NUCLEARINSTALLATIONSAFETYTRAININGSUPPORTGROUP DISCLAIMER

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1 NUCLEARINSTALLATIONSAFETYTRAININGSUPPORTGROUP DISCLAIMER Theinformationcontainedinthisdocumentcannotbechangedormodifiedinanywayand shouldserveonlythepurposeofpromotingexchangeofexperience,knowledgedissemination andtraininginnuclearsafety. TheinformationpresenteddoesnotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheIAEAorthegovernments ofiaeamemberstatesandassuchisnotanoficialrecord. TheIAEAmakesnowaranties,eitherexpressorimplied,concerningtheaccuracy,completeness,reliability,orsuitabilityoftheinformation.Neitherdoesitwarantthatuseoftheinformation isfreeofanyclaimsofcopyrightinfringement. Theuseofparticulardesignationsofcountriesorteritoriesdoesnotimplyanyjudgmentbythe IAEAastothelegalstatusofsuchcountriesorteritories,oftheirauthoritiesandinstitutionsorof thedelimitationoftheirboundaries.thementionofnamesofspecificcompaniesorproducts (whetherornotindicatedasregistered)doesnotimplyanyintentiontoinfringeproprietaryrights, norshoulditbeconstruedasanendorsementorrecommendationonthepartoftheiaea

2 ANSN Workshop July 4 15, 2011 M Introduction to the IAEA Safety Guide on Establishing a Safety Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme (SSG 16 former DS 424) Luis Lederman 30 December 2011 IAEA SAFETY INFRASTRUCTURE 1

3 Background Increasing number of countries considering the introduction of nuclear power. Need to comply with the IAEA Safety Standards for ensuring safety and enhancing international confidence. Development of the Safety Infrastructure Guide DS424 Roadmap to apply the entire set of IAEA Safety Standards in countries embarking on nuclear power 2

4 Application of Safety Fundamentals Principle 1: Responsibility for safety Principle 2: Role of government Principle 3: Leadership for safety 3

5 Some important early considerations Many countries in early phases of infrastructure development Countries getting help from various sources Obvious lack of coordination and communication among: foreign actorsproviding assistance to the countries (international organizations, foreign institutions, private consultants ) domestic actorsinvolved in the development of the national nuclear power programme (relevant ministers, atomic energy commission, operator, regulator ) Underestimation of the workload resulting from all the activities that should be conducted for the implementation of a nuclear infrastructure sustaining long term safety Countries pretending to be almost ready to invite bids whereas some key safety issues have not been adequately addressed Imperious need for greater international confidence and trust regarding safety aspects. 4

6 Why a guide on safety infrastructure? The demand from newcomer countries for practical guidance on how to develop a nuclear safety infrastructure is increasing. New guide (SSG16) constitutes a Road-map to apply the entire suite of IAEA Safety Standards progressively during the early phases of the implementation of a nuclear power programme. Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Operation decision call for tenders commissioning 5

7 Main phases of the safety infrastructure development in the lifetime of a nuclear power plant (based on INSAG-22) Phase 1 Negative decision The safety-related elements of the rationale for the negative decision have to be clearly identified and stated. Safety infrastructure before deciding to launch a nuclear power programme 1~3 years Positive decision Phase 2 Safety infrastructure before bidding process Phase 3 Safety infrastructure before commissioning and operation Phase 4 Safety infrastructure during operation of the NPP Phase 5 Safety infrastructure during decommissioning and waste management phases of a NPP 3~7 years 7~10 years 40~60 years 20~100+ years Safety Infrastructure Guide constitutes a Road-map to apply the entire set of IAEA safety principles and requirements progressively during Phases 1, 2 and 3 of the implementation of a nuclear power programme. 6

8 The central role of the Safety Infrastructure Guide DS424 IAEA Nuclear Power Support Group s BROCHURE International Nuclear Safety Group s REPORT-22 FUNDAMENTALS REQUIREMENTS Milestones document IAEA NG-G-3.1 GUIDES IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS 7

9 The main 3 roles of SSG Road-map to gradually apply the IAEA Safety Standards. 8

10 Structure of the Safety Infrastructure Guide (SSG 16) SSG 16 is structured in accordance with the IAEA Safety Requirements. Primary use is to help enhancing Safety Infrastructure and Capacity Building in newcomer countries Facilitates international cooperation and coordination for building a sustainable nuclear safety infrastructure. 9

