COMMUTER RAIL CEOS COMMITTEE Don Orseno, chair AGENDA

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1 COMMUTER RAIL CEOS COMMITTEE Don Orseno, chair Murano Garden Salon/Grand America Hotel Salt Lake City, UT Sunday, June 21, :30 3:00 p.m. AGENDA 12:00 - Lunch will be available 12:30 Meeting Commences 1. Lunch, Welcome and Introductions Don Orseno, chair 2. Remarks from the APTA Chair - Phil Washington 3. Legislative Update/Report from the joint Commuter & Intercity Passenger Rail Legislative Subcommittee Anna Barry with Billy Terry 4. Conversation with the FRA Bob Lauby, office of railroad safety a. January 27, 2015 Lauby letter on PTC Certification (report from 5/28 follow up meeting) b. Safety Advisory c. Provisional approval strategies d. FRA Report to Congress and recommendations on enforcement strategies 5. PTC a. PTC Surveys & APTA Report to Congress b. AAR/APTA PTC Passenger Working Group c. Hosted PTC service Bill Everett, Rockwell 6. Administrative Items: a. Minutes from March Meeting b. Next Meeting: Identify dates/location of fall retreat meeting 7. New Business 8. Agency updates and information sharing - All 9. Adjourn RELATED MEETINGS Sunday 3:00 3:30 Northeast Corridor Commission Report (Murano Garden Salon) 3:30 5:30 AAR/APTA Passenger Working Group meeting (Murano Garden Salon) Monday 7 8 am Commuter Rail Committee - full committee (Audubon Room)

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7 P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Railroad Administration Safety Advisory Operational and signal modifications for compliance with maximum authorized passenger train speeds and other speed restrictions. AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Notice of safety advisory. SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory to stress to passenger railroads and railroads that host passenger service and their employees the importance of compliance with Federal regulations and applicable railroad rules governing applicable passenger train speed limits. This safety advisory makes recommendations to these railroads to ensure that compliance with applicable passenger train speed limits is addressed by appropriate railroad operating policies and procedures and signal systems. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ron Hynes, Director, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The overall safety of railroad operations has improved in recent years. However, two fatal passenger train accidents in the last 18 months in which serious overspeed events occurred highlight the need to ensure train speed limit compliance, as mandated by existing Federal railroad safety regulations and railroad operating rules.

8 AMTRAK DERAILMENT On Tuesday, May 12, 2015, Amtrak passenger train 188 (Train 188) was traveling timetable east (northbound) from Washington, D.C., to New York City. Aboard the train were five Amtrak crew members, three Amtrak employees, and 250 passengers. Train 188 consisted of a locomotive in the lead and seven passenger cars trailing. Shortly after 9:20 p.m., the train derailed while traveling through a curve at Frankford Junction in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As a result of the accident, eight persons were killed, and a significant number of persons were seriously injured. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has taken the lead role conducting the investigation of this accident under its legal authority. 49 U.S.C et seq.; 49 CFR 831.2(b). As is customary, FRA is participating in the NTSB s investigation and also investigating the accident under its own authority. While NTSB has not yet issued any formal findings, the information released to date indicates that train speed was a factor in the derailment. As Train 188 approached the curve from the west, it traveled over a straightaway with a maximum authorized passenger train speed of 80 mph. The maximum authorized passenger train speed for the curve was 50 mph. NTSB determined that the train was traveling approximately 106 mph within the curve s 50-mph speed restriction, exceeding the maximum authorized speed on the straightaway by 26 mph, and 56 mph over railroad s maximum authorized speed for the curve. 1 1 FRA regulations provide, in part, that it is unlawful to [o]perate a train or locomotive at a speed which exceeds the maximum authorized limit by at least 10 miles per hour. 49 CFR (a)(2). 2

9 In response to the derailment, FRA issued Emergency Order No. 31 (EO 31; 80 FR 30534, May 28, 2015). EO 31 requires Amtrak to take the following actions to ensure the safe operation of passenger trains on the Northeast Corridor: 2 Immediately implement code changes to Amtrak s Automatic Train Control (ATC) System to enforce the passenger train speed limit ahead of the curve at Frankford Junction in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania where the fatal derailment occurred. Survey its Northeast Corridor system and identify each main track curve where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the maximum authorized approach speed to that curve for passenger trains, and provide a list of each curve location to FRA within 5 days after EO 31 was issued. Submit an action plan for FRA approval within 20 days identifying modifications to its ATC System (or other signal systems) that Amtrak will make to enable warning and enforcement of applicable passenger train speeds at the identified curves. If such modifications would interfere with the timely implementation of a Positive Train Control (PTC) system or are not otherwise feasible, Amtrak s plan must describe alternative procedures that it will adopt at the identified curves to ensure compliance with applicable passenger train speed limits. Amtrak s plan must contain milestones and target dates for completion of action plan items. 2 EO 31 s requirements will not apply where Amtrak s Positive Train Control System (Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System (ACSES)) is already in use on the Northeast Corridor. Among other features, ACSES enforces civil speed restrictions that are in place at locations such as curves and bridges. 3

