J STI INTEGRATED MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM DEMONSTRATION PROJECT. Steven E. Aumeier B. Gail Walters

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1 J STI INTEGRATED MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM DEMONSTRATION PROJECT Steven E. Aumeier B. Gail Walters Technology Development Division Argonne National Laboratory-West P. 0. Box 2528 Idaho Falls, ID The submitted manuscript has k e n authored by a contractor of the U. S. Government under contract No. W ENG-38. Accordingly, the U. S. Government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free license to publish or reproduce the published form of this contribution, or allow others to do so, for U. S. Government purposes. To be Presented to at 38* Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management July 1997 *Work supported by the U.S. Department of Energy, Reactor Systems, Development and Technology, under Contract W Eng-38.

2 DISCLAIMER This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product. process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recornmenbtion, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.

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4 Integrated Monitoring and Surveillance System Demonstration Project S. E. Aumeier and G. Walters Technology Development Division Argonne National Laboratory Idaho Falls, ID D. Kotter, W. M. Walrath, andr. J. Zamecnik Lockheed-Miutin Idaho Technologies Company P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415, Abstract We present a summary of efforts associated with the installation of an integrated system for the surveillance and monitoring of stabilized plutonium metals and oxides in long-term storage. The product of this effort will include a Pu storage requirements document, baseline integrated monitoring and surveillance system (IMSS) prototype and test bed that will be installed in the Fuel Manufacturing Facility (FMF) nuclear material vault at Argonne National Laboratory - West (ANL-W), and a Pu tracking database including data analysis capabilities. The prototype will be based on a minimal set of vault and package monitoring requirements as derived from applicable DOE documentation and guidelines, detailed in the requirements document, including DOE- STD The use of standardized requirements will aid individual sites in the selection of sensors that best suit their needs while the prototype IMSS, located at ANL-W, will be used as a test bed to compare and contrast sensor performance against a baseline integrated system (the IMSS), demonstrate system capabilities, evaluate potential technology gaps, and test new hardware and software designs using various storage configurations. With efforts currently underway to repackage and store a substantial quantity of plutonium and plutonium-bearing material within the DOE complex, this is an opportune time to undertake such a project.

5 I. Introduction Currently, many sites within the DOE complex have been directed to repackage and store various plutonium bearing materials in packages meeting requirements detailed in DOE-STD Recent estimates of the number- of plutonium packages requiring opening and repackaging exceed 10,000. This estimate excludes other Pu-bearing material that will also need to be packaged such as certain residues, ash, etc., and thus the actual scope of the packaging campaign will increase. The magnitude of the effort will ensure that a significant number of 3013 packages will be in the DOE inventory at numerous sites by the early part of the twenty-first century, thus making the safe and effective stabilization, packaging, transportation, storage and surveillance of these Pu bearing materials a major area of interest in the coming years. The United State Department of Energy (USDOE) Implementation Plan2 to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) 94-1 recommendations3 included the recognition that a research program should be established to fill any gaps in the information base needed for choosing among the alternate processes to be used in the safe conversion of various types of fissile materials to optimal forms for interim storage and longer-term disposition. The Plutonium Focus Area (PFA) of DOE-ID was tasked, in part, to supply such information by performing an assessment of the technical maturity of technologies associated with various aspects of stabilization, packaging, transportation, and surveillance of material to be stored to the DO53013 standard. Through this review process it was recognized that, although numerous vault and material monitoring and surveillance techniques have been developed or are under development, no systematic approach has been developed to monitor Pu bearing materials in storage. Based on this assessment, the PFA research and development plan4 recommended the development of an integrated approach for the storage and surveillance of Pu packages, using non-intrusive technologies that minimize personnel exposure and maximize safeguards and security. Argonne National Laboratory (ANL)and Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies (LMITCO) have been tasked to install a prototype integrated system, based on available monitoring and surveillance sensor technology, for the surveillance and monitoring of stabilized plutonium metals and oxides in long-term storage. Substantial input and participation is also being provided by other DOE entities and contractors including Sandia National Laboratory (SNL), Savannah River Site (SRS), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNLJ, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Rocky Flats Environmental Test Site (RFS), DOE-Richland, DOE-HQ, and others. The products of these efforts will be a baseline Integrated 1

