Secure container transport: challenges & barriers in the complete stakeholder chain

Transcription

1 Secure container transport: challenges & barriers in the complete stakeholder chain Theodoros Theodoropoulos (SEAbility Ltd) 1 st Training Workshop 19 November 2014, Valencia, Spain

2 Overview Introduction The container transport chain Threat assessment Container security measures Wrap-up and conclusions

3 Introduction Transport authorities face several criminal and terrorist related challenges theft of goods and vehicles Fraud Potential misuse by terrorists illegal immigration Drugs

4 Introduction These threats cause Daily problems to authorities Impacts on the transport sector s ability To ensure the efficient flow of goods within the national and international marketplace

5 Introduction Multiple types of containers exist Maritime aviation and Swap Bodies for road-rail Focus will be made on maritime! Why?

6 Introduction Because essential component of global trade highly efficient relatively safe and reliable means of global goods transport across modes Maritime shipping containers are the most numerous container types involved in international trade truly intermodal in that they are carried by maritime, inland waterway, road and rail operators They are everywhere!

7 Introduction Security measures must be designed in a fashion so that costs of higher security can be recovered, at least partially, through greater efficiencies in the supply chain Improved security and integrity of the transport chain can reduce the danger of tampering and direct costs of theft losses automated customs inspection with timely transmission of accurate information can improve efficiency of customs control and lower direct costs of customs clearance

8 Overview Introduction The container transport chain Threat assessment Container security measures Wrap-up and conclusions

9 The container transport chain Difficulty with respect to security Container transport space is fragmented complex interactions among a great multitude of actors, industries, regulatory agencies, modes, operating systems, liability regimes, legal frameworks These actors are coordinated with respect to efficiency. HOWEVER trade-focused evolution of the container transport system has led to the existence of a number of security vulnerabilities that might be exploited

10 The container transport chain Container types Dry box tank containers for gaseous or liquid cargoes open frame containers for transporting odd-sized consignments soft-top containers reefers

11 The container transport chain Vulnerabilities per type Full tank containers: Not easily scanned, difficult to visually check, can contain harmful substances, dispersal platforms for chemical/biological agents Reefers: insulated walls and refrigeration equipment can be used to disguise explosive devices open-top containers are vulnerable to un-authorised access via the tarpaulin covering the top.

12 The container transport chain World traffic

13 The container transport chain If there are security concerns relating to the use of maritime shipping containers, it is because these have become so tremendously popular and ubiquitous in the world trading system!

14 The container transport chain The container transport chain, in aggregate, is a massive integrating network millions of shippers thousands of intermediaries to organizing and carrying goods hundreds of ports dozens of maritime carriers Visibility and transparency decreases at each step out of the port

15 The container transport chain No central system to co-ordinate security functions Each actor responsible of deploying security measures Even if security measures are deployed at each actor s level, this does not guarantee Compatibility of information management systems Coordinated regulatory frameworks clear security continuity protocols

16 The container transport chain Large presence of small and medium enterprises operating within the system especially at its outer bounds. It is not so much the size per se of shippers, forwarders, intermediaries and carriers (especially road carriers) that is cited as a vulnerability, but rather their limited resources and motivation to bolster security measures

17 The container transport chain Where to intervene in the container transport chain to secure it? Traditionally at the core of the system: large intermediaries, major carriers and natural chokepoints. However a wider umbrella of actors must be included in order to establish an auditable trail of existing security measures Add new measures if required

18 The container transport chain: actors Analysis of the actors and flows is required in order to enable the creation of an enhanced security framework. Each actor should participate in the creation of the security framework. Also collaboration mechanisms should be setup

19 The container transport chain: actors Seller-buyer Initiate containerized moves Seller could be the shipper shippers and buyers have detailed knowledge of the transaction leading to the shipment of the container Shippers usually are the only actor in the chain with detailed firsthand knowledge of the goods placed into a container Shippers are usually smes must be included in the security framework relative lack of resources available, and/or motivation, to implement security measures must be taken into account

20 The container transport chain: actors Freight forwarders visibility over the entire container transport chain are also characterized by a significant number of SMEs that may not be in a position to implement cumbersome or costly security measures Transport operators significant number of transport operators in the container transport chain are SMEs the first mile and last mile are the most vulnerable as carriage is often undertaken by small entrepreneurs unable and/or unwilling to implement effective security measures.

