Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan

Transcription

1 Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan

2 Fractiousness of Society for Neutral Populace for HN Government COIN operations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously: Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition. Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a supportive disposition. Retain supportive individuals. These operations are conducted in an environment where tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents This environment may suggest courses of action aimed at reinforcing or widening seams

3 An increase in funding will influence economic investment and development. A strengthened economy will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group. Fractiousness of Society Development for Neutral Populace for HN Government

4 Developing and Restoring Essential Time to Develop Essential Breakdown of Essential Essential Satisfaction with Essential Expectations for Essential Fractiousness of Society Development for Neutral Populace for HN Government An increase in funding will significantly impact the restoration of essential services. Improvements in the provision of essential services will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.

5 Developing and Restoring Essential Time to Develop Essential Breakdown of Essential Essential Psychological s Satisfaction with Essential Expectations for Essential Fractiousness of Society Time to Develop Governance Governance Development for Neutral Populace for HN Government Available A government that is established, recognized, and that maintains a secure environment is in a position to Send a positive, credible message of success to the populace. Provide an environment that enhances stable employment of the workforce. Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider becoming supporters. Acts of Violence External Material

6 Developing and Restoring Essential Time to Develop Essential Breakdown of Essential Essential Psychological s Satisfaction An appropriate with force mix, and correct operational Essential Time to Develop tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very Governance significant impacts on Expectations for The restoration of essential services. Essential The populace s Governance perception of security. The Government s and COIN forces credibility in Fractiousness their communications efforts with the populace. of Society Development Impact of Illegitimate Actions for Neutral Populace for HN Government Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Mix of Effort and Strategic Emphasis Acts of Violence External Material Available Time to Develop HN Forces Information to Force Density Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social Total Force Density Force Density Host Nation Forces Host Nation Force Density

7 Developing and Restoring Essential Time to Develop Essential Breakdown of Essential Essential Psychological s Satisfaction with Essential Expectations for Essential Fractiousness of Society Time to Develop Governance Governance Development Impact of Illegitimate Actions for Neutral Populace for HN Government Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Mix of Effort and Strategic Emphasis Acts of Violence External Material Available Time to Develop HN Forces Information to Force Density Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social The Logical Lines of s from FM 3-24 Total Force Density Force Density Host Nation Forces Host Nation Force Density

8 Developing and Restoring Essential Time to Develop Essential Breakdown of Essential Essential Psychological s Satisfaction with Essential Expectations for Essential Fractiousness of Society Time to Develop Governance Governance Development Impact of Illegitimate Actions for Neutral Populace for HN Government Individual Competence, Judgment, and Ability to Execute Mix of Effort and Strategic Emphasis Acts of Violence External Material Available Time to Develop HN Forces Information to Force Density Ratio Understanding and Knowledge of Social The Basic Information Ops Loop Total Force Density Force Density Host Nation Forces Host Nation Force Density

9 Sympathizers and Active ers / /Tolerance Govt vs s Gov t & SF POPULAR SUPPORT Attractiveness of Govt vs. Path w/ s PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 9

10 Conditions, Beliefs, & Damages/Use of Force by s Damages/Use of Force by Gov t and CF WOM Amplification Gov t vs Ins Strength and Intent Fear of Attack, Ideology & Ethnic/ Rivalry Intent & Commitment Cultural Erosion/ Average Connectedness of Ideology, w/ Gov t Path Gov t Strength and Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in, & Expectations for, & Visible Gains In, & PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 10

11 Conditions, Beliefs, & by Ideology & Cultural Erosion/ Ethnic/ Rivalry Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & WOM Amplification Gov t vs Ins Intent & Commitment Strength & Intent POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS Average Connectedness of Ideology, Path Fear of Attack/ Perception Of Govt Strength & Intent Gov t & SF POPULAR SUPPORT Satisfaction w/ Gains in, & Visible Gains In, & Expectations for,, & / /Tolerance Govt vs s Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Path w/ s PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 11

12 , Outside / Enablement of s, Narcotics Ins Strategic Comm/IO & Affiliation w/ Fear of Gov t / / Casualties 1 Territory Not Under Gov t Control Coordination Offensives & Among Ins Presence Factions (Clear & Hold) Ins Provision of Gov t & Ins Targeted Attacks on Progress/ for Gov t Havens / Operate, Feedback Loop Examples: 1. expansion: factions with havens as base can expand their presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory. (Permissive population contribution to Havens / Operate input from separate sector). 2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed / policed territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 12 Leadership Training, Skill & Exper Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Outside / Enablement of 2 & Material to s Recruiting, Retention,, & ISR Likelihood of Crime/ Violence/ Ins for Payment Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion Illegit Agric Advantage Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Harshness & Breadth