10 Within 30 days of issuance of the Order, Amtrak must begin to install additional wayside signage alerting engineers and conductors of the maximum authorized passenger train speed throughout its Northeast Corridor system, with particular emphasis on additional signage at the curve locations where significant speed reductions occur. Amtrak must identify the locations where it intends to install the additional wayside speed limit signs in its action plan, and must notify FRA when installation of the signs is completed. METRO-NORTH DERAILMENT In addition to the recent Amtrak passenger train derailment discussed above, in December 2013 a New York State Metropolitan Transportation Authority Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North) train derailed as it approached the Spuyten Duyvil Station in Bronx, New York. The train traveled over a straightaway with a maximum authorized passenger train speed of 70 mph before reaching a sharp curve in the track with a maximum authorized speed of 30 mph. NTSB s investigation of the Metro-North accident determined the train was traveling approximately 82 mph as it entered the curve s 30-mph speed restriction before derailing. That derailment resulted in four fatalities and at least 61 persons being injured. The Metro-North accident is similar to the recent Amtrak accident in that it involved a serious overspeed event in a sharp curve in the track. As a result of the derailment, FRA issued Emergency Order No. 29 (78 FR 75442, Dec. 11, 2013) requiring Metro-North to take certain actions to control passenger train speeds. FRA also issued Safety Advisory , which recommended that all railroads in the United States: 4

11 (1) Review the circumstances of the December 1, 2013, Spuyten Duyvil derailment with each of their operating employees. (2) Provide instruction to their employees during training classes and safety briefings on the importance of compliance with maximum authorized train speed limits and other speed restrictions. This training should include discussion of the railroad s absolute speed limits, speed restrictions based on physical characteristics, temporary speed restrictions, and any other restrictions commonly encountered. (3) Remind their employees that Federal railroad safety regulation, at 49 CFR (a)(2) and (e)(2), prohibits the operation of a locomotive or train at a speed which exceeds the maximum authorized speed by at least 10 mph. (4) Evaluate quarterly and 6-month reviews of operational testing data as required by 49 CFR A railroad should consider increasing the frequency of operational testing where its reviews show any non-compliance with maximum authorized train speeds. A significant number of operational tests should be conducted on trains that are required to reduce speed by more than 20 mph from the maximum authorized train speed. Operational tests should use the reliable methods available, such as reviewing locomotive event recorder data and testing by radar to verify compliance with maximum authorized speeds. (5) Reinforce the importance of communication between train crewmembers located in the controlling locomotive, particularly during safety critical periods when multiple tasks are occurring (e.g., copying mandatory directives, closely approaching or passing fixed signals and/or cab signals at a reduced speed, approaching locations where 5

12 the train s movement authority is being restricted, during radio conversations with other employees or job briefings about track characteristics) and during extended periods of inactivity. OVERSPEED PREVENTION FRA recognizes that passenger rail transportation is generally extremely safe. However, these two recent accidents, which both involved overspeed events and resulted in numerous passenger fatalities, highlight the need to remain vigilant in ensuring employee compliance with operational speed limits and restrictions for passenger trains. As required by 49 U.S.C , railroads operating scheduled intercity and commuter passenger service in this country are required to implement PTC Systems by December 31, By statute a PTC system must be designed to prevent the type of overspeed events that occurred in the derailments discussed above, as well as train-to-train collisions, incursions into roadway work zone limits, and the movement of a train over a switch left in the wrong position. Amtrak has indicated that it intends to meet the statutory deadline to install PTC on the Northeast Corridor. FRA understands that other passenger railroads in this country have concerns about their ability to meet the December 31, 2015 deadline to install PTC. FRA intends to enforce the December 31, 2015 deadline to ensure that PTC is in use as quickly, safely, and efficiently as possible. Until PTC is in use across the passenger railroad systems in this country, and due to the significant safety concerns presented by the two accidents described above, FRA believes all passenger railroads and railroads that host passenger service need to evaluate 6

