# Finance 510 Midterm #2 Practice Questions

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1 Finance 50 Midterm # Practice Questions ) ) Consider the following pricing game between Dell and Gateway. There are two types of demanders in the market, High and Low. High demanders value a computer at \$4000. There are 00 of these people in the market. Low demanders value a computer at \$000. There are 00 of these people in the market. If Dell and Gateway set the same price, they split the market. If they set different prices, the lower price takes the entire market. Assume that the marginal cost of a computer is \$500. First, we need to calculate the profits under each scenario; Dell Charges \$4,000 / Gateway charges \$4000 Dell and gateway split the market (50 customers each) Profit = (\$ \$500)(50) = \$75K Dell Charges \$,000 / Gateway charges \$000 Dell and gateway split the market (50 customers each) Profit = (\$000 - \$500)(50) = \$75K Dell Charges \$,000 / Gateway charges \$4000 (or visa versa) One firm gets all the sales (300 customers) Profit = (\$000 - \$500)(300) = \$50K (Gateway s payoffs are in bold):. Gateway Dell P = \$4,000 P = \$,000 P = \$4,000 \$75K \$75K \$0 \$50K P = \$,000 \$50K \$0 \$75K \$75K

2 Note that neither Dell nor Gateway has a dominant strategy. Suppose Dell charges \$4,000 Gateway s best response is to swerve charge \$4000 (\$75 vs. \$50). However, if Dell charges \$000, then Gateway should charge \$000 (\$75 vs. \$0). Suppose that Dell has adopted the strategy of charging \$4000 /3 of the time and charging \$000 /3 of the time. We need to show that if Dell follows the strategy (/3,/3) then Gateway is indifferent between P = \$4000 and P = \$000. If we calculate the expected reward to Gateway from E(P = \$4000) = (/3)(75) + (/3)(0) = \$7 E(P = \$000) = (/3)(50) + (/3)(75) = \$5 This can t be an equilibrium because Gateway would have a strict preference for the low price. To find the correct probabilities, we need to set them equal.. E(P = \$4000) = (Ph)(75) + (Pl)(0) E(P = \$000) = (Ph)(50) + (Pl)(75) (Ph)(75) = (Ph)(50) + (Pl)(75) Remember the probabilities need to sum to one Ph + Pl = Solving for Ph and Pl, we get Ph = ¾, Pl = /4. Both players are charging low 5% of the time.. Therefore, the probability that they both charge low is (/4)(/4) = /6 = 6.5%. ) Consider the following version of the prisoners dilemma game (Player one s payoffs are in bold): Player Two Cooperate Cheat Player Cooperate \$5 \$5 \$0 \$50 One Cheat \$50 \$0 \$0 \$0 a) What is each player s dominant strategy? Explain the Nash equilibrium of the game.

3 Start with player one: a. If player two chooses cooperate, player one should choose cheat (\$5 versus \$50) b. If player two chooses cheat, player one should also cheat (\$0 versus \$0). Therefore, the optimal strategy is to always cheat (for both players) this means that (cheat, cheat) is the only nash equilibrium. b) Why is an infinite horizon required for cooperation to occur? Explain. If this game is played a multiple but finite number of times, then we start at the end to solve it. At the last stage, this is like a one shot game (there is no future). Therefore, on the last day, the dominant strategy is for both players to cheat. This cheating strategy at the last day unravels back to the beginning. c) Now, suppose that this game was played an infinite number of times. For what values of the interest rate is the present value of cooperating higher than the value of cheating (so that a cooperative equilibrium could occur) Once the possibility of an endgame scenario disappears, there is an incentive to cooperate. Suppose that player follows the following strategy: I will cooperate today. If player one cooperates, I will trust him and cooperate forever. However, if player cheats, then I will never trust him again. Now consider player s response: If I cooperate, I get \$5 a year forever. If I cheat, I get \$50 today and then \$0 a year forever. Player one will cheat if the present value of cheating is greater than the present value of cooperating. \$0 \$5 \$ 50 + > \$5 + i i Player one will cheat if the interest rate is bigger than 4%.