13 , Outside / Enablement of s, Narcotics Ideology & Cultural Erosion/ Ethnic/ Rivalry Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Damages Fear of & Casualties Gov t// Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & WOM Amplification Gov t vs Ins Intent & Commitment Average Connectedness of Territory Not Under Gov t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Ideology, Path Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Provision Of Gov t & Targeted by Attacks on Progress/ for Gov t Strength & Intent POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & Fear of Attack/ Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS Coordination Among Factions Gov t & SF, Satisfaction w/ Gains in, & Visible Gains In, & Expectations for,, & Havens / Operate POPULAR SUPPORT Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Outside / Enablement of INSURGENTS Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal / /Tolerance Govt vs s Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Path Recruiting, Retention, & ISR Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion & Material to s Likelihood of Crime/Violence / for Payment w/ s Harshness & Breadth Advantage NARCOTICS Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels IllegitAgric, PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 13

14 Infrastructure,, & Economy Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Agricultural production and markets: and spending enables agricultural production. can boost economic activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment. (Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.) 2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets. (Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.) Infrastructure Dev. & Sustainment Legit Other & Non-Agric Legit Agric Civilian (SWET, Healthcare, Education) 1 2 Basic Needs Service Levels & Fraction of and Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit vs Illegit Opportunity Infr., Econ, Policy & / Fairness Move People & Goods Rapidly Capital Mgmt, & Spending Legit Activity, PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 14

15 Infrastructure,, & Economy Ideology & Cultural Erosion/ Ethnic/ Rivalry Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & WOM Amplification Gov t vs Ins Intent & Commitment Average Connectedness of Damages Fear of & Casualties Gov t// Territory Not Under Gov t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Ideology, Path Provision Of Gov t & Targeted by Attacks on Progress/ for Gov t Strength & Intent POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & Fear of Attack/ Infr,, Econ. Policy & / Fairness Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO TO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS Coordination Among Factions Gov t & SF, Satisfaction w/ Gains in, & Visible Gains In, & Expectations for,, & Havens / Operate POPULAR SUPPORT Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Infrastructure Dev. & Sustainment Outside / Enablement of INSURGENTS Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal / /Tolerance Govt vs s Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Path Legit Other & Non- Agric & Material to s w/ s Harshness & Breadth Legit Agric Civilian (SWET, Healthcare, Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, Move People Capital Mgmt., SERVICES & Goods & Rapidly & Spending ECONOMY Recruiting, Advantage Retention, Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Likelihood of Crime/Violence / for Payment Fraction of And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Basic Needs Service Levels & Legit Activity, NARCOTICS Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric, Legit vs. Illegit Opportunity PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 15

16 Governance Central Government Development & ; Engagement / Empowerment of Governance; Overall Governance Impacts Central Gov t Institutional & Gov t Policy Quality & Quality Gov t vs Ins Gov t Gov t Training, Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Gov t Gov t Integration of Local Gov t / StratCom/IO Impact Gov t vs Ins Transparency of Gov t Processes & s Gov t/contractor Favoritism Gov t, Policy Quality & Fairness Tax Revenues Overall Gov t Reach,, Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate & Beliefs Feedback Loop Example: Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well another key loop) PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 16

17 Governance Central Government Development & ; Engagement / Empowerment of Governance; Overall Governance Impacts Transparency of Gov t Processes & s Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Overall Reach, Policy Quality & Fairness / Contractor Favoritism Central Tax Revenues Policy Quality & OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY Integration of Local TRIBAL GOVERNANCE Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate & Beliefs / Commun/ Strategic IO Ethnic/ Rivalry Quality Gov t vs Impact Gov t vsins Ideology & Cultural Erosion/ Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & WOM Amplification Gov t vs Ins Intent & Commitment Average Connectedness of Damages Fear of & Casualties Gov t// Territory Not Under Gov t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Ideology, Path Provision Of Gov t & Targeted by Attacks on Progress/ for Gov t Strength & Intent POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & Fear of Attack/ Infr,, Econ. Policy & / Fairness Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO TO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS Coordination Among Factions Gov t & SF, Havens / Operate POPULAR SUPPORT Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Satisfaction w/ Gains in, & Visible Gains Infrastructure Dev. & Sustainment In, & Expectations for,, & Outside / Enablement of INSURGENTS Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal / /Tolerance Govt vs s Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Path & Material to s w/ s Harshness & Breadth Fraction of And Agric. Legit vs Legit Agric Illegit Basic Needs Service Levels & Legit Other Civilian & (SWET, Non - Agric Healthcare, Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, People Move Capital Mgmt., & Goods SERVICES SERVICES & & Rapidly ECONOMY Spending ECONOMY Recruiting, Advantage Retention, Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Likelihood of Crime/Violence / for Payment Legit Activity, NARCOTICS Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric, Legit vs. Illegit Opportunity PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 17