6 Monitoring and Surveillance System (IMSS) that will be installed in the nuclear material vault at the Fuel Manufacturing Facility (FMF) located at Argonne National Laboratory - West (ANL-W). The prototype system will be used as a test bed to evaluate material and vault monitoring sensors, proposed guidelines, provide operator training, evaluate NDA techniques and various material storage configurations, test accessibility and operations concerns related to robotic manipulation of 3013 packages and measurement sensors in a secure, monitored vault, and test new hardware and software designs before purchase and installation in vaults within the DOE complex. These capabilities will provide information useful to sites within the DOE complex in the selection of sensors that best suit their needs. In the process of installing the test bed, several additional products will be provided including a generic database for Pu storage records and data tracking, data analysis toolboxes to condition incoming data for the database as well as analyze andor evaluate data contained in the central database, and a standardized PU storage requirements document (derived from existing guidelines). II. Monitoring and Surveillance Requirements Document A necessary precursor to any integrated monitoring system, whether installed as a test bed or high-volume storage vault, must be a firm set of requirements that such a system is required to adhere to. The magnitude of the packaging and storage efforts combined with the plethora of directives relating to all aspects of Pu storage and the broad array of available material, package, and vault monitoring sensors opens the possibility of expending significant financial resources to ensure safe and effective storage of packages while adhering to DOE-STD For example, DOE-STD states that Storage facility design, safeguards and security interfaces, and transportation requirements are addressed in detail by other DOE directives (e.g. rules, orders) and other agencies regulations. Such requirements are not repeated in this standard. However, users of this standard are advised to consult and assure adherence with other applicable directives while implementing these criteria. As is to be expected in documentation originating from numerous autonomous agencies and for various intents and purposes, there are many instances of overlapping and conflicting requirements that may apply to Pu storage adhering to DOE-STD A formal systems engineering process has been implemented to determine a minimum set of requirements from applicable directives. The process only considered domestic storage requirements and did not consider International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements. However, a similar requirements determination process could also be performed on a site-specific basis to determine IAEA safeguards practices at facilities similar to one of interest. This would be 2

7 useful since IAEA safeguards will be extended to a portion of the domestic storage vaults, e.g. the vault planned for the Savannah River Site. It is important to note that requirements are not being developed as a part of this process. Rather, a rigorous review of existing requirements is underway and these requirements incorporated into a single document for convenience. An initial survey of 39 documents resulted in 502 preliminary requirements to be f!urther investigated and organized into the following eight functional areas: Sense container/vault conditions Acquire sensor data Monitor environmental safety and health compliance Control and account for material Monitor material stability Monitor container integrity Transfer signals and data Duplicate entries were combined and each entry was checked to ensure that it was worded as an independent requirement with redundant or non-applicable entries deleted. Copies of the database were sent to key personnel at DOE Headquarters and all affected sites within the DOE complex for their review and comment. The comments were incorporated and a full System Requirements Review (SRR) was then held in Albuquerque in February Representatives from Sandia, Los Alamos, Argonne-West, Hanford, and the INEEL attended this review. Upon completion of the SRR all changes, deletions, and clarifications were incorporated into the database. The next version of the database was then published and distributed, followed by site visits to Savannah River, Rocky Flats, and DOE Headquarters. These visits were undertaken to ensure that comments from all sites were incorporated in the requirements and because Rocky Flats and Savannah River personnel had been unable to attend the SRR. Final changes were made to the requirements database at the completion of these visits and the database was then incorporated in the System Specification for the IMSS. In addition to the requirements included in the database, the specifications also include a full listing of applicable documents, functional diagram(s), verification matrix, and requirements traceability matrix. The final requirements document will be completed and forwarded to interested parties in the near future. HI; Monitoring and Surveillance System Test Bed Based on the minimal requirements detailed in the draft requirements document, available

8 sensors/systems will be integrated into a test bed located at the FMF nuclear materials vault at ANL-W. The IMSS test bed will be available for conducting performance assessments of various sensor/s torage configurations and data system combinations within an integrated monitoring and surveillance system, described below, and under both normal and transient conditions. Such performance assessments will provide sites throughout the DOE complex information necessary to make optimal choices among various techniques, thus helping minimize the cost and maximize the effectiveness of Pu storage while adhering to all applicable guidelines and requirements. The information may also be useful in providing a strong basis for extension of audit and inspection intervals. The sensors that constitute the initial IMSS are not necessarily the optimal combination for every site, but do provide an integrated infrastructure within which various other sensor combinations and techniques may be tested. The IMSS provides communication networking and data acquisition from several sensor subsystems including those associated with: Monitoring of the 3013 packages for real-time temperature, weight, pressure and radiation levels. Surveillance of the 3013 packages for unauthorized movement. Tamper indication devices for storage configurations. Electronic readable tags for tracking location of 3013 packages. Storage vault environmental monitoring for real-time temperature and radiological conditions. Storage vault surveillance for entry control. These subsystems incorporate off-the-shelf sensor technology provided through collaboration with other DOE laboratories and commercial vendors. The StraightLine Integrated sensor from Sandia National Laboratory will be used to monitor temperature, radiation (gamma), motion, and tamper (container access). Fiber optic neutron sensors are used to monitor radiation and the Smartshelf system used for tracking container location will be provided by Lockheed Martin Energy Systemfl-12. Coded security fiber optic seals from Aquila Technologies will be used as a container tamper indicating device. A scale tag with a gamma sensor is used to monitor weight (for presence) and gamma radiation and fiber optic seals are used to monitor tamper, both of which are manufactured by RandTEC. The IMSS is comprised, in part, of a Local Sensor Network, Remote Monitoring Station, and central information computer. The Echelon LonWorks distributed control technology was selected as the basis for the IMSS data system. The Local Sensor Network is located in the Special Nuclear Materials storage area, providing direct linkage to all sensor subsystems. The 4