13 their systems and take immediate actions to prevent future catastrophic overspeed events from occurring. Some railroads have ATC or cab signal systems 3 that may be modified to prevent overspeed events at critical locations such as curves, bridges, and stations, similar to what FRA required of Amtrak at the May 12, 2015 derailment location in EO 31. Where such signal system modifications are appropriate and would not interfere with the timely implementation of PTC 4, FRA recommends that railroads make such modifications after identifying critical main track locations. Where such modifications to the signal system to slow trains at critical locations are not viable or would interfere with PTC implementation (or on railroads where no cab signal or ATC system is installed or operative), FRA encourages railroads to take other operational actions to prevent overspeed events, such as requiring additional qualified employees to occupy the controlling locomotive of a train to identify and communicate the applicable passenger train speed limits and restrictions, or by requiring additional crew communications regarding applicable passenger train speed limits and restrictions. FRA will continue to focus on ensuring passenger railroad compliance with maximum authorized train speeds and relevant temporary and permanent speed restrictions in the coming months, including stepped up enforcement actions. These actions will include, but will not be limited to, on-board inspections, radar speed 3 FRA regulations require that [p]rior to December 31, 2015, where any train is permitted to operate at a speed of 80 or more miles per hour, an automatic cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control system complying with the provisions of this part [part 236] shall be installed, unless an FRA approved PTC system meeting the requirements of this part [part 236] for the subject speed and other operating conditions, is installed. 49 CFR 236.0(d)(1). 4 FRA recommends that railroads consult with FRA if they believe a modification would interfere with PTC implementation. 7

14 monitoring at locations of significant permanent or temporary speed restrictions, monitoring of railroad officers who conduct operational tests, and comprehensive reviews of a railroad s implementation of their operational tests and inspection program. FRA strongly encourages railroads and other industry members to re-emphasize the importance of compliance with maximum authorized train speeds and any applicable speed restrictions, and to conduct operational testing at a level that will ensure compliance with all posted speed restrictions. RECOMMENDED RAILROAD ACTION: In light of the accidents discussed above, and in an effort to ensure the safety of the Nation s railroads, their employees, and the general public, FRA recommends that passenger railroads and railroads that host passenger service 5 do each of the following: (1) Review and implement the recommendations made in FRA Safety Advisory , which are discussed above. (2) Review the circumstances of the fatal May 12, 2015, Philadelphia derailment with their operating employees. (3) Survey their entire systems, or the portions on which passenger service is operated, and identify main track locations where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the approach speed to a curve or bridge and the maximum authorized operating speed for passenger trains at that curve or bridge (identified locations). (4) If the railroad utilizes an ATC, cab signal, or other signal system capable of providing warning and enforcement of applicable passenger train speed limits, make 5 This Safety Advisory only applies to the portions of the railroad s system over which passenger service is operated. 8

15 modifications to those systems where appropriate to ensure compliance with applicable speed limits at the identified locations. If the railroad is required to implement PTC at the identified locations, implement these recommended signal system changes in the interim. (5) If the railroad does not utilize an ATC, cab signal, or other signal system capable of providing warning and enforcement of applicable passenger train speed limits (or if a signal system modification would interfere with the implementation of PTC or is otherwise not viable) all passenger train movements at the identified locations be made with a second qualified crew member in the cab of the controlling locomotive, or with constant communication between the locomotive engineer and an additional qualified and designated crewmember in the body of the train. If the railroad is required to implement PTC at the identified locations, implement these recommended changes in the interim. (6) Install additional wayside signage alerting engineers and conductors of the maximum authorized passenger train speed throughout the passenger railroad s system or the portions of its system in which passenger service is operated, with particular emphasis on additional signage at the identified locations. FRA encourages all railroad industry members to take actions consistent with the preceding recommendations. FRA may modify this Safety Advisory , issue additional safety advisories, or take other appropriate action necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation s railroads, including pursing other corrective measures under its rail safety authority. 9

16 Issued in Washington, D.C. on June 9, Sarah Feinberg Acting Administrator. 10

17 ORAL STATEMENT OF SARAH FEINBERG, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OVERSIGHT OF THE AMTRAK ACCIDENT IN PHILADELPHIA June 2, 2015 Chairman Shuster, Ranking Member DeFazio, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss issues related to the May 12 th Amtrak accident in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and the safety of passenger rail. Let me say at the outset, all of us at the FRA are heartbroken about this tragic accident. The driving mission of our organization is to keep the public safe and so while every accident matters to us, this accident in particular which appears to have been preventable, and which took so many lives, and left so many injured is truly painful for our FRA family. We extend our deepest sympathies to the victims of this accident, and to their loved ones. And I can assure them that we will take every step we can to ensure an accident like this cannot happen again. We at FRA continue to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident. While it will take time to complete the investigation, we have not and will not wait to take actions that will improve the safety of Amtrak as well as other passenger rail operations. On May 16th, 4 days after the accident, I directed Amtrak to take several actions before allowing its operations to resume north of Philadelphia. I followed those directives with an Emergency Order on May 21. Amtrak has complied with those

