Labor Market Equilibrium. Labor Economics VŠE March 2010

Transcription

1 Labor Market Equilibrium Labor Economics VŠE March 2010

2 Perfectly Competitive Labor Market Assumptions: Perfect Information: o All workers know relevant details about all jobs; o All employers know relevant details about all workers; Perfect mobility: workers can switch jobs costlessly, and all jobs are equally open to all applicants; Homogeneity: o workers are identically skilled o firms offer identical working conditions;

3 Perfectly Competitive Labor Market Profit Maximization: firms choose wages so as to maximize profits; Many employers and workers: o No employer is large enough that its wage influences the market average; o No worker is important enough that its decision affects the overall employment level of a firm.

4 Equilibrium in a Single Competitive LM Equilibrium condition: E* S (w*)=e* D (w*) E* S (w*) is the optimal labor supply (of all workers) at the wage w*; E* D (w*) is the optimal labor demand (of all firms) at the wage w*.

5 Out of Equilibrium Case 1: Labor Surplus w > w* w: more people are willing to work than there are jobs: E* S (w*) > E* D (w*) Case 2: Labor Shortage w < w* w: too few people are willing to work: E* S (w*) > E* D (w*) some people will be unemployed; some work less hours than they would want to. some jobs are not filled; some workers are not willing to work more hours.

6 Reaching a Labor Market Equilibrium Case 1: Labor Surplus w>w*, E* S (w*) > E* D (w*) Ways: 1) The workers compete with each other; 2) The firm offers lower wage. Case 2: Labor Shortage w<w*, E* S (w*) > E* D (w*) Ways: 1) Firms compete with each other; 2) The workers ask for higher wage rate. w=w* E* S (w*)=e* D (w*) w=w* E* S (w*)=e* D (w*)

7 Minimum wage and employment Card & Krueger (1994)

8 Competitive Eq. across Labor Markets Setup: Northern Labor Market yields equilibrium wage rate w N and # of labor hours E N ; Southern Labor Market yields equilibrium wage rate w S and # of labor hours E S ; w N > w S

9 Competitive Eq. across Labor Markets

10 Competitive Eq. Across Skill Levels Setup: Labor Market for College Educated Workers yields equilibrium wage rate w C and # of labor hours E C ; Labor Market for Non-College Educated Workers yields equilibrium wage rate w NC and # of labor hours E NC ; w C > w NC What Do Workers and Firms in each Labor Market Do?

11 Competitive Eq. Across Skill Levels What Do Workers and Firms in each Labor Market Do? Firms: Firms have incentive to substitute skilled labor for unskilled labor. E D (w C ) and w C ; E D (w NC ), w NC. Workers: Non-college educated will attend college. E S (w C ) shifts out and w C ; E S (w NC ) shifts in and w NC. Arbitrage: w* C =w* NC [ π]

12 Labor Market Eq. with Education Education takes time

13 Policy Applications Payroll tax Employers pay Empolyees pay Analysing immigration Analysing imperfect markets Monopsony Monopoly

14 Policy Application: Payroll Taxes Firms pay a kaček per hire

15 A Tax Assessed on Workers Worker pays a kaček Identical result

16 Payroll Tax The real payer is the one with less elasticity! but society is always the loser.

17 Deadweight Loss of Payroll Tax

18 Analysing Immigration Influx of new workers to the market Affect the wage negatively Affect the wage positively

19 Policy Application: Immigration Short Run: Immigrants and Natives are perfect substitutes

20 Policy Application: Immigration Short Run: Immigrants and Natives are perfect complements

21 GE Reaction to Immigration Increase demand Increased savings Increased consumption

22 Country-wide reaction to immigration

23 Noncompetitive Labor Market: Monopsony Monopsony is a market with one buyer As the employer raises wages, some workers will join the labor market and work for the firm; Because there are no other firms, workers will not disappear to another firm when she lowers the wage; Some may return to non-labor market activities.

24 Perfectly Discriminating Monopsonist Everyone gets a different wage!

25 Nondiscriminating Monopsonist MC L > w Firms set output where MR L =MC L w < MR L This leads to smaller output and lower wage than efficient level

26 Monopsony and the Minimum Wage Cases: w min w monopsonic w monopsonic w min w* w monopsonic w* w min Card & Krueger (1994)

27 Monopolist s Hiring Decision The more produces the less gets.

28 Noncompetitive Labor Markets: Monopoly MR < p

29 The Labor Demand Curve of Monopolist Marginal Revenue Product is always less than Value of Marginal Product

30 The Monopsonist/Monopolist VMP MCF S MRP w MRP VMP N* N

31 The Monopsonist/Monopolist VMP MRP w MCF Equilibrium if S both markets are competitive MRP VMP N* N

32 The Monopsonist/Monopolist VMP MRP w MCF MRP Equilibrium if S both markets are competitive Monopolist with competitive VMP labor market N* N

33 The Monopsonist/Monopolist VMP MRP w MCF MRP Equilibrium if S Competitive both market markets with are monopsony competitive labor Monopolist market with competitive VMP labor market N* N Labor Monopoly and Monopsony