THE M4 CORRIDOR AROUND NEWPORT PUBLIC LOCAL INQUIRY

Transcription

1 THE M4 CORRIDOR AROUND NEWPORT PUBLIC LOCAL INQUIRY SUMMARY PROOF OF EVIDENCE Rod Lewis ASSOCIATED BRITISH PORTS Newport Dock Marine Operations

2 1 PERSONAL BACKGROUND 1.1 My name is ROD LEWIS. I am the Regional Marine Operations Manager for the five South Wales ports owned and operated by Associated British Ports (ABP), namely the ports of Newport, Cardiff, Barry, Port Talbot and Swansea. I am also a Master Mariner. 2 STRUCTURE OF EVIDENCE 2.1 My evidence demonstrates that the Welsh Government scheme, as proposed, will: a) Impede the reasonable requirements of navigation at the Port of Newport, including infringing on ABP's ability to discharge its common law and general duties under local and national legislation and general Guidance; b) Impede ABP's ability to discharge its statutory duties and responsibilities, thereby limiting its ability to perform its statutory function; and c) Have a serious detrimental impact on the current and future operation of Newport Dock. 3 NEWPORT DOCK 3.1 ABP s Newport Dock operates as a single integrated whole. Whilst different parts of the Dock have differing maintenance levels and vessel acceptance criteria requirements, the Dock itself is operated as a single operational unit. 3.2 The North Dock, which was constructed in 1875, is separated from the River Usk by the Port s main access road and the Dock s railway line. There is 1,009m of common user berth space (berths with no specifically identified operator) in North Dock. 160m is presently suitable for layby/bunking/repairs and 110m is suitable for tug and layby berths. The South Dock, which was constructed in 1914, includes the Middle Quay area. There is 1,871m of berthing in South Dock, which includes 894m of common user berths, 597m for solid fuel and 380m for exclusive use by Port tenants. 3.3 The South Lock is the only point of entry and exit to the Dock. The lock is 1,000ft (303m) in length and 100ft (30.5m) wide, with intermediate gates to lock small vessels while at the same time preventing the loss of water from within the Dock. The lock can take Handy and Handymax standard vessels, which have typical dimensions of 200m LOA (length overall), 30.0m beam (widest point of the vessel) 2

3 and between 30,000-50,000 DWT (deadweight tonnage the cargo carrying capacity of the vessel). 3.4 The lock gates were originally designed at a height of 13.55m above ACD (admiralty chart datum), which equates to 40 foot above the old dock datum gauge zero level. However, subsequent rises in sea levels and climate change mean that the present lock gates are of insufficient height to prevent over-topping at times of high tides. Dock Water Level 3.5 The average depth in South Dock is 13.06m ACD. ABP has the ability to increase the dock water depth to the top of the lock gates via the feeder or the pump, which would take the level to 13.55m above ACD. 3.6 When the water level in the Dock is at its highest maintained level, North Dock can accommodate vessels of approximately 8.37m draft (with an under-keel allowance of 50 cm). Vessel acceptance criteria at Newport Dock 3.7 The only air draft constraint on Newport Dock is the 64m high voltage electricity cables serving Fifoots Power Station that span the River Usk South of the South Lock entrance. 3.8 Air draft is the most difficult vessel parameters to identify accurately, unlike beam, length and maximum draft, which are all constant and advertised in vessel databases. Newport Dock water level in practice 3.9 Although the average dock water level of Newport Dock is advertised at 11.74m (13.06m ACD), it can vary by as much as a metre (either 50 cm above or below) the advertised level. In this regard, it is important to note that: a) The average maintained dock water level has risen since the dock infrastructure was designed as a result of sea level rise/climate change; b) Every effort is made to retain the water introduced into the Dock via the feeder as it constitutes both an economic and operational best practice; c) Dock water level is maintained at the highest level practicable; 3