18 directives thus far, and FRA will ensure that Amtrak follows through to fully implement them. When we released the May 21 st Emergency Order, we also stated that we were considering taking additional steps to direct similar orders at other passenger railroads that may have similar curve and speed issues. We continue our work on those directives and plan to release additional information about that work in the coming days. And while the cause of this accident has not been officially determined, we know that speed was a significant factor. And speed, simply put, is what we refer to as a human factor a factor based on human behavior. Human factors remain the leading cause of all rail accidents. They are also the most difficult to address. But today, I want to announce that FRA is preparing a package of actions that we will finalize in the coming weeks and months aimed at addressing just these kinds of factors human factors factors such as speed, distraction, training. These actions may include additional emergency orders, safety advisories, fast-track rulemakings, agreements, or other initiatives. And again, beyond just those next steps, I want to assure you that FRA is firmly committed to continue taking additional actions as many as it takes that will mitigate the risks and hazards identified in the ongoing investigation. There has been a significant amount of public discussion about what specifically would have prevented this accident. Which specific technology, which new regulation. The reality is, if we believe that the cause of this incident was speed, it would have been prevented by Positive Train Control. As this committee is well aware, PTC is the single most important railroad safety technological development in more than a century, and it is absolutely necessary to ensuring the kind of safety that we expect on our rail system. Per the Congress s mandate, railroads are required to install PTC on all passenger routes and certain freight routes by December 31, 2015 seven months from now. FRA has been actively pushing the railroads to have PTC fully implemented by this deadline. We have met with the railroads for years on this issue, we have hired staff to assist and oversee the implementation of the technology, we have urged the

19 submission of PTC safety and implementation plans, we have inquired with individual railroads and with the AAR about their progress, we have worked with the FCC to resolve issues related to spectrum. Importantly, we have also urged, year after year, for more funding to be directed at commuter railroads and at Amtrak to implement Positive Train Control. For the past two years, as part of the GROW AMERICA Act FRA has requested $825 million to assist commuter railroads with the implementation of PTC, as well as additional funding to aid with Amtrak s implementation of PTC. GROW AMERICA also proposed that FRA be granted authority to review, approve, and certify PTC Safety Plans on a railroad-by-railroad basis. FRA asked for this authority in order to ensure that railroads would be forced to work with safety regulators to take other or equivalent actions to raise the bar on safety even prior to full PTC implementation. We believe it is important that even those railroads that fail to meet the congressionally-mandated deadline be required to improve safety in the interim. Despite the many challenges facing full implementation of PTC, the Federal Railroad Administration s role is to carry out the enforcement of the deadline that is mandated by the Congress, and to ensure that railroads implement PTC as quickly, safely, and efficiently as possible. And so on January 1, 2016, the FRA will be prepared to take necessary enforcement actions against railroads that have failed to meet the deadline. Safety will always be the FRA s first priority. We appreciate this committee s attention and focus on issues related to the tragic Amtrak passenger train accident in Philadelphia. Again, I want to express our deepest sorrow for the victims and their families. We look forward to working with this Committee to improve our programs and make the American rail network as safe, reliable, and efficient as possible. I am happy to respond to your questions.

20 ORAL STATEMENT OF ROBERT C. LAUBY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATORFOR RAILROAD SAFETY & CHIEF SAFETY OFFICER, FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION U.S. SENATE PASSENGER RAIL SAFETY: ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND ON-GOING EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT TRAIN CONTROL TECHNOLOGY June 10, 2015 Thank you, Chairman Thune and Ranking Member Nelson for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss passenger rail safety. I want to start by extending our deepest sympathies to the victims and their loved ones of the May 12th Amtrak accident in Philadelphia. Safety drives everything we do at the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and I assure you that FRA will take every step it can to prevent accidents like this from happening again. FRA continues to investigate the accident. While it will take time to complete the investigation, FRA has not and will not wait to take actions that will improve the safety of Amtrak and other passenger rail operations. There has been a significant amount of public discussion about what could have prevented this accident. Which specific technology? Which new regulation? The reality is that Positive Train Control (PTC) is specifically designed to prevent overspeed accidents. If we believe that the cause of this incident was overspeed, it would have been prevented by PTC. As this Committee is well aware, PTC is the single most important railroad safety technological development in more than a century, and it is absolutely necessary to achieve the kind of safety that we expect on our rail system. Despite the challenges facing full implementation of PTC, FRA s role is to enforce the December 31, 2015, deadline that Congress imposed. FRA has been actively pushing the railroads to have PTC fully implemented by the deadline. We have met with the railroads for years on this issue, we have hired staff to assist and oversee the implementation of the technology, we 1

