A NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR IMPROVING SEVESO II PERFORMANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS: OVERVIEW, RESULTS, INITIAL EXPERIENCES

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1 A NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR IMPROVING SEVESO II PERFORMANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS: OVERVIEW, RESULTS, INITIAL EXPERIENCES Jacques van Steen 1 and Robbert Plarina 2 1 Safety Group Coordinator, DCMR Environmental Protection Agency, P.O. Box 843, 3100 AV Schiedam, Netherlands; Tel.: þ , Fax: þ , JFJ@dcmr.nl 2 Senior Project Leader, Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, P.O. Box 20951, 2500 EZ Den Haag, Netherlands; Tel.: þ , Fax: þ , robbert.plarina@minvrom.nl European Council Directive 96/82/EC ( Seveso II ) was implemented in the Netherlands in July 1999 through the so-called BRZO 99 (where BRZO is the Dutch acronym of Risks of Major Accidents Decree). BRZO 99 is based on environmental, occupational safety, disaster, and fire brigade regulation. Important characteristics of this decree are: cooperation between the competent authorities involved, in particular the competent authority for environmental regulation, the Labour Inspectorate, and the fire brigade; explicit deadlines for safety report assessment by the competent authorities; and the necessity of performing an inspection as part of safety report assessment. In 2003, a nation-wide evaluation of BRZO 99 execution during the first round of safety reports was carried out by the ministries involved. Whereas this evaluation revealed positive effects, many shortcomings were found, such as deadlines not being met in the majority of cases, lack of manpower, insufficient supporting material being available, lack of training, and substantial differences in approach over the country. Perceptions concerning the underlying causes for certain findings differed, but there was unanimity about the need for developing and implementing improvements. A national workshop with wide participation from the authorities and industry was organized to discuss the conclusions of the evaluation, and this resulted in defining a national program which would eventually improve performance. Six projects were initiated, to be carried out in the period These projects involved: (1) specifying authorities responsibilities and developing operational procedures, in order to improve the required cooperation, (2) specifying the relationship between the authorities and industry, in order to allow for more formally differentiating between companies with different levels of safety performance, (3) establishing a national coordination structure, (4) improving the available supporting instruments and developing new ones as necessary, including a new joint inspection method, (5) specifying quality standards for governmental bodies involved with BRZO 99 execution, and (6) developing a joint training program for authority employees. The year 2006 shows conclusion of the national program, transferal of results, and start of implementation. It serves as a transition year, and improvements are expected to increase gradually for the period The next nation-wide evaluation of BRZO 99 execution will be carried out in This paper discusses the Dutch national program for improving Seveso II performance. It will address:. Key characteristics of Seveso II implementation in the Netherlands and a summary of the conclusions of the 2003 evaluation, in order to set the scene.. The program, by describing its projects in terms of objectives and results.. The overall results of the program.. Initial experiences with implementing the program s results. INTRODUCTION European Council Directive 96/82/EC ( Seveso II ) was implemented in the Netherlands in July 1999 through the so-called BRZO 99 (where BRZO is the Dutch acronym of Risks of Major Accidents Decree). BRZO 99 is based on environmental, occupational safety, disaster, and fire brigade regulation. Important characteristics of this decree are cooperation between the competent authorities involved, explicit deadlines for safety report assessment by the competent authorities, and the necessity of performing an inspection as part of safety report assessment. The first round of safety reports in 2001 involved an enormous effort for industry as well as for the competent authorities most of the 170 upper-tier companies had to submit a safety report that year. In 2003, a nation-wide evaluation of BRZO 99 execution during the first round of safety reports was carried out by the ministries involved. Whereas this evaluation revealed positive effects, many shortcomings 1

2 were found. Perceptions concerning the underlying causes for certain findings differed, but there was unanimity about the need for developing and implementing improvements. Given the circumstances, governmental performance had not at all been that bad, but future performance would definitely have to be at a higher level. Following a first discussion of the evaluation, which led to carrying out an additional analysis, a national workshop with wide participation from the authorities and industry was organized in order to discuss the conclusions of evaluation and additional analysis. This workshop resulted in defining a national program in order to eventually improve performance. A number of projects were initiated which have been carried out in the period The year 2006 shows conclusion of the national program, transferral of results, and start of implementation. Together with the year 2007, it serves as a phase of transition, and improvements are expected to increase gradually for the