Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts. Environmental Participation and Environmental Motivation

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1 CREMA Center for Research n Economcs, Management and the Arts Envronmental Partcpaton and Envronmental Motvaton Benno Torgler María A.García-Valñas Alson Macntyre Workng Paper No CREMA Gellertstrasse 18 CH Basel

2 Envronmental Partcpaton and Envronmental Motvaton Benno Torgler a,b,d, María A.García-Valñas c and Alson Macntyre a a The School of Economcs and Fnance, Queensland Unversty of Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brsbane, QLD 4001, Australa b CREMA Center for Research n Economcs, Management and the Arts, Gellertstrasse 18, CH-4052 Basel, Swtzerland c Department of Economcs. Unversty of Ovedo, Avda. del Crsto s/n. Ovedo, (Span) d CESfo, Poschngerstrasse 5, D Munch, Germany Abstract: We explore whether envronmental motvaton affects envronmental behavor by focusng on volunteerng. The paper frst ntroduces a theoretcal model of volunteerng n envronmental organzatons. In a next step, t tests the hypothess workng a large mcro data set coverng 32 countres from both Western and Eastern Europe usng several dfferent proxes to measure envronmental motvaton. As a robustness test we also explore the relatonshp at the macro level extendng the number of countres nvestgated. Our results ndcate a strong postve relatonshp between envronmental motvaton and ndvduals voluntary engagement n envronmental organzatons. JEL classfcaton: D11, H41, H26, H73, D64 Keywords: envronmental partcpaton, envronmental motvaton, envronmental morale, proenvronmental atttudes, socal captal. Correspondng author (benno.torgler@qut.edu.au). For helpful comments and suggestons thanks are due to Markus Schaffner and Ark Levnson. 1

3 I. INTRODUCTION Why s t that a growng number of studes are devoted to examnng ndvdual envronmental preferences, proposng that ndvduals envronmental morale or atttudes could help to reduce envronmental degradaton or the problems of free rdng assocated wth publc goods (see, for example Frey and Stutzer, 2006)? One motvaton for such a suggeston s that control and deterrence models predct a far lower level of complance than that actually observed. In many countres, the level of government control s too low to explan the hgh degree of envronmental complance. However, there are few studes explorng emprcally whether such proenvronmental atttudes exert a postve effect on ether envronmental behavor or nvolvement n envronmental organzatons. The presence of such norms or envronmental motvaton nfluencng the wllngness to protect the envronment s especally useful n stuatons where t s extraordnarly expensve to arrange a regulatory enforcement regme. A desrable and postve sde effect of voluntary complance s that t lowers the cost of government operatons amed at ensurng publc good provson (Slemrod 2002). We focus on the ndvduals partcpaton n envronmental organzatons because t s a cooperatve behavor that can mprove socal captal, especally the network component 1. Recent studes n the area of ecologcal economcs have shown that socal captal ndeed nfluences transacton costs and can also have some bearng on the 1 See Grootaert and van Bastalaer (2002, p.41-66) 2

4 effectveness of publc envronmental polces (see Torgler and Garca-Valñas, 2007). These results suggest that envronmental conflcts can be resolved by makng collectve choces that are mplemented by establshng, changng or reaffrmng governance nsttutons (Paavola and Adger, 2005, p. 364). The adaptve capablty of socetes s strongly lnked to ther ablty to act collectvely (Adger, 2003), thus the exstence of socal captal s mportant when dealng wth new envronmental scenaros, such as the threat of clmate change, or for copng wth the mpact of envronmental dsasters, such as droughts or floods. Katz (2000) showed that socal captal s related to the ablty to address several market falures regardng common property natural resources. The strength of ths paper les n explorng the mpact of envronmental motvaton on envronmental behavor. We focus on ndvduals voluntary engagement n envronmental organzatons and test ts mpact wth the use of both a large mcro data set coverng 32 European countres and a macro data set that also works wth a large set of 52 countres. Such breadth and depth of data allows exploraton of the dfferent channels through whch ndvduals express ther envronmental motvaton va proenvronmental atttudes, and we captalze on ths opportunty by explorng two varables that measure voluntary envronmental partcpaton (.e. membershp and voluntary work). The outlne of the paper s as follows. Secton 2 of the paper frst dscusses the theoretcal background and proposes a model of volunteerng. Secton 3 ntroduces the data set and the key varables. The emprcal fndngs are presented n Secton 4 and some concludng remarks are offered n Secton 5. 3