9 Local Sensor Network performs data acquisition and transfers monitorhg/surveillance data-sets to a remote central information computer for archiveing. The central information system logs data and provides a capability for performing data trending and statistical analyses and also generates custom status reports. A Remote Monitoring Station can also be attached through a modem to the Local Sensor Network to provide real-time, on-line status of IMSS sensors. The Remote Monitoring Station is typically located outside the secured vault in an administrative office/ oversight area.sandia National Laboratories Modular Integrated Monitoring (MIMS) technology is also being evaluated as a tool to provide local sensor network management and data acquisition. Interface modules, or toolboxes, will be developed to transfer data from the MIMs to the Central Information Computer. This will demonstrate the ability to interface with legacy monitoring and surveillance systems and provide a common central database for complex-wide tracking of Pu storage data. Monitoring and surveillance of Pu storage areas requires an intelligent and expandable data acquisition system that can be tailored to site specific requirements. Current sensor systems do not always use a standardized protocol, thus complicating the use of standardized systems. Trade studies were performed to identify candidate IMSS network architectures and included a technology comparison that was made using preliminary system requirements as a baseline. It was determined that a control or device network was required to support distributed control and unlimited sensor node connectivity. This provides a sensor system with the capability to be easily expanded to support increased monitoring needs and the ability to program each sensor to process data per site-specific requirements. In addition. the network has redundancy and does not introduce a single point of failure. Additional baseline technology comparisons identified the Echelon LonWorks as the network technology of choice. Key decision points were LonWork s ability to support data authentication, error detection, multi-media support, and a full suite of commercial products for integrating sensors from different manufacturers. The LonWorks protocol also provides a standardized configuration that can be easily duplicated at other sites. The performance of a given set of sensors is obviously dependent on the storage configuration used. To account for this dependence, the IMSS test bed will incorporate several 3013 package storage options including a bird cage, 10 gallon drum, and several pedestal storage options. DOE-STD also recognizes the importance of heightened monitoring, particularly in the case of packaged oxides, in early times following packaging. Once the package has survived to a certain time, i.e. survived the period of infant mortalities, the level of monitoring could arguably be significantly reduced while maintaining adequate monitoring of material and package integrity, thus saving resources. The IMSS test bed will allow for this by including two 5

10 I separate storage and sensor test area: a pre/infant storage area where devices designed for heightened package monitoring will be tested and a long-term storage area where the bird-cage, 10 gallon drum, etc. configurations will be located. These configurations may also be used to test accessibility and operations concerns related to robotic manipulation of 3013 packages in a secure, monitored vault. By incorporating several storage configuration options and both longterm and prehnfant storage considerations, the IMSS test bed will provide a truly integrated monitoring and surveillance system for evaluation and testing of material and vault monitoring devices and procedures. This will allow for complete, integrated system evaluations and thus permit DOE sites and contractors to choose the most cost effective and efficient options that best suit their needs. IV. Central Information Database To ensure nuclear material control and accountability all sensor data must be tracked and logged on a periodic basis. A database program and appropriate interface tools were designed to transfer sensor data from the local network to the Central Information Database (CID), which resides on the Central Information Computer. The IMSS CID was designed with MicroSoft Visual FoxPro, an interactive relational database management system. The CID employs an open systems architecture that permits the transfer of IMSS data to users throughout the DOE complex. The system is currently maintained as an unclassified database. Several security features are integrated into the database, such as limiting general users to need to know read only fields. Currently the CID is designed to capture data from surveillance and monitoring sensors over a phone-line modem communication link. The CID can also be tailored to support data transfer from legacy MC&A databases. Manual operator inputting of data is also supported. The CID was designed as a Windows 95 application and uses standard Windows graphical user interface commands. The operator is prompted to systematically enter or review data through selecting options from drop-down menus. The system administrator can configure and tailor the menus to incorporate site-specific options. Several sub-database tables, graphically displayed as a folder index system, are included to track all data representative of the life-cycle of a Pu-bearing material. Current database tables (file folders) include: Storage Facility Information including storage configurations; Package Information including packaging, weld integrity, and leak testing; Source Material Information including NDA measurements, isotopic analyses, description of material physical fondshape, and radiation levels; Process Information including stabilization testing results, e.g. temperature, atmosphere, and LO1 testing; Periodic Monitoring Information including vault environmental conditions; Surveillance Information including 6

