Strategic Risk Assessment and Contingency Planning in Interconnected Transportation Networks (STAR-TRANS)

Transcription

1 Strategic Risk Assessment and Contingency Planning in Interconnected Transportation Networks (STAR-TRANS) Dr. Athanasios Sfetsos NCSR Demokritos With contribution from all consortium members

2 Project Overview Strategic Risk Assessment and Contingency Planning in Interconnected Transport Networks Co-funded by European Commission under FP7 Theme 4 (ICT) & Theme 10 (Security) Duration: 01/11/ /04/2012 Budget: ~3.2 million Euros Objective: To develop a comprehensive Strategic Transportation Security Risk Assessment Framework for assessing related risk and provide coherent contingency management procedures in interconnected, interdependent and heterogeneous transport networks.

3 Background Widely Used Open Systems Intentional Incidents Major terrorism incidents : London, Madrid, Tokyo Sarin Un-intentional Incidents and Natural Disasters EC Directive 114/2008 on Critical Infrastructure Protection All hazards approach Interconnected infrastructures Based on the empirical approach of the Transportation Security Programme for the 2004 Athens Olympic Games

4 Project Objectives To produce a Strategic Security Risk Assessment Framework for European interconnected and interdependent transportation networks. A modelling formalism capable of representing: incidents, structure and assets as well as asset interdependencies Impact Assessment Tool (IAT): a SW tool to manage risk assessment models and capable of assessing and reporting the impact of a specific risk incident To evaluate the proposed Risk Assessment Framework in two demonstrators: Urban (Athens) and Regional (Bologna) To disseminate the results of the project and to formulate a viable and sustainable exploitation strategy.

5 The basic steps Risk Analysis Approach Phase 1: Assessment of present situation Breakdown of transportation elements Threat identification & assessment Vulnerability analysis Phase 2: Risk Assessment Likelihood Consequences Risk propagation Final Risk estimation Phase 3: Contingency Planning and Business Continuity Risk barriers Incident Response procedures Minimal disruption to services Revision of Standard Operating procedures What is critical Prioritization of risk Options to reduce risk & Contingency planning Which was introduced into an ICT tool

6 Transportation Networks Each network was modeled starting from its assets, i.e., objects with specific and easily recognizable roles. Hierarchical classification Direct Assets Means of Transport Transport Demand Transport Network Energy Information Indirect Assets

7 Network of Networks Metro Network (M) Assets are interconnected in non mutually exclusive types Suburban Network (S) Bus-/street Network (BS) Physical Geographical Systems Logical Emergency Response Network (E)

8 Generic Threat Classification Man-made / Targeted / Intentional Organized and non-organized criminal activity Terrorism internal and international Anarchism Organized and common crime Anti-social behaviour Mass Public Demonstrations/Strikes (as a means of protest) Demonstrations / public gatherings / strikes that turn violent Accidents/Random Events Environmental accidents Technological accidents Transportation accidents Collapse of infrastructure Technological intrusion Communication or computer hacking Power failure Other Abandoned objects (usual) Abandoned objects (hazardous materials) Resources deficiency Panic without important cause (e.g., due to spreading of false news) Panic due to emergency (e.g., fire, earthquake) Threats from Nature / Untargeted Natural disasters Extreme weather effects Geological effects Hydro-geological effects Biological Physicochemical disasters (Fires) Fires Wildfires

9 Risk Analysis Process

10 Risk Propagation Probabilistic approach, where the incident in a NoN asset may trigger a new security incident in a different asset. Probability depends upon the nature of the incident affecting the originating asset, the characteristics of the asset under consideration (risk countermeasures, means of immediate response, etc.) and the type of interconnection between the assets. May affect likelihood of new incident and/or consequecnes

11 Contingency Planning Incident Response Who will respond to the incident (and original location) What means are required Incident scene (extent geographical impact on transport network) Emergency routes to / from the incident location (optimally defined paths) Business continuity Minimize disruption to services (rerouting)

12 Dynamic Traffic Simulation Dynamic Traffic Assignment is the state of the art in traffic modeling What does the model do? Finds the routes (Dynamic User Equilibrium) that people take by time of day at 15-min time intervals (or less) Predicts the evolution of traffic conditions on large regions (on an average day or for any modeled specific day) Uses a traffic simulator that can potentially model incident, traffic signals, variable message signs & other traffic control Still data availability and consistency remains an open issue

13 STAR-TRANS tool

14 Presentation of the Athens Case Study Network of Networks Scenario details Bomb call in a station (verified and assessed) Major Hub impact on interconnected assets Pick hour - Impact of transport patterns Dispatching of ER

15 Presentation of the Athens Case Study Risk Output / Incident Response

16 Presentation of the Athens Case Study Impact on traffic flow

17 Presentation of the Athens Case Study ER Dispatching P.S.Vrilissia P.S.Chalandri P.S.Ag.Paraskevi P.S.Geraka GADA SWAT

18 Presentation of the Athens Case Study Rerouting

19

20 Consortium 1 INTRASOFT International S.A. INTRASOFT 2 National Center for Scientific Research Demokritos Environment Research Laboratory NCSRD 3 Center for Security Studies KEMEA 4 Confederation of Organizations in Road Transportation Enforcement CORTE 5 QinetiQ S.A. QINETIQ 6 Fraunhofer Institute for Transportation and Infrastructure Systems 7 Center for Research and Technology Hellas Information & Telematics Institute FhG CERTH 8 Metropolitan Police Service MET 9 CTL Cyprus Transportation Logistics Ltd. CTL 10 SQUARIS Ltd. SQUARIS 11 SCOCIETA RETI E MOBILITA SpA SRM

21 website: Contact Us:

22 Likelihood definition Measurable estimate of the feasibility of an attack or likelihood of an accident / natural event VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM HIGH CERTAINTY Likelihood needs to fit with mainly two types of adverse events: Untargeted attacks or accidents: Historical evidence. Targeted or intentional attacks: Expert knowledge & historical data 15/03/10 Thanasis Sfetsos STAR-TRANS: 1 st Review Meeting Presentation of Deliverable D1.2

23 Level 1 Level 2 Social & People affected Psychological Change of daily routines Impact Categories Level 1 Level 2 Casualties Deaths Injuries Business Continuity Reputation of transport network Employees affected Government Continuity Asset operability Economic Losses Monetary loss of operator Monetary loss in general Loss of service in time Part / entire network out of service Environment Area affected Recovery time Impact on natural population and biodiversity Chemical severity Response Emergency teams Evacuation Accessibility of network Security perimeters Cascade event Transportation network Urban environment Critical Infrastructure Natural Hazard Service restoration time Service replacement Service replacement availability Asset back up service Personnel incapable of work Passengers unable to use network Passengers to be transported by alternative means Rerouting of fleet Impact on interconnected asset Geographical impact

24 Risk Matrix Shows how to combined categorical estimate of Likelihood and Impact into a final Risk value CONSEQUENCES NEGLIGIBLE SMALL MEDIUM HIGH SEVERE CERTAINTY LOW MEDIUM HIGH CRITICAL CRITICAL LIKELIHOOD HIGH VERY LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH CRITICAL MEDIUM VERY LOW LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM HIGH LOW VERY LOW VERY LOW LOW LOW MEDIUM VERY LOW VERY LOW VERY LOW VERY LOW VERY LOW LOW 15/03/10 Thanasis Sfetsos STAR-TRANS: 1 st Review Meeting Presentation of Deliverable D1.2