Keynote Speaker. Dave Freeman JANUARY 23, 2018 EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, OPERATIONS

Transcription

1 Keynote Speaker Dave Freeman EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, OPERATIONS JANUARY 23, 2018

2 BNSF A Culture Focused on Safety Employee Operational Community SAFETY VISION TO OPERATE FREE OF ACCIDENTS AND INJURIES

3 Safety Leader for Continuous Risk Reduction BNSF vs. Class I Reportable Rail Equipment Incident Rate (Incidents per Million Train Miles) Source: FRA Data for Calendar Year through Sept 30, 2017 Class I RR s excluding Amtrak

4 Rail Volume Growth BNSF s volume growth outpaces the Rail Industry *% change from 2016 Weeks 1 through 52 vs vs Source: Association of American Railroads; GDP forecast provided by IHS Markit (December 2017)

5 BNSF s Capital Investments $ Billions

6 2017 Capital Investments $3.3B

7 2017 Expansion in the Pacific Northwest New double track segment Seattle Hauser Fueling Facility Realigned track to increase fluidity New double track segment Spokane Vancouver New siding Pasco New double track segment

8 Positioned for Growth Total BNSF volume ended the year up over 5% y/y. 6,000 +6% BNSF Volume 2017 vs In Thousands 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 +5% +6% 1,000-1% 0 Consumer Products Industrial Products Agricultural Products Coal Source: Association of American Railroads, handled volume through week 52 ending December 30, 2017

9 Technology Plays an Integral Role Wayside Detectors take 200 million readings daily Every year 10 million+ miles of track are inspected 60,000+ bridge inspections per year are performed Radar & UAV technology deployed

10 Mechanical: Equipment Detector Network Prevention Technology Hot Box Detector (HBD) Wheel Impact Load Detector (WILD) Acoustic Bearing Detector (ABD) Sonic Cracked Wheel/Axle Detector (CWAD) Machine Vision Systems Optical Geometry Detector (OGD) Warm Bearing Detection System (WBDS) Hot Wheel Detectors (HWD) Truck Performance Detectors (TPD)

11 More Than 3,000 Wayside Detectors Brake Shoe & Truck Detectors AEI Wheel Profile (WPD) Detector Processer & Communications Bungalow Coupler Hot Bearing Securement Detector Detectors (HBD) Hot Bearing Detector (HBD) Dragging Equipment Detector 11

12 Track Inspection Fleet STAR Car UAV (Drone)

13 Track Inspection Programs Visual Inspection: +10 million miles of track annually visually inspected by over 650 track inspectors Automated Track Geometry Inspection: fleet of cars for high speed laser/inertia test systems collect track condition information Ultrasonic Internal Rail Flaw Detection: intervals between inspections are as frequent as every 16 days on the highest density lines Tie and Ballast Inspection: gathers condition of ties which is utilized to prioritize annual tie replacement cycles Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) Ballast Inspection: used to plan undercutting, or 8-10 below rail ballast replacement, to improve support of track structure

14 Positive Train Control PTC BNSF S PTC SYSTEM

15 New Technology in Train Operations and Control Movement Planner Trip Optimizer Dispatching system that plans train operations and optimizes the use of network capacity Energy management system that calculates and provides throttle limits to maximize efficiency

16 Looking Forward Safety Service/Velocity Efficiency/Productivity People

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18 Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads Chapter 7 Reporting System Amsted Rail Company, Inc. Credit AAR/RSI TAG Committee: Joy Cooke Rick Szromba Ray Morgan Ed Weedmark David Burke Jennifer Novak TTCI/AAR, 10/20/2016 p1

19 AAR Chapter 7 Reporting System * Logging In / Creating an Account * Home Page Features * Creating a Report 7.1 * Responding to a Report 7.2 * Accept or Deny the Response 7.3 * Acceptance by the AAR QAC TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p2

20 Web Address to Access the Chapter 7 Reporting System TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p3

21 Logging In Click Here to Create an Account TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p4

22 Creating an Account Select Your Contractor TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p5

23 AAR Chapter 7 Reporting System * Logging In / Creating an Account * Home Page Features * Creating a Report 7.1 * Responding to a Report 7.2 * Accept or Deny the Response 7.3 * Acceptance by the AAR QAC TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p6

24 Home Page TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p7

25 Home Page Drop-Down Menus TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p8

26 Home Page Drop-Down Menus TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p9

27 Home Page View Open 7.1 s TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p10

28 View Pending Forms Left click on the control number to open Date the 7.1 was added to the log Taken From Section J- Appendix A Company who submitted the 7.1 Company receiving the 7.1 Status of the Chapter 7 Person who submitted the 7.1 TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p11

29 Home Page View Completed 7.1 s TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p12

30 View Completed Forms Left click on the control number to open Date the 7.1 was added to the log Taken From Section J- Appendix A Company who submitted the 7.1 Company receiving the 7.1 Status of the Chapter 7 Person who submitted the 7.1 TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p13

31 * Logging In * Home Page Features * Creating a Report 7.1 AAR Chapter 7 Reporting System * Responding to a Report 7.2 * Accept or Deny the Response 7.3 * Acceptance by the AAR QAC TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p14

32 Home Page Submit a 7.1 TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p15

33 Submit Form 7.1 Company submitting the 7.1 form Note chevrons for ease of selection List of suppliers for ease of selection Section J, Appendix A A list of possible nonconformance scenarios Reference Section A Tables of Content for Standard TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p16

34 Input one or more Choices of: New Reconditioned Requalified If inspected left click the box Any unique identifier TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p17

35 Be as descriptive as needed to ensure the receiving party understands the nonconformance What is the current status of the part(s) TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p18

36 Help the company that supplied you the part(s) by attaching a picture of the part(s) or the document that shows the dimensions you got during your incoming inspection process. Any added information will be a great help to the contracted company. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p19

37 If you save the form remember to go back and submit it when ready TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p20

38 * Logging In * Home Page Features * Creating a Report 7.1 AAR Chapter 7 Reporting System * Responding to a Report 7.2 * Accept or Deny the Response 7.3 * Acceptance by the AAR QAC TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p21

39 Responding to a Report 7.2 TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p22

40 Responding to a Report 7.2 View Open 7.1 s TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p23

41 Responding to a Report 7.2 Getting Started When you select the Form 7.2, you get this screen. You then need to press the Submit Form 7.2 button to start. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p24

42 Responding to a Report 7.2 Nonconformance Description The ID number automatically transfers from the 7.1 and stays with the incident. The nonconformance description transferred from the 7.1 If you believe this description is incorrect, you can change it, but you should probably do it in conjunction with the initiator. Before moving onto the next section, enter a date in the Nonconformance Date field. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p25

43 Responding to a Report 7.2 Acts for Disposition Root Cause Explain what you want to do with the product in question and how are you going to make sure there are no other product, either in the shop or already shipped, with the same issue. Again, it is important, enter a date in field below the box. Explain in detail the root cause of the problem. This should not be an assumption, but an answer based on the use of one of the many root cause analysis tools. (i.e.: Fishbone Diagrams, 5 Whys, Kepner-Tregoe, or the Apollo Root Cause Analysis). Once again, add a date. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p26

44 Responding to a Report 7.2 Corrective Action Follow Up Plan Explain, based on the root cause analysis, exactly what you are going to do to prevent a similar occurrence from happening again in the future. Remember, that our corrective action must satisfy the concerns of the customer. Enter a date before moving on. Define what actions you will take to monitor the implementation of the corrective action. This may include several internal audits, done on specific time intervals, or some other means of following up. Once again, add a date. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p27

45 Responding to a Report 7.2 Finishing Up When you are finished entering all of the information, enter your name and title. When you are done, you can press the Submit Form button If you need to come back and update something, press the Save Changes button and close the website. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p28

