Transportation and Emergency Planning*

Transcription

1 IAEA Seminar on Governance of Uranium Production Activities, Copenhagen, May, 2014 Transportation and Emergency Planning* Kevin Scissons, Canada * Based on IAEA Training course on Authorization and Inspection of Uranium Mining and Milling Activities in Africa - Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa, August

2 During uranium mining operations, transportation of various hazardous materials occurs. Includes materials, like acid, alkali, fuel or explosives, reagents, low level radioactive waste rock, uraniumcontaining resin, as well as uranium processing concentrates (UPC) or yellowcake. National Regulations of Dangerous/Hazardous Goods will apply as appropriate. Thus Regulatory Oversight is necessary. 2

3 Packaging Emergency Response Transport Security Transboundary 3

4 Transportation of Rad. Material High Grade Ore Slurry, Canada Type A Package Type IP-2 Package Industrial Package (Australia) Artisanal exploitation of radioactive minerals (DRC) 4

5 Class 1 Explosives Class 2 Gases Class 3 Flammable Liquids Class 4 Flammable Solids Class 5 Class 6 * Class 7 Oxidizers & Peroxides Toxic & Infectious Radioactive Materials RADIOACTIVE * Likely only Class of goods NOT associated with Uranium Mine, Processing Class 8 Corrosives Class 9 Miscellaneous Dangerous Goods 5

6 1 Sv = 100 rem 6

7 The IAEA regulations have a classification scheme for radioactive materials. Has requirements for transportation and packaging and testing procedures. If all countries use TS-R-1, trans-boundary issues minimal. Main focus on the provision of adequate packaging to safely contain the radioactive material during normal handling as well as accident conditions. Due to its low activity per unit mass, uranium ore (< 2% grade) and the processed concentrates are considered a minor hazard and can therefore be transported as industrial package with appropriate placarding and labels. Note: By example, the high grade Canadian uranium ores, of up to 25% grade, are classed for IP-2 containers, due to the dose (on surface of package: ~ 200 µsv/h; and 80 µsv/h at 1 m.) 7

8 IAEA S TS-R-1 Content General : Radiation Protection Emergency Response Quality Assurance Compliance Assurance Non-compliance Special Arrangements Training Activity Limits and Classes Requirements and Controls for Transport Requirements for Packaging, Testing Approval and Admin. Requirements 8

9 LSA-I includes: (i) Uranium and thorium ores and concentrates of such ores, and other ores containing naturally occurring radionuclides which are intended to be processed for the use of these radionuclides; (ii) Natural uranium, depleted uranium, natural thorium or their compounds or mixtures, that are unirradiated and in solid or liquid form; 9

10 Example excerpt: 302. A radiation protection programme shall be established for the transport of radioactive material. The nature and extent of the measures to be employed in the programme shall be related to the magnitude and likelihood of radiation exposures. 10

11 Good industry practices include: drum design, size, materials and labelling, as well as requirements for lids and rings. external, non-fixed radiation is to be kept low * verified that the drums are clean (swiped) adequate securing of the drums for transport. * 11

12 URANIUM PROCESSED CONCENTRATE (CONT D) Shipment of uranium concentrate is in sealed, reusable steel drums. For international shipments, they are stacked securely in ISO (sea) containers. Main health concern of processed concentrate is due to its chemical toxicity as a heavy metal, rather than its radioactivity. If properly packaged and handled, no health hazard is expected from the uranium concentrates and annual individual doses should not exceed 1 msv. 12

13 Requires Regulatory Approval if Ore is by large haul trucks, ore slurry totes, ISL resin, or train. In fact Radiation Issues differ with Ore vs. yellowcake. 13

14 The IAEA TS-R-1 regulations have been adopted in about 60 countries. This can avoid delays or denials of shipment at the interface of different regulatory regimes (as transported over large distances, multiple countries). Having a broad acceptance on these regulations is a major advantage, and can prevent authorities or carriers to refuse shipments. Illegal trans-boundary shipments are still another issue. 14