18 Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Duration of US Domestic Cost/Benefit & Knowledge & Understanding of Social Avg COIN Experienc e & Skill Resource Levels (Mil. & Civ. Forces and Levels) US Gov t for US Domestic/ Int l StratComm & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Breadth of & Priorities StratComm/IO COIN Strategy & Unity Balance of Effort & Force Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan Dev. Ops- & Aid Dev. Ops-Gov t & Aid Dev. Ops- Infrastructure,, Econ Visibility to /Homeland Acceptance of Afghan Methods Western Affiliation Backlash Provide Humanitarian Relief PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 18

19 Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland US Domestic Cost/Benefit & Duration of Knowledge & Underst of Social Avg COIN Experience & Skill Resource Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Forces, Aid Levels) US for Breadth of & US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Balance of Effort & Force Priorities COIN Strategy & Unity COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES COALITION DOMESTIC SUPPORT Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan Dev. Ops- Visibility to Dev. Ops- /Homeland Gov t Acceptance of Afghan Methods Central Training Integration of Mentoring, Local Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov t Overall Processes & Reach, s Policy Quality & Fairness / Contractor Dev.Ops- Favoritism Infrastructure,, Econ. Tax Revenues Policy Quality & / OVERALL Strategic Commun/ IO GOVERNMENT CAPACITY TRIBAL TRIBAL GOVERNANCE Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate & Beliefs Impact Gov t vs Ins Western Affiliation Backlash Ethnic/ Rivalry Provide Humanitarian Relief Quality Gov t vs Ideology & Cultural Erosion/ Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & WOM Amplification Gov t vs Ins Intent & Commitment Average Connectedness of Damages Fear of & Casualties Gov t// Territory Not Under Gov t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Ideology, Path Provision Of Gov t & Targeted by Attacks on Progress/ for Gov t Strength & Intent POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & Fear of Attack/ Infr,, Econ. Policy & / Fairness Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO TO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS Coordination Among Factions Gov t & SF, Havens / Operate POPULAR SUPPORT Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Satisfaction w/ Gains in, & Visible Gains Infrastructure Dev. & Sustainment In, & Expectations for,, & Outside / Enablement of INSURGENTS Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal / /Tolerance Govt vs s Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Path & Material to s w/ s Harshness & Breadth Fraction of And Agric. Legit vs Legit Agric Illegit Basic Needs Service Levels & Legit Other Civilian & (SWET, Non - Agric Healthcare, Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, People Move Capital Mgmt., & Goods SERVICES SERVICES & & Rapidly ECONOMY Spending ECONOMY Recruiting, Advantage Retention, Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion Likelihood of Crime/Violence / for Payment Legit Activity, NARCOTICS Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric, Legit vs. Illegit Opportunity Duration of PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 19

20 Development, Impacts Tactical & Institutional & Damages/ Casualties & Recruiting & Retention ISR / Open Source Ops Unit Leadership & Tactical 1 1 Total Force & focus Unit, Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Ops (Hold) Targeted Strikes Counter Narcotics /Crime Ops Institutional & Training & Mentoring 2 \ Corruption & Favoritism Avg, Skill, Discipline & Morale R.O.L. Policy, & Fairness Feedback Loop Examples: 1. success and informal momentum: professionalism and skill contributes to tactical capacity which enables effective operations. Success and experience feeds back into professionalism, skill and morale which further reinforces both leadership & tactical capacity and recruiting / retention. 2. institutional capacity: Institutional capacity and processes enable manpower, formal training, logistics, planning & budgeting, etc that reinforce informal gains support capacity over time. PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 20