4 d) The lock gates, are presenting challenges in terms of infrastructure resilience and dock water management 4 NEWPORT DOCK - SHIPPING OPERATIONS IN PRACTICE Introduction to Newport Dock Marine operations 4.1 The number of vessels being serviced at Newport Dock has decreased over the years, due to a decrease in single commodity export (coal) and a steep growth in multiple cargo imports and exports. This growth means that the typically smaller vessels used to service the coal trade, have been replaced by larger vessels that are more economic and efficient to carry a variety of cargo in terms of cost per cargo tonne. An increase in vessels, however, means that more quay space per vessel is taken up and those vessels are remaining alongside for longer periods of time than was the case even twenty years ago. Shipping Trends 4.2 The consequential need to accommodate larger vessels in South Dock has had a significant impact upon the South Dock s south side common user facilities, as they now have to accommodate much larger vessels, for longer periods of time. 4.3 Significantly, the operational constraint presented by Junction Cut as well as increasingly introducing challenges for ABP and ABP s customers, also impacts upon ABP s ability to attract new trades and customers to Newport Dock. It may also serve to inform present customers perception as to Newport Dock s capability to sustain its present operations and its ability to support plans for continued growth. 5 STATUTORY POWERS AND DUTIES OF ABP 5.1 Newport Dock is owned and operated by ABP in its capacity as a statutory port undertaker. 5.2 In terms of its statutory duties, section 9 of the Transport Act 1981 provides that "(1) it is the duty of Associated British ports to provide port facilities at its harbours to such extent as it may think expedient. (2) Associated British Ports shall have due regard to the efficiency, economy and safety of operation as respects the services and facilities provided by it and its subsidiaries. 4

5 (3) In the performance of its functions Associated British Ports shall have regard to the interests in general of its employees and the employees of its subsidiaries." 5.3 Schedule 3 of the Transport Act 1981 provides that ABP - "has the power to operate its harbours and port facilities at them" and "may provide facilities for the storage of goods." Impediment to ABP's statutory functions 5.4 The construction of a six lane motorway bridge at a low height through the middle of an operational port will act as an impediment to ABP's ability to perform its statutory functions. 5.5 Section 107(4) of the Highways Act 1980 refers to objections to a Highway Order made on the grounds that "the bridge is likely to obstruct or impede the performance of [a navigation authority's] functions under any enactment." The nature of the "impediment" created by the construction of the proposed motorway bridge strikes at ABP's ability to operate its port undertaking fully in compliance with its statutory obligations. 5.6 ABP's statutory function will be impeded by altering and limiting the way in which it will be able to perform that statutory function. "Open port" duty 5.7 The proposed motorway bridge would also be impeding ABP's "open port" duty under section 33 of the Harbours Docks and Piers Clauses Act which requires ABP to open the Port to all persons upon the payment of the relevant fee. Port Safety 5.8 By impeding its statutory function, Welsh Government will also be limiting ABP's ability to perform that function safely. This critical function extends not only to the safety of vessels but also to the safety of personnel, members of a vessel's crew, those working within the Port and of course, members of the public crossing the Port in vehicles on the motorway bridge. Compulsory acquisition of rights 5.9 Welsh Ministers are seeking to acquire property rights over Junction Cut. If the scheme is approved, ABP will not be practicable for ABP to widen the Cut. 5