5 II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS What s the meanng of pro-envronmental behavor? Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) defne t as actons taken by an ndvdual n conscously seekng to mnmze the negatve mpact of human actvtes on the envronment and Jensen (2002) refers to those personal actons that are drectly related to envronmental mprovements. Some daly actvtes, such as mnmzng resource and energy consumpton, reducng and recyclng waste, or usng publc transport are prvate actons whch contrbute to the preservaton of nature. In the same way, partcpaton n envronmental organzatons can be seen as a knd of pro-envronmental behavor and s hghly relevant n ensurng the effcacy of envronmental polces whch requre behavoral changes. As Handy (2001, p.648) ponted out, much of the ntal mpetus towards change for protectng envronmental qualty came from concerned ndvduals who have often come together and formed voluntary non-proft assocatons to collectvely address envronmental concerns. Ther persstent lobbyng and advocatng for envronmental protecton has changed publc sentment, thereby convncng government and busnesses to pay attenton to ther demands. ( ) Nevertheless, many envronmental nonproft organsatons contnue to play an mportant role n advocatng a better envronmental qualty. Cvl engagement n voluntary organzatons s ganng ncreased attenton from researchers; nonetheless the causes of envronmental partcpaton are stll relatvely unknown. The beneft of partcpaton n voluntary actvtes s the creaton of socal output that would per se requre pad resources (Freeman, 1997). Pretty and Ward (2001) 4

6 showed that the creaton of actve pro-envronmental groups was sgnfcant for solvng certan local envronmental problems 2. Our study wll not only explore the gender, age and parental effect, but wll also show who s lkely to partcpate and whose prortes and values are best promoted by voluntary work n envronmental organzatons. However, to date only a few studes have analyzed the factors mpactng on the partcpaton n envronmental organzatons (Moha, 1992; Thompson and Barton, 1994; Martnez and McMulln, 2004). The advantage of focusng on drect partcpaton n envronmental organzatons s that ndvduals behavor can be measured. Moreover, t bulds a brdge between the socal captal lterature that focuses on volunteerng and the envronmental lterature on pro-envronmental preferences. The relevance of lookng beyond the neoclasscal approach n understandng seemngly non-ratonal behavor s demonstrated n the tax complance lterature and the analyses of tax payng behavor. In seekng to explan the reasons why ctzens comply wth tax regulatons gven that the probablty of beng audted s extremely low, t s clear that deterrence mechansms alone cannot explan the level of observed complance n ths regard (Torgler 2007). Smlarly, the level of formal deterrence s too low to explan why, for example, people do not ltter more often. Invokng the power of socal norms helps to resolve such a puzzle, but further emprcal evdence s requred to determne whether envronmental atttudes affect envronmental actons. We note that prevous lterature has shown how values and atttudes can affect ndvdual behavor n more general sense (Ajzen and Fshben, 1980; Lews, 1982). Thus, t s useful to explore whether the decson to partcpate n envronmental organzatons s drven by a 2 Those authors analyzed some envronmental organzatons n rural communtes. They found an evoluton from reactve-dependence groups (statc and created exclusvely n reacton to a threat or a crss), towards awareness-nterdependence groups (more dynamc and nteractve). 5

7 set of atttudes and norms. Our theoretcal model s strongly nfluenced by prevous studes on altrusm (Andreon, 1990) and moral motvaton 3 n a publc good envronment (Brekke et al. 2003). When consdered from an economc perspectve, envronmental partcpaton exemplfes an ndvdual s voluntary effort to provde an envronmental publc good (Clark et al. 2003, p. 238). An economc analyss also prompts the queston: why do people take actons (ncurrng prvate costs) that result n collectve benefts? Whle the tradtonal theoretcal models predct a free-rder effect n the prvate provson of publc goods, n practce we fnd clear evdence to the contrary (Andreon, 1988; Plavn and Charng, 1990). Andreon (1990, p. 465) developed an mportant model of mpure altrusm as a means of understandng donatons to publc goods. He assumes an economy wth only one prvate good and one publc good. The ndvdual utlty donaton functon depends on the consumpton of a prvate good (x ), the total amount of a publc good (G), and the ndvdual s gft to the publc good (g ). Thus, U = U(x, G, g ). Ths allows the author to dfferentate two cases, namely a purely altrustc stuaton U(x, G ) when the ndvdual cares nothng for the prvate gft, and U(x, g ) when the ndvdual s motvated to gve only by a warm-glow outcome (purely egostc). The cases n between are defned as an mpurely altrustc behavor. However, he acknowledges that there are mportant alternatve approaches to such an mpure altrusm model, namely moral or 3 The lterature has dentfed a free-rde effect, n order to explan why people do not partcpate actvely n voluntary organzatons. Thus, f an ndvdual perceves that he/she can beneft from any successful outcome of collectve acton, whether or not they contrbuted to acheve t, then he/she can decde not to contrbute actvely at all. Accordng to Lubell et al. (2006, p. 150), when collectve acton s analyzed, s necessary to ncorporate the logc of free rdng by acknowledgng that the contrbuton of a sngle ndvdual only rases the probablty of successfully provdng a publc good by small amount. From ths perspectve, how ndvduals perceve ther own personal nfluence on collectve outcomes s the crtcal value. So, the free-rder effect s a sgnfcant and addtonal argument that clarfes why people can fal to partcpate actvely n envronmental groups. 6

