Lessons learnt and subsequent actions taken in France after Fukushima accident

Transcription

1 Lessons learnt and subsequent actions taken in France after Fukushima accident Thomas HOUDRÉ ASN 1

2 Contents 1. Crisis Management in France after Fukushima Handling of the crisis Communication lessons learnt 2. Post Fukushima assessment in France The hardened safety core FARN 3. Conclusions 4. Appendix : detailed contents of ASN s post Fukushima requirements 2

3 Crisis Management in France ASN responsibilities In an emergency situation, ASN s responsibilities, with the support of IRSN, are : - to ensure that adequate and relevant actions are undertaken by the licensee; - to advise the Government about emergency measures; - to inform the media and the public; - to act as competent authority within the framework of the international conventions. 3

4 Extremely weak radiological consequences in France foreseen and measured Strong media pressure Crisis Management in France ASN & the Fukushima accident Necessity to adapt the objectives of the ASN emergency centre From 11 march to early April 2011, ASN emergency triggered on a 24/24h basis to: - get information - analyze this information - advise the Government: French citizens in Japan Importation of goods Impact of radioactive plume on French territories - inform the media and the public 4

5 Crisis Management in France Handling of crisis Crisis centre activated 24/7 during 1 month Daily audio conference with IRSN, IAEA, foreign RB (NRC, ONR, CNSC), French Embassy in Tokyo and French institutions In the heart of the crisis : 20 people in the crisis centre 1000 man*day rallied in 1 month Numerous meetings with Government, parliament, 4 meetings of the CIC (interdepartmental crisis unit) Reinforced monitoring of the environment 5

6 Crisis Management in France Support and Communication ASN provided support to the French Embassy in Japan and to the ministry for French citizen living in or visiting Japan Active communication during 1 st month - 18 ASN Press conferences - 28 Press releases - 10 to 15 people to answer to 1200 media demands - Dedicated website ( visits) - Dedicated phone number to answer questions from the public Both national and local communication 6

7 Crisis Management in France First lessons learnt Facing a long term crisis - Need for important human resources due to shifts - Ensuring the management of ASN on on-going activities - Need to ensure coordination between ASN, IRSN and other stakeholders - Rethinking the configuration and the organization of the ASN Emergency Center - Importance of anticipating post-accidental measures 7

8 Facing a major media crisis Crisis Management in France First lessons learnt - Need for a large number of trained staff, - Need for available background information on foreign nuclear installations - Need for a specific organization Facing an international nuclear crisis - Need for an enhanced coordination between regulatory authorities at European (EC ) and international (IAEA, NEA ) levels - Need for translation capacities 8

9 Contents 1. Crisis Management in France after Fukushima Handling of the crisis Communication lessons learnt 2. Post Fukushima assessment in France The hardened safety core FARN 3. Conclusions 4. Appendix : detailed contents of ASN s post Fukushima requirements 9

10 Post-Fukushima assessment by ASN - Specific inspections 2-3 days per NPP Fukushima-related topics 38 inspections (June-Oct. 2011), 116 days of inspection immediate impact (2011/2012) - Complementary safety assessment Post Fukushima assessment Introduction based on European Stress Tests Specifications Extreme external hazard Whole site SBO & LHS Severe accident 150 nuclear installations, 12 Licensees Schedule Operator reports : September 15 th 2011 ASN report : January 2012, Requirements issued on June 26 th 2012 short, mid and long term impact This approach supplements the safety regulation currently in force (PSR, regular control, inspections, etc.) 10

11 Post Fukushima assessment Transparency Observers from many entities attended technical meetings during stress tests as well as inspections (from the French High Committee for transparency and Information on Nuclear Security, local information committees and several foreign experts and regulators) At each step of the process, whether European or national, major reports (incl. licensees reports) and resolutions have been posted on ASN website Several information notices published + 4 specific press conferences 11

12 ASN s conclusions Important conclusions of the stress tests (1/3) Following this work, the facilities examined offer a safety level that is sufficient for ASN not to request the immediate shutdown of any of them. At the same time, ASN considers that continued operation of the facilities requires that their robustness to extreme situations be increased beyond the existing safety margins, as soon as possible. Importance of the PSR process and significant OEF Seismic improvements Wide ranging set of hazards considered for flooding risk assessment Severe accident measures implemented on all the sites EPR already offers an improved protection against severe accident 12