21 Development, Impacts Tactical & Institutional Duration of Knowledge & Underst of Social Avg COIN Experience & Skill Resource Levels (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Strategic Forces, Aid Levels) US for Breadth of US Domestic & Cost/Benefit & US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Balance of Effort & Force Priorities COIN Strategy & Unity COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES COALITION DOMESTIC SUPPORT Recruiting & Retention Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan Dev. Ops- & Damages/ Casualties Visibility to Dev. Ops- /Homeland Gov t Acceptance of Afghan Methods Central Training Integration of Mentoring, Local Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov t Overall Processes & Reach, s Policy Quality & Fairness / Contractor Dev.Ops- Favoritism Infrastructure,, Econ. TACTICAL Tax Revenues Unit Leadership & Tactical Training & Mentoring Policy Quality & ISR / Open Source Ops Favoritism / OVERALL Strategic Commun/ IO GOVERNMENT CAPACITY TRIBAL TRIBAL GOVERNANCE Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate & Beliefs, Avg. Skill, Discipline, & Morale Total Force Focus R.O.L. Policy, & Fairness Impact Gov t vs Ins Western Affiliation Backlash Ethnic/ Rivalry Provide Humanitarian Relief Quality Gov t vs Ideology & Cultural Erosion/ Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Ops (Hold) INSTITUTIONAL Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & WOM Amplification Gov t vs Ins Intent & Commitment Average Connectedness of Damages Fear of & Casualties Gov t// Territory Not Under Gov t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Ideology, Path Provision Of Gov t & Targeted by Attacks on Progress/ for Gov t Strength & Intent POPULATION POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS & Fear of Attack/ Infr,, Econ. Policy & / Fairness Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO TO INSURGENT FACTIONS FACTIONS Coordination Among Factions Gov t & SF, Satisfaction w/ Gains in, & Visible Gains In, & Expectations for,, & Havens / Operate POPULAR SUPPORT Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Infrastructure Dev. & Sustainment Outside / Enablement of INSURGENTS Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal / /Tolerance Govt vs s Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Path & Material to s w/ s Harshness & Breadth Fraction of And Agric. Legit vs Legit Agric Illegit Basic Needs Service Levels & Legit Other Civilian & (SWET, Non - Agric Healthcare, Education) INFRASTRUCTURE, People Move Capital Mgmt., & Goods SERVICES SERVICES & & Rapidly ECONOMY Spending ECONOMY Legit Activity, Counter Narcotics/ Crime Ops Recruiting, Advantage Retention, Criminal/ & ISR Trafficking Capability & Coercion NARCOTICS Likelihood of Crime/Violence / for Payment Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Illegit Agric, Legit vs. Illegit Opportunity Duration of PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 21

22 Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics = Significant Delay / Infrastructure, Economy, & Government Afghanistan Forces s Crime and Narcotics Forces & Actions Physical Environment US Domestic Cost/Benefit & Duration of Knowledge & Underst. of Social Avg COIN Experience & Skill Resource Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Forces, Aid Levels) US for Breadth of & US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Balance of Effort & Force Priorities COIN Strategy & Unity COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES Dev.Ops- Infrastructure,, Econ. Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan Dev. Ops- Visibility to Dev. Ops- /Homeland Gov t Acceptance of Afghan Methods COALITION DOMESTIC SUPPORT Media Sensationalism Bias Transparency of Gov t Processes & s Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring & Damages/ Casualties TACTICAL CENTRAL GOV T Recruiting & Retention Unit Leadership & Tactical Training & Mentoring Policy Quality & Overall Reach, Policy Quality & Fairness / Contractor Favoritism Central Tax Revenues ISR / Open Source Ops Avg. Skill, Discipline, & Morale Favoritism Integration of Local Recognition/ Engagement Integrate to & Beliefs, Total Force Focus R.O.L. Policy, & Fairness / Strategic Commun/ IO Provide Humanitarian Relief Quality Gov t vs Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Impact Gov t vsins Western Affiliation Backlash Ethnic/ Rivalry Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Policing & Ops (Hold) INSTITUTIONAL OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY TRIBAL GOVERNANCE Ideology & Cultural Erosion/ Damages Fear of & Casualties Gov t// Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & WOM Amplification Gov t vs Ins Intent & Commitment Average Connectedness of Territory Not Under Gov t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Ideology, Path by Strength & Intent POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS Fear of Attack/ Expectations for,, & Infr,, Econ. Policy & / Fairness Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Provision Of Gov t & Targeted Attacks on Progress/ for Gov t Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in, & OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS Coordination Among Factions Gov t & SF, Havens / Operate POPULAR SUPPORT Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Infrastructure Dev. Visible Gains & Sustainment In, & Outside / Enablement of INSURGENTS Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal / /Tolerance Gov t vs s Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Path Legit Other & Non-Agric w/ s & Material to s Harshness & Breadth Civilian (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Recruiting, Retention, & ISR Legit Agric INFRASTRUCTURE, Move People Capital Mgmt., SERVICES & Goods & Rapidly & Spending ECONOMY Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Likelihood of Crime/Violence / for Payment IllegitAgric, Basic Needs Service Levels & Legit Activity, Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion Fraction of And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Advantage NARCOTICS Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Legit vs. Illegit Opportunity Duration of WORKING DRAFT V3 PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 22

