Released capacity and HS2

Transcription

1 The Red House 10 Market Square Old Amersham Buckinghamshire HP7 0DQ 21 February 2013 Rt Hon Patrick McLoughlin MP Department for Transport Great Minster House 76 Marsham Street London SW1P 4DR Dear Secretary of State, Released capacity and HS2 I am writing to you as a Director of HS2 Action Alliance, an organisation supported by more than 70 local groups concerned about the lack of justification for HS2. In January 2013, DfT and HS2 Ltd published an explanation of the service patterns assumed for the August 2012 business case for HS2 1. This detailed the services to be run with the released capacity. It improved services for a number of stations that previously would have had worsened services when HS2 becomes operational. But it does so at the cost of leaving no space for more freight or local commuting services and also has implications for the business case. Lack of released capacity for local commuting and freight Analysis of these proposed service patterns shows that on the WCML the assumed service pattern for the August update now leaves no spare capacity. This has the consequence (inter alia) that it would not be practicable either to move some traffic from the slow to fast lines or to run additional stopping services or freight on the fast lines (as the fast lines have now become full), and thus create train paths for either stopping local commuter trains or freight. I attach a summary of this analysis. This is contrary to the assumed impact of HS2 given in Released Capacity on the Wider Rail Network, which was published as a supporting document for the 2011 consultation on HS2, which states that: On the WCML there would be the opportunity to provide a fast, more frequent and regular set of services not only to and from London but also between the growing population centres along the route. 1 Updated economic case for HS2 (August 2012): Explanation of the service patterns, January

2 We have assumed: a number of long distance services between London and the North West, North Wales and Scotland would continue on the WCML but more would stop at key intermediate stations such as Milton Keynes frequent all day fast services connecting London, Watford and Milton Keynes to Northampton and Rugby before serving either the route to Birmingham or Trent Valley stations such as Lichfield more frequent services from London to Milton Keynes and Northampton calling at principal stations as well as a more frequent stopping service south of Milton Keynes Additional capacity would be available for freight services, particularly fast container trains from the South and East Coast ports to the Midlands and North, thereby helping to reduce the number of lorries on the motorway network. While the assumptions of the first two bullets survive, the latter parts of the statement (in blue) do not. You will appreciate that the assumed freed up capacity for local suburban services and for freight has been a core part of the message your Department has been giving on the benefits of HS2. Rejection of the 51m solution is baseless The absence of capacity to provide additional stopping commuter and freight services was presented as a decisive defect in 51m s proposals for additional long distance capacity. It now seems that HS2 similarly creates no more local and freight capacity. This undermines the justification given by the Secretary of State in her January 2012 decision to reject the 51m solution. It also undermines the case made by a number of supporters of HS2 that there would be widespread benefits from released capacity. The 51m solution meets all your forecast demand, is cheaper, and can be done in stages against emergent demand. The latter is an important benefit, bearing in mind the uncertainty that demand growth will continue as previously (as emphasised by 32 transport economics professors in a recent open letter to you). It also does not rely upon unjustifiable assumptions about the value of business time savings. I trust that you will now reconsider the 51m solution. Infeasibility of service patterns The assumed service patterns in the January 2013 document give rise to other concerns. The proposals for Coventry to Birmingham seem impracticable because there is insufficient line capacity to run them. The proposals for north of Preston seem likely to reduce line capacity restricting rather than enhancing freight capacity. Questions about the deliverability of HS2 and classic services should not remain unanswered. Why have illustrative timetables not been published that demonstrate how the claimed patterns would be deliverable? 51m did this for their proposals. The failure of DfT and HS2 Ltd to similarly demonstrate the feasibility of their assumed service patterns is consequently surprising. Business case Not only does the absence of spare train paths undermine the reason given for your Department s rejection of the 51m solution, it brings into question other elements of the business case for HS2. The Wider Economic Impacts (WEI) for HS2 are made up of two components: imperfect competition and agglomeration. Imperfect competition is a function of the business cost savings (time savings 2

3 and reliability benefits), while agglomeration is the benefit from improved local travel (ie commuting) from the reuse of released capacity. You will be aware that we consider that the business cost savings based on shorter journey times are questionable, because the real value of the journey time savings is plainly less than assumed by DfT. Reliability benefits are also unlikely to be realisable because of the assumed HS2 service intensity of 18 trains per hour all day. A service pattern 18 trains/hr all day has questionable delivery and is yet to be proven possible: any delay (ie from the late arrival of a train from the classic network, or a breakdown or equipment failure) may be unrecoverable due to the intensity of working. But the agglomeration benefits are also now highly questionable, as HS2 creates little improvement for the more local commuting journeys. It is surprising that the August 2012 business case finds greater benefits for HS2 from WEI. I would be grateful if DfT or HS2 Ltd might provide an itemisation of the assumed WEI for Phase 1 ( 4.8 bn) and the full Y ( 15.4 bn) based on the current service plans. There are similar issues with the assumed reductions in the cost savings from reduced classic rail services worth 7.7bn in the business case. Clearly if services are maintained on the classic lines, the previously assumed savings will not be realised. In fact the August update states that greater savings were found on the classic network 2. I would be grateful if DfT or HS2 Ltd could explain how the previously assumed savings are expected to be increased with the revised service patterns. Yours sincerely, Bruce Weston Director, HS2 Action Alliance cc Alison Munro, Chief Executive, HS2 Ltd Jill Adam, DfT Andrea Leadsom, MP David Lidington, MP Cheryl Gillan MP Martin Tett, Chairman, 51m 2 Updated Economic Case for HS2, August 2012, section 4.2 3