13 Important conclusions of the stress tests (2/3) Decision to implement new and robust safety measures rather than performing sophisticated analysis Reinforce protection against seismic and flooding hazards Reinforce electricity and water supply Reinforce emergency preparedness Hardened safety core concept Limited list of equipment designed well above the design safety requirements (e.g. for earthquake) "Nuclear rapid response force (FARN)" specialist crews and equipment, able to take over from the personnel of a site affected by an accident and to deploy additional emergency response resources in less than 24 hours. Additional preventive measures to prevent major cliff edge effects Risk of dewatering of the spent fuel in the pools due to beyond design hazards Whole site SBO (shutdown states, 900MWe ) 13

14 Important conclusions of the stress tests (3/3) The licensees have been required to strengthen the deviances processing system On the basis of the in-depth experience feedback from the Fukushima accident, ASN will reinforce the baseline safety referential of the nuclear facilities, particularly with respect to earthquakes, flooding and risks associated with other industrial activities. Earthquake (characterization of seismic motion, civil engineering), Flooding (new regulatory published in 2013) Combinations of hazards to consider (external, internal, with internal events), Requirements associated to SSC (fire protection, severe accident management...) Durations of loss of heat sink and loss of energy 14

15 Hardened safety core ASN requirements in order to increase robustness ASN Requirement ECS-1: hardened safety core (beyond design), scope definition before end of June objectives, for the situations studied in the stress tests prevent or mitigate the progress of an accident with fuel melt, mitigate large-scale radioactive releases, enable the licensee to perform its emergency management duties. - strengthened equipment including an additional ultimate electricity generating set for each reactor; an diverse emergency cool-down water supply for each reactor; new crisis management premises, offering greater resistance to hazards and remaining accessible and habitable at all times and during long-duration emergencies mobile devices and means of communication essential to emergency management technical and environmental instrumentation - SSCs included in the hardened safety core shall be maintained in a functional state, in particular for the extreme situations studied in the stress tests. SSCs shall be designed with significant fixed margins in relation to the requirements currently applicable. - Composed of independent and diversified SSCs in relation to the existing ones to avoid CCF. The licensee shall justify the use of undiversified or existing SSCs. File transmitted by EDF, evaluated by the standing group of experts 15

16 Hardened safety core Operating NPPs case Arrangements Hardened to Safety Core must be manage protected more against potential induced and more events, severe like fire, explosion, load drops... situations Level 5 (emergency management) Level 4 (severe accidents) Level 3 (Safeguard) Level 2 (abnormal operation) Level 1 (Normal operation) hardened safety core (limited number of essential functions) deviances Margins «Emergency management» «Limitation of severe accident consequences» «Prevention of severe accident» Level of hazards considered in the safety framework Stress-test Level Level of hazard considered for designing systems and components 16

17 Hardened safety core key concepts defined EFWS-u M PTR CSS H4 U3 SIS ASG EFWS M M M M Water tanks Ultimate water make up pump Water table wells M LHA LHB Diesel generators Electrical panel LHC Ultimate diesel generator 17

18 Hardened safety core Major SSCs 19 bunkered crisis management centres 58 additional diesel generators 58 ultimate heat sinks (based on new artesian wells or water tanks) 18

19 Hardened safety core External hazards Seismic Hazard : operator proposal is under evaluation compared to 10-4 probabilistic definition. Flooding : operator proposal for HSC includes significant margins compared to the recently published regulatory guide Other hazards: checked compared to WENRA requirements when available. Design provisions are already considered for new hard core SSC and oversized. 19

20 Hypothesis for the FARN design FARN Creation context and design hypothesis Only one site out of the 19 faces a severe accident. It may be one «FARN site». Major destruction of the infrastructures, including access roads to the site Total or partial unavailability of local teams (shift teams, local on-call emergency plan personnel) The FARN is able to work in environment facing radiological and/or chemical hazards FARN is fully included in the EDF national crisis organization FARN is a resource of the national crisis organization of the nuclear fleet. Its organization is included in the EDF emergency plans, either national or local Decision of FARN alerting is made by nuclear fleet director, on request of the NPP management, advised by an FARN headquarter member, 20

21 To arrive on a site in accident conditions within 12h in order to : FARN Objectives Bring skilled operators on site in order to help the local shift, and possibly take-over. If existing on site equipment is no more available, supply additional electricity, water and compressed air with own mobile equipment (stored and transported by the FARN) : connect, start and operate it, to ensure permanent core and spent fuel pool cooling Ensure supply chain and technical support (with own logistic means stored and transported by the FARN) To be fully operational on a site in accident conditions within 24h. Avoid releases in the environment Avoid, as much as possible, any core melt 21