23 Key Feedback Loop: Securing and Empowering the Recruiting & Retention Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan Dev. Ops- t ng acy Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring alition Opsov t Acceptance of /Homeland visory Afghan Methods Aid sparency Gov t cesses & stments & Damages/ Casualties Visibility to Unit Leadership & Tactical Training & Mentoring 2 Policy Quality & ISR / Open Source Ops 1 Avg. Skill, Discipline, & Morale Favoritism, Total Force Focus R.O.L. Policy, & Fairness Ideology & Policing & Ops (Hold) Quality Gov t vs Cultural Erosion/ Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Damages & Casualties Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Fear of Gov t// Territory Not Under Gov t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Fear is a key mechanism for insurgent factions to prevent the / population from engaging and actively Strategic supporting the Central Commun/ Government. IO Securing populated territory (clear and hold ops) can reduce WOM insurgent ability to target and intimidate the population Amplification such Impact Gov t Gov t vs Ins that Gov t sympathizers Integration of are willing to be vs active Ins supporters. Western! HUMINT: The population Local will be Affiliation more willing to provide intel Backlash if they do not fear insurgent repercussions. Intent & Commitment! ANA & ANP Development: recruiting and development is Overall facilitated by the expansion of secure regions. (ANA and Reach, ANP Policy leaders, Quality families, facilities, etc less likely to be targeted or & Fairness overrun. by Strength & Intent Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Provision Of Gov t & Fear of Attack/ Targeted Attacks on Progress/ for Gov t Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in Coordination Among Factions Gov t & SF, Havens / Operate Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Infrastructure Dev Outside / Enablement of Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal / /Tolerance Gov t vs s Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Path S w Private Workf Skill & PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 23

24 Key Feedback Loop: Government Engagement and Integration of Governance han tion Ops- SF sory id sibility to opulation alition/homeland Acceptance of fghan Methods Training oring, g, and ing Policy Quality & Fairness v't/ ractor ption & avoritism Central Tax Revenues Training & Mentoring Overall Reach, Favoritism Integration of Local Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate & Beliefs R.O.L. Policy, & Fairness Ideology & Provide Humanitarian Relief Impact Gov t vs Ins Western Affiliation Backlash Ethnic/ Rivalry Cultural Erosion/ Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ WOM Amplification Gov t vs Ins Intent & Commitment Average Connectedness of & Pakistan) Critical for the Government to recognize and make the Damages/Use effort to Policy engage existing tribal structures and of Force by Gov t & Governance Quality & if they are to be accepted by the population. Quality Ties to local governance can Gov gain t vs popular support and rapidly expand the Government s overall capacity and / reach which further increases Strategic Commun/ their capacity and ability to engage the population. IO Ideology, Path Provision Of Gov t & Targeted by Attacks on Progress/ for Gov t Strength & Intent Fear of Attack/ Infr,, Econ. Policy & / Fairness Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in, & Expectations for,, & Gov t & SF, Visible Gains In, & Training, Skill & Experience Infrastructure Dev. & Sustainment Move People & Goods Rapidly Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal / /Tolerance Gov t vs s Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Path Legit Other & Non-Agric Capital Mgmt., & Spending & Material to s w/ s Harshness & Breadth Civilian (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Retention, & ISR Legit Agric Likelihood of Crime/Violence / for Payment Basic Needs Service Levels & Legit Activity, Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion N & Illegit A Produc Trad Employ Fraction of And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Legit vs Rela Econo Opport PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 24

