STRATEGY The strategy for developing the Thorp Safety and Operations culture comprised four key elements (5) :

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1 Developments in Safety and Operations Culture in BNFL s Thorp Reprocessing Plant, Sellafield, Cumbria. P J Kett BNFL, Sellafield, Seascale, Cumbria, CA20 1PG, United Kingdom. INTRODUCTION One of the best descriptions of Culture is how we do things around here. In a stable organisation it is extremely difficult to control the change in culture, whether it is an operations, customer service or safety culture (1, 2). To change a culture one of two elements are essential. There must be either a significant external pressure felt by all in the organisation or a change in senior management, with authority to set a new direction for the organisation (3). In the 1990 s BNFL had a unique opportunity through the commissioning of the Thorp Reprocessing Plant at Sellafield to shape a new Safety and Operations Culture. Both the key elements for change were present. Thorp was a high profile flagship plant. The plant was a 2bn multinational investment for recycling uranium and plutonium from reactor spent fuel. BNFL had an obligation to its customers, its shareholders, its workforce, the community and the wider nuclear industry to commission and operate Thorp safely. The time scale for the active commissioning of this complex plant, which incorporated new technology, was two years, and the plant was being commissioned in an environment where there was significant opposition from pressure groups. A strong senior management team was, therefore, specially selected to commission and operate the plant. Although the conditions for successful culture change were present, there were restraining forces acting against the desired change (3). These restraining forces included : Rigidity in the organisation. The Thorp Reprocessing Plant represented a relatively small fraction of the huge industrial complex at Sellafield that had been in existence since the 1950s For many individuals at Sellafield moving to a new way of working was stepping into the unknown. They were fearful of the proposed changes. BNFL had never embarked on such a large-scale cultural change before and did not overtly have the skills required to design and manage the change. Despite these restraining forces, a new Safety and Operations culture was successfully implemented. The senior management team developed common strong values and beliefs on what was required to meet the external challenges. They were given sufficient freedom of action by the other component parts of BNFL to enable effective implementation (4). STRATEGY The strategy for developing the Thorp Safety and Operations culture comprised four key elements (5) : Developing common, strong, clear organisational goals and principles Developing of semi-autonomous working with minimum formal controls Strong emphasis on selection, training and development of personnel Clear understanding of the potential rewards and benefits to be gained ORGANISATIONAL GOALS AND PRINCIPLES The senior management team determined that it was necessary for Thorp to develop a strong operating culture if it was to be a commercial success. Meeting tight commissioning and customer milestones was a fundamental requirement and, to achieve this, both commissioning and operations teams needed to operate in a highly flexible and co-operative manner with a high degree of personal freedom. This approach could only be successful if all individuals in the organisation understood, and believed, that operating safely was always essential. 1

