Are there chances for real competition on the European Single Energy Market?

Transcription

1 NEUF 2009 Nowa Energia User Friendly Warszawa 18 czerwca 2009 Are there chances for real competition on the European Single Energy Market? drkamila Kloc-Evison, DG Competition Energy & Environment, Antitrust This presentation reflects the personal views of the author

2 Introduction Economic characteristics: network industries, no duplication natural monopoly, access to networks essential; dominance of incumbent companies often vertically integrated, high barriers to entry; Regulation (ex ante) and/vs. competition policy (ex post); Social dimension (sensitive sectors); Security of supply issues; National markets and/vs. Single European Market.

3 Commission's approach Energy sector inquiry ( ) Increased use of antitrust tools (art 82, 81 and 82/86) Merger control State aid Implementation of the current regulatory framework: infringement cases against MSs Improved regulatory framework: 3 rd package

4 Energy sector inquiry Findings: Market concentration/market power Vertical foreclosure (inadequate unbundling of supply and network leading to underinvestment) Insufficient market integration Lack of transparency (market info) Distrust in price formulation Little competition on downstream markets Commission s dual strategy: regulatory framework (3 rd package) and competition law enforcement to open markets, to enable new entrants, to grant access to infrastructure

5 Antitrust cases (1) Commitment cases (art 82): Unbundling: EON in electricity (November 2008), RWE in gas (March 2009) Limitation of LT downstream contracts: Distrigaz(2007) Art 86/82 cases (state measures in favour of public undertakings with special or exclusive rights which are contrary to article 82 (dominance): Lignite case Greece (infringement decision -2008, commitments decision )

6 Antitrust cases (2) Ongoing cases: Art 81 case against E.ON and Gazde France (SO issued in 2008) Art 82 cases: ENI (initiated in 2007, SO issued in 2009) Gaz de France (proceedings opened in 2008) Electricite de France (SO issued in 2008) Svenska Kraftnat(proceedings opened in 2009)

7 Mergers (1) Prohibition case: EDP/GDP/ENI (December 2004) Portuguese market, merger between gas and electricity incumbents, risk of vertical foreclousure Withdrawn case: OMV/MOL (2008)

8 Mergers (2) Commitment decisions: GDF/Suez(2006): divestment of generation/supply; British Energy/EdF(2008): divestment DONG/Elsam/EnergiE2(2006), Cases without issues: Market-coupling JVs (2008): increase of cross-market liquidity Ongoing cases: Dutch market (Vattenfall/Nuon; RWE/Essent)

9 State aid Regulated electricity tariffs: cases against Spain and France Stranded costs: power purchase agreements: cases in Poland and Hungary

10 3 rd package Proposed in 2007, voted in by the EP in April 2009, to be adopted by the Council (Summer 2009) Main elements (from the competition policy point of view): Unbundling (combined with pro-active enforcement by regulators and competition authorities will stimulate the emergence of a competitive market structure) Cross-border integration (easier access to cross boarder capacity; incentives for TSOs to develop export/import capacities and coordinate network management) Improved regulatory oversight (Agency for the Coordination of Energy Regulators with a cross-boarder focus to help National Regulators who have no jurisdiction outside their national markets and strengthening of NRAs)

11 Conclusion Trends: Opening of traditionally national energy markets for external competition common market Ongoing consolidation at the EEA level Unbundling (3 rd package and antitrust commitments) yes, there are real chances to create competition on the ESEM (thanks to combination of regulatory and competition tools). But it is long process due to historical, economic, political (national markets, security of supply) arguments