8 group-nterested behavor. In lne wth ths suggeston, Brekke et al. (2003) mplement moral motvaton n ther model by workng wth a socal welfare functon to determne the morally deal effort, where ndvduals share a utltaran moral phlosophy. For smplcty, they assume that the labor supply and the ncome are exogenously fxed. In a next step, ndvduals maxmze ther utlty n a beneft-cost envronment, tradng the benefts of mantanng a self-mage as socally responsble ndvduals aganst the costs. The desre to mprove self-mage nduces an mproved effort towards upholdng belefs that are perceved to be morally rght. Keepng n mnd the theoretcal work outlned above, we examne the motvaton for envronmental partcpaton by developng a model of volunteerng. We assume that ndvdual s utlty functon s gven by U = U x, l, G, λ ) (1) ( where x s ndvdual s consumpton of prvate goods, l represents lesure, G s the publc good of ncreasng envronmental qualty, and λ the utlty from partcpatng voluntarly n an envronmental organzaton. Voluntary work s tme consumng and subject to opportunty costs. Thus, v represents the hours spent for voluntary work n an envronmental organzaton. Indvduals consumpton can therefore be wrtten as an ncome constrant, defned by the product of the wage rate w and the workng hours T - l - v 0, where T s the tme constrant (avalable tme): 7

9 x = w T l v ) (2) ( The total amount of publc good (envronmental qualty) depends on the publc provson G p and prvate provson g, assumng dentcal ndvduals N: G = G p + g (3) where g = α v (4) s ndvdual s producton functon that depends on the level of voluntary partcpaton n an envronmental organzaton and an effcency parameterα. Snce we have dentcal ndvduals g s equal to Ng. Therefore, we can wrte: G = G + Nα (5) p v The utlty from partcpatng n a voluntary envronmental organzaton ( λ ) has the followng form: 8

10 2 λ = m v m v ) (6) ( where m s a factor that measures an ndvdual s motvaton to contrbute to the envronment ( m 0). It measures what the ndvdual beleves to be the morally deal envronmental nvolvement. Thus, partcpatng n voluntary organzatons s correlated wth ndvduals motvaton towards contrbuton and ths enhances an ndvdual s utlty functon (see frst term). On the other hand, f the partcpaton n voluntary organzatons s l-ower than the morally deal envronmental nvolvement ( v < m ), ndvduals also experence moral or psychc costs (see second term). Ths nduces a feelng of gult and shame. We also assume that the utlty functon s addtvely separable n x, l, G, and λ. The utlty functon thus becomes: U = x + l + G + λ (7) Consderng (2) to (6) leads to the followng utlty functon: U 2 = w ( T l v ) + l + ( G p + Nα v ) + mv ( m v ) (8) 9

11 An ndvdual maxmzes utlty (8) subject to her voluntary nvolvement n an envronmental organzaton ( v ). Settng the frst order condton leads to the followng condton for the optmal effort engagement: U ' U = v equal to 0 v = w + Nα + 2 3m (9) Eq. (9) suggests that envronmental partcpaton wll ncrease wth an ncrease n ndvdual s motvaton to contrbute. Thus, we can develop the followng man hypothess: Hypothess 1: A hgher level of envronmental motvaton due to hgher envronmental moral standards leads to a stronger voluntary nvolvement n envronmental organzatons. Moreover, Eq. (9) also ndcates that an ncrease n the wage rate changes the allocaton of tme. An ncrease leads to a declne of voluntary work n envronmental organzatons. However, such a negatve effect s reduced wth a hgher level of effcency n the contrbuton of the prvate provson of the publc good, α multpled by the number of ndvduals n the socety. It should be noted that we have mplemented a consumer model. One may argue that ndvduals are also volunteerng to accumulate human captal wth the ntenton of ncreasng future ncome through the acquston of certan types of sklls and through creatng and developng networks that enhance ther human captal 10

12 (Hackl et al., 2007). Ths would requre the use of an nvestment model wth a dynamc structure. However, we beleve that our consumer model s useful and approprate when explorng moral values. III. DATA We use two varables that measure nvolvement n a voluntary envronmental organzaton, namely membershp and dong unpad work: Please look carefully at the followng lst of voluntary organzatons and actvtes and say whch, f any, are you currently dong unpad voluntary work for: conservaton, the envronment, ecology, anmal rghts (1=yes, 0 otherwse). Please look carefully at the followng lst of voluntary organzatons and actvtes and say whch, f any, do you belong: conservaton, the envronment, ecology, anmal rghts (1=mentoned, 0= not mentoned). To ensure the robustness of results, we use several dependent varables that can be seen as a proxy m, namely the motvaton to contrbute to the envronment. The frst two varables measure m n the followng way: I would gve part of my ncome f I were certan that the money would be used to prevent envronmental polluton (0=strongly dsagree, 3=strongly agree) 11