2 To create the required Safety and Operations culture comprises three key principles were developed. These aligned strongly with IAEA guidance (6) : Rigorous risk assessments should be carried out before work commences and modifications to the plant were implemented. There should be a high level of involvement by those most affected in both operations and safety matters Strong, supportive leaders should be selected who does not allow safety, quality or operational standards to be compromised; and who encourage open debate on how to improve. During commissioning and operation of Thorp the robustness of the Safety and Operations Culture was demonstrated. On several occasions, despite intense external and commercial pressure, operations were halted until the situation was resolved safely both technically and procedurally. RECRUITMENT The management teams were selected in advance of the commissioning and operations teams. It was essential that this team could lead the required cultural change process. Wherever practicable managers and team leaders selected their own team members. In the selection process three key components were identified as necessary (7). Firstly did the individual have the necessary skill and secondly the knowledge to carry out the role? This confirmed that the individual was likely to be competent. Thirdly did the individual have the passion or desire for change? This confirmed that the individual was likely to perform in the role at the required standard. Individual technical and behavioural competencies were assessed through formal selection processes. The individual s values and beliefs were identified through open discussion and debate. The Thorp work force were all volunteers from either other plants at Sellafield or external recruits. People who were not comfortable with the proposed new Safety and Operations culture were not selected. This approach overcame one of the key restraining forces against change (i.e. individual s fear of change). TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT In several areas, Thorp itself did not have the necessary skills or experience to deliver the required training, and so external training organisations were used. To enable the process of change to sustain itself in the longer term members of the Thorp workforce were trained to support and facilitate the changes (Table 1). This strategy of using external resources, and enhancing the skill of internal resources, negated one of the restraining forces opposing effective cultural change. The training and development programme had five main components. 1.Technical Skills Training The arrangements for the training, and assessment, of technical competencies in the Thorp Reprocessing Plant are described elsewhere (8) 2.Team Work Training Pivotal components of the desired Safety and Operations culture were co-operative team working and respect for the individual. This would enable high levels of involvement and encourage open debate on how to improve. An external training organisation was used to train the behavioural skills needed to achieve this result. This process provided the whole workforce with a common language, dramatically improving effectiveness, and enabled problems to be resolved by semi-autonomous teams working across organisational boundaries without the need for close supervision. To enable the process to be sustained, members of the Operations teams were trained as facilitators who, in turn, were the potential future leaders in the organisation. 3.Total Quality Management (TQM) Training In addition to providing behavioural skills to the whole workforce, a smaller group of individuals were trained in TQM skills, which an external training organisation was again used in support. In general these additional skills were also provided to the Team Working facilitators, who were able help local teams resolve commissioning and operations challenges by providing systematic problem solving techniques and processes. 4.Personal Development Every individual prepared a Personal Development Plan (PDP). The PDP identified individual s development needs so that they could maximise their personal potential for their own personal benefit and the future of the organisation. This approach effectively wove together the needs of, and rewards for, the individual into the long term future and success of the Safety and Operations culture. 2

3 5.Leadership Development The senior management teams undertook a common leadership development process facilitated by an external training organisation. It had two key purposes. Firstly to develop common values on leadership style and approach, and secondly to provide mutual support network enabling managers to challenge and help each other when an individual manager s behaviour deviated from agreed leadership approach. 360-degree feedback processes supported this approach. Table 1. Approximate number of people trained against each of the key programmes Training Programme Number trained Technical skills 1000 Co-operative team working 1000 Personal Development Plans 1000 Facilitators (Team working and TQM) 50 Leadership development 50 INVOLVEMENT The required Safety and Operations Culture could only be successfully implemented if all individuals in the organisation understood what was required and believed that it was necessary. A team, comprising a representative cross section of the workforce and led by the Director, developed the cultural principles for the Thorp plant. Every member of the workforce was then given the opportunity to understand what the principles meant in practice. Every local area in the Thorp Reprocessing plant formed a Departmental Safety Committee (DSC) comprising representatives of the workforce, local management and safety specialists. The DSC reviewed the safety performance in its area and prepared local action plans to improve safety. The Senior Management team annually reviewed the adequacy of, and implementation of, these action plans. This approach ensured local ownership of issues and also ensured that teams were accountable for their safety performance. EFFECTIVNESS OF THE SAFETY AND OPERATIONS CULTURE It is difficult to determine with absolute certainty how effective the Thorp Reprocessing Safety and Operations Culture has been, as there are no independent controls to assess safety or operations performance of the plant. A number of indicators have, however, been selected to illustrate the effectiveness of the Safety and Operations culture. Occupational Radiation Exposure Table 2. Comparison of occupational radiation exposure against plant design standards Average dose (msv) Highest dose (msv) Plant Design target (*) 1.5(*) * = Forecast exposure Clearly the exposures are well within the Plant Design Standards (Table 2). This demonstrates a high level of control. However one could argue that these low exposures are achieved through excellent plant design and that the Safety and Operations culture was not a dominant force in achieving these low exposures. Control of Exposure during Engineering tasks The Thorp Reprocessing Plant either met, or exceeded, production targets for four consecutive financial years (from 1994/95 to 1997/98). During 1998 and 1999 the Head End plant experienced a reduction in production rates due to the erosion and blockage of some lines transferring fuel cladding. The engineering teams, supporting the Head End plant, identified the need to implement modifications to the plant to restore production rates. Modifications were required in areas of plant not designed for man access and had extremely challenging radiological conditions. 3