46 Responding to a Report 7.2 Comments If there is any additional information you want to record, this can be done in the comments tab. Click in the text box, enter the information and the press the Create Comment Comments can be entered at any point during the life of the report, until it has been closed by the AAR Quality Assurance Committee. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p29

47 Responding to a Report 7.2 Attachments, Pictures, Reports Seeing is believing, so if you have pictures or reports to support your corrective action, press the Select files button. The program will access your document library and allow you to select any documents/pictures to upload. When you have selected what you want, press the Submit button to attach it to this file. Once attached, you will see a link to the document appear. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p30

48 * Logging In * Home Page Features * Creating a Report 7.1 AAR Chapter 7 Reporting System * Responding to a Report 7.2 * Accept or Deny the Response 7.3 * Acceptance by the AAR QAC TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p31

49 References Control Number Accept 7.2 Response Reject 7.2 Response Any additional comments TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p32

50 References Control Number no longer exists, but the correct reference is Accept or Deny the 7.2 Response Number of days from submittal of 7.1 to receipt of 7.2 Any additional comments TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p33

51 Any Additional Comments Attachments, Files, or Photos TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p34

52 * Logging In * Home Page Features * Creating a Report 7.1 AAR Chapter 7 Reporting System * Responding to a Report 7.2 * Accept or Deny the Response 7.3 * Acceptance by the AAR QAC TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p35

53 Completed Forms Acceptance by the AAR QAC 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 are reviewed by the AAR QAC. These are either approved or additional information is requested. If more information is required, the 7.2 response is reset for a 2 nd response. Once it is approved the form status will show that it was accepted by the AAR QAC. This is the final step and official closure of the Chapter 7 System TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p36

54 Thank you for your attention! TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p37

55 Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads How to Audit: Union Tank Car Co. Exterior Paint, Interior Coatings & Interior Linings Christian L. Meeker Manager of NDT & Special Processes TTCI/AAR, 10/20/2016 p1

56 What to look for Personnel qualification Materials storage and shelf life Surface Preparation Application of coating or adhesive and maintenance of essential variables Overlap and joint preparation of sheets Inspection and test equipment Reporting of results TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p2

57 Storage temperatures Atmospheric Exposure Opened containers Cleanliness Labeling Shelf Life Materials Storage TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p3

58 Coating or Lining system requirements Anchor profile Temperature restrictions Timing between preparation and application Surface Preparation TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p4

59 Exterior Paint - Discontinuities Acceptable run/sag Unacceptable run/sag TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p5

60 Exterior Paint - Discontinuities Unacceptable trash/dirt Blowholes - unacceptable TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p6

61 Corrosive vs product purity Personnel qualification (NACE RP0495 and Appendix L) Manufacturer s specifications Environment (temperature and humidity) Reporting and traceability Interior Coating TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p7

62 Interior Lining Storage shelf life and temperature controls Personnel qualification 49 CFR Environment controls Adhesive application Timing between adhesive application and sheet application Curing requirements and temperatures Recording and traceability TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p8

63 Referenced AAR/DOT Requirements 49 CFR : Lined Tanks 49 CFR : Requirements for inspection and test of specification tank cars MSRP CIII Appendix L: Interior Cleaning, Lining and Coating TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p9

64 Thank you for your attention! TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p10

65 Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads AAR Information: How to Get It Transportation Technology Center Rule 1 Gage Videos David Cackovic Steve Berkshire TTCI/AAR, 10/20/2016 p1

66 AAR Services Provided by TTCI TTCI support to the AAR Safety and Operations Department and the rail industry Technical Standards MID BOE Publications QA RF Damage Prevention RF Economics 2017 TTCI/AAR

67 AAR What s new or in process: M-1004 Specification for Fuel Tenders (new) Development of waiver for reflectorization (in process) Passenger standards (in process) Rewrite of interchange rules 3, 5, 6, 7 for brakes (in process) A more robust cost benefit analysis process (new) Increased life of railcars and castings (in process) Dissemination of Information (Web) Electronic publications including on-line MSRPs and electronic ordering (new) Enhanced Circular Letter System Enhanced training with videos 2017 TTCI/AAR

68 AAR The Publications Process at TTCI supports AAR and the rail industry with: Publications Management Formats and edits documents to become camera ready Prints manuals Meets industry sales, fulfillment and distribution needs Moving into sales automation and electronic media Includes on-line MSRP system, which is updated with Committee revisions in real-time Circular Letters Training Videos 2017 TTCI/AAR

69 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

70 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

71 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

72 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

73 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

74 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

75 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

76 AAR The Mechanical Inspection Department supports AAR, the ARB and technical committees, and the rail industry with: Rules and Standards compliance inspections to the Interchange Rules and MSRPs Allowable mechanical repairs Allowable billing for repairs Wheel and Air Brake Shop certifications Freight car component manufacturing and reconditioning Quality assurance audits to ensure compliance with AAR Specification M-1003 Training 2017 TTCI/AAR

77 AAR AAR Arbitration and Rules Committee (ARB) Responsible for the content and compliance to the Code of AAR Interchange Rules Field Manual and Office Manual Content is both technical, with support of the AAR Technical Committees (e.g. Equipment Engineering), and business/administrative rules ARB is keenly aware that each individual in the railway system must be attentive of their responsibility under the rules, and that the Interchange Rules do not explicitly demonstrate gage use procedures ARB requested TTCI and MID to develop online training tools on the use of Field Manual Rule 1 Gages 2017 TTCI/AAR

78 AAR Field Manual Rule 1.5.a States they are required for all repair tracks. States use of gages must be demonstrated upon request by the MID. Correct use a must to prevent improper removal of noncondemnable components. * Reminder in 2016 there were 105 exceptions to gages and/or use of gages 2017 TTCI/AAR

79 AAR Field Manual Rule 1.5.a 2017 TTCI/AAR

80 Rule 1 Gages 2017 TTCI/AAR

81 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

82 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

83 AAR Web Based Information TTCI/AAR

84 Other Endeavors Railcar Repair Committee Short Line Association Visits RSI MARTS Railcar Repair Committee To promote the open exchange of best practices in the railcar repair industry 2017 TTCI/AAR

85 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

86 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

87 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

88 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

89 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

90 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

91 Web Based Information AAR 2017 TTCI/AAR

92 Thank you for your attention! 2017 TTCI/AAR

93 Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (PFMEA) Strato Inc. Paul Olmstead VP Quality TTCI/AAR, 10/20/2016 p1

94 Agenda What is an FMEA? Types of FMEAs What is a Process FMEA? The Process FMEA Form Some PFMEA Thoughts Questions / Comments TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p2

95 FMEA stands for: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Commonly referred to as a FEMA TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p3

96 The 3 Most Common Types of FMEAs are System FMEA Design FMEA Process FMEA TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p4

97 Types of FMEAs System FMEA Identifies the effect on the system when one or more of its components or subsystems fail to perform their intended functions System Objective System is designed to operate between 195 and 212 degrees System Component Failure Mode Thermostat opens too soon Possible System Effect Loss of efficiency May not pass Emissions No heat in Cabin TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p5

98 Types of FMEAs Design FMEA Helps identify design weaknesses and potential failure modes that might prevent a component or assembly to perform as intended (as designed) Design Objective Thermostat opens at 212 degrees Design Failure Mode Thermostat does not open at 212 degrees Possible Design Causes Spring load design is too high Piston travel design too short Wax pressure design too low Shaft clearance design is too tight TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p6

99 Types of FMEAs Process FMEA Identifies the potential failure modes, effects, and causes when a process step fails to produce its process function (intended output) Process Function Install spring A on the shaft Potential Failure wrong spring was installed Spring A Potential Cause Spring B placed in Spring A bin Potential Effect of failure Cell - 100% sort and scrap Customer cooling system overheats / damage to engine and other components Spring B TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p7