21 have urged the timely submission of PTC development and safety plans, we have discussed progress with individual railroads and with the Association of American Railroads (AAR), and we have worked directly with the FCC to resolve issues related to spectrum. Acting Administrator Feinberg also established a PTC Implementation Team that is aggressively managing this critical, Congressionally mandated safety technology. For more than three years, FRA has been sounding the alarm that most railroads have not made sufficient progress to meet the December 2015 deadline. FRA highlighted its concerns about PTC implementation in its August 2012 PTC report to Congress, as well as in the GROW AMERICA Act. Among those are the following challenges: Design Specification Availability Back office Servers and Dispatch System Availability Track Database Verification Installation Engineering Communications Spectrum Availability Radio Availability Reliability and Availability Funding Importantly, we have also urged, year after year, that more funding be directed at commuter railroads and Amtrak to implement PTC systems. For the past two years, FRA has requested $825 million to assist commuter railroads with the implementation of PTC, as well as additional funding to aid with PTC implementation on the Amtrak network. Despite a lack of federal funding directed to commuter railroads, FRA is using the resources it has available now to assist railroads in implementing PTC. For example, FRA issued a $967.1 million loan through the Railroad Rehabilitation and Improvement Financing (RRIF) program to the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the nation s largest commuter railroad provider. We also focused over $400 million of our High Speed Intercity Passenger Rail program funding on PTC installation. Additionally, our budget requests for rail development programs have consistently made 2

22 PTC installation an eligible activity, and have proposed that a continuous, predictable and reliable source of funding be provided for rail. If, on January 1, 2016, railroads required to implement PTC systems are in violation of this statutory deadline, FRA will take appropriate enforcement actions to achieve compliance. To address those concerns, the GROW AMERICA Act proposes that FRA be granted authority to review, approve, and provisionally certify PTC plans on a railroad-by-railroad basis. Provisional certification would also give FRA the authority to establish conditions to ensure railroads raise the bar on safety and establish appropriate back stops while they work toward full PTC implementation. GROW AMERICA also proposes to provide more than $3 billion over 6 years to help pay for PTC implementation on publicly funded commuter railroads and Amtrak routes. The public policy implications of railroads failing to meet the PTC deadline are serious. If Congress provides FRA the authority and flexibility as requested in the GROW AMERICA Act, then PTC implementation can be managed safely, efficiently, and effectively. We appreciate this Committee s attention and focus on to this issue, and we look forward to working with this Committee to improve our programs and make the American rail network as safe, reliable, and efficient as possible. I am happy to respond to your questions. 3

23 Positive Train Control: An Assessment of PTC Implementation by Commuter Railroads April 2015 Abstract Despite significant efforts and expenditures close to $1 billion, most commuter railroads will be unable to meet the December 31, 2015 deadline to implement Positive Train Control (PTC)

24 Contents About APTA... 2 Introduction and Executive Summary... 2 PTC Costs, Expenditures and Available Resources... 4 PTC Components... 6 Locomotives and control cars... 6 Technology... 7 Communications... 8 Back Office... 9 Integration and Testing... 9 Certification Process... 9 Conclusion Appendix A Appendix B

25 About APTA APTA is a nonprofit international association of 1,500 public and private sector organizations, engaged in the areas of bus, paratransit, light rail, commuter rail, subways, waterborne services, and intercity and high-speed passenger rail. This includes: transit systems; planning, design, construction, and finance firms; product and service providers; academic institutions; transit associations and state departments of transportation. APTA is the only association in North America that represents all modes of public transportation. APTA members serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient and economical transit services and products. More than 90 percent of the people using public transportation in the United States and Canada ride APTA member systems. Introduction and Executive Summary The Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (RSIA, P.L ), mandates that all passenger railroads and certain freight railroads install Positive Train Control (PTC) technology by December 31, Freight and commuter railroads have spent billions of dollars, to date, working towards implementation of the PTC requirement as the statutory deadline nears. However, even as railroads have devoted tremendous resources to PTC installation, APTA on behalf of the commuter industry and working in conjunction with other railroad industry partners, including AAR and ASLRRA, continues to assert that the complete deployment of a nationwide interoperable PTC network is not achievable by the statutory December 31, 2015 deadline. The Administration also testified before Congress that nationwide implementation of PTC is highly unlikely by the end of We support the contentions of the AAR in the April 2015 update that key components of the so called I-ETMS system remain under development and understand that the supply community is unable to produce systems and subsystems at a rate commensurate with a 2015 deadline. Complicating the issue for commuter railroads is the fact that the operators in the Northeast must contend with a non-interoperable yet FRA approved system, ACSES, in addition to I-ETMS, which is being deployed where required on the general railway network. Some operators are likely being required to dual equip their prime movers, so as to operate in territory covered by either ACSES or I-ETMS. An additional complication for commuter railroads is the use of a variety of prime movers (locomotives, cab cars, and self-propelled cars) which are not typical in the general railway network. The differences between the prime movers and control vehicles add to the engineering complexity, and make the situation for commuter railroads more complicated than that presented to the freight railroads. 2