15 Contains elements * like: Full description of the radioactive material Threat assessment to identify any credible threats Description of the type of vehicle used to transport Proposed security measures in place during transport, such as will there be continuous tracking (GPS) and an escort? Communications arrangement between the carrier and the response force (local police or military?) Communication arrangement for licensee and response force Primary and alternate transportation routes Any trans-boundary issues Considering its value, operator will be considering security * Based on CNSC Protocol 15

16 TRANSPORTATION SECURITY PLAN Providing physical protection, (and following the regulations regarding the legitimate transport of radioactive substances), is important now more than ever: to avoid illegal acquisition and illicit trafficking protect the public protect the operators investment secured shipments minimizes regulatory follow-up to stolen materials, and the public s concerns. 16

17 Transportation incidents involving radioactive material is always a topic of public concern. Therefore a comprehensive emergency plan has to be developed in the case of a spill/accident. This includes: an active risk communication towards the public; first response training for the drivers to initially minimise the impacts; qualified response units along the transportation route. A framework for planning and preparing for response to accidents in the transport of radioactive material has been developed by the IAEA: Planning and Preparing for Emergency Response to Transport Accidents Involving Radioactive Material Safety Standards Series No. TS-G-1.2 (ST-3), IAEA, Vienna (2002). 17

18 Several governmental organizations, the consignor, the carrier and their personnel have responsibilities to act to mitigate its consequences. In most transport accident situations this response consists of life saving, medical aid, fire suppression and control, and the normal police work with any accident. Accidents involving radioactive materials must be reported to the Nuclear Regulator, Transport Officers or Transport Specialists for follow-up. Important to have specialized organizations trained to deal with radioactive material to assess the accident and implement the protective measures used to contain, control or eliminate any radiological hazard. 18

19 5.1. In responding to transport accidents involving radioactive material the main actions to be taken are to: (a) Rescue and provide emergency medical aid to any victims, (b) Control fires and the other common consequences (c) Identify the hazards of the material involved, (d) Control any radiation hazard and prevent the spread of radioactive contamination, (e) Recover the package or packages and transport vehicle, (f) Decontaminate personnel, (g) Decontaminate and restore the thoroughfare and delineate the borders of other contaminated areas, (h) Decontaminate in the vicinity and restore to a safe state. 19

20 Incident Response Questions (examples) : Who will be the first responders to the incident scene? Are things like first aid and medical staff needed? Are radiation protection specialist(s) available or can be contacted, and how will they be transported to the incident scene? Is access control at the incident scene in place? Is there containment of any released materials, and risks mitigation understood? Plan for clean-up of the affected areas and disposal of contaminated materials? Who will verify adequate clean-up and decontamination? Is there good management of field operations and external communications in place, or being put in place? What other support to the emergency operations is needed? 20

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23 Risks from a sealed container of yellowcake drums FROM: URANIUM COUNCIL TRANSPORT WORKING GROUP Guide to Safe Transport of Uranium Oxide Concentrate, Australia 2012 Risks from an open container of yellowcake drums, with spilled product. 23

24 Compliance Assurance follow similar protocols we have discussed. This includes: Transport Inspector training Reporting requirements and practices for inspectors Standards of conduct of inspectors Enforcement policy, procedures and practices Method of inspection to be used (packaging, in transit) Methods for selection of inspection samples Relevant technical information and questionnaires, as likely a mix of hazardous materials are in transit. 24

25 COMPLIANCE PROGRAMME (CONTINUED) Considerations: Inspection Team, Specialists needed General, Focus Specific, or Audit Inspection of carrier Sampling required, and preparation Previous Insp. results, follow-up Enforcement protocols, options (illegal shipments) Security verification Trans-boundary issues, protocols Insp. Report outcome and follow-up 25

26 REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE Following the TS-R-1 Regulations and other IAEA documents we discussed, the issues for health and safety are minimized for: Packaging, Transportation, Trans-boundary, Security and Emergency Response Emergency Response Security Packaging Transport Transboundary 26