PLC solution for aircraft Cabin Lighting System (CLS) Safety aspects

Transcription

1 Aircraft Powerline Communications - Paris, 15 February 22 - PLC solution for aircraft Cabin Lighting System (CLS) EKIS Romania The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/ ) under grant agreement number

2 Safety performed by EKIS The have 3 main objectives: Definition and verification of /reliability requirements Participation to design definition Safety level of TAUPE concepts and recommendations for future aircraft applications. The shall be consistent with: The applicable standards of aeronautic systems (ARP 4754&4761, CS 25, DO) The classical process carried out in the aeronautic domain. The classical methods (FMECA, FTA, reliability analysis ) used in the aeronautic domain. The need of no regression of A/C systems. Final Dissemination Event 15/02/22 Copyright TAUPE Consortium 22 2

3 According to European regulations (EASA) CS 25: Catastrophic: Failure Conditions, which would result in multiple fatalities, usually with the loss of the aeroplane. Hazardous : Failure Conditions, which would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating, conditions to the extent that there would be a large reduction in margins or physical distress. Major : Failure Conditions which would reduce the capability of the aeroplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example, a significant reduction in margins. Minor : Failure Conditions which would not significantly reduce aeroplane. Final Dissemination Event 15/02/22 Copyright TAUPE Consortium 22 3

4 Safety process: The simplified approach has been established according to a V process as follow: Aircraft System Aircraft Step 1.1: Identification of the system Safety/ Reliability constraints Apportionment Step 1.2: Identification of the equipment Safety/ Reliability constraints Aircraft Safety analysis Way Forward for future A/C applications Step 3: System Safety/ Reliability Analysis Safety Process performed in the frame of the TAUPE Project Equipment Step 2: Equipment Safety/Reliability Analysis Final Dissemination Event 15/02/22 Copyright TAUPE Consortium 22 4

5 Step 1.1: Identification of system Safety/Reliability First step begins at system level. Aircraft level Aircraft Aircraft Safety analysis Way Forward for future A/C applications This task is mainly based on the actual systems architecture and the existing System Safety Analysis from AIRBUS experience System level Step 1.1: Identification of the system Safety/ Reliability Apportionment Step 1.2: Identification of the equipment Safety/ Reliability Step 3: System Safety/ Reliability Analysis Equipment Step 2: Equipment Safety/Reliability Analysis CLS FC_Ref Failure Condition Failure cause Severity level Required Probability of occurrence F/H CLS_FC_ Total loss of system Loss of CIDS MAJ CLS_FC_02 Strongly reduced system. CLS_FC_03 Reduced system Loss of function of one Top Line Pair Loss of function of one Top Line of each Top Line Pair Loss of function of at least 50% of all DEUs Type A Loss of function of a single Top Line Loss of function of a single DEU Type A MAJ MIN Final Dissemination Event 15/02/22 Copyright TAUPE Consortium 22 5

6 Step 1.2: Identification of equipment Safety/Reliability Second step is performed at equipment level. Aircraft level Aircraft Aircraft Safety analysis This task of the process consists on the apportionment of the Safety & Reliability identified from system to equipments. System level Step 1.1: Identification of the system Safety/ Reliability Apportionment Step 1.2: Identification of the equipment Safety/ Reliability Way Forward for future A/C applications Step 3: System Safety/ Reliability Analysis Equipment Step 2: Equipment Safety/Reliability Analysis PHEU FC Ref PLC requirements Loss of 3 PHEU s (power or data) leading to the loss of 3 sets of IBUs (3x8 IBUs) Severity level MAJ Probability of occurrence (/FH) 10-6 /FH DO-254 => DAL C for HW DO-178 => DAL C for SW 03 Loss of one PHEU (power or data) leading to the partial loss of sets of IBUs (worst case 50%) MIN 10-4 /FH PTU_FC_0 1 Loss of one (power or data) leading to the loss of 1 IBU MIN 10-5 /FH Final Dissemination Event 15/02/22 Copyright TAUPE Consortium 22 6

7 Step 2: Equipment Safety/Reliability Analysis Safety process performed at equipment level. An equipment analysis is performed in order to show the compliance with the /reliability requirements identified in step 1.2. Aircraft level System level Aircraft Step 1.1: Identification of the system Safety/ Reliability Apportionment Step 1.2: Identification of the equipment Safety/ Reliability Aircraft Safety analysis Way Forward for future A/C applications Step 3: System Safety/ Reliability Analysis 28V IN- A EMER D4A 28V IN-A NORM D3A OR with diodes DC-to-DC Converter D 2A DC in ETH1 PLC Modem A ETH2 TL_A1 TL_A2 Equipment Reliability Prediction Project TAUPE Part Count Method using MIL-HDBK-217F+N2 Equipment: PHEU Module: PHEU Coupling Module Step 2: Equipment Safety/Reliability Analysis 28 VDC IN-1 IN-2 C1 C2 ~ LP filter & transient suppressor T1 PHEU coupler OUT 1.1 OUT 1.2 OUT 2.1 OUT VDC Quality λg (AIC) FR (AIC) λg (GF) FR (GF) Component Reference Qty Section # Part Type Style πq Level (FIT) (FIT) (FIT) (FIT) Connector J1-J Connector Rack & Panel MIL-SPEC 1 0,1 0,40 0,0270 0,11 Diode D1,D Transient Low Freq. JANTX 1 0,075 0,15 0,0230 0,05 Suppressor/Varist or Resistor R Film RN (R, C or N) M 1 0,08 1,60 0,60 0,32 Capacitor C1-C Metallized Plastic CRH M 1 0,13 1,17 0,0084 0,08 Inductive Device L1-L Coil, Fixed Chip / Molded MIL-SPEC 1 0, ,0 0,0002 0,00 Inductor / Choke Inductive Device L6-L Coil, Variable Chip / Molded MIL-SPEC 1 0, ,004 0,0004 0,00 Inductor Inductive Device T1-T Transformer RF MIL-SPEC 1 1,2 6,00 0,9500 4,75 PHEU coupling module PHEU coupler converter (Line A) converter (Line B) PLC modem A PLC modem B Transient protection Transient protection Power divider PHEU coupler PHEU coupler PHEU coupler 28V line PHEU coupler 28V line 28V line 28V line Identifier PLC requirements Result Compliance 02 Loss of 3 PHEU s (power or data) leading to the loss of 3 sets of IBUs (3x8 IBUs) 4.6 E-09 / FH Yes Recommendations for future applications PHEU coupling module Final Dissemination Event 15/02/22 Copyright TAUPE Consortium 22 7