13 I would agree to an ncrease n taxes f the extra money were used to prevent envronmental polluton (0=strongly dsagree, 3=strongly agree) Although we are not conductng a contngent valuaton study (CV), these two questons offer the chance to explore our parameter m. However, the queston s not free of problems and can be crtczed n several ways. The statement s relatvely vague: envronmental polluton s not clearly specfed, and nether s the level of mprovement. Smlarly, the proporton of ncome to be spent and the degree of tax ncrease are not clarfed. Therefore the respondents are not aware of how much they would hypothetcally have to contrbute 4. The consequences of taxaton are not mentoned and no nformaton s provded regardng the extent to whch ncome tax, value added tax or other taxes are supposed to ncrease. Thus, t s not clear who wll bear the hghest tax burden. Such unspecfed questons regardng the payment schemes wll ncrease the varance n responses, but on the other hand, may nfluence the wllngness to contrbute (Wtzke and Urfe, 2001). Nevertheless, despte these possble shortcomngs, an unspecfed statement stll helps to measure moral values and to reduce strategc behavor va nfluencng the quantty or qualty of envronmental goods. Provdng a more concrete scenaro could encourage respondents to ntentonally ndcate a false wllngness to contrbute to ensure that the outcome of the study matches ther own preferences (Hdano et al., 2005). When nether specfc goods nor quanttatve values are used, the attrbutes of the envronmental goods n queston do not have to be 4 It has been shown that the preferences to protect the envronment (regardng causes and consequences of envronmental damages) depend on the level of nformaton ncluded n the questonnare (Bulte et al., 2005). 12

14 thoroughly explaned to ensure that respondents understand the proposton and respond wth the approprate wllngness to sacrfce ncome and accept an ncrease n taxes 5. In a next step we wll explore a varable that measures envronmental atttudes, but takes nto account the possblty that people may have an ncentve to free-rde (proft wthout ncurrng costs). We would predct that such a varable would lead to contradctory results (compared to the prevous two varables): The Government has to reduce envronmental polluton but t should not cost me any money (0=strongly dsagree, 3=strongly agree) Our multvarate analyss ncludes a vector of control varables, whch are explaned n the Appendx. Prevous research n envronmental economcs and socal norms demonstrates the relevance of consderng such soco-demographc factors, formal and nformal educaton and partcpaton n an envronmental organzaton (see Torgler and Garca-Valñas, 2007; Torgler, 2007). We also dfferentate between the two regons of Europe (.e. Western and Eastern Europe) to account for effects of the reform process n the transton countres. The rapd collapse of nsttutonal structures n Eastern European countres produced a vacuum n many, f not all, of these countres. Ths led to large socal costs, especally n terms of worsenng ncome nequaltes, ncreasng poverty and poor nsttutonal condtons resultng from uncertanty and hgh transacton costs. Torgler (2003) and Alm et al. (2006) show that such crcumstances have an mpact on socal norms. 5 For a detaled dscusson regardng possble survey bases see Carson and Mtchell (1995). 13

15 IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS The followng mcro level analyss uses data provded by the European Values Survey (EVS) 1999/2000, whch s a European-wde nvestgaton of soco-cultural and poltcal change. The survey collects data on the basc values and belefs of people throughout Europe. The EVS was frst carred out from 1981 to 1983, then n 1990 to 1991 and agan n 1999 through 2001, wth an ncreasng number of countres partcpatng over tme. The methodologcal approach s explaned n detal n the European Values Survey (1999) source book, whch provdes nformaton on response rates, the stages of samplng procedures, the translaton of the questonnare, and feld work, along wth measures of codng consstency, relablty of data, and data checks. All country surveys are conducted by experenced professonal survey organzatons, wth the excepton of Greece. Intervews are face-to-face and those ntervewed are adult ctzens aged 18 years and older. Tlburg Unversty coordnates the project and provdes the gudelnes to guarantee the use of standardzed nformaton n the surveys and the natonal representatveness of the data. To avod framng bases, the questons are asked n a prescrbed order. The response rates vary from country to country wth an average response rate of around 60 percent. Because EVS poses an dentcal set of questons to ndvduals n varous European countres, the survey provdes a unque opportunty to emprcally examne our hypotheses. We are able to employ a large data set consderng 32 representatve natonal samples. EVS has been desgned as a wde-rangng survey, thereby reducng the danger of framng effects when compared wth many other surveys that focus entrely on 14

