decreaed to 13% in the period October In the year thereafter job detruction increaed again to 15%. Thu, immediately after the policy wa implemented in December 1996 job creation increaed and job detruction decreaed cauing net employment to increae 5%. In the year thereafter job creation wa contant while job detruction increaed omewhat, cauing employment to grow 3%. Of coure, thee development in job flow and worker flow may have been affected by the working hour reduction, but they may alo be influenced by change in the Portuguee economy. In an economy known to be characterized by very high level of firm creation and firm cloure (Mata and Portugal 1994) it i not trange to ee that after 1996, job creation increaed mainly through new firm. The main reaon behind the decreae of the job detruction i not o clear, firm cloure or firm contraction. The lat two column in Table 2 how that worker acceion fluctuate more than worker eparation. It i alo clear that worker turnover rate are high. Every year about one third of all Portuguee worker leave their job and find a new job. 4 5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 5.1 Set-Up of the Analyi By uing market level data we can take the creation of new firm in a particular market into account becaue they are part of employment creation in that market. The way thee labor market are affected by the working hour reduction depend on how many worker are affected within thee labor mar- 4 Blanchard and Portugal (2001) argue that thoe high turnover rate in Portugal are related to the mall ize of firm in Portugal.

9 STANDARD WORKING HOURS AND EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS 201 Figure 1 Market level ditribution of the hare of worker working more than 40 h per week; October (percentage) ket. 5 A a definition of policy intenity we ue a variable n, defined a the hare of affected worker in each of the 84 labor market working more than 40 h at the relevant October date. The ditribution of n in the period October 1994 October 1996, hortly before the working hour reduction, i preented in Fig. 1. Clearly the policy intenity varie a lot between the different labor market. Over time there are ome change in the ditribution but by and large the ditribution of n in variou year look very much alike. To analyze the year 1 effect of the working week reduction in labor market k repreented by indutry, region, ize we etimate the following equation: y kt = α t + α k + βn kt + δn kt d p + ɛ kt (11) The dependent variable are job creation rate (JC), job detruction rate (JD), worker acceion rate (WA) and worker eparation rate (WS) and change in employment ( e) from t to t +1, where t run from October 1994 to October Furthermore, the α t repreent calendar time fixed effect, the α k repreent time-invariant labor market fixed effect, d p repreent a dummy variable for the pot reform period, and n repreent the hare of individual that worked more than 40 h in October of year t. The main parameter of interet i δ, repreenting the treatment effect. Finally, ɛ repreent an error term. 5 Obviouly, the hourly wage may have been affected by the reduction of tandard working hour. However, thi doen t affect our reduced form analyi, in which we relate the change in tandard working hour to the employment effect without attempting to ditinguih between the variou determinant of thi change.

10 202 PEDRO S. RAPOSO AND JAN C. VAN OURS 5.2 Exploratory Analyi To give an idea about the relationhip between the hare of worker working more than 40 h per week and employment growth, job creation and job detruction Fig. 2 preent an exploratory analyi. The horizontal axi how the hare of worker working more than 40 h per week in October 1996, hortly before the mandatory reduction in the tandard working week wa implemented. The vertical axi how change in the period October 1996 October 1997 in employment growth (panel a), job creation (panel b) and job detruction (panel c). Ahowninpanela of Fig. 2 the higher hare of 40+ h worker, the higher the change in employment growth. The lope of the traight line in Fig. 2 repreent an etimate for δ. 6 Indeed, the lope i poitive in panel a indicating that the larger the hare of worker involved in the reduction of the tandard workweek the higher employment growth. Panel b how that there i no uch relationhip with job creation, while from panel c it i clear that job detruction i affected by the reduction of the tandard workweek: the larger the hare of worker involved in the reduction of the tandard workweek the lower the change in job detruction. 5.3 Parameter Etimate The parameter etimate for δ from Eq. 11 etimated over the period are preented in the firt column of Table 3. A hown the change in employment i ignificantly affected. The higher n, the higher employment growth. Conditional on the other characteritic of the labor market, an average labor market with an n of 0.5 experience an employment growth of almot 5%. A hown, job creation and worker acceion are not affected by the reduction of the tandard workweek. But, job detruction and worker eparation are negatively affected. Apparently, labor market confronted with a reduction of the tandard workweek reduce job detruction and thu increae employment. Thi would be in line with prediction from the theoretical model. Limiting the etimation period to hardly affect the parameter etimate (column 2). 6 Note that if we take firt difference of Eq. 11 over the period we find: y k,95 96 = α 96 α 95 + β(n k,96 n k,95 ) + δn k,96 + ɛ k,96 ɛ k,95 (12) uch that if n didn t change too much between 1995 and 1996 we find: y k,95 96 α + δn k,96 + ɛ (13) In a linear regreion we find for δ (abolute t-tatitic baed on robut tandard error): panel a: (1.8), panel b: (0.6), panel c : (2.2).