21 The container transport chain: actors Transport authorities responsible for vehicles, drivers and operators (and their facilities Custom authorities responsible for the contents of the container Port/terminal operators world s top 20 ports handled 48% of all port container moves in 2002, and the top 40, nearly 63%. Maritime carriers Transport chain concentrator

22 The container transport chain: physical flow The physical movement of the container and its contents from place to place and from mode to mode Important to know: how it has travelled, where it can be found and whether its integrity has been compromised The risk of a security breach at any one of its links (modes), compromise the security of the entire chain

23 The container transport chain: physical flow Security concerns related to the physical flow originating shipper has a critical role to play in the container security by generating a clear, accurate and complete inventory of the physical contents of the container Proper site security, stuffing procedures and oversight of the stuffing process are necessary for this important link in the chain to be secure

24 The container transport chain: physical flows Containers are most vulnerable to being tampered with when they are at rest and least vulnerable when they are in motion Especially at nodes of the network where the container is handled and/or stored (Land side border crossings) Containers travelling via certain modes are more vulnerable than others. Road carriage less safe in contrast to maritime

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26 The container transport chain: information flows Generating, receiving and processing information related to the container transport the examination and cross-examination of these flows that can reveal discrepancies indicating terrorist and/ or criminal involvement Big amount of data + non uniform handling (paper, mails, proprietary interfaces) makes cross referencing difficult

27 The container transport chain: information flows Security relevant highlights Security-relevant information generated early on in the commercial contracting and documentary credit cycles is not used by Customs. Early access to this information could facilitate and otherwise improve Customs security screening of container When looking at the entire container transport chain lack of messaging interoperability is still the rule and not the exception. Especially when considering the outer bounds of the system

28 Overview Introduction The container transport chain Threat assessment Container security measures Wrap-up and conclusions

29 Threat assessment Containers have been misused in order to smuggle drugs, contraband goods and even people Criminals have found ways in response to authority vigilance Will they use the container transport system be used in order to deliver a CBRN weapon?. Difficult to answer An assessment must be made in order to analyze such a scenario

30 Threat assessment: Methodology The threat assessment analysis must take the following into consideration Type of the threat Vulnerabilities of the system Criticality Risk Such an assessment is essential when considering measures that are costly and trade-unfriendly measures

31 Threat assessment: Risk Example: Would the container system be used as a delivery vehicle for a weapon of mass destruction? No evidence that it has happened. Considerable evidence that terrorists and rogue states have used shipping containers in support of their actions. Therefore it they used it as a delivery mechanism that would probably mean the end of using it for other supportive actions as the counter-measures would likely shut off all other possibilities Moreover would they choose the container transport system instead of other means?

32 Threat assessment: Type Use the container transport to deliver a CBRN weapon or to purchase the components needed for developing weapons? As mentioned previously most likely the second Relative programs include the US Second Line of Defence

33 Threat assessment: Vulnerabilities

34 Overview Introduction The container transport chain Threat assessment Container security measures Wrap-up and conclusions

35 Container security measures: Overall Scan or otherwise physically confirm the contents of the container Measures seeking to ensure the physical integrity of the container. Measures aimed at ensuring the security of the container environment Measures seeking to track and trace the container in the supply chain. Measures centred on the provision, and use of, information related to the shipment.

36 Container security measures: assessment

37 Container security measures: scanning Scanning: Theoretically a two step process Screening: Assessment of the need for scanning on the basis of available information Scanning: Physical act of inspecting the container contents

38 Container security measures Screening methodology Establish security criteria for identifying high-risk containers based on advance information. Pre-screen containers at the earliest possible point. Use technology to quickly pre-screen high-risk containers. Develop secure and smart containers. Send officials to foreign countries to perform the screening

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40 Container security measures Scanning cnt d Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) devices such as X-ray scanners Physical inspection if image quality is not sufficient Sophisticated SW or experienced personnel is required in order to identify chemical, biological, radioactive or nuclear materials. Instrumentation and equipment costs but could be combined with the effort to avoid smuggling and increase tax collection

41 Container security measures: container integrity Container integrity Indicative mechanical seals Secured mechanical seals Mechanical seals: high-security seals Electronic seals Smart and safe containers

42 Container security measures: secure environment Securing the container environment Usually considered from the inland and away from port environment unsecured rail yards road stops shipping/loading interchange terminal facilities

43 Container security measures: secure environment Border crossings variable QoS Lack of or insufficient computer equipment Inadequate x-ray verification capacity. Poor co-ordination among authorities responsible for the border verifications. Lack of respect for the TIR procedures Insufficient number of customs personnel Unethical corrupt behaviour

44 Container security measures: secure environment Securing the container environment measures: intermodal facilities should be physically secured to minimise the risks ofunauthorised access Employment of technologies such as smart cards as access control cards, biometric authentication, CCTV cameras, etc Re evaluation of security in road transport

45 Container security measures: tracking Container tracking Collaboration for carrier-industry/government tracking Real time data are great but right time data are better Aggregated information such as: a container was late arriving at a checkpoint and know who the last carrier was and how they may be contacted Take advantage of technology Low cost GNSS devices are emerging

46 Container security measures: intelligence Trading document and process visibility

47 Container security measures: intelligence Trading document and process visibility the party responsible for generating security-relevant data provides that data to Customs when the data is first generated incorporate and/or communicate proprietary information to the principal agency in charge of screening containerized consignments

48 Conclusion Transport authorities must address weak links of the container transport chain More specific threat assessments involving Transport authorities needed Security measures must be adapted to the threat Policy levers at the disposal of Transport authorities Guiding principles to secure the container transport chain Specific recommendations to inland Transport and Maritime authorities

49 Thank You Theodoros Theodoropoulos (SEAbility Ltd) 3 rd Training Workshop 19 November 2014, Valencia, Spain