16 envronmental questons. A further advantage of usng ths extensve data set s the ablty to explore a large number of dependent varables. In the macro analyss we not only explore the EVS but also the World Values Survey (WVS) usng the same wave. EVS can be seen as a subpart of the WVS, although one should note that the questons are not always fully dentcal. For example, n the emprcal mcro analyss we are also gong to use.data that has not been collected n the WVS. Economsts are ncreasngly usng survey data n areas of research such as those dealng wth socal captal, corrupton, happness and tax complance. These lteratures explore the causes of atttudes (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Brewer and Steenbergen, 2002; Uslaner, 2004; Brewer et al., 2004; and Chang and Chu, 2006 and Torgler, 2008). In general, a probt estmaton s approprate when workng wth nformaton such as our two dependent varables that measure partcpaton n envronmental organzatons. We calculate the margnal effects to measure the quanttatve effect of a varable, because the equaton s nonlnear. Margnal effects ndcate the change n the probablty of ndvduals havng a specfc level of envronmental preferences when the ndependent varable ncreases by one unt. Weghted estmates are conducted to ensure that the samples correspond to the natonal dstrbuton. 6 Furthermore, answers such as don t know are elmnated n all estmatons, as are any mssng values. Table 1 presents the fndngs regardng membershp n an envronmental organzaton. In the frst three specfcatons we explore our key envronmental motvaton varables m separately and the fourth ncludes all the three varables n the 6 The weghtng varable s provded by the EVS. 15

17 specfcaton. The results from the frst three specfcatons ndcate that all the m proxes are statstcally sgnfcant. The frst two have a postve mpact, and the thrd has a negatve mpact. Thus, hypothess 1 cannot be rejected. A hgher level of envronmental motvaton due to hgher moral standards nduces voluntary nvolvement n envronmental organzatons. The negatve coeffcent n specfcaton (3) s consstent wth our predcton as t measures ndvduals nterest n free-rdng. A hgher wllngness to free-rde s negatvely correlated wth envronmental engagement. The varable WILLINGESS TO GIVE INCOME has the strongest effect. An ncrease n the scale by one unt rases the probablty of partcpatng n an envronmental organzaton by 2.5 percentage ponts. The mportance of ths varable s also vsble once you nclude all three varables n the regresson. The coeffcent s stll statstcally sgnfcant at the 1% level wth a margnal effect of 1.9 percentage ponts. On the other hand, the coeffcent for the varable WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES s only statstcally sgnfcant at the 10% level, and also shows a decrease n the margnal effects. Overall, these frst results ndcate that envronmental motvaton matters. Lookng at the control varables we can see that women are more lkely to be members of envronmental organzatons. Age s also postvely correlated wth beng a member. Overall, the age group AGE shows the strongest level of envronmental partcpaton (largest margnal effects). Havng a chld s negatvely correlated wth envronmental partcpaton, possbly because tme restrctons may act as a barrer to beng nvolved n envronmental organzatons. Educaton and poltcal nterest, measured as poltcal dscusson, have a postve mpact on the probablty of beng a member n an envronmental organzaton. The tme restrcton argument may also be nvoked when 16

18 focusng on the martal status. Those who have never before been marred, and those who are separated exhbt the hghest probablty of partcpatng n envronmental organzatons. Moreover, when takng employment status nto account, we observe that part tme employees are more lkely to be members. There s also the tendency for selfemployed ndvduals to be more actve n envronmental organzatons, probably because of the opportunty to mprove ther networks. On the other hand, the tme restrcton argument fals when t comes to the unemployed and retred, as they are less lkely to be members than are full-tme employees. Fnally, we also observe that people n Western Europe are more lkely to engage wth envronmental organzatons through membershp. The margnal effects are qute large (more than 4 percentage ponts). In Table 2 we explore a second aspect, namely dong unpad work for envronmental organzatons. The results are qute smlar. All the proxes for m n specfcaton (5) to (7) are statstcally sgnfcant. The strongest effects are agan observable for the varable WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME. However, t should be noted that compared to Table 1 we fnd lower quanttatve effects. Specfcaton (8) also shows that the coeffcent for the varable CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS s no longer statstcally sgnfcant. Lookng at the control varables we fnd that contrary to the results on membershp, there s now a negatve correlaton between envronmental partcpaton and beng a woman. Thus, women are more lkely to be a member n an envronmental organzaton, but are less lkely to do unpad work. However, t can be argued that women mght be more actve n communty-based and neghborhood organzatons whch address local envronmental ssues, whle men are more lkely to partcpate n formal 17