6 5.10 The operational consequence will be that not only will the North Docks potential be removed but the current North Dock capacity of around 8,000 DWT will be reduced to around 3,500/4,000 DWT. Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC) and risk assessment 5.11 The Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC) and the Guide to Good Practice on Marine Operations (GTGP) guide the day-to-day discharge and implementation of these responsibilities, along with the requirement to comply with relevant health and safety legislation. Although these publications do not have any legal force, they are viewed as the industry standard and embrace the principles of formal risk assessment, mitigation of identified risk and continuous improvement The PMSC applies to all Harbour Authorities in the UK with statutory powers and duties and sets national standards for all aspects of port safety, founded upon risk assessment and the consequent removal, mitigation and/or management of any remaining residual risk to a level which must be as low as reasonably practicable in accordance with good practice It would be legally irresponsible for ABP to ignore the advice contained in the PMSC and may leave ABP open to legal liability. Collision Impact Assessment and Welsh Government's Navigational Risk Assessment 5.14 Only late last year did Welsh Government provide ABP with its first draft of an impact assessment. It is unfortunate that the vertical clearance set for the bridge across the Dock in 2006 appears to have been fixed without a clear understanding on the part of the scheme promoter as to a safe height for the Dock crossing. 6 RISK ASSESSMENT AND VERTICAL SAFETY CLEARANCE 6.1 All bridges spanning navigable waterways require a vertical safety clearance, so as to account for inaccuracies in measurement, uncertainties in water level and navigational uncertainties due to dynamic factors and human error. 6.2 The 2014 PIANC Harbour Approach Channel Design Guidelines (PIANC Guidelines) states that 'the clearance between the top of the ship and the bottom of an overhead structure should not be less than 2m.' 6.3 Unlike tidal ports, of course, the water level in Newport Dock will not be going up and down in a cyclic manner. It follows, therefore, that there will not be periods 6

7 before and after high water when there will be more available vertical clearance than the minimum advertised, which means there is no flexibility regarding vertical clearance when entering or leaving North Dock. 6.4 In the context of a vertical clearance envelope, it should be noted that it is assumed that all vessels that intend to use the North Dock will have to make one passage (either in or out), in a ballasted condition and due to operational reasons the vessel may not have filled her full sea ballast when in transit. 7 NEWPORT DOCK - PROPOSED INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS Lock Gate Renewals 7.1 ABP is renewing and improving the lock gates at Newport Docks in The lock gate renewal project will enable the water level within the Dock to be maintained at a maximum 14.21m ACD. Junction Cut Widening Project 7.2 ABP proposes to widen Junction Cut by removing the relatively small area of dock wall to the west of the Cut. The widening is expected to be to around 35m to 38m. 8 REQUIRED VERTICAL CLEARANCE FOR THE PORT CROSSING HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 8.1 In my main roof I analyse the historical development of the scheme by the promoters and the reasons why the Welsh Government has arrived at a bridge height of 26.2m through the middle of Newport Dock. In simple terms - a) Welsh Government determined a height for the bridge based primarily on cost and an apparent belief that the Docks did not require special consideration in terms of the statutory protection afforded by section 107 and reasonable requirements of navigation; b) Welsh Government's highway consultants assessed the needs of the Port and verified the proposed height of the bridge based on inappropriate assumptions; and c) Marine consultants were presented with a fixed scheme and then sought to justify the height of the bridge across the Port on the basis of reliance on the incorrect application of inappropriate guidelines and the misinterpretation and/or lack of understanding of international guidance. 7

8 8.2 In particular, I draw attention to the following historical documents: a) 'Dock Crossing Report and Recommended Route' ARUP and Eagle Lyon Pope (1994) concluded that a bridge height of between 25-30m would need to be established if present and future traffic is not to be impeded but based only on a limited three month sample period. b) 'Navigation and Dock Crossing Clearance Assessment Volume 1' ARUP (1998) stated that a 20-30m bridge height would appear to enable a balance to be struck between navigational clearance and constraints on port operations on one hand and visual intrusion on the other. c) 'Navigation and Dock Crossing Clearance Assessment Volume 2' ARUP (1998) acknowledged that a 25m crossing would impact access to North Dock and stated that - "a clearance of 35m would accommodate the requirements of recent shipping. d) 'Marine Considerations at Newport' Eagle Lyon Pope (2006) concluded that a low bridge of 25m through the middle of the Dock would only exclude some 10% of vessels and only ABP's customers would be impacted (not ABP itself). No consideration was given to trends or future commercial requirements of the Port. e) 'Marine Considerations at Newport' ARUP and Eagle Lyon Pope (2008) recognised that the previous studies proposing a 25.5m air draft clearance across Junction Cut were questionable but then incorrectly misquoted and misapplied the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials Guidelines (AASHTO Guidelines) in relation to collision impact assessment and vertical clearance. It also incorrectly references the ECMT Guideline for inland waterways and the PIANC river sea classifications, both of which do not apply to Newport Dock as an international sea port. f) 'Shipping Analysis' Global Maritime (formerly Eagle Lyon Pop) (2015) states that the height of the viaduct is "set at" 25.5m across Newport dock and 32m across the River Usk, without any assessment of the required vertical clearance. The report incorrectly adopts a beam limitation of 16m, a 120m LOA for North Dock and selectively considers vessel visits when determining the volume of trade to Newport Dock. 8