100 Lets Talk about the Process FMEA TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p8

101 A Process FMEA is - A structured, formal way to analyze a process to determine: How the process could fail What Effect the failure would have on the customer TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p9

102 What could have caused the failure What is the likelihood or probability that the failure will occur What is the likelihood or probability that the failure will be prevented or detected before it reaches the customer TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p10

103 The Process FMEA Form TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p11

104 SEVERITY OCCURRENCE DETECTION RPN SEVERITY OCCURRENCE DETECTION RPN POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (PROCESS FMEA) PART # / REV: SUPPLIER / CODE: PROGRAM: PART NAME: KEY CONTACT: FMEA DATE (REV):. CUSTOMER: CORE TEAM: FMEA DATE (ORIG): ACTION RESULTS Process step Description Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE Current Process Controls ACTION(S) Action Owner & TARGET DATE ACTIONS TAKEN TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p12

105 SEVERITY OCCURRENCE DETECTION RPN SEVERITY OCCURRENCE DETECTION RPN POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (PROCESS FMEA) PART # / REV: SUPPLIER / CODE: PROGRAM: PART NAME: KEY CONTACT: FMEA DATE (REV): CUSTOMER: CORE TEAM: FMEA DATE (ORIG): Process step Description Function / Requirements. Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE Current Process Controls ACTION(S) Action Owner & TARGET DATE ACTIONS TAKEN ACTION RESULTS Typical Header Part# / Description / Rev. PFMEA Control# Customer Process Name / Description Manufacturer Name / Location Core Team Team Leader Process Owner / Responsibility Date Created Date Revised TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p13

106 PART PROCESS # SEVERITY OCCURRENCE Process step Description. Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE Process Description A Simple description Clamp Part Install bearing Leak test Fitting Drill hole Torque Nut TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p14

107 PART PROCESS # SEVERITY OCCURRENCE Process step Description. Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE The Process Function is the expected output of the process step. The Process Function should be described as a Process Output and/or a Product Design Output set clamp air pressure to 40 +/- 5 psi Process Output adjust feed rate to 100 ft/min drill.50 +/-.010 Dia. / 1.50 deep Product output Bore to 5.355" diameter add 1/2 cup solvent to paint each shift dispense glue for 3 seconds logo per drawing Apply Black #433 Enamel Paint cap 6 intake holes before paint Rotate 360 degrees Saw to " long Bend to 1/2 " radius 200 rpm drill speed assemble part A to B first 100 Ra 95 in-lbs torque TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p15

108 PART PROCESS # SEVERITY OCCURRENCE Process step Description. Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE (This is where the rubber meets the road!) You must know the intended output! Process Step Clamp Part Process Function / Expected Output Clamp Part to table, using pneumatic clamp CL143, clamp on casting boss, at 95 psi TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p16

109 PART PROCESS # SEVERITY OCCURRENCE Process step Description Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE. Process Potential Failure Modes usually fall into these Categories: Process Function / Requirements Clamp part to table using pneumatic clamp CL143, clamp on casting boss at 95psi 1. No Function: Process operation totally non-functional 2. Over Function: Process output is greater than specified. 3. Under Function: Process output is less than specified. 4. Degraded over time: Process output degrades over time 5. Intermittent Function: Process output starts and stops (time between start and stop may vary) Process Potential Failure Modes Clamp is not Positioned on the Boss Clamp Pressure to High Clamp pressure too low Clamp jaws worn TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p17

110 PART PROCESS # SEVERITY OCCURRENCE Process step Description Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE. The Effect is what the customer might notice with respect to performance expectations Remember; The Customer could be: The assembler The next operation The facility The Customer The System The end user It is your choice which customers to consider on the PFMEA TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p18

111 PART PROCESS # SEVERITY OCCURRENCE Process step Description Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE Process Potential Effect(s) of Failure Process Potential Failure Modes Clamp pressure too low Injure Operator W/O warning - Part could dislodge during subsequent drilling operation 100% Sort and Scrap - nonconforming drill hole location 100% Sort and Rework - nonconforming drill diameter and surface finish TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p19

112 PART PROCESS # SEVERITY OCCURRENCE Process step Description Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE. Severity is the rank associated with the most serious effect from the Potential Effect of Failure column. This is a relative ranking, usually 1-10 within the scope of the individual FMEA. 1 being the least severe, and 10 being the most severe. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p20

113 Simple Format Can be added to a drop down in Excel SEVERITY SCALE 10 Hazardous - w/o warning, safety issue 9 Hazardous - w/ warning, safety issue 8 Very High 7 High 6 Moderate 5 Low 4 Very Low 3 Minor 2 Very Minor 1 None TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p21

114 A Little More Explanation Uses 1-10 Rating but only 5 categories Severity Criteria Failure would have a very negligible effect on further processing or product performance Rating 1 Low severity rating. Failures have minor effect on further processing or product performance. Moderate severity rating. A failure that causes customer concern or program impact, but will not cause a Criticality 1 failure of the end item or an equivalent process failure. High severity rating. Failure causes severe impact to component or process and may contribute to a Criticality 1 failure of the end item or an equivalent process failure Very high severity rating. Failure contributes to a known or highly probable Criticality 1 failure of the end item or an equivalent process failure involving loss of life or a major loss of manufacturing facilities 9-10 TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p22

115 Effect My Favorite! Severity evaluation criteria Encourages thinking about Internal Process the Effect on both Customer Effect (Manufacturing/Assembly Effect) Ranking Internal Process vs. Customer Hazardous without warning Hazardous with warning affects safe product operation and/or involves non-compliance with government regulation - without warning. affects safe product operation and/or involves non-compliance with government regulation with warning. Or may endanger operator (machine or assembly) without warning. 10 Or may endanger operator (machine or assembly) with warning. 9 Very high Product/item inoperable (loss of primary function). Or 100% of product must be scrapped 8 High Product/item operable but at a reduced level of performance. Customer very dissatisfied. 100% of product must be sorted, some can be reworked at high cost, but most will be scrapped 7 Moderate Product/item operable but comfort/convenience item(s) inoperable. Customer dissatisfied. 100% of product must be sorted, most can be reworked at moderate cost, but some will be scrapped 6 Low Very low Product/item operable but comfort / convenience item(s) operable at a reduced level of performance. Fit and Finish. Item does not conform. Defect noticed by most customers. (Greater than 75%). 100% of product may have to be sorted and reworked off line at low cost, but some will be scrapped Defects readily identified during process. Can be reworked off line at low cost, with no scrap 4 5 Minor Fit and Finish. Item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% of customers. Defects readily identified during process. Can be reworked on line at low cost with no scrap 3 Very Minor None Fit and Finish. Item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminating customers (less than 25%). No discernible effect. Defects readily identified during process. Can be reworked on line at no cost with no scrap. 2 Or slight inconvenience to operation or operator, or no effect. 1 TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p23

116 PART PROCESS # SEVERITY OCCURRENCE Process step Description Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE Process Potential Failure Modes 10 Clamp pressure too low Severity evaluation criteria Process Potential Effect(s) of Failure Part could dislodge during subsequent drilling operation (could injure operator) Effect Hazardous without warning Internal Process Effect (Manufacturing/Assembly Effect) Or may endanger operator (machine or assembly) without warning. Ranking 10 Hazardous with warning Or may endanger operator (machine or assembly) with warning. 9 TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p24

117 SEVERITY OCCURRENCE Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE. How could this failure occur? Potential Cause of Failure Process Potential Failure Modes Clamp pressure too low Setup - Pressure not set correctly Faulty Clamp Pressure Gage Faulty Regulator Clamp valve worn and does not retain pressure Air filter clogged Air volume / pressure from compressor is inadequate TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p25

