Managing the Unexpected: identifying vulnerabilities in the Water Sector. Dr Anthony J. Masys CD, PhD Centre for Security Science, DRDC

Transcription

1 Managing the Unexpected: identifying vulnerabilities in the Water Sector Dr Anthony J. Masys CD, PhD Centre for Security Science, DRDC

2 Shocks Water Treatment Plant Hit by Cyber-attack 1

3 Outline Shocks (black swans) Ways of seeing Systems thinking Complexity Risk Landscape Hyper-connectivity Problem Framing 2

4 Shocks New Normal High Impact Low Frequency Events such as 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the Japanese earthquake and tsunami, Super Typhoon Haiyan were all mega-disasters with global impact. 3

5 Shocks Surprising Events Boston Marathon April

6 Shocks Surprising Events Paris 13 November

7 Shocks Surprising Events Brussels 22 March 2016 Raises new questions about the way in which we perceive risk and prepare for disruptive events. 6

8 Mental Models Imagination a failure of imagination, and a mind-set that dismissed possibilities. (9/11 Commission Report) 7

9 Resilience and Response Unexpected events often audit our resilience everything that was left unprepared becomes a complex problem, and every weakness comes rushing to the forefront (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007)

10 Black Swans What are we missing?

11 Linear thinking The way we think is outdated. As a result, the way we act creates problems, and then we are ill-equipped to address them because of the way we think.

12 ways of seeing 11

13 ways of thinking 12

14 ways of planning 13

15 Ways of Seeing/ Thinking

16 Complex Risk Environment The world is insufficiently prepared for an increasingly complex risk environment. WEF (2015) Global Risks th Edition: Insight Report.

17 Hyper-Risks and Reflection With our hyper-connected world underpinned by hyper or hybrid-risks, the impact of unexpected events such as terrorist attacks, floods, earthquakes, financial crisis, and cyber-attacks has revealed the fragility and vulnerabilities that lie within the our interdependent systems. 16

18 Complexity Interdependencies It is important to stress that threats and risks cannot be seen in isolation. The feedback loops between risks and the fact that they are also driven by underlying trends raise their complexity and make it more difficult to control individual risks.

19 Systems Thinking Senge (1990) The world exhibits qualities of wholeness, the relevance of systemic thinking is captured within its paradigm of interdependency, complexity and wholeness According to Dekker (2005) systems thinking is about relationships and interaction. It sees a socio-technical system as a complex web of dynamic, evolving relationships and transactions 18

20 2003 Can/US Blackout Water supply compromised Detroit and Cleveland Decreasing water pressure in water pumps allowed bacteria to build up in municipal water systems Sewage treatment facilities were shut down Michigan Millions of gallons of raw or partially treated sewage was discharged into lakes and streams 19

21 Hyper-Risks and Reflection Many of the systemic risks that shape crisis evolution often arise from unanticipated consequences of interactions within and between different types of systems. A networked mindset supports a holistic approach to hazard, vulnerability and risk management that transcends linear agent-consequence analysis. 20

22 Systems thinking and mapping Part of systems thinking and mapping involves identifying the various actors and relationships in the system and creating causal loop diagrams that model these relationships. Perspective taking in interdisciplinary work involves examining a problem from the standpoint of interested disciplines and identifying the differences between them (Repko, 2008:120). Perspective taking is essential in systems thinking to understand how the various actors in a system interrelate. (Mathews and Jones, 2008:78) Mathews, L.G. and Jones, A. (2008) Using systems thinking to improve interdisciplinary learning outcomes: reflections on a pilot study in land economics. Issues in integrative studies. No 26:

23 Red Teaming If everyone is thinking alike, someone isn t thinking. General George S. Patton 22

24 Biases and Assumptions According to Richards Heuer (The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis) and Morgan D. Jones (The Thinker s Toolkit), we do not approach analysis with empty minds. Our minds are full of biases and assumptions. Unless we are forced to stop and think through a particular challenge, we are able to blot out much of the complexity surrounding us and rely on routines of habit. Usually, this works fine until we treat a truly unique situation as yet another routine situation, at which point we are taken by complete surprise. Hopefully we survive and learn.

25 Red Teaming Definition Red Teaming is the art of applying independent structured critical thinking and culturally sensitised alternative thinking from a variety of perspectives, to challenge assumptions and fully explore alternative outcomes, in order to reduce risks and increase opportunities.

26 Benefits Broader understanding of the Operational Environment. Filling gaps in understanding. Identifying vulnerabilities and opportunities. Reducing risks and threats. Avoiding group think, mirror imaging, cultural miss-steps and tunnel vision. Revealing how outside influences, adaptive adversaries and competitors could counter plans, concepts and capabilities. Identifying desired or undesired 2nd and 3rd order effects and unforeseen consequences.