22 a 2 level, national and regional, organization FARN Organization Gravelines 1 national FARN headquarter Flamanville Paluel Penly Chooz (reconnaissance team, about 30 people, 5 on-call teams, country wide intervention) Nogent/Seine Etat-major Base matérielle nationale Cattenom 1 national equipment base (mid and long term equipment, back bases modules) Fessenheim Chinon St Laurent Belleville Dampierre 4 regional FARN HR bases with regional equipment bases nearby Le Blayais Civaux Bugey St Alban hosted by 4 FARN ed NPPs (Civaux, Dampierre, Paluel, Bugey) (about 4 x 70 people in 5 teams of 14 on-call people each, country wide intervention) Golfech Cruas Tricastin 22

23 GLOBAL FARN INTERVENTION CHRONOGRAM FARN Intervention TOP FARN T h T0 + 72h Alert and FARN Mobilization decision EDF Autonomous Management First Emergency Plan actions performed by NPP shift teams FARN 1st Stage Reconnaissance team (FARN national center) 1 st stage teams and mobile equipment deployment (FARN regional centers) FARN 2d Stage (to replace 1 stage teams) Emergency Plan actions performed by NPP shift teams and possibly by NPP on-call teams FARN interventions Wave1 FARN Wave2 In collaboration with other French nuclear operators Mid and Long Term Crisis Management GIE Intra interventions (National Shared Nuclear Equipment) Centralized management of the emergency situation 23

24 FARN Human resources FARN NATIONAL LEVEL ORGANIZATION: - about 30 people : allows to constitute a reconnaissance team on-duty of 3 individuals 2 people insure attendance and advising at ONC crisis Center FARN REGIONAL LEVEL ORGANIZATION: - each of the 4 regional FARN service is staffed by about 70 on call people : allows to constitute 5 teams of about 14 individuals each, Different skills (operation, maintenance, logistics) A total force of about 300 on call-people with its own equipment able to rescue a site in less than 24h Rescue team sent by one regional FARN Service Management( 1) Operation (6) Maintenance (5) Other (2) 14 people Cope with 2 units with its own HR and equipment 24

25 FARN Logistics means 25 25

26 FARN Logistics means 26

27 FARN Water make up means 27

28 FARN Electrics means 28

29 FARN Back base 29

30 Overview of actions schedule Phase 1 : short term covering by emergency situation means and interim solutions for beyond design SBO and LHS (several units, long duration) - Crisis management buildings, local and regional emergency resources, - Multi units and long duration crisis : organization, local resources and mobile safety resources, telecommunication functions, - Interim diesels and pumps - plug and play connections for primary and secondary water make-up - Deployment of FARN - Measures largely consistent with international safety measures (mobile resources, like US FLEX-Flexible Response Capability ) Phase 2 : Mid term covering by definitive SSC for beyond design SBO and LHS situations - Progressive deployment of the hardened safety core main SSCs, with a strengthened robustness against external events, e.g. ultimate back-up diesel generator, ultimate water make-up system, new ECC, - Improvement in the robustness of the main safety systems beyond the current safety requirements, to better prevent SBO and LHS Phase 3 : Long term covering by definitive SSC for beyond design SBO and LHS situations - Finalization of the deployment of the hardened safety core (mitigation) 30/25

31 Déf. HSC FARN FARN (4 tr) (6 tr) PHASE 1 FARN Mobile means Emergency resources VD GP New on-site emergency plan Mobiles means, plug & play connections Assessment phase 1 modifications current ECC seismic improvement Mobile injection pump Small DG Other modifications* * Piquages air, Simu, eau borée, etc. ** Paniers soude, U4, Alim. DVC, renforcement U5 au séisme, GMPP, etc. *** Appoint au primaire pour les états primaires non pressurisables, etc. Ultimate DG (DUS) PHASE 2 Implementation of HSC Assessment phase 2 modifications Ultimate water make-up system New ECC Other modifications** Finalization of HSC Mitigation PHASE 3 Reinforcement of training of emergency teams for extreme situations Assessment phase 3 modifications Ultimate water make-up system/secondary cooling Ultimate I&C and link with new ECC Robustness of HSC SSC against extreme hazards Others modifications Prevention SA*** 31

32 Contents 1. Crisis Management in France after Fukushima Handling of the crisis Communication lessons learnt 2. Post Fukushima assessment in France The hardened safety core FARN 3. Conclusions 4. Appendix : detailed contents of ASN s post Fukushima requirements 32