19 envronmental organzatons. Our survey queston captures more of the latter than the former for ths reason, our results may not actually conflct wth fndngs to the contrary. Moreover, t should be noted that women (partcularly younger women) would face other restrctons on ther ablty to partcpate n voluntary organzatons, as they are often more heavly nvolved n tme ntensve household actvtes. The age effect s now less vsble, but we stll observe that the AGE group has the strongest probablty of dong unpad work and that both educaton and poltcal nterest have a sgnfcant and postve mpact on envronmental engagement. Moreover, we also observe that the never marred ndvduals are the most actve n envronmental organzatons. On the other hand, the parental effect s now less obvous and t appears that only retred people are sgnfcantly less wllng than the full tme-employed ndvduals to be actve n envronmental organzatons through unpad work. Fnally we agan observe that Western European ctzens are more lkely to be envronmentally engaged. However, the effect s not as strong as for membershp and the coeffcent s no longer statstcally sgnfcant n all specfcatons. In the next two tables we extend the prevous regresson by ncludng ndvduals economc stuaton wth two dummy varables. It should be noted that the number of observatons n Table 3 and 4 strongly decreased after controllng for ndvduals economc stuaton. The results ndcate that a hgher level of economc status leads to a hgher probablty of beng a member and dong unpad work n envronmental organzatons. It seems that wealther ctzens have a hgher demand for a clean envronment and less envronmental damages and thus a stronger ncentve to actvely contrbute to the envronment by partcpatng n a voluntary organzaton. Thus, such a 18

20 result s not consstent wth our Eq. (9). However, t should be noted that the economc stuaton varable may not only cover the current wage but also the accumulated wealth over tme. Nevertheless, we observe that the results obtaned prevously reman robust. Table 5 explores the potental endogenety problems. One can argue that beng nvolved n an envronmental organzaton enhances pro-socal envronmental atttudes. To control for such a problem, we wll use an nstrumental approach to check the robustness of the results. A sutable nstrument must be contemporaneously uncorrelated wth the error term but must be hghly correlated wth membershp n a voluntary envronmental organzaton. Our nstrument (an ndex of perceved level of socal noncomplance wth well-known socal rules 7 ) satsfes these condtons. For smplcty, we only report the results on membershp nvolvement n Table 5. In prevous studes we have seen that the perceved level of complance affects ndvduals ntrnsc motvaton to contrbute and cooperate (Frey and Torgler 2008, Torgler, Frey and Wlson 2008, Dong, Dulleck and Torgler 2008). The extent to whch others comply wth socal rules systematcally nfluences the ndvdual wllngness and motvaton to contrbute. Addtonally, Owen and Vderas (2006) found a postve and sgnfcant relatonshp between cvc cooperaton and/or allowng free-rde behavors and envronmental atttudes and ntentons. They concluded that cvc cooperaton was a key factor to mprovng pro-envronmental atttudes, especally n low ncome countres. 7 Aggregated ndex of the followng questons: Accordng to you, how many of your compatrots do the followng: Clamng state benefts to whch they are not enttled; Drvng under the nfluence of alcohol; Speedng over the lmt n bult-up areas (each scale from 4=almost all to 1=almost none). 19

21 The table reports the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) estmatons together wth the frst stage regressons. The results ndcate that atttudes have a strong and sgnfcant mpact on envronmental nvolvement. In addton, Table 5 also shows that the nstruments and the F-tests for the nstrument excluson set n the frst-stage regresson are statstcally sgnfcant. There s a negatve correlaton between our envronmental motvaton varables and the perceved level of dshonest behavor. We also report the Anderson canoncal correlatons LR test for the relevance of the nstruments, checkng the relevance of the excluded nstruments. A rejecton of the null hypothess ndcates that the model s dentfed and that the nstruments are relevant (see Hall et al., 1996). Moreover, we show results of the Anderson-Rubn test ndcatng that the endogenous varables are jontly statstcally sgnfcant. Table 5 reports that n all cases the Anderson canoncal correlatons LR test shows rejecton of the null hypothess, whch ndcates that the models are dentfed and that the nstruments are relevant. The Anderson-Rubn test s also statstcally sgnfcant and has the advantage of beng robust to the presence of weak nstruments. Fnally, we test n Table 6 and 7 whether the mpact of envronmental motvaton on envronmental nvolvement s drven by a subset of countres and present the results for the coeffcents for envronmental atttudes n both tables usng the specfcatons n the frst two tables (wthout controllng for the economc stuaton). Each table s a summary of 96 regressons conducted wthn 32 countres. Table 6 focuses on membershp partcpaton, whle Table 7 explores unpad work as a dependent varable. In general we observe dfferences between the countres. Table 6 shows that the coeffcent of the varable WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME s statstcally sgnfcant 20

