Concrete Pipe Delivery Near Miss

Transcription

1 Concrete Pipe Delivery Near Miss WHAT HAPPENED? A Load of 4 No.1800mm diameter concrete pipes arrived to site for off loading. The site entrance was restricted in width and the trailer was reversed outside the site entrance. The driver unstrapped the straps securing all four pipes; the first three pipes were successfully offloaded to the holding area. In order to get access to the fourth pipe the driver moved his lorry forward without replacing the straps on the final pipe; as it was not secure the pipe rolled off over the chocks and off the back of the flat bed trailer. Approximate weight 7tonnes. CAUSE? The driver had removed all straps from the four concrete pipes, meaning the load was not secure when he moved his vehicle forward. The chocks were insufficient for this type of load. PREVIOUS LIFTING OPERATION CHOCKS USED DAMAGED PIPE ACTIONS Satisfy yourself of the delivery driver competency levels and ensure they know the correct off loading procedures. Ensure that straps are only removed immediately prior to off loading materials. A Suitable lift plan should be in place for all loading / off loading, this should be briefed to all parties involved. Never assume that delivery drivers are familiar with loading / off loading procedures. CONSIDER ACCIDENTS RECOGNISE EVERYONE S SAFETY 2014 SA 04 (Jan 2014)

2 26 June 2013 MP TOWER CRANE LIFT DROPPED LOAD Background/incident Bundle of scaffold tube dropped from lifting operation during a routine lift a bundle of scaffold tube dropped back into lift area from approx 3m above ground level. CRITICAL FACTORS: Insufficient care taken when slinging the load. Load check at 1.0m above ground did not identify any issues with slinging. CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS: Scaffold tubes in lift bundle were of varying lengths between 16 & 21 feet. Slinger/Signaller had Red CPCS card and should have been supervised more closely with a more experienced Blue card holder. ACTIONS REQUIRED: Scaffold tubes to be banded before lifting. AP s to ensure competency of slingers and other appointed operatives, and to ensure adequate supervision of those individuals who are trained but not yet proven to be fully competent (i.e those not yet in possession of their Blue CPCS card) If AP s role is delegated to a sub-contractor, CSUK AP to review & approve appointments. Scaffold tubes following fall as viewed from tower crane and at ground level Tony Dixon Managing Director - Construction

3 18 June 2013 MP ACCESS RAMP PLATFORM FAILURE Failure of the access ramp platform beneath the piling rig caused the front tracks of the piling rig to sink into the ground, destabilizing it. CRITICAL FACTORS: The design and installation of the access ramp platform was inadequate. BBGE failed to follow procedure in obtaining an updated FPS piling certificate after maintenance to the access ramp and the permit to work prior to moving plant. There was a breakdown in communication between BBGE and the Principal Contractor after maintenance to the access ramp was carried out. CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS: The Principal Contractor failed to carry out his duty as temporary works designer, i.e. design and install an adequate piling platform access ramp. There had been a previous issue raised regarding the suitability of the access ramp at this location on this site. This resulted in maintenance being required to the ramp by the Principal Contractor. ACTIONS REQUIRED: All incidents relating to piling platforms should be immediately escalated to the relevant Business Stream Director prior to any continuation of plant movements or work activities. It is recommended that the Federation of Piling Specialist (FPS) reviews the adequacy of the FPS piling platform certificate in relation to ramps. In the meantime, all operational staff will be re-briefed on the piling platform certification process. All operational staff will be re-briefed on the key risks for piling platforms. Malcolm O Sullivan Managing Director BBGE

