Human Factors: Safety and Automation. Beth Lyall, Ph.D. Research Integrations Inc.

Transcription

1 Human Factors: Safety and Automation Beth Lyall, Ph.D. Research Integrations Inc.

2 Overview Definition and approach Examples of automation and safety improvements Flight deck automation issues Human factors considerations for design of all components 3

3 What is automation? A function that is accomplished by a system that would otherwise be accomplished by the user of focus (pilot, maintenance technician, ground worker, flight attendant, etc.) The definition can be a moving target Automation is not automation is not automation Different findings can be explained by differences in WHAT was automated, HOW it was automated, and FOR WHOM it was automated 4

4 Accident Rates Aircraft Generations st generation: B707 DC8 2nd generation: B727 B737-1/200 B747 Conv DC9 DC10 A300B4 3rd generation: MD80 MD11 MD90 B737-3/4/500 B B757/B767 A310/A th generation: A319/A320/A321 A330/A340 B st generation All aircraft 4th generation 3rd generation 2nd generation Years Of Operation 5

5 ATL Departure Procedures- Before RNAV Departures are vectored Headings, altitudes and speeds issued by controllers Large number of voice transmissions required Significant dispersion Tracks are inconsistent and inefficient Limited exit points Source: MITRE/CAASD 6

6 ATL Departure Procedures- After RNAV Departures fly RNAV tracks (not vectored) Headings, altitudes and speeds are automated (via avionics) Voice transmissions reduced (30-50%) Dispersions reduced Tracks are more consistent and more efficient Additional exit points available Improved vertical profiles Source: MITRE/CAASD 7

7 Automation and Human Factors Some new challenges Authority and responsibility Behavior visibility must be designed in to the system Takes more forethought in design to make it Understandable Useable with other systems Function allocation issues Are systems necessary? Do users/pilots/others have the control they need? Precision of possible performance can cause problems 8

8 Flight Deck Automation Issues Database includes multiple sources of information 93 issues related to flight deck automation Can search database for evidence from: Accidents Incident studies Experiments Observational studies Survey studies Can search for all evidence on any one issue or resource Can search all information by keyword(s) 9

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12 Some Design-Related Issues Acc Inc Res understanding of automation may be inadequate 5 x x automation may not work well under unusual conditions 4 x x displays (visual and aural) may be poorly designed 3 x x mode selection may be incorrect 3 x x situation awareness may be reduced 3 x x mode awareness may be lacking 3 x x insufficient information may be displayed 2 x x behavior of automation may not be apparent 2 x x controls of automation may be poorly designed 2 x x 13

13 Other Design-Related Issues 10 more with evidence from 1 or 2 accident reports pilots may be out of the loop vertical profile visualization may be difficult automation may lack reasonable functionality database may be erroneous or incomplete protections may be lost though pilots continue to rely on them manual operation may be difficult after transition from automated control automation information in manuals may be inadequate pilots have responsibility but may lack authority interface may be poorly designed automation may demand attention 14

14 More Issues 14 with incident and research evidence 4 with only research evidence Scan pattern may change Automation may be too complex Workarounds may be necessary Automation integration may be poor 15

15 DC-9 Runway Excursion Captain took over landing at last minute and came in fast with autothrottles still engaged then inadvertently engaged TOGA instead of disengaging autothrottles. Airplane went off side of runway. 16

16 DC-9 Example: Kajaani Airport, Finland, November 1994 Evidence: "ANALYSIS... It is obvious that the captain did not realize that the autothrottle was still engaged and in go-around mode but concentrated on flying the aircraft towards the runway." (page 38) Issue: mode awareness may be lacking (Issue #95) See Issue details Design-related human factors considerations: Necessary information is presented Display appropriately attracts attention Timing of information is appropriate Information is visually accessible Information is understandable 17

17 Control Issues Evidence: "ANALYSIS... When the captain took over the controls, he put his right hand on the throttle levers. According to the DFDR the goaround mode was activated at the height of approximately 120 ft which must indicate that the captain or first officer pushed at least one of the two TOGA buttons on the thrust levers. The captain told he had no intention to make a go around. No signs of go-around can be seen in the DFDR elevator control data. According to the investigation commission the TOGA button push must have been unintentional or a so called substitution error ie. [sic] either pilot has intended to switch off the autothrottle but has selected the TOGA button." (page 38) Issue: mode selection may be incorrect (Issue #145) See Issue details Design-related human factors considerations: Control design prevents inadvertent operation Control design is consistent with user expectations Control operation does not require excessive attention Control is usable with related controls and displays 18

18 HF areas of focus Design Certification Manufacturing Pilot training and certification Operations Maintenance Wherever humans touch the system Important to understand tasks for all users 19

19 Designers Manufacturing organization Evaluators Regulatory organization Policy makers Certifiers Producers Training organization Pilot/operator Trainers Pilots Dispatchers Operating organization Public Other pilots or operators Ground/ Ramp crew Maintaining organization Maintainers Enroute controllers Air traffic organization Ground controllers Terminal area controllers Training organization Maintenance Trainers

20 Human factors considerations Displays Controls Systems Other equipment Procedures 21

21 Displays Display design is adequate Necessary information is presented Timing of information is appropriate Design is consistent with user expectations Information is visually accessible Information is understandable Crew action implications are appropriate Display appropriately attracts attention Display is usable with other displays and controls Display characteristics do not induce fatigue Skills requirements are not excessive Display is not objectionable 22

22 Controls Control design is adequate Necessary controls are provided Control design prevents inadvertent operation Control is accessible (visually and physically) Control movement is unrestricted Strength requirements are not excessive Control design is consistent with user expectations Control function and method of operation are understandable Control operation does not require excessive attention Control is usable with related controls and displays Control characteristics do not induce fatigue Skill requirements are not excessive Control is not objectionable Control design minimizes potential for injury 23

23 Systems System design is adequate Necessary systems are provided System logic prevents inadvertent operation System logic provides appropriate information to pilots Timing of system operations is appropriate User is provided necessary control over the system System logic and behavior are consistent with user expectations System logic and behavior are understandable System operation or monitoring does not require excessive attention System response to control input is appropriate System is usable with other systems Skill requirements are not excessive System design minimizes potential for injury System is not objectionable 24

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29 Food for thought Company 30

30 System including UAS Company 31

31 Differences To Address Assumptions may be different from those for manned aircraft Pilot will always be there to take over Automation can always be turned off Pilot can react to environmental changes in real time Pilots are involved in mission for full duration e.g. Shift and duty issues Minimum flight crew decisions e.g. A pilot/monitor outside of the control station may be required 32

32 Good Human Factors Minimizes This 33

33 Acknowledgements The research related to flight deck automation issues and human factors considerations was funded by the Human Factors Research and Development Office of the Federal Aviation Administration. Our contract monitors are Dr. Tom McCloy and Dr. Eleana Edens. 34