period The next nation-wide evaluation of BRZO 99 execution will be carried out in This paper discusses the Dutch national program for improving Seveso II performance. It starts with addressing key characteristics of BRZO 99 and giving a summary of the conclusions of the 2003 evaluation and additional analysis, in order to set the scene (sections 2 and 3). Next, the national program is presented, by describing its projects in terms of objectives and results (section 4). The overall results of the program are summarized in section 5. An impression of initial experiences with implementing the program s results is given in section 6, followed by some concluding remarks in section 7. SEVESO II IMPLEMENTATION IN THE NETHERLANDS: KEY CHARACTERISTICS The BRZO 99 safety report is an integrated report in which three reports are combined which were previously, under Seveso I, submitted separately: the external safety report, the occupational safety report, and the company fire brigade report. Requirements for the safety report, which are set out in an annex to BRZO 99, are more elaborate and extensive than those included in the Seveso II Directive. For example, a quantitative risk analysis and an environmental risk analysis have to be performed according to prescribed methods and using prescribed tools, and documented in the safety report. Supporting instruments have been made available at the national level. These include a report which elaborates the various information requirements (notification, safety report, scenario descriptions, etc.), a manual for governmental agencies involved with carrying out BRZO 99, a manual for carrying out the quantitative risk analysis, and software for carrying out the environmental risk analysis. The integrated safety report is evaluated by the competent authority for environmental regulation (a province or a municipality), the Labour Inspectorate (which is a national agency), the regional fire brigade, and the municipality (in its quality as competent authority for disaster regulation), whereat the competent authority for water quality has an advisory role. Evaluation of the safety report requires cooperation by the competent authorities involved, with the competent authority for environmental regulation acting as coordinator. The degree of cooperation is not prescribed: it may vary from the coordinator serving as mailbox (minimum level) to operating jointly as a team (optimal situation). It should be noted that the legal responsibilities of the various authorities involved remain unchanged. Whereas the Seveso II Directive requires evaluation of the safety report to be performed and communicated within a reasonable period of receipt of the report, explicit deadlines are contained in BRZO 99. Completeness has to be assessed within eight weeks after safety report submission. If necessary, additional information has to be submitted by the operator within six weeks after receiving the request for it. Total evaluation of the safety report has to be completed within six months after submission, which period may be extended once with a maximum of three months. As a result of evaluating the safety report, the operator has to be informed about the acceptability of the risks which are described in the safety report. Simultaneously, the safety report and the authorities judgments have to be made available to the public. The Seveso II Directive requires a system of inspections which shall not be dependent upon receipt of the safety report or any other report submitted. In addition to the corresponding system of inspections as required by BRZO 99, it is stated explicitly that an inspection which is based on the safety report must be part of the evaluation of the safety report before the acceptability statement may be given. SUMMARY OF 2003 EVALUATION AND ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS In 2003, the ministries involved decided to carry out a nation-wide evaluation of BRZO 99 execution during the first round of safety reports. To this end, many individuals involved were interviewed and also an extensive questionnaire was distributed on a large scale. Firstly, it was concluded from this evaluation that BRZO 99 had positive effects on occupational safety, external safety and emergency response, and this conclusion was shared by governmental bodies as well as industry. There was increased safety consciousness and thus more attention for safety. Organizational and technical measures had been taken in order to further improve risk control. Moreover, communication between government and industry appeared to be improved, and there was also improved cooperation and exchange of knowledge between the various governmental bodies involved. However, many operational shortcomings were found as well: prescribed deadlines had not been met in many cases, quality as well as quantity of inspections and enforcement showed room for improvement, quality and completeness of a substantial number of safety reports had been assessed insufficient, and substantial differences in approach existed over the country. 2