25 Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics SECURITY US Domestic Cost/Benefit & Duration of Knowledge & Underst. of Social Avg COIN Experience & Skill Resource Levels (Military Strategic Forces, Commun./IO Civilian Forces, Aid Levels) US for Breadth of & US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Balance of Effort & Force Priorities COIN Strategy & Unity Dev.Ops- Infrastructure,, Econ. Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan Dev. Ops- Gov t Dev. Ops- & Damages/ Casualties Visibility to /Homeland Acceptance of Afghan Methods Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov t Processes & s / Contractor Favoritism Recruiting & Retention Central Policy Quality & Fairness Tax Revenues Overall Reach, Unit Leadership & Tactical Training & Mentoring Policy Quality & ISR / Open Source Ops Avg. Skill, Discipline, & Morale Favoritism Integration of Local Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate & Beliefs Priorities Total Force Focus R.O.L. Policy, & Fairness / Strategic Commun/ IO Ideology & Provide Humanitarian Relief Quality Gov t vs Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Impact Gov t vs Ins Western Affiliation Backlash Ethnic/ Rivalry Policing & Ops (Hold) Cultural Erosion/ Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Damages & Casualties Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & WOM Amplification Gov t vs Ins Intent & Commitment Average Connectedness of Fear of Gov t// Territory Not Under Gov t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Ideology, Path by Strength & Intent Fear of Attack/ Infr.,, Econ. Policy & / Fairness Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Provision Of Gov t & Expectations for,, & Targeted Attacks on Progress/ for Gov t Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in, & Coordination Among Factions Gov t & SF, Visible Gains In, & Havens / Operate Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Infrastructure Dev. & Sustainment Move People & Goods Rapidly Outside / Enablement of Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal / Tolerance Gov t vs s Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Path Legit Other & Non- Agric / Infrastructure, Economy, & Government Afghanistan Forces s Crime and Narcotics Forces & Actions Physical Environment Capital Management, & Spending & Material to s w/ s Harshness & Breadth Civilian (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Recruiting, Retention, & ISR Legit Agric Likelihood of Active for Payment Basic Needs Service Levels & Legit Activity, Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion Illegit Agric, Fraction of And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Advantage Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Legit vs. Illegit Opportunity Duration of WORKING DRAFT PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 26

26 Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics GOVERNANCE US Domestic Cost/Benefit & Duration of Knowledge & Underst. of Social Avg COIN Experience & Skill Resource Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Forces, Aid Levels) US for Breadth of & US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Balance of Effort & Force Priorities COIN Strategy & Unity Dev.Ops- Infrastructure,, Econ. Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan Dev. Ops- Gov t Dev. Ops- & Damages/ Casualties Visibility to /Homeland Acceptance of Afghan Methods Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov t Processes & s / Contractor Favoritism WORKING DRAFT Recruiting & Retention Central Policy Quality & Fairness Tax Revenues Overall Reach, Unit Leadership & Tactical Training & Mentoring Policy Quality & ISR / Open Source Ops Avg. Skill, Discipline, & Morale Favoritism Integration of Local Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate & Beliefs Priorities Total Force Focus R.O.L. Policy, & Fairness / Strategic Commun/ IO Ideology & Provide Humanitarian Relief Quality Gov t vs Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Impact Gov t vs Ins Western Affiliation Backlash Ethnic/ Rivalry Policing & Ops (Hold) Cultural Erosion/ Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Damages & Casualties Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & WOM Amplification Gov t vs Ins Intent & Commitment Average Connectedness of Fear of Gov t// Territory Not Under Gov t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Ideology, Path by Strength & Intent Fear of Attack/ Infr.,, Econ. Policy & / Fairness Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Provision Of Gov t & Expectations for,, & Targeted Attacks on Progress/ for Gov t Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in, & Coordination Among Factions Gov t & SF, Visible Gains In, & Havens / Operate Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Infrastructure Dev. & Sustainment Move People & Goods Rapidly Outside / Enablement of Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal / /Tolerance Gov t vs s Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Path Legit Other & Non-Agric Capital Mgmt., & Spending w/ s Harshness & Breadth Civilian (SWET, Healthcare, Education) / Infrastructure, Economy, & Government Afghanistan Forces s Crime and Narcotics Forces & Actions Physical Environment & Material to s Recruiting, Retention, & ISR Legit Agric Likelihood of Crime/Violence / for Payment Basic Needs Service Levels & Legit Activity, Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion Illegit Agric, Fraction of And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Advantage Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Legit vs. Illegit Opportunity Duration of Reconciliation PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 27