22 n 25 out of 32 cases, and the strongest effect s observed for the Netherlands. An ncrease n the WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME by one unt ncreases the probablty of beng a member n an envronmental organzaton by almost 10 percentage ponts. A strong quanttatve effect s also observed n Austra, Belgum, Denmark and Greece, however the effects are generally lower among Eastern European countres. We fnd a smlar result for the varable WILLIGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES. The coeffcent s statstcally sgnfcant n 24 out 32 cases. The strongest effect can also be found n the Netherlands (9.1 percentage ponts), followed by Denmark (4.4 percentage ponts) and Greece (3.4 percentage ponts). The results are less strong when focusng on wllngness to free-rde. However, here we also observe the strongest negatve mpact for the Netherlands (8.9 percentage ponts), followed by Denmark (4.2 percentage ponts) and Belgum (4.2 percentage ponts). Lookng at Table 7 and therefore at unpad work we fnd that the relatonshp s less strong when usng unpad work nstead of membershp partcpaton as a dependent varable. Thus, envronmental motvaton helps to substantally ncrease the number of membershps, but s less strong when ndvduals are requred to do unpad work for envronmental organzatons. The coeffcent for the varable WILLIGNESS TO GIVE INCOME s now only statstcally sgnfcant n 18 out 32 regressons. The quanttatve effects are also substantally smaller. Greece reports the strongest effect wth a margnal effect of 3.5 percentage ponts. Moreover, t should be noted that the same pcture can be found for the other two motvatonal questons. 21

23 Table 1: Determnants of Beng A Member n Envronmental Organzatons WEIGHTED PROBIT (1) (2) (3) (4) Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Envronmental Motvaton (m) WILLINGNESS TO GIVE 0.313*** *** INCOME WILLINGNESS TO 0.223*** * INCREASE TAXES CONTRIBUTE AT NO *** *** COSTS Gender FEMALE 0.054** ** ** ** Age AGE AGE ** * ** ** AGE *** *** *** *** AGE *** *** *** *** AGE *** *** *** *** Parental Effect CHILD * ** ** * Formal and Informal Educ. EDUCATION 0.025*** *** *** *** POLITICAL DISCUSSION 0.142*** *** *** *** Martal Status WIDOWED * *** ** ** DIVORCED SEPARATED NEVER MARRIED 0.123*** *** *** *** Employment Status PART TIME EMPLOYEE 0.141*** *** *** *** SELFEMPLOYED * * UNEMPLOYED ** **

24 AT HOME ** ** * * STUDENT RETIRED *** *** *** *** OTHER * * Regon WESTERN EUROPE 0.595*** *** *** Pseudo R Number of observatons Prob > ch Notes: The reference group conssts of MAN, AGE<30, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statstcal sgnfcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectvely. Robust standard errors. 23

25 Table 2: Determnants of Unpad Work n Envronmental Organzatons WEIGHTED PROBIT (5) (6) (7) (8) Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Envronmental Motvaton (m) WILLINGNESS TO 0.233*** *** GIVE INCOME WILLINGNESS TO 0.162*** * INCREASE TAXES CONTRIBUTE AT NO *** COSTS Gender FEMALE *** ** ** ** Age AGE AGE AGE * ** ** * AGE AGE Parental Effect CHILD Formal and Informal Educ. EDUCATION 0.019*** *** *** *** POLITICAL 0.110*** *** *** *** DISCUSSION Martal Status WIDOWED DIVORCED SEPARATED NEVER MARRIED 0.139*** *** *** ***

26 Employment Status PART TIME EMPLOYEE SELFEMPLOYED UNEMPLOYED AT HOME ** * * ** STUDENT * RETIRED *** *** *** *** OTHER Regon WESTERN EUROPE 0.092*** ** * Pseudo R Number of observatons Prob > ch Notes: The reference group conssts of MAN, AGE<30, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statstcal sgnfcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectvely. Robust standard errors. 25

27 Table 3: Income and Membershp n Envronmental Organzatons WEIGHTED PROBIT (9) (10) (11) (12) Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Envronmental Motvaton (m) WILLINGNESS TO 0.295*** *** GIVE INCOME WILLINGNESS TO 0.196*** INCREASE TAXES CONTRIBUTE AT NO *** *** COSTS Gender FEMALE 0.083** ** ** ** Age AGE AGE AGE * * ** * AGE AGE Parental Effect CHILD Formal and Informal Educ. EDUCATION 0.026*** *** *** *** POLITICAL 0.147*** *** *** *** DISCUSSION Economc Stuaton UPPER CLASS 0.142*** *** *** ** MIDDLE CLASS 0.087** ** * * Martal Status WIDOWED DIVORCED

28 SEPARATED NEVER MARRIED Employment Status PART TIME EMPLOYEE SELFEMPLOYED UNEMPLOYED AT HOME ** ** ** ** STUDENT RETIRED OTHER Regon WESTERN EUROPE 0.355*** *** *** *** Pseudo R Number of observatons Prob > ch Notes: The reference group conssts of MAN, AGE<30, LOWEST CLASS, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statstcal sgnfcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectvely. Robust standard errors. 27