4 When work has finished The Person in Charge is responsible for clearing and checking the work site to ensure that: The work has been completed to the required standard and is fit for purpose The worksite is clear of tools, plant, equipment, materials or any other obstructions Station areas affected by works have been left in a clean, tidy and safe condition with doors locked and secured The Person in Charge must report back to the Station Supervisor and confirm that the work has finished and the site has been left in a clear, clean and safe condition. The Person in Charge must then sign the Person in Charge declaration - exit section of the PiCER form and make sure all members of the work group are signed out on the PiCER form. When there is a problem Station Supervisors are required to actively seek to resolve any issues or concerns with the Person in Charge, this includes any discrepancy with SABRE numbers. Where the Station Supervisor is unable to resolve, they must then refer the matter to the Duty Operations Engineer (DOE) or Duty Operations Manager Engineering (DOME) for resolution. If the DOME or DOE decides to deny access then a Denied Access Form must be completed by the Station Supervisor and a copy given to the Person in Charge for their reference. If you experience any problems relating to station access please contact: StationAccessTeam@TfL.gov.uk Transport for London London Underground HoA No. LF41 Station Access A guide to accessing a station to carry out work Head of Access Issue 01

5 Being prepared prior to arriving at a station If you intend to book-on to work at a station using a SABRE or fault number you will be required to complete a Person in Charge Evacuation Register (PiCER). This is now a requirement for both Traffic and Engineering Hours. Arriving at the station: When arriving at a station the Person in charge of the work must report to the Station Supervisor. Station Supervisors are required to enable access to their station promptly; however please bear in mind that they may be undertaking other duties when you arrive. If the Station Supervisor is not immediately available please make contact with a member of staff who will alert them to your presence. The Person in charge should complete the PiCER ahead of reporting to the Station Supervisor in order to speed-up the booking-on process. Blank PiCER templates are available from StationAccessTeam@tfl. gov.uk Note: Station cleaning operatives undertaking routine cleaning activities are not required to complete a PiCER and are to sign in/out on the station visitor s book. Working in Engineering hours: Please ensure that you arrive in good time to submit your completed PiCER form to the Station Supervisor. This will ensure a smoother signing-on process to enable work to begin more quickly. You will be able to book-on with the Station Supervisor before the station closes - Station Access Arrangement files are available for each station and contain location specific details on each station. Conduct Be aware that you are representing London Underground whilst working on or around our stations and track locations. You are expected to act in a professional manner at all times and respect our customers and local residents. Work finish times Work finish times for planned works are defined by the London Underground Access Team and you should ensure you are aware of these before attending site. As a general rule: Engineering work at night in public areas of the station must normally be completed 20 minutes before the station opening time and areas returned ready for customer use - unless the appropriate approvals have been agreed in advance by the LU Access Team. You are advised to contact StationAccessTeam@ TfL.gov.uk to query work finish times or for help in extending your working windows on station or track.

6 No: NRS_ 322 Issue 2 Network Rail Safety Bulletin- Update Thwaites Personnel Carrier Runaway For the attention of all owners and users of GOS (Philmor) converted Rexquote (Thwaites) Personnel Carriers and Rexquote (Thwaites) 5ton, 6ton and 8ton dumper variants. This bulletin updates the previous bulletin NRS_322. Background Whilst off tracking at a worksite, a Thwaites personnel carrier ran away approximately 45 metres and collided with a trailer attached to the back of another road rail vehicle lower down the gradient. There were no injuries as a result of the incident, but the personnel carrier and trailer did sustain minor damage. Note: the GOS (Philmor) converted Rexquote (Thwaites) personnel carrier is based on the Rexquote (Thwaites) 5ton dumper, fitted with the same rail axles as the 6ton and 8ton dumper variants. Investigation The investigation into the incident has found multiple factors that can affect the base vehicle park brake performance on a gradient whilst on/off tracking, making this type of machine at a particularly high risk of a runaway. A major contributing factor is the lack of interference between the road wheel and rail wheel (squash), which is not adjustable on this machine type. Immediate Action Required by Users The following machine types are prohibited from use until a Network Rail approved Direct Rail Wheel Braking system is fitted; GOS (Philmor) Rexquote (Thwaites) personnel carrier Rexquote (Thwaites) 5ton swivel skip dumper Rexquote (Thwaites) 6ton swivel skip dumper Rexquote (Thwaites) 8ton swivel skip dumper Network Rail The Quadrant: MK Elder Gate, Milton Keynes MK1 9EN 23/05/14 Example of GOS (Philmor) converted Rexquote (Thwaites) personnel carrier Example of Rexquote (Thwaites) 5ton swivel skip dumper Issued by: Paul Conway Acting Professional Head (Plant and T&RS).