118 PART PROCESS # SEVERITY OCCURRENCE Process step Description Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE. Occurrence is the likelihood that a specific Cause/Mechanism will happen. (What are the Odds!) The likelihood of Occurrence ranking number has a relative meaning rather than an absolute value. 1 being the least likely, and 10 being the most likely. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p26

119 What is the probability that the potential failure cause will occur? Do we have data? maintenance, reject, customer returns, safety Occurrence Rating Criteria Criteria r Remote probability of occurrence. The team is not aware of this failure having ever occurred. Low probability of occurrence. Relatively few failures have occurred Moderate probability of occurrence. Occasional failure, but not in major proportions High probability of occurrence. Process has experienced higher than normal failure rate Very high probability of occurrence. Process failure is almost certain Rating TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p27

120 PART PROCESS # SEVERITY OCCURRENCE Process step Description Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE Process Potential Failure Modes. 5? Clamp pressure too low Potential Cause of Failure Setup - Pressure not set correctly Faulty Clamp Pressure Gage Faulty Regulator Clamp valve worn and does not retain pressure Air filter clogged Air volume / pressure from compressor is inadequate Criteria Remote probability of occurrence. The team is not aware of this failure having ever occurred. Low probability of occurrence. Relatively few failures have occurred Moderate probability of occurrence. Occasional failure, but not in major proportions High probability of occurrence. Process has experienced higher than normal failure rate Very high probability of occurrence. Process failure is almost certain Rating TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p28

121 PART PROCESS # SEVERITY OCCURRENCE So, Where Are We? Process step Description Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE 1 Clamp Part Clamp part to table using pneumatic clamp CL143, clamp on casting boss at 95psi 1. Clamp pressure too low 1. Part could dislodge during subsequent drilling operation (could injure operator) 10 Pressure not set correctly during Set-up 5 2. Part could move during subsequent operations nonconforming drill hole location 8 Faulty Clamp Pressure Gage 3 TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p29

122 SEVERITY OCCURRENCE Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE Current Process Controls. Both Prevention and Detection methods can be considered to control a Process Prevention is always Preferable over Detection Prevention and detection methods should: Prevent the Cause of Failure from occurring Prevent the Failure Mode from occurring or escaping Or at least; reduce the rate of occurrence TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p30

123 SEVERITY OCCURRENCE Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE Current Process Controls Process Potential Failure Modes Clamp pressure too low. Current Controls Potential Cause of Failure Setup - Pressure not set correctly Setup Pressure adjusted by Lead Person Hole location gaged each hour Hole diameter gaged each hour TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p31

124 SEVERITY OCCURRENCE DETECTION Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE Current Process Controls. Detection is the rank associated with the best Detection control listed in the process control column. Assume the Process or Product failure has occurred Then assess the capabilities of all "Current Process Controls" to detect or prevent, the Cause of Failure or Failure mode, if it were to happen TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p32

125 If I had a Product or Process failure, Current Controls Potential Cause of Failure Setup - Pressure not set correctly Setup Pressure adjusted by Lead Person What is the likelihood that I would Hole location detect gaged it? each hour Hole diameter gaged each hour Ranking Detection Ability to detect 10 Absolute Uncertainty, 9 Very Remote 8 Remote 7 Very Low 6 Low 5 Moderate 4 Moderately High 3 High 2 Very High 1 Almost Certain r TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p33

126 SEVERITY OCCURRENCE DETECTION RPN Potential Failure Mode POTENTIAL EFFECT(S) OF FAILURE POTENTIAL CAUSE(S) OF FAILURE Current Process Controls RPN The Risk Priority Number (RPN) is the product of Severity (S), Occurrence (O), and Detection (D) ranking. RPN = (S) x (O) x (D) This value can be used to rank and prioritize your action items, with respect to the urgency, risk, and resources at hand. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p34

127 PART PROCESS # SEVERITY OCCURRENCE DETECTION RPN So, Where Are We? Process step Description Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) OF FAILURE Potential Cause(s) of Failure Current Process Controls 1 Clamp Part Clamp part to table using pneumatic clamp CL143, clamp on casting boss at 95psi 1. Clamp 1. Part could pressure too low dislodge during subsequent drilling operation (could injure operator) 10 Pressure not set correctly during Set-up 5 1. Setup Pressure adjusted by Lead Person 2. Pressure Gage on 1 yr Calibration 3. Air Filter on 1 yr maintenance schedule 4. Compressor on 1 yr maintenance schedule 5. Hole location gaged each hour 6. Hole diameter gaged each hour Part could move during subsequent operations nonconforming drill hole location 8 Faulty Clamp Pressure Gage 3 1. Setup Pressure adjusted by Lead Person 2. Pressure Gage on 1 yr Calibration 3. Air Filter on 1 yr maintenance schedule 4. Compressor on 1 yr maintenance schedule 5. Hole location gaged each hour 6. Hole diameter gaged each hour TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p35

128 SEVERITY OCCURRENCE DETECTION RPN Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) OF FAILURE Potential Cause(s) of Failure Current Process Controls ACTION(S) 1. Clamp 1. Part could pressure too low dislodge during subsequent drilling operation (could injure operator). 10 Pressure not set correctly during Set-up 5 1. Setup Pressure adjusted by Lead Person 2. Pressure Gage on 1 yr Calibration 3. Air Filter on 1 yr maintenance schedule 4. Compressor on 1 yr maintenance schedule 5. Hole location gaged each hour 6. Hole diameter gaged each hour Actions!! prioritize your action items with respect to the urgency, risk, and resources at hand. Concentrate on Process Control Methods (if you just replace worn clamp jaws; it will do nothing to detect or prevent worn clamp jaws in the future) TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p36

129 OCCURRENCE DETECTION RPN Potential Cause(s) of Failure Current Process Controls ACTION(S) Action Owner & TARGET DATE Pressure not set correctly during Set-up 5 1. Setup Pressure adjusted by Lead Person 2. Pressure. Gage on 1 yr Calibration 3. Air Filter on 1 yr maintenance schedule 4. Compressor on 1 yr maintenance schedule 5. Hole location gaged each hour 6. Hole diameter gaged each hour Check Pressure gage, regulator, and Filter for proper operation 2. Check calibration records to see if interval is too long 3. Check maintenance records to see if PM is performed and interval is correct 4. Check clamp for wear and add to PM or calibration schedule 5. Review inspection interval for hole position and hole diameter 6. Investigate alarm for inadequate air pressur 7. Add a check during setup for actual clamp force 8. Add poke Yoke for drill hole diameter and location 1. PO - by 1Jan18 2. MJ - By 1Jan18 3. PO - By 7Jan18 4. MK - By 15Jan18 5. MK - By 30Jan18 6. KN - By 3Feb18 7. KN - By 15Feb18 8. PO - By 9Mar18 List Actions, Owners, and Due Dates TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p37

130 DETECTION RPN SEVERITY OCCURRENCE DETECTION RPN ACTION RESULTS Current Process Controls ACTION(S) Action Owner & TARGET DATE ACTIONS TAKEN 1. Setup Pressure adjusted by Lead Person 2. Pressure Gage on 1 yr Calibration. 3. Air Filter on 1 yr maintenance schedule 4. Compressor on 1 yr maintenance schedule 5. Hole location gaged each hour 6. Hole diameter gaged each hour Check Pressure gage, regulator, and Filter for proper operation 2. Check calibration records to see if interval is too long 3. Check maintenance records to see if PM is performed and interval is correct 4. Check clamp for wear and add to PM or calibration schedule 5. Review inspection interval for hole position and hole diameter 6. Investigate alarm for inadequate air pressur 7. Add a check during setup for actual clamp force 8. Add poke Yoke for drill hole diameter and location 1. PO - by 1Jan18 2. MJ - By 1Jan18 3. PO - By 7Jan18 4. MK - By 15Jan18 5. MK - By 30Jan18 6. KN - By 3Feb18 7. KN - By 15Feb18 8. PO - By 9Mar Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Feb Feb Mar When Actions Are Complete Recalculate new RPN In this example - RPN went from 200 to 20 TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p38