27 Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics DEVELOPMENT US Domestic Cost/Benefit & Duration of Knowledge & Underst. of Social Avg COIN Experience & Skill Resource Levels Strategic (Mil. & Civ. Commun./IO Forces, Aid Levels) US for Breadth of & US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Balance of Effort & Force Priorities COIN Strategy & Unity Dev.Ops- Infrastructure,, Econ. Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan Dev. Ops- Gov t Dev. Ops- Transparency of Gov t Processes & s Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring & Damages/ Casualties Visibility to /Homeland Acceptance of Afghan Methods / Contractor Favoritism Recruiting & Retention Central Policy Quality & Fairness Tax Revenues Overall Reach, Unit Leadership & Tactical Training & Mentoring Policy Quality & ISR / Open Source Ops Avg. Skill, Discipline, & Morale Favoritism Integration of Local Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate & Beliefs Priorities Total Force Focus R.O.L. Policy, & Fairness / Strategic Commun/ IO Ideology & Provide Humanitarian Relief Quality Gov t vs Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Impact Gov t vs Ins Western Affiliation Backlash Ethnic/ Rivalry Policing & Ops (Hold) Cultural Erosion/ Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) Damages & Casualties Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & WOM Amplification Gov t vs Ins Intent & Commitment Average Connectedness of Fear of Gov t// Territory Not Under Gov t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Ideology, Path by Strength & Intent Fear of Attack/ Infr.,, Econ. Policy & / Fairness Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Provision Of Gov t & Expectations for,, & Targeted Attacks on Progress/ for Gov t Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in, & Coordination Among Factions Gov t & SF, Visible Gains In, & Havens / Operate Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Infrastructure Dev. & Sustainment Move People & Goods Rapidly Outside / Enablement of Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal / /Tolerance Gov t vs s Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Path Legit Other & Non-Agric Capital Mgmt., & Spending Civilian (SWET, Healthcare, Education) / Infrastructure, Economy, & Government Afghanistan Forces s Crime and Narcotics Forces & Actions Physical Environment & Material to s w/ s Harshness & Breadth Recruiting, Retention, & ISR Legit Agric Likelihood of Crime/Violence / for Payment Basic Needs Service Levels & Legit Activity, Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion Illegit Agric, Fraction of And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Advantage Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Legit vs. Illegit Opportunity Duration of PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 28 WORKING DRAFT

28 Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics Claim the Information Initiative US Domestic Cost/Benefit & Duration of Knowledge & Underst. of Social Avg COIN Experience & Skill Resource Levels (Military Strategic Forces, Commun./IO Civilian Forces, Aid Levels) US for Breadth of & US Domestic/ Int'l Strategic Commun. & Diplomacy Media Sensationalism Bias Balance of Effort & Force Priorities COIN Strategy & Unity Dev.Ops- Infrastructure,, Econ. Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan Dev. Ops- Gov t Dev. Ops- & Damages/ Casualties Visibility to /Homeland Acceptance of Afghan Methods Training Mentoring, Vetting, and Hiring Transparency of Gov t Processes & s / Contractor Favoritism Recruiting & Retention Central Policy Quality & Fairness Tax Revenues / Infrastructure, Economy, & Government Afghanistan Forces s Crime and Narcotics Forces & Actions Physical Environment Overall Reach, Unit Leadership & Tactical Training & Mentoring Policy Quality & ISR / Open Source Ops Avg. Skill, Discipline, & Morale Favoritism Integration of Local Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate & Beliefs Priorities Total Force Focus R.O.L. Policy, & Fairness / Strategic Commun/ IO Ideology & Provide Humanitarian Relief = Significant Delay Quality Gov t vs Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Impact Gov t vs Ins Western Affiliation Backlash Ethnic/ Rivalry Policing & Ops (Hold) Cultural Erosion/ Targeted Strikes Sweep Ops (Clear) WOM Amplification Gov t vs Ins Intent & Commitment PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 29 Claim the Information Initiative: quality and availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility. availability is constrained by low average connectedness (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM Damages Fear of & Casualties Gov t// Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & Average Connectedness of Ideology, Path by Strength & Intent Fear of Attack/ Infr.,, Econ. Policy & / Fairness Offensives & Presence (Clear & Hold) Provision Of Gov t & Expectations for,, & Targeted Attacks on Progress/ for Gov t Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Satisfaction w/ Gains in, & Coordination Among Factions Gov t & SF, Visible Gains In, & Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Infrastructure Dev. & Sustainment Move People & Goods Rapidly Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Path Legit Other & Non- Agric Capital Management, & Spending w/ s Harshness & Breadth Civilian (SWET, Healthcare, Education) Counter- Narcotics/ Crime Ops tends to amplify negative messages more strongly than positive, but also tends to be biased towards current sentiments. / Outside Western affiliation backlash may undermine Havens / Operate Government messages if they are Enablement seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress of or have taken an overly Western posture Territory Not Under Gov t Control (Afghan & Pakistan) / Tolerance Gov t vs s & Material to s Recruiting, Retention, & ISR Legit Agric Likelihood of Active for Payment Basic Needs Service Levels & Legit Activity, Criminal/ Trafficking Capability & Coercion Illegit Agric, Fraction of And Agric. Legit vs Illegit Advantage Narcotics & Criminal Activity Levels Legit vs. Illegit Opportunity Duration of WORKING DRAFT