3 Early 2004, these findings were discussed in a couple of informal meetings between government and industry. There was unanimity about the necessity of improvement, although it appeared that there were varying perceptions as to the underlying causes. Thus, it was decided to perform an additional problem analysis which would then serve as input for a national workshop. The additional problem analysis was carried out in the summer of 2004 by a small working group which consisted of key representatives from the governmental bodies involved. The working group defined BRZO 99 execution in terms of a number of specific processes and identified associated operational problems on the basis of own experience. This resulted in approximately 100 problems, 50 of which had been derived from the national evaluation. Next, the analysis focused on determining and categorising underlying causes, and to this end two dimensions were distinguished: operation and structure. This led to the following picture:. Aspects concerned with operation Lack of clarity. BRZO 99 execution was insufficiently supported by standards to be applied. Insufficient knowledge and experience. Many competent authorities do cover only a small number of Seveso companies and thus have too little opportunity to build up and maintain experience. Insufficient manpower. Much more manpower appeared to be required than was available.. Aspects concerned with structure Tension between centralized and decentralized government bodies. Provinces, municipalities and the regional fire brigades are decentralized bodies, whereas the Labour Inspectorate is a national agency. This leads, among other things, to differences in freedom of policy and operation. Differences in view on the relationship between industry and government. These differences concern responsibilities of government and industry, and may lead to different attitudes of government bodies towards industry (e.g. fulfilling an advisory role or not). Insufficient balance between tasks and responsibilities. BRZO 99 requires cooperation between competent authorities and also coordination by the competent authority for environmental regulation. This demands for more clarity in the assignment of tasks than is experienced. Insufficient coordination (horizontally as well as vertically). There does not exist a well-developed mechanism for deciding in case of differences in judgment, for example. Unclear balance between goal and means. Some tasks, such as the analysis of domino effects, are experienced as much more time-consuming than is justified by the relevance of the results. The overall conclusion of the working group was that governmental agencies and industry had achieved a lot during the first round of safety reports. Governmental performance had not been perfect, but had also not been inadequate, in particular given the conditions under which the process had to be carried out, such as time pressure, lack of manpower, insufficient supporting material being available, and lack of training. The problems which had been experienced were considered to be characteristic for the first phase of implementing new regulation. Completion of the first cycle provided the opportunity to collect lessons learned and improve performance in the second cycle an improvement which was certainly considered necessary. End of summer 2004, a national two-day workshop was organized for which the 2003 evaluation and the additional problem analysis served as input. There was wide participation from government (ministries as well as operational agencies) and industry. This workshop identified the following overall directions for solving the problems identified:. Sharpening responsibilities.. Developing process descriptions, operational instruments, quality criteria and a coordination structure, in order to establish national uniformity on criteria and approach as well as joint regional operation.. Defining (or redefining) the relationship between industry and government. In addition, it was agreed that possibilities would be investigated for achieving more spread in submitting the 2006 safety reports, in order to reduce the peak in the required evaluation capacity. An important condition for agreement on the subsequent process was that any changes and modifications should be realized within the existing structure of administrative responsibilities. Thus, the workshop initiated a process in which a national improvement program would be carried out. NATIONAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM: OVERVIEW In total, six specific projects were defined to constitute the national improvement program. These projects were aimed at: developing quality criteria for governmental bodies redefining responsibilities/making process descriptions for cooperation reviewing existing and developing new operational instruments specifying the relationship government industry establishing a national coordination structure developing a joint training program A solid program structure was set up, with a steering committee, a program committee, and project groups. The project groups were involved with actually carrying out the projects. Mostly, an external consultant was hired for performing the work, whereas project group members provided input and discussed intermediate results. The program committee consisted of a general program coordinator and the various consultants. The steering committee 3