8 Step 3: System Safety/Reliability Analysis Safety process performed at system level This task is based on Safety Analysis previously performed at equipment level in order to consolidate the demonstration that the systems /reliability requirements identified in step 1.1 are reached. CIDS1 CIDS2 CIDS3 converter A converter B PHEU 1 PLC modem A PLC modem B PHEU 1 (Coupling module) IBU IBU IBU (X8) (X8) (X8) FC_IBU- Loss of PHEU 1 common functions: Strongly reduced IBU system Converter + Modem Line A 2,20E-05 Converter A Result: 4,88E-07 OR PLC modem A 4,88E-07 AND Line B Converter B Objective: 2,20E-05 1E-5 / FH OR PLC modem B Aircraft level System level Equipment Aircraft Step 1.1: Identification of the system Safety/ Reliability Apportionment Step 1.2: Identification of the equipment Safety/ Reliability Step 2: Equipment Safety/Reliability Analysis Aircraft Safety analysis Way Forward for future A/C applications Step 3: System Safety/ Reliability Analysis Loss of PHEU 1 common function Part of TAUPE_D2.1_SAF_0061_1.1 Loss of CIDS commanding OUT of the TAUPE project PHEU 2 Loss of 3 PHEU s TAUPE_D2.1_SAF_0061_1.1 Loss of one PTU TAUPE_D2.1_SAF_0064_1.0 IBU (X8) IBU (X8) IBU (X8) Loss of IBU OUT of the TAUPE project Loss of 48 IBU from 2 PHEU Loss of 24 IBU linked to PHEU 1 Dedicated PHEU 1 failure 2,66E-14 4,93E-08 4,93E-08 Loss of 24 PTU Loss of PHEU coupling module Loss of 8 due to cable common mode failure Loss of 8 due to cable common mode failure AND Loss of 8 due to cable common mode failure OK Identifier CLS requirements Result Compliance Remark CLS_FC_ CLS_FC_ 02 Probability of occurrence < /FH (MAJ) for: Total loss of system /FH Yes Recommendation for future applications,.. Final Dissemination Event 15/02/22 Copyright TAUPE Consortium 22 8

9 Overall V process process illustration CLS FC_Ref Failure Condition Failure cause CLS_FC_ Total loss of system CLS_FC_02 Strongly reduced system. CLS_FC_03 Reduced system Severity level Required Probability of occurrence Loss of CIDS MAJ Loss of function of one Top Line Pair Loss of function of one Top Line of each Top Line Pair Loss of function of at least 50% of all DEUs Type A Loss of function of a single Top Line Loss of function of a single DEU Type A F/H MAJ MIN Identifier CLS requirements Result CLS_FC_ CLS_FC_ 02 Probability of occurrence < /FH (MAJ) for: Total loss of system /FH Compli ance Yes PHEU FC Ref 03 PTU_FC_0 1 PLC requirements Loss of 4 PHEU s (power or data) leading to the loss of 3 sets of IBUs (3x8 IBUs) Loss of one PHEU (power or data) leading to the partial loss of sets of IBUs (worst case 50%) Loss of one (power or data) leading to the loss of 1 IBU Severity level MAJ MIN MIN Probability of occurrence (/FH) 10-6 /FH 10-4 /FH 10-5 /FH 28V IN- A 28V IN-A EMER NORM 28 VDC IN-1 IN-2 D4A C1 C2 D3A OR with diodes DC-to-DC Converter D 2A DC in ETH1 PLC Modem A ETH2 ~ LP filter & transient suppressor T1 PHEU coupler TL_A1 TL_A2 OUT 1.1 OUT 1.2 OUT 2.1 OUT VDC Identifier PLC requirements Result Compliance 02 Loss of 3 PHEU s (power or data) leading to the loss of 3 sets of IBUs (3x8 IBUs) 4.6 E-09 / FH Yes Recommendations for future applications Final Dissemination Event 15/02/22 Copyright TAUPE Consortium 22 9

10 Safety approach achieved: - Identification of applicable standards and high requirements ; - Identification of process and methods ; - Safety requirement identified for each TAUPE equipment for CLS & CDS systems ; - Contribution of the activity in the architectures optimisation and definition ; - Consolidation that implementation of TAUPE concepts in CLS & CDS architectures are in line with constraints and applicable standards for such aeronautical applications. Final Dissemination Event 15/02/22 Copyright TAUPE Consortium 22 10