26 As details of the hardware and software requirements for I-ETMS deployment become more clear, the ongoing back office requirements for even the most simple tenant commuter operations are presenting major issues in terms of initial cost, long term license fees and full time qualified personnel to make the system work. APTA s commuter railroads are unequivocally committed to implementing PTC on their systems as a national safety priority. However, meeting the PTC deadline remains a significant challenge for publicly-funded commuter railroads due to funding constraints, access to communication spectrum, and the state of the technology under development. In addition to the technical and logistical challenges faced by the freight railroads, the commuter situation is further complicated by the fact that commuter railroads are publicly funded and there are significant limitations in what they can do to free up resources. This remains especially true given the substantial and continuing backlog of state of good repair projects facing many agencies. Critical state of good repair projects, which also have significant safety implications, have been deferred in order to fund PTC at some railroads. Additionally, key parts of the technology required for PTC are still under development, and tens of thousands of radios remain to be manufactured. Lastly, the availability and acquisition of radio spectrum for PTC interoperability is a continuing challenge, along with the timely approval of required radio towers and antennas under the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) review process. Even for smaller systems, the complexity of the undertaking presents numerous challenges. Those commuter railroads who are right of way owners share the issues associated with track and wayside equipment database validation with the larger railroads. Those who operate on right of way owned by others must be conversant with revised and updated data bases on which they will operate. All operators dependent on I-ETMS software are constrained by the progress of final releases of the software. The instability of the I-ETMS system and its software represents a major challenge for commuter railroads with limited resources and no tolerance for incomplete or noncompliant systems. Moreover, commuter railroads will be required to train and, in most cases, hire employees to implement PTC. Freights are expressing willingness to share training programs but commuter railroads must adapt them to their specific circumstances adding a further burden to already minimal staff. Hopefully the concept of the shared back office will alleviate this situation to some extent. And there are issues that are certainly somewhat unique to commuter railroads and the environment in which they operate. Commuter operations present challenges not faced by the 3

27 freight railroads including numerous turn-backs which may require re-initialization of onboard PTC equipment, station stops requiring precise alignment, and in-service consist changes. While commuter railroads share the concerns of the freight operators regarding wayside implementation, resource constraints often place commuter railroads in a poor position to compete with larger railroads for procurement priority. Furthermore, the paperwork requirements for the planning and implementation of this one technology has raised concerns. Those who must submit PTC Safety Plans (which can reach 3000 pages) are faced with a daunting task, and some have expressed concerns that the scale of effort is not proportional to the size of the submitting agency. PTC Costs, Expenditures and Available Resources Based on the most recent data provided by commuter railroads, APTA estimates that it will cost more than $3.48 billion to fully implement PTC on all commuter railroads nationwide, an increase from the previous estimate of $2.75 billion. This remains a conservative estimate that excludes the remaining costs associated with spectrum acquisition or ongoing operational costs expected once these systems are fully implemented. Constrained budgets are a reality for publicly-funded commuter systems and substantial federal support is critical for these railroads to address PTC. These estimates do not take into consideration the costs of license fees for proprietary, yet required hardware and software and the ongoing fees for operations beyond the in-house costs for personnel not currently required for operations. The constraints that face public agencies such as commuter railroads cannot be overstated, as publicly funded operations are severely limited, with existing resources already committed, and shifts in resources highly difficult. Over two years ago the initial conservative estimate for PTC implementation on commuter railroads was over $2 billion, with more than 4,700 locomotives and passenger cars with control cabs and nearly 8,300 track miles to be equipped. Since this initial estimate, as commuter railroads progress with installation of PTC, the total costs of implementation have exceeded that previous estimate, and the estimates do not include costs related to the acquisition of the necessary 220 MHz radio spectrum. Further, the commuter sector represents a small percentage of the total rail industry s needs for PTC hardware and related vendor services, placing it at a disadvantage in a market where qualified vendors and equipment are limited. Taking the commuter industry as a whole, it is evident that considerable resources have been and must continue to be applied in order to achieve compliance. Taken individually, resource availability is not uniform. Since the industry is in the end widely distributed, commuter railroads 4

28 are in a poor position to compete for priority in the supply sector. All operators are in the end public, not for profit enterprises, supported by public funds, which are in short supply. Progress is being made in compliance with the PTC mandate. However, progress is not uniform throughout the industry given the differences in funding resources, the complexity of systems, interrelationship with other railroads, and even geographic distribution of operations. Some operators will be prepared within their own operations to begin serious deployment. Others while less developed are working seriously to be in compliance. To date, drawing from scarce public funds, commuter railroads have spent nearly $950 million, toward the estimated $3.48 billion cost to complete deployment. In the absence of Federal funding to support efforts to comply with the Federal mandate, commuter railroads have faced significant challenges to identify capital resources for implementation, as well as resources for the long-term operational costs of PTC. Yet, despite these challenges, nearly 71 percent of commuter railroads say they have identified a potential funding source for full implementation costs. However, even among those agencies, funding continues to be cited as a significant challenge (see page 11). Further, 50 percent of commuter railroads are deferring other capital improvements in order to implement PTC. However, despite progress in identification of resources needed to implement the technology, questions remain when considering long-term operational costs. Total national annual operating costs are estimated to be more than $83 million, with individual agency estimates ranging from a high estimate of $40 million down to several agencies reporting less than Sources identified for full implementation costs Capital Fund Full Funding Grant Agreement (FFGA) FRA, FHWA, state, Local FTA (primary) and State (secondary) FTA, Regional, state and agency funds Federal and state funds Federal, Local, potential RRIF Federal, State and Local sources Federal, State, Local and private sources Internal, Federal and State sources Local Funds Local funds, capital budget Local, State & Federal Grants State funds and Federal grants State Funds State safety and security funding Sales tax 5