29 Table 4: Income and Unpad Work n Envronmental Organzatons WEIGHTED PROBIT (13) (14) (15) (16) Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Coeff. z-stat. Marg. Envronmental Motvaton (m) WILLINGNESS TO 0.231*** *** GIVE INCOME WILLINGNESS TO 0.153*** INCREASE TAXES CONTRIBUTE AT NO *** *** COSTS Gender FEMALE *** *** *** *** Age AGE AGE AGE AGE AGE Parental Effect CHILD Formal and Informal Educ. EDUCATION 0.022*** *** *** *** POLITICAL 0.064* * DISCUSSION Economc Stuaton UPPER CLASS 0.237*** *** *** *** MIDDLE CLASS 0.153*** *** *** *** Martal Status WIDOWED

30 DIVORCED SEPARATED NEVER MARRIED Employment Status PART TIME EMPLOYEE SELFEMPLOYED UNEMPLOYED AT HOME STUDENT RETIRED * * * * OTHER Regon WESTERN EUROPE 0.119** * ** Pseudo R Number of observatons Prob > ch Notes: The reference group conssts of MAN, AGE<30, LOWEST CLASS, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statstcal sgnfcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectvely. Robust standard errors. 29

31 Table 5: 2SLS Focusng on Envronmental Membershp WEIGHTED 2SLS 2SLS (17) FIRST STAGE REGRESSION 2SLS (18) FIRST STAGE REGRESSION 2SLS (19) FIRST STAGE REGRESSION Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. t-stat. Coeff. Envronmental Motvaton (m) WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME 0.353*** 3.61 WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES 0.232*** 4.65 CONTRIBUTE AT NO *** COSTS Gender FEMALE ** *** *** ** Age AGE * ** ** 2.17 AGE *** *** ** ** AGE *** *** *** *** ** 2.42 AGE *** ** *** *** *** 4.34 AGE *** *** *** * *** *** 3.34 Parental Effect CHILD * *** ** Formal and Informal Educ. EDUCATION *** *** *** POLITICAL ** *** * *** ** *** DISCUSSION Martal Status WIDOWED 0.024* *** *** * 1.89 DIVORCED 0.024** *** *** *** 2.92 SEPARATED NEVER MARRIED 0.025*** * *** * ***

32 Employment Status PART TIME * EMPLOYEE SELFEMPLOYED *** * ** UNEMPLOYED *** *** *** 4.67 AT HOME * * *** 4.32 STUDENT *** *** *** *** RETIRED *** *** ** *** 7.54 OTHER Regon WESTERN EUROPE 0.111*** *** *** *** *** Instrument: PERCEIVED *** *** *** 5.30 LEVEL OF DISHONESTY Test of excluded 16.45*** *** nstruments Anderson canon. cor *** *** *** LR statstc Anderson-Rubn test 43.86*** 41.73*** *** Notes: The reference group conssts of MAN, AGE<30, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statstcal sgnfcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectvely. Robust standard errors. 31

33 Table 6: The Impact of Envronmental Motvaton on Membershp Partcpaton n Sngle Countres 96 REGRESSIONS WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATIONS WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATIONS WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATIONS VARIABLE: WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS (32 REGRESSIONS) (32 REGRESSIONS) (32 REGRESSIONS) COUNTRIES Western European Countres Germany 0.586*** *** ** Austra 0.299*** *** *** Belgum 0.263*** *** *** Great Brtan 1.119*** *** Denmark 0.207*** *** *** Fnland 0.402*** ** * France 0.269*** * Iceland ** Ireland 0.316* Italy 0.422*** *** *** Luxembourg 0.211*** ** * Malta Netherlands 0.240*** *** *** North Ireland 0.538*** *** Portugal 2.473*** Span 0.481*** ** ** Sweden 0.237*** * Eastern European Countres Belarus *** Bulgara 0.633*** *** Croata Czech Republc 0.234*** ** * Estona 0.608*** *

34 Greece 0.309*** *** Hungary 0.435*** *** *** Latva 0.312* *** ** Lthuana 1.078*** *** Poland 0.312** ** Romana Russa 0.422*** ** Slovak Republc 0.365*** *** ** Slovena Ukrane ** Notes: Only the atttudnal coeffcent s reported n the Table. Regressons wthout the economc stuaton. The symbols *, **, *** represent statstcal sgnfcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectvely. Robust standard errors. 33

35 Table 7: The Impact of Envronmental Motvaton on Unpad Work n Sngle Countres 96 REGRESSIONS WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATIONS WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATIONS WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATIONS VARIABLE: WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS (32 REGRESSIONS) (32 REGRESSIONS) (32 REGRESSIONS) COUNTRIES Western European Countres Germany 0.650*** *** ** Austra 0.164* Belgum 0.107* Great Brtan 0.229** * Denmark Fnland France 0.226** Iceland Ireland Italy 0.410*** *** *** Luxembourg 0.211** Malta Netherlands * North Ireland 1.513** *** Portugal Span 1.141*** *** ** Sweden 0.346** Eastern European Countres Belarus ** Bulgara 0.479*** ** Croata Czech Republc * * Estona 0.746***