Outline. Motivation. Maritime Security Gaps and Vulnerabilities. Maritime Security Gaps and. Motivation

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1 Outline Motivation Maritime Security Gaps and Vulnerabilities Technologies for Maritime Security Technology Application Summary Risk Analysis Conclusion Contact Information 2 International Ship and Port Facility Security Code Motivation Maritime Security Gaps and Vulnerabilities Containerized cargo for intermodal transportation Ferries Cruise ships and large pleasure vessels Car carriers Underwater sabotage of a port facility Tankers and liquefied gas carriers Hazardous materials cargo Terrorists masquerading as professional seafarers and/or professional waterfront workers 3 4

2 Containerized Cargo for Intermodal Transportation Threats: - hiding and transporting weapons; - hiding and transporting CBRNE substances; - illegal human transportation. Vulnerabilities: - openness of ferry terminals; - passenger screening. Ferries Verify cargo contents without incurring commercial delays. Distinguish legitimate port users and ferry passengers from those desiring to do harm without infringing upon civil liberties and without creating lengthy delays. 5 6 Cruise Ships and Large Pleasure Vessels Vulnerabilities: - openness of the terminals; - passenger and crew screening (large number of multicultural crew members); - surveillance. Car Carriers Threats: - hiding and transporting weapons; - hiding and transporting CBRNE substances; - illegal human transportation. Distinguish legitimate passengers and crew members from those desiring to harm without infringing upon civil liberties, and without creating delays. Identify a process to unobtrusively detect whether or not a vehicle has been tampered with and accomplish this without delaying the vehicle transfer. 7 8

3 Underwater Sabotage of a Port Facility Vulnerability: Attacks from underwater divers and remotely operated underwater vehicles. Tankers and Gas Carriers Threat: High consequence cargoes e.g., crude oil, petroleum products, LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas), LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas). Identify counter-technologies to combat possible attacks by underwater divers and remotely operated underwater vehicles without adversely impacting a port s capability to openly and freely accommodate maritime commerce. Create a system which improves the port officials capability to have adequate assurances that those overseeing the ship and cargo operation are not intending to use them as weapons while minimizing port delays Hazardous Materials Cargo Placards Vulnerability: Placards may identify potential targets for terrorists Terrorists Masquerading As Professional Seafarers and/or Professional Waterfront Workers Threat: Terrorists infiltrating a shipping company posing as legitimate seafarers and acquiring access to key ship components and/or the ship s cargo. Make first responders aware of hazardous material containers, drums, and other means of hazardous material storage for transportation, without facilitating the identification of the hazardous material contents to potential terrorists. Design an effective credentialing system to develop assurances that waterfront workers and seafarers do not have the intent to do harm when at their shipboard or shore-side workplace

4 Technologies for Maritime Security -Ray, Gamma Ray, and Neutron Scanning Biometrics RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) Tags Underwater Surveillance Smart Containers Port Security Web Board Query -Ray, Gamma Ray, and Neutron Scanning -Ray Scanning Gamma Ray Imaging Neutron Scanning Biometrics Radio Frequency Identification Tags RFID System Architecture: -Tag -Reader -Data Processing - voice recognition - fingerprint recognition - iris scan - retinal scan - facial recognition - vascular pattern recognition RFID System Classifications - Active tags vs. passive tags - Frequency based classification (LF, HF, and UHF) 15 16

5 Underwater Surveillance Underwater Surveillance ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle AUV Autonomous Underwater Vehicle ROVs vary in size and configuration C-TRA Smart Containers LLNL UWB Intrusion Detection Sensor Integrated Satellite Phone and GPS Unit Neutron, Gamma Spectroscopy, Radiation Detector Optional Sensors: 3-Axis Accelerometer Temperature, Humidity Hall-Effect Door Sensor Still Camera for Snapshots Ambient Light Detector Passive Infrared Detectors Control CPU and Data Logging Hardware Large Capacity External Data Storage High Capacity Batteries and Power Monitoring Hardware * Information provided by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 20

6 Smart Containers Port Security Web Board Query 1) Build & test prototype package 2) Install & verify package and scan at load point 5) Compare logged and real-time data 4) Scan at transshipment points 3) Track shipment, log data & report status to website * Information provided by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory TECHNOLOGY APPLICATION SUMMARY Risk Analysis Application Technology Container Ferry Yacht Cruise ship Car Carrier Underwater sabotage Tanker, LPG, LNG Hazardous Materials Seafarer and ship management integrity Port perimeter Scanning portals Handheld CBRNE detection Biometrics RFID ROV Sonar Smart container Web Query Data/network security Mesh network of sensors Smart video surveillance Aerostat surveillance Risk = ( Threat Vulnerability) Consequence Countermeasures Threat Vulnerability Risk = Consequence Countermeasures 23 24

7 Risk Management Conclusion Challenges to improve maritime security: 3. Need for national and international standards with how terrorism-related risks are, at the port level, defined, evaluated and contrasted; Risk A Cost of Countermeasures 10. Need for further exploration and further development of port security technologies; Conclusion 1. Need for turn-key port security solutions which address administrative and technological interoperability; Contact Information Dale Ferriere National Infrastructure Institute Center for Infrastructure Expertise 100 Arboretum Drive Suite 306, Portsmouth, NH USA, dferriere@ni2.org Khrystyna Pysareva University of New Hampshire, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Kingsbury Hall, Durham 03824, USA, pisareva@cisunix.unh.edu 7. Need for greater inclusion in the development and application of port security technologies of leading, distinguished, non-national shipping companies and international seafarers. Andrzej Rucinski University of New Hampshire, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Kingsbury Hall, Durham 03824, USA, andrzej.rucinski@unh.edu 27 28