27 What is a Scenario? 26

28 Qualities of good scenario planning Explores the possibility space Facilitates flexible, adaptable and robust strategies Participative (recognizes worldviews of all stakeholders) Must be meaningful and understandable

29 Scenarios The very process of developing scenarios generates deeper insight into the underlying drivers of change. Scenarios force companies to ask, What would have to be true for the following outcome to emerge? As a result, they find themselves testing a wide range of hypotheses involving changes in all sorts of underlying drivers. They learn which drivers matter and which do not and what will actually affect those that matter enough to change the scenario.

30 Assumptions/ Reflective Practices Reason (2004:32) points out that the path to adverse incidents is paved with false assumptions. Similarly, Turner (1978) notes that failures do not develop instantaneously. Instead there is an incubation period in which discrepant events develop and accumulate unnoticed. Preventing errors, therefore entails some form of assessing or reassessing working assumptions. (Barton and Sutcliffe, 2009: 1336)[i] [i] Barton, M.A. and Sutcliffe, K.M (2009) Overcoming dysfunctional momentum: organizational safety as a social achievement. Human Relations 62(9):

31 Reflective Practice Reflective practices that support mindfulness affords organizations a heightened awareness in critical and complex situations which require novel responses (Zundel, 2012). As described in Weick and Sutcliffe (2007), mindfulness supports a preoccupation with failure and a reluctance to simplify interpretations, coupled with sensitivity to weak signals and the ability to respond locally and in real time.

32 Federal Perspective The Government of Canada fosters an approach to CI in which activities are implemented in partnership with all levels of government and private sector owners and operators. Under the National Strategy and Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure, federal, provincial and territorial governments will work together to enhance the resilience of CI, monitor progress and update programs and activities as appropriate to address new and emerging threats and risks. This will strengthen coherence of action among all levels of government and the private sector, and improve Canada s ability to enhance the resilience of its CI. 31

33 CSSP-2015-CP-2095 Strengthening the Resilience of the Water Sector Lead : Public Safety Canada Partnership: Canadian Water and Wastewater Association, School of Public Administration, Dalhousie University, Start-End: June 2015 to December 2016 Funds: CSSP Funds Co-Investment Funds In-Kind Cash Total Funds $198,764 $142,654 $10,000 $351,418 Project Summary: Objective(s): 1. Determine what policies and practices water utilities are expected to have in place to mitigate and prevent risks and enhance resilience according to policies and legislation in Canada. 2. Identify emerging threats and risks, and emerging trends, practices and theories in advanced water utility risk management. 3. Determine what risk management practices water utilities in Canada currently employ to mitigate and prevent risks and enhance resilience, how effective these practices are and what obstacles prevent them from doing more. 4. Identify gaps, misalignments and areas of compatibility in water utility risk management. Outcome(s): The project aims to develop concrete recommendations to enhance resilience in critical water infrastructure using evidencebased qualitative and quantitative research, after accomplishing identifying areas of compatibility, misalignment, gaps through a National Survey in the creation of a National Risk Profile. This project will address a broad range of public safety and security domains for the Water Sector across multiple research portfolios which include Critical Infrastructure Resilience, Emergency Management Systems and Interoperability, and Natural Hazards

34 Understanding Vulnerability within the Water Sector Enabling Resilience This workshop will help stakeholders within the water sector and greater CI community examine their vulnerabilities through the application of systems thinking and soft operations research methods. Through facilitated exercises, attendees will learn how to apply systems thinking to support both vulnerability analysis and resilience. In particular the workshop will focus on: Systems Thinking Scenario Planning Structured Argumentation Red Teaming Assumption based Planning Network Analysis Canadian Water and wastewater Conference November 2016, Toronto 33

35 Worldview- mental models Multidisciplinary perspectives 34

36 Review Shocks (black swans) Ways of seeing Systems thinking Complexity Problem Framing Risk Landscape Hyper-connectivity Red Teaming Scenario Planning considerations 35

37 Dr. Anthony J. Masys Centre for Security Science Defence R&D Canada

38 Scenarios expand your thinking A powerful tool for understanding uncertainty and developing strategy. You will think more broadly if you develop a range of possible outcomes, each backed by the sequence of events that would lead to them. The exercise is particularly valuable because of a human quirk that leads us to expect that the future will resemble the past and that change will occur only gradually. By demonstrating how and why things could quite quickly become much better or worse, we increase our readiness for the range of possibilities the future may hold. You are obliged to ask yourself why the past might not be a helpful guide, and you may find some surprisingly compelling answers.