33 Main achievements & Challenges Definition, through regulatory binding documents, of the schedule of the works to be performed Implementation of the short term measures ongoing - FARN able to intervene on one site at the end of Multi units crisis management organization operational: organization, local resources and mobile safety resources, telecommunication functions, - Interim diesels and pumps being installed - plug and play connections for primary and secondary water make-up under deployment Hardened safety core - Definition of hard core safety goals (June 2012) - Position of the French standing group of experts on operator hard core definition (December 2012) - Final ASN s position on requirements of HSC being finalized So far, EDF complied with the requirements set by ASN Collective challenge to achieve to implement all the safety improvements, in due time, with a rigorous monitoring and without adverse impact on other essential activities (operational safety at first) 33

34 34

35 Earthquake ASN Requirement n 1 : hardened safety core (beyond design), scope definition sent in June 2012 ASN Requirement n 8-10 : More attention in day-to-day operation (need seen during numerous ASN inspections after Fukushima accident), training + maintenance of instrumentation etc. ASN Requirement n 13: evaluation of the benefits of an immediate scram in case of an earthquake sent in December 2012 ASN Requirement n 19: severe accident instrumentation (corium detection, hydrogen detection) designed for DBE (minimum) before end of 2017 Accelerometer on a EDF NPP ASN Requirement n 29: design evaluation of filtered depressurization system before end of

36 Flooding ASN Requirement n 4: complete protective works & measures following the 2007 "flooding" reassessment, before end of ASN Requirement n 5: improve maintenance of volumetric protection of the facilities, before end of June 2012 ASN Requirement n 6: reinforce protection of facilities against flood over and above current baseline safety requirements, for ex. by increasing the VP. Proposal awaited before end of 2013; implementation before the end of 2017 ASN Requirement n 11: re-evaluation of the robustness of the dykes (Fessenheim, Tricastin) and analysis of the potential consequences of a breach before end of 2013 Fessenheim Tricastin 36

37 SBO (1/2) ASN Requirement n 16-II: Installation of pumps for water make-up for shutdown states in case of total loss of power completed in June 2013 ASN Requirement n 18-I: Increase of the batteries autonomy used in loss of off-site and on-site electrical power supplies file sent in June Implementation before end 2014 ASN Requirement n 18-II: Implementation of one UDG / reactor, part of the hardened safety core, before end ASN Requirement n 18-III: pending of this installation, implementation of temporary generator sets implementation completed in June

38 SBO (2/2) ASN Requirement n 23: study of the possible measures, in case of SBO and accidental emptying, to ensure safe positioning of a fuel assembly being handled in the fuel building file sent in June 2012 ASN request n 19: Ensure reliability of on-site fuel and oil stocks and their replenishments under all circumstances to ensure autonomy 2 weeks action plan accepted in September 2012 ASN request n 22: Enhancement of leak-tightness of primary pumps seals detailed analysis transmitted ASN request n 24 (EU-peer review recommendation): Study advantages/drawbacks of means enabling the recharge of the batteries before their depletion 38

39 LUHS ASN Requirement n 15: complete heat sink design review (prevention of clogging risks, ) before sent in June 2012 ASN Requirement n 16-I: implementation of ultimate water make-up means, by pumping water from the groundwater or large-capacity ponds, able to provide water make up to EFWS tanks, FPCS tanks and to the SPF ASN Requirement n 17: Hazard robustness of the equipment used to manage a whole-site long lasting LUHS/SBO situation, before end of 2013 SFP Piscine BK EFWS ASG FPCS PTR 10m NB 40m Pumping facility (12 m x 12 m H : 10 m) Own DG 39

40 Severe accidents (1/2) ASN Requirement n 1 : Hardened core will include crisis management equipment (communication means, dosimetry, etc.) ASN Requirement n 36 response force» (FARN) : «Nuclear rapid specialist crew and equipment, able to take over from the personnel of a site affected by an accident and deploy additional emergency response resources in less than 24 hours Progressive implementation from 2012 on : fully operational in 2014 ASN Requirement n 35 : Additional training to be performed in 2013 to prove that its organization guarantees the availability of the necessary skills in the event of an emergency 40

41 Severe accidents (2/2) ASN Requirement n 22: - EDF has to enlarge siphon breakers in the SFP before the end of March EDF has to install an automatic isolation system of cooling stem intake line, before end of 2016 ASN Requirement n 29: evaluation of design improvements of filtered depressurization system before end of 2013 (robustness to hazards, feasibility of filtration of iodine and noble gases ) ASN Requirement n 32 : EDF reinforced its material and organizational measures to take into account extreme situations that could affect simultaneously several units of one site by the end of ASN Requirement n 31: EDF presented the modifications to ensure that in the event of a release of dangerous substances or opening of the U5 venting-filtration system, the operation and monitoring of all the facilities on the site is guaranteed, until a long-term safe state is reached, in December Iodine filter 41