131 PART PROCESS # SEVERITY OCCURRENCE DETECTION RPN SEVERITY OCCURRENCE DETECTION RPN So, Where Are We? ACTION RESULTS Process step Description Function / Requirements Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) OF FAILURE Potential Cause(s) of Failure Current Process Controls ACTION(S) Action Owner & TARGET DATE ACTIONS TAKEN 1 Clamp Part Clamp part to table using pneumatic clamp CL143, clamp on casting boss at 95psi 1. Clamp 1. Part could pressure too low dislodge during subsequent drilling operation (could injure operator) 10 Pressure not set correctly during Set-up 5 1. Setup Pressure adjusted by Lead Person 2. Pressure Gage on 1 yr Calibration 3. Air Filter on 1 yr maintenance schedule 4. Compressor on 1 yr maintenance schedule 5. Hole location gaged each hour 6. Hole diameter gaged each hour Check Pressure gage, regulator, and Filter for proper operation 2. Check calibration records to see if interval is too long 3. Check maintenance records to see if PM is performed and interval is correct 4. Check clamp for wear and add to PM or calibration schedule 5. Review inspection interval for hole position and hole diameter 6. Investigate alarm for inadequate air pressur 7. Add a check during setup for actual clamp force 8. Add poke Yoke for drill hole diameter and location 1. PO - by 1Jan18 2. MJ - By 1Jan18 3. PO - By 7Jan18 4. MK - By 15Jan18 5. MK - By 30Jan18 6. KN - By 3Feb18 7. KN - By 15Feb18 8. PO - By 9Mar Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Feb Feb Mar TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p39

132 Some PFMEA Thoughts What a great way to learn about the Process, and the Effect a failure might have on the customer Great training tool, especially when asked by the trainee Why is that important This sure makes writing a Control Plan much easier I would rather know the potential failure modes now, than find out from a customer later TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p40

133 Beware of Murphy s Law regarding the likelihood that a cause or failure will happen (If it can, It will) Don t get hung up wrestling over rankings, they are relative Don t get hung up with formatting the spreadsheet Use caution if the router says assemble, or machine, or plate; Break process steps into smaller process steps you can analyze Make it a way of life; and it will be TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p41

134 Thank you for your attention! TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p42

135 Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads Railway Production Part Approval Process (PPAP) TrinityRail, Inc. Robert Helsel Director of Supply Chain Quality TTCI/AAR, 10/20/2016 p1

136 Agenda What is Production Part Approval Process (PPAP) Why should we use PPAP PPAP requirements When is PPAP required PPAP documentation Benefits of PPAP Information Resource Summary Questions TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p2

137 What is PPAP Production Part Approval Process Developed by the Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG), the standard is used to formally reduce risks prior to product or service release Provides evidence that all customer engineering design and specification requirements are properly understood by the organization It demonstrates the manufacturing process has the potential to produce product that consistently meets all requirements during production at the required production rate PPAP manages change and helps assure product conformance TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p3

138 Why should we use PPAP? Measured Rejects MRB Warranty claims Scrap Quality engineering & administration Rework/Repair Maintenance & service Quality audits Additional labor hours Not Usually Measured Process control Opportunity cost if sales greater than capacity Improvement program costs Lost customer loyalty Vendor control Inspection/test (materials, equipment, labor) Cost to customer Expediting Regulatory Compliance Brand reputation Excess inventory Poor product availability Longer cycle times PPAP brings awareness to potential issues improving compliance TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p4

139 PPAP Requirements Part Submission Warrant (PSW) Design Records Engineering Change Documents Customer Engineering Approval Design Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (DFMEA) Process Flow Diagram Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (PFMEA) Control Plan Capability Analysis/Initial Process Studies Measurement Systems Analysis (MSA) Dimensional Results Records of Material/Performance Test Results Qualified Laboratory Documentation Appearance Approval Report (AAR) Sample Production Parts Checking Aids Master Sample Customer Specific Requirements 18 Elements, Use as appropriate for the situation and industry TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p5

140 When is PPAP Required? New part Engineering change(s) Tooling: move, transfer, replacement, refurbishment, or additional build Correction of discrepancy (if correction impacts process, tooling, or design requirements) Production lapse of 2 years or more Change to optional construction or material Sub-supplier or material source change Change in part processing Parts produced at a new or additional location PPAP is required with any significant change to product or process TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p6

141 PPAP Documentation TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p7

142 Benefits of PPAP Helps to maintain design integrity Identifies issues early for resolution Reduces warranty charges and prevents cost of poor quality Assists with managing supplier changes Identifies suppliers that need more development Prevents use of unapproved and nonconforming parts Improves the overall quality of the product & customer satisfaction Improves ability to recognize, mitigate/resolve problems early TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p8

143 PPAP Information For more information, literature, and training you can visit the Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG) website. Production Part Approval Process 4 th Edition available for non-members for approximately $150. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p9

144 Summary PPAP manages change and helps assure product conformance PPAP brings awareness to potential issues improving compliance 18 Elements, Use as appropriate for the situation and industry PPAP is required with any significant change to product or process Improves ability to recognize, mitigate/resolve problems early For more information visit the AIAG website TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p10

145 Thank you for your attention! TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p11

146 Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads LEAN Thinking and Quality TTX Company Rich Szromba Director Operational Excellence TTCI/AAR, 10/20/2016 p1

147 LEAN Six Sigma Question: Is the lean approach to Quality what Six Sigma is about? Program Six Sigma Lean Thinking Theory Reduce Variation Remove Waste Application Guidelines 1. Define 1. Identify Value 2. Measure 2. Identify Value Stream 3. Analyze 3. Flow 4. Improve 4. Pull 5. Control 5. Perfection Focus Problem Focused Flow Focused TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p2

148 LEAN Thinking and Quality Does LEAN Thinking contain a quality component? Is Quality a primary component of LEAN Thinking? Which Lean method is aimed at improving Quality? TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p3

149 Lean thinking Definitions The core idea is to maximize customer value while minimizing waste. Simply, lean means creating more value for customers with fewer resources. Lean Enterprise Institute A business methodology that aims to provide a new way to think about how to organize human activities to deliver more benefits to society and value to individuals while eliminating waste. Wikipedia Consists of five principles that guide peoples actions. Specify Value Identify the Value Stream Flow Pull Perfection Lean Thinking 1996 Womack, Jones, Ross TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p4

150 Definitions Waste Anything that does not add value to the product or service. Value anything that customers are willing to pay for. There are 3 components to Value Quality Cost Delivery TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p5

151 Definitions Quality Degree of excellence Merriam-Webster The characteristics of a product or service that bear on its ability to satisfy stated or implied needs - ASQ A product or service free of deficiencies - ASQ Fitness for use - Joseph Juran Conformance to requirements - Philip Crosby TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p6

152 LEAN Thinking and Quality Cost Quality Delivery The core idea of lean is to maximize customer value. Value TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p7

153 LEAN Thinking and Quality Does LEAN Thinking contain a quality component? Is Quality a primary component of LEAN Thinking? Which Lean method is aimed at improving Quality? TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p8

154 Evolution of LEAN Thinking Eli Whitney Interchangeable parts Frederick Taylor Standardized work Frank & Lillian Gilbreth Process charts, motion study and Non-value added elements Henry Ford Manufacturing system E Deming, J Juran SPC & TQM Eiji Toyoda, Taichi Ono Toyota production system Womack, Jones, Ross Lean Thinking TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p9