4 A thorough and careful approach was employed. Table 3 illustrates that there was no discernible increase in occupational exposure during this period. This is considered to be a strong indication of the effectiveness of the Safety and Operations culture. Again safety remained an absolute priority despite tremendous external pressures. Table 3. Occupational Radiation Exposure to workforce in Head End Year Highest dose (msv) < 1.2 Conventional Safety Performance The conventional safety accident rate (Table 4) is considered to be a good indicator of Safety and Operations culture. The vast majority of accidents are directly attributable to the behaviour and attitude of the individual affected. A review of the root causes of accidents in 1997 identified that more than 75% were caused by either by over-confidence or complacency. In 1995 the Thorp Reprocessing senior management team, in conjunction with the workforce, decided that there was only one acceptable accident rate, which was zero accidents. The whole workforce thus jointly developed a common set of values and beliefs, which enabled new processes to be implemented. Prior to 1995 safety improvements tended to tackle physical plant conditions, but developing common values and beliefs has enabled open debate about peoples behaviour and local improvement. Table 4 The impact of the Safety and Operations culture on conventional accident performance. Year Number of Accidents In 1998 BNFL introduced the OSHA reporting system to monitor accident rate. This enabled more effective comparisons with other areas. Table 5 illustrates the effective of Thorp s Safety and Operations culture when compared to other areas at Sellafield. Table 5 Comparison of OSHA rates with other areas at Sellafield Lost Workday Case Rate (LWCR) Total Recordable Injury Rate (TRIR) Thorp Sellafield average Thorp Sellafield average 1998/ /00 (*) * = Rate in January

5 CONCLUSIONS The strategy to develop new Safety and Operations culture has been successfully implemented. The key elements for success were present enabling BNFL to fully exploit this opportunity. Having a strong senior management team, with the authority to break the mould, helped to overcome existing attitides. The use of external specialist training resources at critical phases of the project enabled rapid integration of new processes into normal ways of working (3). A total of about 1000 workers were directly involved in this culture change process. It is considered unlikely that the workforce had been much larger that the project would have been as successful in the available time, because larger organisations have increasingly significant inertia against change. FUTURE CHALLENGES It is always possible to improve physical conditions on plant and control procedures, but it is considered that further significant improvements in safety will not be achieved by these approaches. To achieve the next step change in safety the major lever will be to further develop strong values and beliefs throughout the whole organisation. The Safety and Operations culture needs to become a learning environment where unsafe behaviours are constructively challenged at all levels in the organisation. The physical processes for gathering information on unhelpful behaviours are being developed, and new processes are now required to develop a culture of constructive challenging where peer pressure is as powerful as management exhortation. On such approach being piloted is Behavioural Safety, which is giving promising results but the effectiveness of which has yet to be evaluated. REFERENCES 1. Wilson D C and Rosenfeld R H, Managing Organisations, McGraw-Hill, Handy C B, Understanding Organisations, Penguin, Lewin K, Field Theory in Social Science, Harper and Row, Mullins L J, Management and Organisational Behaviour, Pitman, Child J, Organisation: A Guide to Problems and Practice, Harper and Row, IAEA Safety Report Series No 11, Developing Safety Culture in Nuclear Facilities (1980) 7. Covey S R, The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People, Simon and Schuster, Kett P J, Thorp Reprocessing Plant Preparing the Workforce to Operate the World s Largest New Nuclear Facility, SRP Proceedings,