4 3) Suppose that you operate a water park. You have the following demands for your rides. Rides have a marginal cost of \$5. 50 P, (Adults) Q = 30 P, (Children) a) If you could set different ride prices for adults and children, what would you charge? What would you charge if you were required to charge everybody the same ride price? First we need to aggregate the two demand curves 50 P, Q 0 Q = 80 P, Q 0 Now, calculate thee two inverse demand pieces: 50 Q, Q 0 P = 40.5Q, Q 0 Now, calculate TR for each piece 50Q Q, Q 0 TR = PQ = 40Q.5Q, Q 0 Now, calculate marginal revenue for each piece: 50 Q, Q 0 MR = 40 Q, Q 0 Lastly, set marginal revenue equal to marginal cost. Note that with MC = \$5, you will always sell at least 0 tickets, so the only piece of the demand curve that matters is that with Q>0. 5 = 40 Q Q = 35 P = \$.50 Profits = \$.50(35) - \$5 (35) = \$6.50

5 However, if we could charge different prices, we can use each demand curve individually. For Adults: Q = 50 P P = 50 Q TR = 50Q Q MR = 50 Q = 5 Q =.5 P = \$7.50 For Kids: Q = 30 P P = 30 Q TR = 30Q Q MR = 30 Q = 5 Q =.5 P = \$7.50 Profits = \$7.50 (.5) + \$7.50(.5) - \$5 (35) = \$66.50 b) Suppose you could engage in two part pricing (i.e a price per ride plus an entry fee. What would you charge for adults and children? First, recognize that willingness to pay is increasing in the amount that each consumes. Therefore, we want to raise sales as much as possible. This is done by setting a price equal to MC (\$5). AT that price, we have the following: Adults: Q = 45 CS = (/)(45)(45) = \$0.50 Children: Q = 5 CS = (/)(5)(5) = \$3.50 Therefore, we could charge children \$ for 5 rides (\$3.50 for admission plus \$5 for the rides) and adults \$37.50 (\$0.50 for admission plus \$5 for the rides)

6 c) Now, suppose that you set menu prices (that is, you sell books of tickets ticket per ride). What ticket packages would you sell? We only need to worry about adults buying the children s package of 5 rides. If an adult buys 5 rides, he gets \$ \$65 = \$ = Total willingness to pay. Subtracting the \$ package price gives us \$500 of surplus. Therefore, the 45 ride package should cost \$ \$500 = \$ ) Suppose that the elasticity of demand for tennis shoes is 4 (and is constant). Calculate the markup that would be charged is a monopoly controlled the market. How would your answer change if the market was oligopolistic with an HHI index of 5,000. HHI P MC 0,000 LI = P ε P MC =.5 P P =.4MC =.5 =.5 4 You should charge a 4% markup. On the other hand, for a monopolist P MC LI = = P ε P MC =.5 P P =.33MC 4 =.5 A monopolist should charge a 33% markup.

7 5) Suppose that the (inverse) demand curve for bananas is given by P = 400 5Q Where Q is total industry output. The market is occupied by two firms, each with constant marginal costs equal to \$5. a) Calculate the equilibrium price and quantity assuming the two firms compete in quantities. Calculate the elasticity of demand facing each firm. How does this differ from industry elasticity? First, rewrite the aggregate production as the sum of each firm s output. ( q ) P = q Now, lets look at the demand facing firm (remember, firm one treats firm two s output as a constant P = ( 400 5q ) 5q Total revenues equal price times quantity. Pq ( 400 5q ) q q = 5 Marginal revenue is the derivative with respect to quantity. MR = ( 400 5q ) 0q Set marginal revenue equal to marginal cost and solve for quantity. To get market price, remember there are two firms. ( 400 5q ) q 395 5q = 0 0q = 5 = q This is firm one s best response function. Note that firm two is perfectly symmetric to firm one. q q = q = q Substitute one into the other to get the equilibrium. Then, substitute into the demand curve to get price (remember, there are two firms)

8 q = 6.3 P = 400 5(5.6) = \$37 = q π = π = \$37(6.3) \$5(6.3) = \$ b) Repeat parts (a) assuming the competition is in prices rather than quantities. In Bertrand competition, identical products results in marginal cost pricing. Therefore, price equals \$5, quantity = 79 and profits are zero. c) Suppose that each firm was capacity constrained. That is, each firm can only produce 00 units. How does this change your answers to (b)? (oops there was a typo in this question.i meant to set the capacity of each firm equal to 0, not 00!!) If only 0 units can be produced (0 by each firm), then P = 400 5(0) = \$300 Each firm produces 0 units and sells them for \$300. 6) What is bundling? Give an example, of how bundling can increase a firms profits. What characteristics of market demand make bundling desirable? Bundling allows you to take advantage of markets where there might be a large variance in consumer demand across products, but little variance over bundles of the products: See the lecture slides for a specific example. 7) Explain the similarities/difference between Cournot competition and Bertrand competition. What are the key assumptions/results of each? Cournot: Simultaneous move game. Each firm has a cost function to determine marginal costs (in the baseline example, marginal costs are constant and equal across firms, but this need not be the case). The firms face a common aggregate demand curve. Each firm chooses production levels conditional on what they expect their rival s production levels to be. The nash equilibrium is the result of all firms playing their best responses.