155 Henry Ford Mass Production 1908 Introduces the Model T Creates a car that was designed for manufacture Creates a car that was user friendly 1913 Completes the Assembly line What is significant about the assembly line? What it takes to implement Complete and consistent interchangeability of parts Working to gauge TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p10

156 Eiji Toyoda & Taichii Ono Toyoda and Ono spent significant time in Ford s Rouge plant after World War II 1. There may be possibilities to improve the production system 2. Mass production will not work in Japan Wide range of vehicles Small domestic market Starved economy TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p11

157 Taichii Ono Mass production is filled with Waste Material Time Effort REWORK Move the Metal 1. Yield 2. Quality Defects need to be resolved immediately Lower inventory Less time Less effort Zero Rework Problem Solving Five Why s Eliminate reoccurrence TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p12

158 LEAN Thinking and Quality Does LEAN Thinking contain a quality component? Is Quality a primary component of LEAN Thinking? Which Lean method is aimed at improving Quality? TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p13

159 Design Coordinate Supply Production LEAN Elements Five elements of the Lean Business System Focus on the Customer Design Coordinate supply Produce the product Manage the system Manage the System Focus on the Customer TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p14

160 LEAN Methods 5S Andon Bottleneck Analysis Continuous Flow Gemba (The Real Place) Heijunka (Level Scheduling) Hoshin Kanri (Policy Deployment) Jidoka (Autonomation) Just-In-Time (JIT) Kaizen (Continuous Improvement) Kanban (Pull System) KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) Muda (Waste) Overall Equipment Effectiveness (OEE) PDCA (Plan, Do, Check, Act) Poka-Yoke (Error Proofing) Root Cause Analysis Single-Minute Exchange of Dies (SMED) Six Big Losses SMART Goals Standardized Work Takt Time Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) Value Stream Mapping Visual Factory TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p15

161 LEAN Thinking and Quality Which Lean method is aimed at improving Quality? ALL - LEAN Thinking focuses on PERFECTION Defect Process Delay Defect Quality is the basis from which LEAN Thinking was derived. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p16

162 Design Coordinate Supply Production Coincidence? Manage the System Interaction Voice of Customer Relationship Value Focus on the Customer Requirements TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p17

163 LEAN Thinking and Quality Does LEAN Thinking contain a quality component? Is Quality a primary component of LEAN Thinking? Which Lean method is aimed at improving Quality? TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p18

164 Thank you for your attention! TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p19

165 Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads How to Audit: D15.1 Welding Program Union Tank Car Co John Killion Manager: Welding Processes TTCI/AAR, 10/20/2016 p1

166 How to Audit: D15.1 Welding Program Objective: Identify and understand the elements and activities involved in a focused audit of welding processes TOPICS: Documentation: Welding Procedure Qualification Welding Procedure Specification Welder Performance Certification Shop Floor Observations: Welder Compliance Welding Equipment Electrode Storage/Control PWHT equipment Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) Shop Floor Safety TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p2

167 AWS D15.1: Minimum welding requirements to the components not directly welded to the tank car tank (Platforms, handrails, ladders, etc. Any components welded to attachments or re-pads) TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p3

168 How to Audit: D15.1 Welding Program: Documentation: Pre-Qualified or Qualified Welding Procedure Qualification Records (WPQR): Documents Essential Variables: Plate/Pipe Process Material Electrode Position Gas Mix/Flow Electrical Characteristics Joint Configuration Technique TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p4

169 How to Audit: D15.1 Welding Program: Documentation Welding Procedure Specification (WPS): Same Essential Variables Limiting instruction Pipe and plate Voltage Amperage Wire Feed Speed Travel Speed TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p5

170 How to Audit: D15.1 Welding Program: Documentation Welding Performance Certification: Welding Process Material Pipe and plate Type Position 6 Month Continuity TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p6

171 How to Audit: D15.1 Welding Program: Shop Floor Observations Welder Compliance: WPS in the immediate work area? Which procedure? Drawing(s)? Interpretation? Surface condition Weld gauges? Certified? AAR S-402 (Brake pipe) TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p7

172 How to Audit: D15.1 Welding Program: Shop Floor Observations Welding Equipment: Are cables frayed, broken? Are cables firmly attached at the source and at the ground? Is the ground attached to rails or assembled trucks? Is the ground attached over paint, rust, dirt etc? TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p8

173 How to Audit: D15.1 Welding Program: Shop Floor Observations Welding Equipment: Are power sources and wire feeders calibrated? Annual calibration Label readable? Label torn/missing? Machine tagged for Out of Service? TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p9

174 How to Audit: D15.1 Welding Program: Shop Floor Observations Electrode Storage and Control: 5, 6, or 8 Low-hydrogen electrodes stored at 250 F minimum Are electrodes segregated in the oven? Is the oven calibrated? Label torn/missing? Oven tagged for Out of Service? TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p10

175 How to Audit: D15.1 Welding Program: Shop Floor Observations Electrode Storage and Control: How are low-hydrogen electrodes controlled? Are low hydrogen electrodes laying around? Weld wire? I.D. Label? TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p11

176 How to Audit: D15.1 Welding Program: Shop Floor Observations PWHT Equipment: Is the machine calibrated? Annual calibration Label readable? Label torn/missing? Machine tagged for Out of Service? PWHT procedure? Operators trained? TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p12

177 How to Audit: D15.1 Welding Program: Shop Floor Observations PWHT Equipment/Personnel: Are thermocouple wires frayed/broken? Are heating pad cables/insulation frayed/broken? Operators trained and certified? Broken Thermocouple TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p13

178 How to Audit: D15.1 Welding Program: Shop Floor Observations Non-Destructive Examinations (NDE): Designated Inspector: Visual Inspection NDE Documented Training: Per written practice Personnel Qualifications: SNT-TC-1A, AWS QC-1, MSRP C-III; Appendix T NDE Methods Radiographic Testing (R.T.) Ultrasonic Testing (U.T.) Liquid Penetrant (L.T.) Magnetic Particle (M.T.) TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p14

179 How to Audit: D15.1 Welding Program: Shop Floor Observations SAFETY: Are gas bottles secured by chain or holding bin? Aerosol spray cans? Cutting torches and hoses Proper PPE TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p15

180 Thank you for your attention! TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p16

181 F E D E R A L R A I L R O A D A D M I N I S T R A T I O N Lawrence H. Strouse, P.E. General Engineer (HM) Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

182 F E D E R A L R A I L R O A D A D M I N I S T R A T I O N Root Cause Analysis & Corrective Action Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

183 Overview FRA Mission Statement Regulatory Requirements Definitions Case Studies Questions Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

184 FRA Mission Statement The Mission of the Federal Railroad Administration is to enable the safe, reliable, and efficient movement of people and goods for a strong America, now and in the future. Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

185 Regulatory Requirements 49 CFR (a) Each tank car facility shall have an AAR approved quality assurance program that (1) Ensures the finished product conforms to the applicable specifications and regulations; (2) Has the means to detect any nonconformance in the manufacturing, repair, inspection, testing, qualification, and maintenance program of the product; (3) Prevents nonconformances from recurring. Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

186 Regulatory Requirements 49 CFR (b) At a minimum, the quality assurance program must have the following elements... (5) A description of the manufacturing, repair, inspection, testing, qualification, and maintenance program, including acceptance criteria, so that an inspector can identify the characteristics of the tank car and the elements to inspect, examine, and test at each point; (6) Monitoring / control of processes and product characteristics during production; (7) Procedures for correction of nonconformities. Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