29 $1 million per year to operate their PTC system. Most of those reporting operating costs below $1 million are attributable to limited estimates and insufficient data. However, only 50 percent of agencies report having identified a source of funds to support PTC operational costs for the long-term. Some uncertainty remains for agencies however, regarding what the full costs will be for operations, not the least of which involves back office server (BOS) considerations. And again, when asked whether agencies were deferring other aspects of their capital program to fulfill the PTC mandate, 50 percent of commuter railroads state that they are deferring other capital investments to implement PTC. What projects are you deferring or have you deferred to pay for PTC? Bridge rehabilitation and tie replacements Several rail, highway and bridge projects Signal upgrades, yard improvements, rolling stock, track and bridge improvements State of good repair projects Track improvements, speed enhancements, safety projects at crossings. Bridge, station, substation and numerous other projects. Deferred fleet & route expansions that can possibly double the agency's annual ridership. Deferred investments in transit oriented development. Design/Construction of redundant dispatch control center, highway grade crossing safety improvements, double-tracking and capacity improvements, traction power rehabilitation, radio communication improvements Master finance plan is complex with many projects and it would be difficult to state exactly which projects have been deferred. PTC Components Locomotives and control cars Issues faced by the freight railroads are replicated in the commuter environment magnified by the added complexity of the nearly 4900 prime movers in commuter service. There are cab cars, double ended units, and a variety of electric and diesel units presenting numerous additional challenges for equipment installers. 6

30 Component The Commuter Industry Industry Total (estimated) Revenue vehicles operated in maximum service 6,184 Revenue vehicles available for maximum service 7,304 Number of cab units* 4,744 Track Mileage 8,265 Total Rail-Grade Crossings 3,668 Annual Total Vehicle Miles (millions) 359 Unlinked passenger trips (millions) 488 Annual Total Train miles (millions) 59 *Cab units include locomotives, self-propelled cars and locomotive hauled cars with control cab units. Vehicles in Industry Total reflect those requiring PTC equipment. Numbers drawn from Appendix B include Loco-motives, Self-Propelled Passenger Cars (one Cab), Self-Propelled Passenger Cars (Two Cabs counted twice), and Loco-motive Hauled Passenger Cars (One Cab). Not included in count are Loco-motive Hauled Passenger Cars (No Cab), Self-Propelled Passenger Cars (No Cab). Technology Fifty percent of commuter railroads will be utilizing I-ETMS as their technology, however, some may have to utilize more than one technology due to track and ROW shared with other railroads. This is a major issue facing commuter railroads which differs from the freight situation -- the prospect that some commuter railroads in the Northeast may be required to dual equip in order to accommodate I-ETMS and ACSES. Which technology are you planning to use? Value Count Percent ACSES % I-ETMS % Enhanced Automatic Train Control % Communications-Based Train Management (CBTM) 1 4.2% Other (required) % 7

31 Communications Spectrum remains an issue for commuter railroads. Lack of availability and the initial cost of leasing spectrum from 220 LLC and yet undefined ongoing costs are major challenges. Smaller commuter railroads at least are not in a position to compete in the market for priority. More than 54 percent of commuter railroads report that they do not yet have access to the spectrum necessary for their PTC system to function (including one reporting that it is utilizing a PTC technology that will not require spectrum). Of those reporting that they have not acquired adequate spectrum, eleven agencies have not acquired any spectrum, one agency has acquired 10 percent, and 1 agency has acquired 75 percent. When asked what steps they were taking to obtain the needed spectrum, agencies provided a variety of responses. Do you have the necessary spectrum? Yes 46% N/A (Not Needed) 4% No 50% Yes No N/A (Not Needed) What are you doing to acquire the necessary spectrum? Pursuing purchase of spectrum on secondary market Type approval does not rely on an I-ETMS solution. Waiting on TYPE approval from the FRA before pursuit of spectrum. Leasing spectrum from PTC 220 LLC In negotiations with PTC-220 LLC to acquire spectrum. Pursuing multiple commercial providers for access via lease or purchase Working with regional partners to acquire or lease but we have been in the process for several years now. It is not clear if there is a reasonable path forward at this time. 5-year lease with PTC 220 LLC is in place to support near-term needs while we continue to seek FCC approval of spectrum acquisition that has been in escrow for many years. Will be compelled by circumstance to utilize WSRS and fiber optic backbone. Wayside to train communication via Federated network and PTC 220 LLC facilities. Multiple approaches, negotiating with sister agencies to sub-lease RF Spectrum from them; contact with PTC-220 LLC; issue a second RFP on the commercial market for source and identify any other license holders of the 220 MHz Spectrum. Work with the partners to complete the regional slot plan. PTC-220 got their waivers approved by FCC almost doubling the available 220 MHz channels in our area. In the process of negotiating with two spectrum holders at this time. One request is currently with the FCC - the second is being sought in the event the first request is denied by the FCC. 8