29 Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics Claim the Information Initiative h & Morale n Training & Mentoring n s- y Favoritism alition bility to ulation on/homeland ceptance of an Methods Central Policy Quality & ining Integration of ng, Local and g Overall Reach, Policy Quality & Fairness Recognition/ Engagement to tor Integrate on & oritism & Beliefs Tax Revenues R.O.L. Policy, & Fairness / Strategic Commun/ IO Western Affiliation Backlash Ethnic/ Rivalry Provide Humanitarian Relief Quality Gov t vs Impact Gov t vs Ins Ideology & Cultural Erosion/ Strategic Commun/IO & Affiliation w/ Damages/Use of Force by Gov t & WOM Amplification Gov t vs Ins Intent & Commitment Average Connectedness of Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Ideology, Path Provision Of Gov t & Targeted by Attacks on Progress/ for Gov t Strength & Intent Fear of Attack/ Expectations for,, & Infr.,, Econ. Policy & / Fairness Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Gov t & SF, Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal / Tolerance Gov t vs s Attractiveness of Gov t vs. Path Legit Other & Non-Agric Fun Ma Sup Insu Popu Sympa w/ Insu Claim the Information Initiative: quality and availability Satisfaction impact who is relatively more effective in influencing w/ Gains in Infrastructure the population., Government message Dev. quality has been stronger & relative to Visible insurgent Gains factions & Sustainment (who have typically not In, made the effort or been effective & in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility. T Ha & Civilia Servic (SWE Healthc Educat availability is constrained by low average connectedness (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). Move WOM Capital People Management, tends to amplify negative messages more strongly & Goodsthan positive, & but Rapidly Spending also tends to be biased towards current sentiments. Western affiliation backlash may undermine Government messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 30

30 Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics p g cal Ops ty Priorities (Hold) Avg. Skill, Discipline, & Morale Strategic R.O.L. Policy, Commun/IO Favoritism & & Affiliation w/ Fairness ty y & ent Quality Gov t vs p Havens / Operate Coordination Offensives & Among Territory Not Presence Factions Under Gov t (Clear & Hold) Control (Afghan & Pakistan) Provision Of Gov t & Targeted by Attacks on Progress/ Damages/Use for Gov t of Force by Gov t & Strength & Intent Leadership, Training, Skill & Experience Outsid Suppor Enablem of, Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal / Tolerance Gov t vs s tegration of ocal ecognition/ gagement to Integrate tructures& Beliefs / Strategic Commun/ IO Western Affiliation Backlash Impact Gov t vs Ins : is a function of day to day conditions and also perception of who will win over longer term:! Actual damages by both the s and / forces impact perceived security.! s rely targeted attacks on progress to generate fear and intimidation to limit sympathizers moving towards active supporters. They often threaten or target civilian and security force individuals who are visibly supporting the government the fear this generates is powerful in slowing or reversing positive momentum. Ideology & Cultural Erosion/! In addition to near term security concerns, the population Ethnic/ is assessing who will win over the long term by comparing Rivalry perception of strength to perception of Government strength and also considering perceived commitment. (A key input to perceived strength is how much of the population lives in region secured by the Government.) They will hesitate to actively support the government if they feel they will fail, particularly if they have been witness to clear and leave operations. Gov t & SF WOM Fear of Attack/ Amplification Gov t vs Ins Intent & Commitment Perception Of Gov t Strength & Intent Ideology, Path Average Connectedness of I f S i E Satisfaction w/ Gains in, & Expectations for,, & Visible Gains In, & Attractivenes of Gov t vs. Pa Priv W Infrastructure Ski Dev. & Sustainment Legit Other & Non-Agric Private Se Move Capita People Managem Investme PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 31