4 Appendix HS2 Released capacity on the West Coast Main Line (WCML) HS2 Ltd published a technical note Released Capacity on the Wider Rail Network in 2011 as part of the HS2 Phase 1 consultation material. The note includes a clear description of railway capacity: When we describe the capacity of a railway we mean the number of trains that can be reliably run in a given time period over a route often measured as trains per hour in each direction. As well as physical considerations such as the spacing of signals, this depends on factors such as: The mix of types of trains express, commuter, freight each with different top speeds, acceleration and braking The mixture of stopping patterns (a train stopping at one station will be caught up by non-stopping ones) The note then argues that, following the transfer of most long distance non-stop services to HS2, space would be freed up on the WCML; and because the mix of trains would be reduced, more commuter and freight trains could be run than the longer distance trains they were replacing This note analyses the claims made in HS2 s technical note in the light of the indicative service patterns set out in the Updated economic case for HS2 (August 2012): Explanation of service patterns 3, published in January Impacts on key sections of the route are considered below. Euston Milton Keynes This is a four-track section, with two fast lines primarily carrying 125 mph tilting Virgin trains, but also with some use by 100/110 mph London Midland electric multiple units (EMUs), and two slow lines carrying semi-fast and stopping passenger services and freight (principally 75 mph intermodal trains). Current use in each direction for a typical off peak hour is set out below: Fast lines 8 x 125 mph tilting Pendolino services 1 x 125 mph tilting Voyager service 3 x 100/110 mph EMUs One Pendolino and one EMU stop at Watford Junction, and one EMU switches to the slow lines at Ledburn Junction, south of Leighton Buzzard. The remaining trains all run non-stop to Milton Keynes or beyond. The fast lines are planned with a minimum of three minute 3 1

5 headways, but stops at Watford junction, slower journey times for the EMU services and the switch of one train to the slow lines at Ledburn Junction means that in practice the line is heavily utilised, with no possibility of use by freight trains or stopping passenger services. Slow lines 2 x semi-fast services to Milton Keynes (one through to Northampton) 2 x stopping services to Tring 1 x East Croydon Milton Keynes service stopping at most, but not all stations 2/3 x 75mph freight trains Although there are fewer trains overall on the slow lines, capacity and speed are constrained by the stopping services; freight trains typically travel at less than 75 mph, as they catch up stopping passenger trains. Proposed use in each direction for a typical off peak hour: The specification set out in the Explanation of service patterns gives the following pattern (derived from the tables on pages 7 and 8): Fast lines 3x 125 mph tilting Pendolino services 1 x 125 mph tilting Voyager service 5 x 100/110 mph EMUs Whilst this is a reduction in the total number of trains per hour, 5 trains are shown to stop at Watford Junction, and 2 are shown to switch to the slow lines at Leighton Buzzard. Taking these increased constraints into account for example a fast train can only leave Euston 8 minutes after a train stopping at Watford Junction it is clear that there will still be no capacity for freight trains or stopping passenger trains on the fast lines, even in off-peak periods. Slow lines The specification is essentially unchanged, with no additional capacity created over and above the existing spare capacity. On the basis of the indicative information provided by HS2, it is clear that no additional capacity is provided for freight and semi-fast and stopping passenger services between London and Milton Keynes In particular, HS2 will not create any additional peak suburban commuter capacity on the slow lines. The Government s rejection of the 51m alternative, primarily on the grounds of inadequate Euston commuter capacity, is therefore flawed. 2

6 Coventry Birmingham This is a constrained two-track section, on which capacity is limited by stopping service which, if stopping at all stations, take 15 minutes longer than InterCity trains calling only at Birmingham International. Current use in each direction for a typical off peak hour: 3x 125 mph tilting Pendolino services 1 x 125 mph tilting Voyager service 3 x 100mph EMUs making between 4 and 8 stops 1 x stopping EMU between Birmingham New Street and Birmingham International only In addition there are some freight trains (4 or 5 a day) Proposed use in each direction for a typical off peak hour: 1x 125 mph tilting Pendolino services 2 x 125 mph tilting Voyager service 3 x fast EMUs 3 x EMUs non-stop between Birmingham New Street and Birmingham International, then all stations to Coventry 2 x stopping EMUs between Birmingham New Street and Birmingham International only HS2 s indicative specification significantly increases the number of trains on this section, and is in practice highly likely to be impossible, given the journey time difference between the fast and the stopping services. There is also clearly no capacity for any day-time freight on this section. Lichfield Crewe/Manchester This section already has bottlenecks, principally the two-track section between Colwich and Stafford, the major junction just south of Stafford, and the two-track section north of Stokeon-Trent. These constraints will become more serious after the completion of Phase 1, significantly constraining future freight growth until Phase 2 is completed. Preston Glasgow The indicative specification for Phase 2 shows two high speed trains an hour non-stop from Preston to Carstairs, where the trains will both divide with half portion going to Glasgow, the other to Edinburgh. This section is two-track, mixed traffic, with freight operation already constrained by the existing InterCity services, almost all of which stop at Lancaster, Oxenholme or Penrith, and Carlisle. The high speed trains will therefore increase the speed differential with freight, reducing overall capacity on the route. If the high speed trains are timed at 30 minute intervals, which would be desirable to maximise the attractiveness of the London Scotland service, it is doubtful whether there would be any daytime capacity over this section for freight, taking into account the other passenger services specified to serve intermediate stations. February