11 . package weight, temperature, pressure, radiation, and various tamper indicators. The database also provides computational analysis support. Real-time monitoring data is compared to both alarm threshold limits and historical data to determine if abnormal storage conditions exist. Spreadsheet fields are used to itemize and track materialkontainer transfers, and to provide a summary of all storage configurations and packages within a vault. Additional tables are used to record inspection tests, names of inspectors, dates, and results. Limited vault security alarms are logged and used to track vault entry. All data is correlated through unique package, storage configuration and location identification numbers. The database also supports memo fields to allow log book entry of free format observations, such as visual inspection of the packages. To enhance the user friendly nature of the CID, custom programming modules or toolboxes may be added to automate complex database operations. The toolboxes allow the database to be tailored to site-specific calculations, queries, and reports and to provide functions such as statistical trending of 3013 container temperature, weight, radiation, and pressure profiles or perform MC&A optimization studies. Therefore, the CID and associated toolboxes could provide an avenue for fast, efficient, and convenient tracking and analysis of PLI storage information complex-wide. V. Summary An integrated monitoring and surveillance system test bed is presently being installed at ANLW. The IMSS will integrate the various tasks and technologies necessary to ensure material stability and package integrity, material control and accountability, proper environmental, safety, and health control, and also provide extensive data acquisition and analysis capabilities. Proven existing technologies, e.g. sensors, detectors, etc., from both government and industry sources are utilized. These sensors are integrated into an existing reporting system and also networked to a central information database capable of monitoring numerous facilities simultaneously. System design and operations will incorporate consideration for material stabilization and package constraints, thus minimizing necessary assay and verification measurements, increasing system fidelity, and optimizing system operations and performance. A great degree of flexibility will also be included in the prototype such that, as experience is accumulated and as new technologies emerge, potential system modifications can be rigorously tested and characterized before being installed full-scale in an operational vault. 7

12 The IMSS demonstration will provide several distinct products: A requirements document detailing the existing monitoring and surveillance requirements for Pu storage (exclusive of IAEA requirements), a test bed to evaluate material and vault monitoring and surveillance sensors/ systems within an integrated system located in an operational nuclear material storage vault, and a generic database and associated analysiddata synthesis toolboxes to track complete material records from several sites at a central location. The systems engineering review of directives relevant to Pu storage will identify inapplicable, conflicting, and overlapping requirements and result in a minimal set of Pu storage requirements (based on existing guidelines and requirements), thus helping to minimize the cost and complexity of Pu storage. The use of minimal standardized requirements, detailed in this document, will aid individual sites in the selection of package and vault monitoring sensors that best suit their individual needs while assuring adherence to all applicable directives. The prototype IMSS and associated test bed will provide a means of comparing and contrasting sensorlstorage configuration performance against a baseline integrated system, demonstration of system capabilities, and testing of new hardware and software designs before purchase and installation in vaults within the DOE complex. These attributes will also be of great value in determining where technology gaps may exist, thus allowing for the most efficient allocation of scarce resources. Evaluations conducted at the test bed may also be useful in developing a basis for the extension of audits and inspections at Pu storage facilities. In providing a means of evaluating technologies, requirements, and guidelines against an integrated system, the IMSS test bed will allow individual sites the opportunity to choose the most efficient and effective sensor systems and thus conserve available resources. With efforts currently underway to repackage and store a substantial quantity of plutonium and plutonium-bearing material within the DOE complex, this is an opportune time to undertake the IMSS efforts. References 1. Criteria for Preparing and Packaging Plutonium Metals and Oxides for Long-Term Storage. DOE-STD , September O Leary, H. R., Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 94-1: Implementation Plan, Attachment to Letter from Sec. of Energy to Chairman of the DNFSB, February Conway, J. T., Recommendation 94-1 to the Secretary of Energy Pursuant to 42 U. S. C. 2286a Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As Amended, Attachment to Letter from DNFSB to 8

13 See. of Energy, May 26, United States Department of Energy, Plutonium Focus Area Technical Advisory Panel, PFA Research and Development Plan (Rev. 1), DOE-ID-10561, November