11 GS-R-1 BSS-115 GSR Part 5 GS-R-2 NS-R-3 The 20 chapters of the SAFETY INFRASTRUCTURE Guide DS National policy and strategy 2 - Global nuclear safety régime 3 - Legal framework 4 - Regulatory framework 5 - Transparency and openness 6 - Funding and financing 7 - External support organizations and contractors 8 - Leadership and management for safety 9 - Human resources development 10 - Research for safety and regulatory purposes 11 - Radiation protection 12 - Safety assessment 13 - Safety of radioactive waste, spent fuel management and decommissioning 14 - Emergency preparedness and response 15 - Operating organization 16 - Site survey, site selection and evaluation 17 - Design safety 18 - Preparation for commissioning 19 - Transport safety 20 - Interfaces with nuclear security GS-R-3 GSR Part 4 WS-R-5 NS-R-2 NS-R-1 TS-R-1 10

12 Structure of each element of the safety infrastructure Responsibilities of each organization and Actions to be taken: - in Phase 1; - in Phase 2; - in Phase 3. IAEA Safety Requirements identified Explanatory text Other Safety key-publications (INSAG ) 11

13 Text format for each Phase Phase 1: Basis for the actions example In Phase 1, the progressive application of Requirements 1 and 2 of GSR Part 1 and Requirement 2 of GSR Part 5 necessitates that: Actions ( should statements ), which are listed and numbered o Action 10. The Government should example o Action 11. The Operating Organization should o Action 12. The Regulatory Body should o Others actions Additional guidance Phase 2: same structure Phase 3: same structure 12

14 Some steps important to safety described in the Safety Infrastructure Guide Ready to make a decision on whether or not to introduce nuclear power Ready to invite bids Ready to commission and operate the first NPP Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 1~3 years 3~7 years 7~10 years Initial site survey Issuance of the nuclear law Establishing the basic regulatory framework Issuance of safety requirements needed for bid specification Safety evaluation of the bids Contract Application for construction license First concrete 13 Preparation of safety documentation Issuance of the construction licence Assessment by the regulatory body Site preparation Fuel delivery Construction phase

15 Involvement of the main entities Ready to make a decision on whether or not to introduce nuclear power Ready to invite bids Ready to commission and operate the first NPP Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 1~3 years 3~7 years 7~10 years Involvement of the Government Involvement of the Regulatory Body in nuclear power activities establishment Involvement of the Operating Organization establishment 14

16 Interfaces and focus uses the concept of 3 Phases utilized in the Milestones document. limits its scope to safety. contents drawn from the IAEA Safety Standards and the INSAG-22 inputs. addresses safety issues in a detailed manner. covers 20 safety elements. is structured in accordance with the Safety Requirements. identifies responsibilities of the main actors and interfaces. suggests 200 actions to facilitate implementation of the Safety Requirements represents international consensus and the experience of countries with mature nuclear power programmes. 15

17 The 3 main roles of SSG Road-map to gradually apply the IAEA Safety Standards. 2. Terms of reference to tailor the Safety Review Services. 16

18 Importance of coordination IAEA safety review missions based on internationally agreed safety standards are well established and are best practices to build up confidence on the capacity of a country to develop safe and sustainable a nuclear power programme. 17

19 Coordinating Safety reviews and Holistic reviews (INIR missions) Safety peer reviews against the Safety Standards (to address the safety-related infrastructure) Siting Mission IRRS Mission Safety Missions pre-osart, IRRS Ph 1 Ph 2 Ph 3 Operation INIR Mission INIR Mission Holistic reviews against the Milestones (Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review) 18

20 The 3 main roles of SSG Road-map to gradually apply the IAEA Safety Standards. 2. Terms of reference to tailor the Safety Review Services. 3. Training framework for embarking countries. 19

21 Phasing the Training Programme Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Operation M1: decision M2: call for tenders M3: commissioning Before contract After contract IAEA plays a more relevant role Most of the training provided by the vendor and by the RB that have licensed a similar facility 20

22 Framework for E&T in Nuclear Safety Requires the identification and analysis of what an organization is going to need in terms of competencies, number of staff and background Provides a framework for the implementation of E&T activities for embarking countries based on previous experience and materials available in NS Department Consistent with the actions defined in SSG 16 Covers 3 phases 21

23 Overview of applications 1. Road-map to gradually apply the IAEA Safety Standards. 2. Terms of reference to tailor the Safety Review Services. 3. Training framework for embarking countries. 22

24 Outlook Useful tool to provide consistent coordination for all safety infrastructure areas among regulators of suppliers, recipients and international organizations. Consideration is also given to other governmental organizations and the industry. 23