4 approved project plans and final results, and also decided on discussion points. Industry participated in the steering committee, and in project groups as appropriate. QUALITY CRITERIA FOR GOVERNMENTAL BODIES The main objective of this project was to establish quality criteria for governmental agencies as well as inspectors, in order to achieve that operational tasks are executed by qualified agencies only. At the organizational level, criteria were formulated for guaranteeing continuity of available knowledge and experience. These were, among other things, translated into a minimum number of Seveso companies within the competent authority. As far as the individual inspectors are concerned, qualifications were developed for education and experience, and also criteria for the number of BRZO 99 inspections they are required to carry out yearly. These qualifications for individuals have been elaborated in criteria for the composition of an inspection team. PROCESS DESCRIPTIONS FOR COOPERATION The main objective of this project was to establish process descriptions that together constitute a quality management system for cooperation between the various governmental agencies. An initial idea had been to redefine operational responsibilities in order to reduce overlap between tasks, for example in safety management system assessment, but it was concluded by the project group that such overlap could be explained and was even desirable. Thus, the key result of this project consisted of process descriptions for the various BRZO 99 tasks, with emphasis on cooperation aspects. In addition, it involved formulating definitions for insufficiently clear concepts, such as inspection program, and defining a cooperation model which covered various aspects of cooperation (inspections, enforcement, incident investigation). This project also addressed the question of how to reduce the peak in the required safety report evaluation capacity as well as some aspects of BRZO 99 that had been experienced as problematic (in particular the need to evaluate acceptability of the risks as described in the safety report). As a result, BRZO 99 was amended in the course of Major changes were: Evaluation of the safety report does no longer require a mandatory inspection. The requirement of the acceptability statement is deleted. The new formulation reads that the operator has to be informed about the competent authorities conclusions concerning the safety report. OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTS The main objective of this project was to review existing supporting documents and revise these as necessary, in order to achieve more uniformity and less room for interpretation in the requirements which companies have to meet regarding information and implementation. It was primarily focused on a 2001 document which elaborated the various information requirements (notification, safety report, scenario descriptions, etc.). The project group, in which also industry participated, delivered a new document in the course of An intermediate task of the project group, in the first half of 2005, had been to compose an addendum to the 2001 document, in order to provide companies with the necessary information to prepare the 2006 safety report. This addendum concentrated on specifying criteria for scenarios. A separate, but associated activity concerned the development of a new inspection method. This was aimed at standardizing the way in which inspections are being carried out, including preparation and reporting. The project group delivered a comprehensive methodology, consisting of a number of distinct modules. It is supported by an automated system which is accessible through a website. This automated system also contains a joint working space for each individual inspection which may be used by the inspection team for storing data that are helpful in preparing the inspection, gathered during the inspection, or relevant for reporting it. In addition, the automated system provides the possibility of monitoring and evaluation. RELATIONSHIP GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY The main objective of this project was to review and possibly adapt the relationship government industry, from the perspective of industry s own responsibility. This was elaborated by investigating the possibilities of differentiating between individual companies as to the extent of government supervision. The project group, in which industry participated, developed a model which calculates the number of inspection days on-site on the basis of scores for three groups of variables: Factors which determine the magnitude of the risks, such as the number of installations, the type of processes, and the type of hazardous materials. Factors which determine the level of organizational and technical measures, such as the quality of the safety management system. Factors which are output-oriented, such as the occurrence of incidents. A separate, but associated activity, in which industry also participated, concerned the development of criteria for safety management systems. This resulted in a formal document which specifies a safety management system for major accident hazards. It indicates how the legal requirements may be fulfilled by establishing or adapting a management system which is based on the plan-do-check-act cycle. It may be applied on a voluntary basis, and there will not be an associated certification system. NATIONAL COORDINATION STRUCTURE The main objective of this project was to establish a national coordination structure, as permanent follow-up to the tempor- 4

5 ary program structure. This permanent structure is aimed at such matters as realizing uniformity in executing BRZO 99, solving problems, defining assessment criteria, updating documents as necessary, and monitoring execution. A structure was developed which consists of a steering committee, a working group, and a support team. JOINT TRAINING The main objective of this project was to create a common level of knowledge and understanding between all those involved in executing BRZO 99. Within the timeframe of the improvement program, joint training was developed concerning the new inspection method. Other training subjects will be addressed by the national coordination structure. NATIONAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM: OVERALL RESULTS Two categories of results may be distinguished: results from an operational point of view and results from an