32 Back Office As mentioned elsewhere in this report, mechanizing back office operations is a major challenge for commuter railroads. The purpose of the PTC back office (or control center) is to provide a central location for communication and coordination of Crew Sign-in/off, Bulletins, Train orders, Track Authorities, Speed Restrictions, and Train Information, as well as specialized data to and from the wayside, and train operational and safety data. Especially for smaller commuter rail operations, the back office requirements add a unique level of complexity never before included in their operations. Safely guaranteeing the flow of critical information between the sub-systems and maintaining the functionality of the back office server (BOS) is an essential part of the operation of the system. There remain some issues concerning to what degree commuter railroads must install and operate back offices. With FRA concurrence, shared back office solutions are being investigated however there continue to be obstacles contributing to delays in developments in this area. Back office issues are also relevant for commuter railroads required to dual equip. The freight industry and AMTRAK have been most helpful in defining requirements as the details of the various system requirements emerge. Workers with the skills required are generally not currently available at most commuter railroads and certainly not in quantities necessary to support sustained back office operations. APTA and FRA have been advocating the availability of a Shared Back Office. Nearly 71 percent of commuter railroads state that they will either host or work with Class I railroad who will serve as host to back office server operations, while 29 percent indicate they would use shared services. Integration and Testing Where commuter railroads are hosted by others, integration and testing can be complicated by tenant relationships, adding yet another step in the deployment process. Commuter railroads will be asked to execute agreements defining the relative roles of the parties involved also leading to the workload of the host railroad. Internally, commuter railroads must accommodate the requirements of host dispatchers and system initialization practices which are likely to change under PTC. Most commuter railroads do not have separate test facilities and are therefore dependent on hosts or contractors to facilitate testing. Test plans must be coordinated with host systems to insure acceptance and authorization to proceed into PTC territory. Certification Process Where required by the nature of operations commuter railroads will submit Safety Plans for consideration by FRA. In most cases reliance will be placed on contract resources due to the lack of internal manpower or expertise. Issues related to coordination with the FRA and the pace of approval will in some cases need to be coordinated with host railroads. FRA reported to Congress 9

33 in August 2012, that it will need at least 6 to 9 months to review PTC Safety Plans, and approximately 38 railroads will need certification. And FRA has also indicated its own concerns over a shortage of qualified FRA staff, noting that its PTC staff consisted of 10 PTC specialists and one supervisor. There has also been some suggestion that certification responsibilities may fall to the railroads themselves, in order to expedite certifications within the current 2015 deadline, due to this FRA staffing shortage. For smaller commuter railroads, staff capacity is even more limited, and commuter railroads will not have the capacity to fulfill the Federal government s responsibilities for certification. If the expectation is that commuter railroads hire independent, third-party consultants to certify the systems, then that will add to additional unexpected and unfunded costs facing these agencies, in addition to raising liability questions and adding further delay. Conclusion The commuter industry has made great strides in responding to the PTC deployment mandate, and all commuter railroads remain committed to implementing this important safety technology. However, while 29 percent of agencies continue to openly target dates within 2015 for full implementation of their PTC systems, significant questions remain around whether those target dates are achievable, given the testing and certification steps that must occur. Systems which may be prepared to deploy by the end of 2015, may also find themselves delayed by forces beyond their control such as plan approval. More than 57 percent of those agencies do not include FRA certification within the time estimated. Agencies indicating that they will not be able to fully implement by the deadline were asked by APTA to estimate their target date for implementation. Most agencies indicated a completion date prior to the end of 2018, although two indicated needing until 2019 and one indicated the timeline was dependent upon the host railroad. It is worth noting again, that even among the 71 percent of agencies which do not claim to be on target to achieve full implementation before the statutory deadline of December 2015, considerable resources have already been expended or committed to the process drawn from extremely limited funds. 40% Estimated % of Lines Complete by End of Year 56% 71% 94% 96% 100%