11 STANDARD WORKING HOURS AND EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS 203 a 0.4 Employment growth Change in employment growth Share of 40+ hour worker b Change in Job Creation Job creation Share of40+ hour worker c 0.2 Job detruction Change in Job Detruction Share of40+ hour worker Figure 2 Change in employment growth, job creation and job detruction;

12 204 PEDRO S. RAPOSO AND JAN C. VAN OURS TABLE 3 BASELINE ESTIMATES 1 Year effect 2 Year effect (1) (2) (3) (4) e (2.1)** (2.2)** (1.8)* (1.8)* JC (0.5) (0.4) (0.2) (0.1) JD (3.1)** (3.3)** (2.4)** (2.5)** WA (0.6) (0.9) (0.1) (0.2) WS (2.3)** (2.1)** (2.2)** (2.2)** Obervation Labor market Note: All etimate alo have the hare of 40+ h worker (n) a explanatory variable in addition to labor market fixed effect (84) and calendar period fixed effect (3); abolute t-tatitic baed on robut (cluter) tandard error in parenthee (Bertrand et al. 2004); a **/* indicate that the coefficient i different from zero at a 5%/10% level of ignificance Replacing y kt for t = 1996 in Eq. 11 by the average for the period we alo etimated the year 2 effect of the working hour reduction. The parameter etimate are preented in the third and fourth column of Table 3. Thereultareverymuchtheameabefore. The market level analyi allow u to make a ditinction between worker acceion to new firm and worker acceion to firm that urvive. Similarly, we can make a ditinction between worker eparation from firm cloure and worker eparation from urviving firm. Table 4 alo how how the working hour reduction affect the flow of worker to and from thee different type of firm. The working hour reduction mainly affect worker flow to new firm and from firm cloure. Conditional on the other characteritic of the labor market, firm being born and dying on an average labor market with an n of 0.5 experience an employment growth of almot 5% after 1 year where half of thi effect come from worker eparation and half come from worker acceion. After 2 year the effect on net employment i poitive but maller (3.5%) and it come mainly from the reduction of worker eparation. The effect to and from urviving firm are much maller after 1 year but after 2 year the effect are very imilar. We performed two type of enitivity analyi relating to our meaure of policy intenity and relating to our definition of labor market. In our baeline etimate our policy intenity parameter i meaured by the hare of worker working more than 40 h. A an alternative policy intenity indicator we ued the per worker average number of hour in exce of 40 h. In our baeline etimate we ditinguih labor market according to indutry, region and