organizational point of view. The latter are concerned with the national coordination structure and the quality criteria for governmental bodies. These stand by themselves and will return in Section 6. There are a number of operationoriented results, and these are collected in a BRZO 99 manual. This manual consists of two separate volumes:. A handbook for governmental bodies.. Information requirements for companies. The handbook for governmental bodies consists of three parts: A. General. The legal framework is described, coordination aspects (both on a national and a regional scale) are discussed, and the quality criteria for governmental bodies are summarized. B. Process descriptions for joint tasks. Each of the processes is elaborated in terms of its goal, scope, products and quality criteria, and steps to be performed, and described graphically in a flow diagram. C. Inspections and incident investigation. This part contains the supervision model and the new inspection method, and also a preliminary elaboration of the way in which to deal with incidents at Seveso companies. The information requirements for companies consist of two parts: A. Instructions for implementing BRZO 99. This is the document in which the various information requirements connected with implementing BRZO 99 are elaborated. B. Specification of a safety management system for major accident hazards. The handbook for governmental bodies was completed in the first half of It is available as hard copy and on a website. At the end of 2006, the information requirements for companies were not yet formally published, although its ingredients were available. Together, the two volumes constitute a solid basis for industry as well as the competent authorities to carry out BRZO 99 more effectively and efficiently, and also in a more uniform manner. IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM S RESULTS The national improvement program was finished in the summer of 2006, and implementation of its results could then begin. The national coordination structure was initiated, and regional conferences were organized in the fall of 2006 in order to transfer results. Separate conferences were held for managers/coordinators and for inspectors. The first training sessions on the new inspection method were given, and these will continue until early Thus, all inspectors will be sufficiently qualified in the course of In general, the initial impression is that a lot of enthusiasm exists in implementing and applying the results of the program. Implementation involves a demanding process, however, and is considered to be a period of transition. As regards the quality criteria for governmental bodies, an analysis of the existing situation showed that many of the agencies involved do not meet the criteria which have been formulated. Mostly, this is due to an insufficient number of Seveso companies under the supervision of these agencies. Solutions which are being pursued include organizing structural cooperation in order to create a package of a sufficient number of companies or seeking additional assistance from qualified professional units. Whichever solution is chosen, it has to be documented in the inspection program for which March 2007 is the final date. IN CONCLUSION Although governmental performance during the first round of safety reports in 2001 was assessed as sufficiently adequate, given the conditions under which the process had to be carried out, it was also concluded from a national evaluation and subsequent discussion of its findings that future performance would have to be at a higher level. A number of directions for improving future performance were addressed in a national improvement program. Key characteristics of this program are that it was comprehensive and integrated, in terms of issues as well as participants. Among the issues tackled are qualifications of inspectors, operational instruments, and coordination aspects, whereas not only government agencies participated in the program, but also industry. Carrying out the national improvement program involved an enormous effort, and implementing the program s results will also require substantial effort from all parties involved. The enthusiasm with which this implementation started creates sufficient optimism as to achieving eventual success. Finally, it is hoped that competent authorities in other EU countries will benefit from the approach which was taken in the Netherlands for improving Seveso performance. 5

6 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution of many individuals, from all parties involved, to the national improvement program. Moreover, the authors have benefited from various documents which have been produced in the course of the program. Theo Konijn and Walter de Koning provided valuable comments on an earlier version of the paper. REFERENCES Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment, 2006, PGS 6: Instructions for implementing BRZO 99. (in Dutch; English version considered). National steering committee BRZO, 2006a, Model for determining planned governmental supervision at BRZO companies. (in Dutch; English version to appear). National steering committee BRZO, 2006b, New Inspection Method. (in Dutch; English version considered). National steering committee BRZO, 2006c, Quality criteria for BRZO agencies. (in Dutch; English version to appear). National steering committee BRZO, 2006d, Requirements for a BRZO inspection team. (in Dutch; English version to appear). Netherlands Standardization Institute, 2006, Netherlands Technical Agreement NTA 8620 (uk): Specification of a safety management system for major accident hazards. 6