9 The report concludes that vessel visits and air draft has decreased since the 2008 study and that the exclusion percentage caused by the construction of a 25.5m bridge across the Port is 11.6% of unique vessels. For the record, the actual exclusion percentage based on the 2008 study would be 44%. The report also states that best practice has suggested the adoption of a 0.3m vertical clearance margin for the Newport docks crossing, which is incorrectly drawn from the Dutch Inland Waterway Guidelines. 8.3 In the latest iteration of Welsh Government s WelTag assessment (published 16 th December 2016), all of the references to the 2015 Global Maritime report that were relied upon in in the original WelTag assessment have been deleted. Whilst this may seem like recognition by Welsh Government that the GM report has been of little or in reality no value, the fact remains that the promotion of the Welsh Government scheme insofar as it crosses the Port of Newport, has clearly relied upon this material. 9 BROOKS BELL SAFETY AT SEA - TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 9.1 ABP engaged the services of Brookes Bell (Safety At Sea) (BBSAS) to undertake various analyses of the Dock and vessel movements based upon 11 years of data (between 2004 to 2015) supplied by ABP. 9.2 BBSAS undertook an exclusion analysis of the proposed scheme over the Junction Cut, considering both a 1.0m and 2.0m vertical safety clearance. 9.3 Over the 11 year period of analysis (considering the 10 complete calendar years), BBSAS found that there has been very significant increases in the size of vessels utilising Newport Dock. ABP Conclusions based upon the BBSAS Analysis 9.4 Drawing upon the BBSaS report, the following conclusions can be drawn: a) If already implemented, the WG scheme would have resulted in a significant exclusion of historical vessel visits to the North Dock over the 11 year period of between 25.1% and 50.8%. As vessels continue to grow in size, the impediment and impact in the future will continue to grow. b) ABP is improving and replacing its dock infrastructure. On the basis of raised water level, the historical exclusion percentages rise to between 33.2% and 50.8%, (dependent on a 1.0m or 2.0m vertical safety clearance). 9

10 c) Trades that use ABP s common user facilities are utilising significantly larger sized vessels in terms of DWT capability of performing vessels. North Dock vessels have increased in size by 49.75% between 2005 and When the impacts of the widened Junction Cut scenario are considered, the exclusion percentage rises to 68.8% with the adoption of a 2.0m vertical safety clearance. d) The waters of Newport Dock affected by the proposed bridge scheme are both upstream and downstream. The downstream area of water already accommodates vessels of very significant air draft and displacement. 10 THE REASONABLE REQUIREMENTS OF NAVIGATION THE CONCEPT 10.1 There is no specific legislation or guidance in the UK which informs vertical clearance requirements for bridges or the reasonable requirements of navigation Section 107(4) of the Highways Act 1980 considers the reasonable requirements of navigation in the context of statutory impediment The guidance provided in the AASHTO and PIANC Guidelines are also relevant when considering the reasonable requirements of navigation. Bridge Construction precedent in the UK and beyond 10.4 When considering the construction of major bridges across navigational waterways in the UK and other parts of the world, Port Authorities and Navigation Authorities require that bridges provide a vertical clearance that is sufficient for the current and foreseeable future requirements of shipping In this context, I draw attention to the following UK bridge examples: a) Orwell Bridge, Ipswich - minimum air draught clearance of 43.07m above ACD, specified by the Ipswich Port Authority to allow a 9,000t container ship to pass below the bridge and berth at the port. b) QEII Bridge at Dartford - air draught clearance of 57m above MHWS over a clear width of 100m, specified by the Port of London Authority. c) Thames Bridge - minimum air draught clearance of 57m above MHWS over a clear width of 100m, specified by the Port of London Authority. d) The Second Forth Road Bridge - minimum vertical clearance to be provided was specified as 45m AOD. 10