187 Definitions Root Cause "The most basic cause(s) that can reasonably be identified that management has control to fix and, when fixed, will prevent, or significantly reduce, the likelihood the problem recurs. Paradies The cause that, if eliminated, will result in the nonconformance never recurring. M-1003 Chapter There may be multiple root causes for one problem!!! Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

188 Definitions Conformance / Nonconformance Conformance The state of meeting specified requirements whether in a specification, regulation, contract, or standard; Nonconformance The state of not meeting specified requirements in a specification, regulation, contract, or standard; Noncompliance A systemic problem or discrepancy in the contractor s quality assurance program, likely discovered during audit. Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

189 Definitions Corrective / Preventive Action Corrective Action Action taken to eliminate the root cause of a detected nonconformance and prevent recurrence or other undesirable situation. Preventive Action Action taken to eliminate the cause of a potential nonconformance or other potentially undesirable situation. Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

190 Case Study Marking Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

191 Case Study Root Cause What caused this? Production, Inspection, and Test Planning? Inspector Training? Stenciler Training? In-process Inspection? Nonconformance Reporting / Rework? Internal Audit? Management Review? Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

192 Case Study Root Cause What could have prevented this? Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

193 Case Study Welding Leak Path Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

194 Case Study Welding 20º Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

195 Case Study Root Cause What caused this? Production, Inspection, and Test Planning? Welder Training? Design Engineer Training? In-process Inspection? Nonconformance Reporting / Rework? Internal Audit? Management Review? Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

196 Case Study Root Cause What could have prevented this? Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

197 Questions??? USS ILLINOIS SSN 786 Moving America Forward FRA Office of Railroad Safety 1/24/2018

198 Magnetic Particle Inspection of Railroad Knuckles Joy Cooke, Director Car Engineering

199 Railroad Knuckles and Magnetic Particle Inspection What is a knuckle? How do knuckles fail? What happens when a knuckle fails? How can we prevent knuckle failures?

200 What is a knuckle? Part of coupler assembly Connects rolling stock Cars / Locomotives Cast steel Acts as a fuse Subject to Fatigue

201 What is a knuckle?

202 What is a knuckle?

203 How do Knuckles Fail? High Stress Area

204 What happens when a knuckle breaks? Cars Separate Emergency Air Brake Application Train Stops Conductor Walks Train Average train length: >4,000 ft. (¾ mile) Conductor finds knuckle broken Spare knuckle retrieved From locomotive or repair truck Replacement knuckle applied Cars re-coupled Air brakes restored Train movement resumes Average delay: 80 minutes 18x/week

205 Why does this matter? Last year on CSX, 930 knuckles broke ~18 per week, ~80 minutes per delay More than 1,200 hours of train delay

206 What can we do about it? New knuckle designs with significantly improved fatigue life Some well in excess if 1M cycles 5x to 10x improvement New knuckles are inspected by the manufacturer Wet method Shot-blasted surface Once in service, knuckles rust Dry method Gray powder for high contrast

207 What can we do about it? How do we conduct MPI on 2-3 million knuckles? Add MPI as part of the craft persons scope of work, make it routine Already inspect knuckles visually Train them to use MPI equipment.

208 Magnetic Particle Inspection of Knuckles PULLING FACE AREA PLACEMENT #1 PLACEMENT #2 PLACEMENT #3 PLACEMENT #4

209 MPI finds this type of defect 50% of the time If we can replace cracked knuckles before they break: Cars are not separated Emergency Air Brake Application does not happen Train is not delayed Conductor does not walk

210 Challenges Railroad environment not conducive to testing Cold Wet Dirty Electricity not always available Solutions Knuckles must be dry for inspection Cleaning knuckle face with wire brush standard operating procedure Flashlight to enhance visibility Generators supply electricity when not commercially available.

211 Questions?

212 WILD Data: Understanding Variation & Recommendations for Proper Use RB Wiley Transportation Technology Center, Inc.

213 Frequent questions about uses of WILD data: Why doesn't a wheel always produce the same reading on the detector? Why does my data have so much variation in it? Given the WILD data variation that I see, how do I use it successfully? Today we are going to explore these issues for the Wheel Impact Load Detectors (WILDs)

214 Database- ics InteRRIS is central detector data clearinghouse Receives, quality checks, analyzes and transmits rail vehicle data & events Supports intensive management of rail vehicles Input from more than 300 wayside detectors worldwide Stores 470 million-plus information records per month Equipment Health Management System (EHMS) detector data source Data for more than 1.5 million rail vehicles in the North American interchange railroad system

215 N Wayside Detectors 198 (181 reporting) 106 (98 reporting) Miles i InteRRIS Wayside Detector Distribution Detector Sites as of: 11/15/2017 Based on USGS DLG 1:22,500,000 Geographic Projection, DD 2017, Transportation Technology Center, Inc.

216 Impact Load Detectors Electronic Equipment TTCI Testing of Impact Load Detectors

217 Wheel Impact Loads: Machined Flat

218 Defect Position vs. Sensor Location

219 Defect Position vs. Sensor Location 90 Scatterplot of Vert against crib; categorized by axle no and Car Side Raw_WILD_SampleCar.sta 19v*128c Vert crib Car Side: R Car Side: L

220 Feel the Wheel s Pain!!

221 Application of Vehicle Health Monitoring Data How to interpret data? Variation is relative Interpreting variation depends on the application How do you know? By Expee-erience? Revisit some WILD (wheel impact load detector) data application and usage basics

222 Ungrouped/Uncategorized Data 120 Scatterplot (J-Type_WILD_hits.sta 28v*352c) max_vert SEP SEP SEP OCT OCT NOV SEP SEP OCT OCT OCT-03 train_date

223 Load Condition:Site - Variation Sources 120 Scatterplot (J-Type_WILD_hits 28v*352c) max_vert Include v18>.9 and v3=39 : Loaded-Bismark : Loaded-Redwing Other : Empty SEP SEP SEP OCT OCT NOV SEP SEP OCT OCT OCT-03 train_date

224 Speed:Site - Variation Sources Include v18>.9 and v3=39 : Loaded-Bismark Include v18>.9 and v3=126 : Loaded-Redwing Other : Empty Scatterplot (J-Type_WILD_hits.sta 28v*352c) max_vert train_speed

225 Vertical Force Accuracy: Load Estimate 1.2 Scatterplot (J-Type_WILD_hits.sta 28v*352c) Include v18>.9 and v3=39 Include v18>.9 and v3=126 Other : Loaded-Bismark : Loaded-Redwing : Empty pct_load SEP SEP OCT OCT OCT SEP SEP OCT OCT NOV-03 train_date

226 See the Wheel! Be the Wheel!!

227 WILD Variation: OOR vs. Good Wheel - a simple low variation example

228 Wheel Force Measurement Variation: Wheel Tracking Variation R1 L1 R1 Tracking Position (wheel-rail contact) affects force magnitude consistency; Measurement Accuracy is NOT affected! L1: Asymmetric (two wear lines) R1: Centered (single wear line)

229 Wheel Force Measurement Variation: Wheel Tracking Variation (position on rail)

230 WILD Variation: Empty-Load Cycle - a typical example

231 Application of Vehicle Health Monitoring Data: WILD - a Summary Properly calibrated and maintained strain-gage based WILDs have the accuracy and resolution required to identify wheels that generate vertical forces that exceed the AAR standard for EHMC alerts. There are many factors that affect the magnitude of forces ALL Variation leads to lower than the true impact

232 Application of Vehicle Health Monitoring Data: WILD - a Summary (cont.) Factors affecting force magnitude include (but not limited to): Operating Speed Car Load Condition Wheel / Rail Contact Conditions Car Dynamic Behavior (hunting, rock & roll, pitch and bounce, etc) Understanding and accounting for these factors is necessary in order to properly interpret WILD data trends