13 STANDARD WORKING HOURS AND EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS 205 TABLE 4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS; DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN SURVIVING FIRMS AND FIRMS BEING BORN/DYING 1 Year effect 2 Year effect (1) (2) (3) (4) Firm being born and dying e (2.6)** (2.6)** (1.8)* (2.1)** WA (1.9)* (1.8)* (0.9) (0.8) WS (2.7)** (2.7)** (1.9)* (2.2)** Surviving firm e (0.3) (0.4) (1.1) (0.8) WA (0.9) (0.7) (0.8) (0.8) WS (1.4) (1.0) (2.1)** (1.7)* Obervation Labor market Note: See footnote Table 3 firm ize. A a enitivity analyi we ignored the ditinction by firm ize. Thi reduce the number of labor market from 84 to 28. For both enitivity analye we find that the relevant parameter etimate are very much the ame a before. From thi, we conclude that our parameter etimate are quite robut. 6 CONCLUSIONS Previou empirical tudie ugget that reduction of tandard working hour do not have poitive employment effect. However, previou tudie only meaure partial employment effect while in our tudy we conider overall employment effect. We tudy the working hour reduction that wa introduced in Portugal in In our analyi we exploit regional, ectoral and firm-ize variation in the hare of worker who were affected by the working hour reduction. A working hour reduction i likely to have had a bigger impact when the hare of affected worker wa high. To invetigate thi we perform an analyi on the level of labor market defined by indutry, region and firm ize. We find evidence that the working hour reduction had a poitive effect on employment through a fall in job detruction. The reduced labor cot didn t timulate job creation which may have to do with the trict employment protection in Portugal. We can only peculate about the reaon why reducing tandard working hour in Portugal increaed employment wherea in other countrie no uch effect occurred. Mot likely, the increaed flexibility in the ue of the tandard workweek made it eaier to adjut the workforce at the

14 206 PEDRO S. RAPOSO AND JAN C. VAN OURS intenive margin rather than at the extenive margin. To the extent that thi reduced labor cot, job detruction wa reduced, cauing poitive employment effect. Open Acce Thi article i ditributed under the term of the Creative Common Attribution Noncommercial Licene which permit any noncommercial ue, ditribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author() and ource are credited. REFERENCES Andrew, M.J., T. Schank and R. Simmon (2005), Doe Workharing Work? Some Empirical Evidence from the IAB-Etablihment Panel. Scottih Journal of Political Economy, 52, pp Bertrand, M., E. Duflo and S. Mullainathan (2004), How much Should We Trut Difference-in- Difference Etimate? Quarterly Journal of Economic, 119, pp Blanchard, O. and P. Portugal (2001), What Hide Behind an Unemployment Rate: Comparing Portuguee and U.S. labor market. American Economic Review, 91, pp Boeri, T. and J.C. Van Our (2008), The Economic of Imperfect Labor Market, Princeton Univerity Pre. Calmfor, L. and M. Hoel (1988), Workharing and Overtime. Scandinavian Journal of Economic, 90, pp Cardoo, A.R. (2006), Wage Mobility: Do Intitution Make a Difference? A Replication Study Comparing Portugal and the UK. Labour Economic, 13, pp Chemin, M. and E. Wamer (2009), Uing Alace-Moelle Local Law to Build a Differencein-Difference Etimation Strategy of the Employment Effect of the 35-Hour Workweek Regulation in France. Journal of Labor Economic, 27, pp Crépon, B. and F. Kramarz (2002), Employed 40 Hour or Not-Employed 39: Leon from the 1982 Workweek Reduction in France. Journal of Political Economy, 110, pp Davi, S.J. and J. Haltiwanger (1999), Gro Job Flow. in: O. Ahenfelter and D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economic, vol. 3, Amterdam, Elevier, pp Etevão, M. and F. Sá (2008), The 35 Hour Workweek in France: Straightjacket or Welfare Improvement? Economic Policy, 55, pp Hunt, J. (1999), Ha Work-Sharing Worked in Germany? Quarterly Journal of Economic, 114, pp Manning, A. (2003), Monopony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Market, Princeton Univerity Pre. Mata, J. and P. Portugal (1994), Life Duration of New Firm. Journal of Indutrial Economic, 42, pp Marimon, R. and F. Zillibotti (2000), Employment and Ditributional Effect of Retricting Working Time. European Economic Review, 44, pp Rapoo, P. and J.C. Van Our (2010), How Working Time Reduction Affect Job and Wage. Economic Letter, 106, pp

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