11 e) Second Severn Crossing - minimum air draught clearance of 37m above MHWS over a clear width of 400m, specified by the Gloucester Harbour Trustees For all of the above bridges, the requirements of the relevant Port or Navigation Authority on widths and air draft clearances for shipping were fully taken into account in determining the clearance to be provided. 11 THE REASONABLE REQUIREMENTS OF NAVIGATION NEWPORT DOCK 11.1 If Junction Cut is widened, the operational facilities offered by the North Dock would be similar to the South Dock. Beam acceptance would be at 30.1m and the available water in the North Dock would be in excess of 11m once the lock gate replacement works have been completed With a low level motorway bridge in place across Junction Cut, however, the reasonable requirements of navigation are clearly not met ABP s requirements are encapsulated by the AASHTO Guideline, namely - Vertical Clearances for a proposed bridge should be established to permit the passage of the vessel using the waterway with the highest vertical clearance requirements travelling in a ballasted condition at periods of high water levels. The actual requirement shall be established from the data on the actual and proposed vessels using the waterway (AASHTO, para 8.5.2). 12 SERIOUS DETRIMENTAL IMPACT Immediate Impact 12.1 If the motorway bridge is constructed as presently promoted, the maximum vessel ballast air draft that could be accepted into North Dock is likely to be 24.2m. This equates to a vessel exclusion percentage of 50.8% in respect of unique vessels and 45.1% in respect to general vessel visits. In terms of DWT capability, the vertical clearance envelope of 24.2m will restrict almost 80% of vessels over 5000 DWT that have utilised the North Dock over the last decade Taking this forward, adding to it the accepted fact that the trend in vessel size is towards larger vessels it becomes clear that the impact of the proposed motorway bridge and the consequent compulsory acquisition of rights across Junction Cut must be seriously detrimental to the operation of the Port. 11

12 Newport Dock as a whole 12.3 As vessels get larger and more vessels are excluded from access into the North Dock due to a low motorway bridge, there will be increasing costs associated with handling and transporting of cargo to the required area of the Port. ABP will have to try to accommodate those displaced vessels somewhere in South Dock adding further pressure upon South Dock common user capability and adding further to customer frustration - reducing confidence. Fundamental and Overriding Impacts 12.4 This underlines the importance of North Dock to the integral port operational whole. The severe operational limitation that would be imposed upon North Dock both in itself and in terms of the practical operation of Newport Dock as a whole would act to the serious detriment of ABP, impeding its ability to comply with its statutory duties and responsibilities. 13 CONCLUSIONS 13.1 My evidence has demonstrated that throughout the evolution of the Relief Road scheme which we have been observing for the last two decades, Welsh Government do not appear properly to have addressed, nor indeed necessarily understood, the operational and safety imperatives of the Newport Dock I have attempted to provide in some detail a description of the operational mechanics for Newport Dock, from vessel movements (with the assistance of BBSaS), berth availability and user requirements I have in addition identified the constraints within which the Dock currently operates which as with every enclosed Dock go to matters such as the area of water within the Dock, quay availability, water depth and operational requirements both in terms of ABP as the owner and operator of the Dock and its customers If one combines all of these factors, adding also considerations such as the required vertical safety clearance under the bridge, risk assessment and best practice, a number of conclusions can be drawn a) The construction of a bridge across the entrance to North Dock will, of itself, interfere with the "reasonable requirements of navigation"; b) In terms of statutory compliance, ABP's ability to comply, as the owner, operator and statutory undertaker for the port, with its statutory obligations to 12

13 provide a port function safely and efficiently will be compromised, not least in the context of the requirements placed upon ABP to maintain an "open port" under the 1847 Act; and c) Finally, the compulsory acquisition of rights over land owned by ABP as the statutory port undertaker and the consequent construction of the motorway crossing will act to the serious detriment of ABP's port undertaking. 13