233 Questions? Follow up: o c

234 Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads How to Audit: Element 2.9 Purchasing/Contracting RESCAR COMPANIES Jay G Standish VP of Quality Assurance TTCI/AAR, 10/20/2016 p1

235 M-1003, Specification for Quality Assurance 2.9 Purchasing/Contracting The contractor shall do the following: Identify products to be purchased or subcontracted Determine for those subcontracted and purchased products an appropriate method of verifying that the products/services conform to specified requirements. Typical methods include but are not limited to the following: Inspection by subcontractor Source inspection by contractor Incoming inspection Objective evidence, such as certificates of compliance Surveillance of subcontractor Evaluate and select subcontractors based on documented assessments of their ability to meet contract and quality requirements Survey and audit subcontractor's verification of quality at the subcontractor's plant or the site of processing as and when required Maintain quality records of acceptable subcontractors Purchasing documents shall contain data clearly describing the items ordered, including the following, where applicable: The type, class, grade, or other precise identification, including AAR specification, drawings, or other technical specifications The title or other positive identification and applicable issues of specifications, drawings, process requirements, inspection instructions, and other relevant technical data, including requirements for approval or qualification of items, procedures, process equipment, and personnel The title, number, and issue of the quality standard to be used The verification arrangements and method of product release The contractor shall review and approve purchasing documents for adequacy of the specified requirements prior to release When specified in the contract, the contractor s customers shall be afforded the right to verify at the subcontractor s plant and on the contractor s premises that subcontracted items conform to specified requirements. Verification by the customer shall not absolve the contractor of the responsibility to provide acceptable service, nor shall it preclude subsequent rejection by the customer. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p2

236 Time is of the essence. Know your basics going in. What happens with every purchase? Identify the products / services Verify the products / services Evaluate and select suppliers / vendors documented assessment of ability Survey / audit when required Maintain records (good and bad guys) Complete and accurate records of what, when, to what standards Review and approve Allow our customers to check in TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p3

237 Understand the process A wife, three daughters and a granddaughter. One Henry rifle? PURCHASE NOT APPROVED!! Purchase process is fairly common and simple. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p4

238 Work backwards! Collect info during the plant tour and during the normal travel of the audit. Parts and materials at incoming, in storage, being used, in final QA. Part number, PO number, heat number, description Get a good sample size. What is the process as seen from the shop floor?? How is a purchase started? By who? How is it communicated?? Purchase authority TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p5

239 Remember your 6 pack! What are you doing? How do you know how to do that? How do you know it s done right? What do you control to make sure it will be right? How do you control that? What do you do if it s not right? Does the process described here match the process described on the shop floor? Note the discrepancies. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p6

240 Let the record show. Talk to the purchasing authority. Using the info collected, review the records. Do the records show: Part number Description Type, class, grade, model, drawing The quality system that applies (M-1003, Title and Date) How was the product or service inspected/ verified? Show me? We ll get to that. Who reviewed and approved the PO? Who was used? Are they approved? How? TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p7

241 Supplier / vendor assessment Evaluate and select subcontractors based on documented assessments of their ability to meet contract and quality requirements. Survey and audit subcontractor's verification of quality at the subcontractor's plant or the site of processing as and when required. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p8

242 Same Goes for Contracting I. What services? Are they well defined? II. Look for the basic controls. Parameters III. Who? IV. Are they qualified? TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p9

243 Look what you covered! Purchasing Incoming Inspection Identification and Traceability Final Inspection Inspection Status Quality Records Follow your instincts. Don t fall down the rabbit hole. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p10

244 M-1003, Specification for Quality Assurance 2.9 Purchasing/Contracting The contractor shall do the following: Identify products to be purchased or subcontracted Determine for those subcontracted and purchased products an appropriate method of verifying that the products/services conform to specified requirements. Typical methods include but are not limited to the following: Inspection by subcontractor Source inspection by contractor Incoming inspection Objective evidence, such as certificates of compliance Surveillance of subcontractor Evaluate and select subcontractors based on documented assessments of their ability to meet contract and quality requirements Survey and audit subcontractor's verification of quality at the subcontractor's plant or the site of processing as and when required Maintain quality records of acceptable subcontractors. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p11

245 2.9.2 Purchasing documents shall contain data clearly describing the items ordered, including the following, where applicable: The type, class, grade, or other precise identification, including AAR specification, drawings, or other technical specifications The title or other positive identification and applicable issues of specifications, drawings, process requirements, inspection instructions, and other relevant technical data, including requirements for approval or qualification of items, procedures, process equipment, and personnel The title, number, and issue of the quality standard to be used The verification arrangements and method of product release The contractor shall review and approve purchasing documents for adequacy of the specified requirements prior to release When specified in the contract, the contractor s customers shall be afforded the right to verify at the subcontractor s plant and on the contractor s premises that subcontracted items conform to specified requirements. Verification by the customer shall not absolve the contractor of the responsibility to provide acceptable service, nor shall it preclude subsequent rejection by the customer. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p12

246 Auditing the Purchasing Element Time is limited, so do not waste it. Know your basics. Collect your samples Gain an understanding of the process Check that process with the purchasing authority Verify records have all that is required. Be sure to check on assessments Do not forget about services Spread your notes around to the other elements. TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p13

247 Thank you for your attention! TTCI/AAR 10/20/2016 p14

248 Transportation Technology Center, Inc., a subsidiary of the Association of American Railroads AAFR Five Step Process GBW Railcar Services, LLC. Adrian Morgan TTCI/AAR, 10/20/2016 p1

249 AAFR Objective Improve knowledge Properly complete an AAFR What s acceptable What s unacceptable TTCI/AAR, 1/11/2012, Filename p2

250 Adverse Audit Finding Report (AAFR) TTCI/AAR, 1/11/2012, Filename p3

251 AAFR Step One of Five PROBLEM STATEMENT Auditors Finding? or A description of the problem including identifying factors that resulted in the nature, the magnitude, the location, and the timing of the harmful outcomes (consequences) How large is the problem? What are the risk including potential impact to community and environment? TTCI/AAR, 1/11/2012, Filename p4 4

252 AAFR Step Two of Five CONTAINMENT Actions necessary to prevent unintended spread of a nonconformance Work not started In-process Outbound Shipped Product/Service TTCI/AAR, 1/11/2012, Filename p5

253 AAFR Step Three of Five ROOT CAUSE "The most basic cause (or causes) that can reasonably be identified that management has control to fix and, when fixed, will prevent (or significantly reduce the likelihood of) the problem s recurrence." Mark Paradies 2005 Span of Control Sphere of Influence Outside of Influence TTCI/AAR, 1/11/2012, Filename p6

254 Root Cause What are some tools to assist in determining root cause? Cause and effect diagram Fishbone diagram Five why? TTCI/AAR, 1/11/2012, Filename p7

255 AAFR Step Four of Five CORRECTIVE ACTION The process of reacting to an existing nonconformity and eliminating the cause of the nonconformity. Simply put, Corrective Action is based on a nonconformance event that has happened in the past. TTCI/AAR, 1/11/2012, Filename p8 8

256 Corrective Actions When probable (highly likely) root cause has been achieved what must change? One or more of the following: Practice Procedure Process TTCI/AAR, 1/11/2012, Filename p9

257 AAFR Step Five of Five FOLLOW-UP Follow-up measures are the measurements of processes or product to determine effectiveness of corrective actions implemented to mitigate nonconformance's or unintended results. Who What Where When How long with Reporting to who, and Additional steps when desired results are not achieved. TTCI/AAR, 1/11/2012, Filename p10 10

258 Adverse Audit Finding Report (AAFR) TTCI/AAR, 1/11/2012, Filename p11

259 Thank you for your attention! TTCI/AAR, 1/11/2012, Filename p12