Organizing the Global Value Chain: a firm-level test. ITSG Rome, 11 December

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1 Organizing the Global Value Chain: a firm-level test Davide del Prete (Sapienza University) Armando Rungi (IMT Institute for Advanced Studies) ITSG Rome, 11 December

2 THE CASE OF NUTELLA The ordered sequence of all production stages makes a chain with some suppliers that are integrated or not within one or more corporate boundaries. Nutella supply chain Source: OECD (2013)

3 LITERATURE SNAPSHOT The global decision to make or buy has been investigated theoretically (Antràs, 2003; Antràs and Helpman, 2004; Antràs and Helpman, 2008) and empirically (Corcos et al., 2013; Nunn and Trefler, 2008 and 2013; Kohler and Smolka, 2012; Bernard et al., 2010; Tomiura, 2007) Introduction for a case of unique headquarters negotiating with multiple suppliers, by Acemoglu et al. (2007). The novelty is the introduction of a sequence (Antràs and Chor, 2013; Alfaro et al., 2015), because one production stage cannot commence if the previous one does not deliver: 1. Assumption is that space of contracts available to a firm and its suppliers is not altered by integration (Grossman & Hart, 1986), but it affects the relative bargaining power in negotiations. 2. Relationship-specific investments made by upstream suppliers have consequences on incentives of downstream suppliers: organization of the chain matters. 3. In other words, the final and optimal allocation of ownership rights along the sequence can depend both on the relative position of each intermediate producer, and on the surplus that can be extracted from the sale of the final output, on which all the producers along the chain can rely. 4. Attempt to introduce heterogeneity as asymmetric inputs (asymmetric in contractibility)

4 Timing and sequence Source: Alfaro et al. (2015) Organizing GVC - Del Prete

5 Our empirical contribution We positively test at the firm-level for the (relative) positions of parent and integrated affiliates on the supply chain, after new investment operations: a higher demand elasticity of the final output implies vertical integration choices for activities that are (relatively) more proximate to the final consumer. BUT: firm heterogeneity matters: more productive, bigger and less capital-intensive firms are more able to reach stages proximate to the final consumer The previous extent of the supply chain matters: bigger and older corporate networks, more productive parents, are less likely to integrate further at the margin. The main prediction of the theoretical framework (Antràs and Chor, 2013; Alfaro et al., 2015) is not statistically significant for activities that approach the final consumer: after the VIII decile of the affiliate downstreamness from our sample. Horizontal integration? Organizing GVC - Del Prete

6 SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION We exploit different sources: Zephyr by Bureau Van Dijk for merging and takeover activities (brownfield investment operations). Orbis by Bureau Van Dijk for newly established activities (greenfield investment operations) and financial accounts (when present) Downstreamness metrics/indicators from Antràs et al (2012): they establish the (weighted and unweighted) distance from the final consumer of NAICS (6-digit) activities on the basis of US input-output tables. They suggest (and use) an index for the median level of industry complementarity/substitution. Elasticities of substitution from Broda and Weinstein (2006): estimates from US trade activities to assess gains from trade and varieties of goods (extensive/intensive margin, HS). Industry-level degree of contractibility from Rauch (1999), as a further control for a simple make or buy choice Some indicators from World Bank for country-level contract enforcement: rule of law, fixed entry cost The outreach of corporate boundaries is identified through the procedure set in Altomonte and Rungi (2013), to track corporate control chains in the case of direct or indirect equity participation. We focus on manufacturing parents (but including service affiliates), hence excluding financial corporations, consultancy firms and their branches. Organizing GVC - Del Prete & Rungi (2015)

7 Mapping the full hierarchy: with new and old investment operations Organizing GVC - Del Prete

8 BIRD S EYE VIEW OF OUR SAMPLE Parents All affiliates Affiliates as before Newly integrated affiliates (A+B) (A) (B) OECD 3,371 88,041 60,867 27,174 non-oecd ,679 10,144 6,535 European Union 1,421 58,508 40,620 17,888 United States 1,407 18,005 10,592 7,413 Rest of the world 1,386 28,207 19,799 8,408 of which: Japan 285 7,079 5,986 1,093 Latin America 50 2,539 1, Middle East 47 1, China 154 2,113 1, Africa 24 1,448 1, ASEAN 211 2,748 2, Total 4, ,720 71,011 33,709

9 THE TALE OF TWO SUPPLY CHAINS: SONY AND JOHNSON&JOHNSON Both supply chains have a similar group size, as they control 405 and 353 affiliates respectively. Their outputs are among the most downstream in our sample (.87 and.92), but final consumers tend to be much less price sensitive in the case of Sony (elasticity around 4.79) than in the case of Johnson&Johnson (elasticity around 12.72). Accordingly, the average affiliates downstreamness is.50 for Sony and.71 for Johnson&Johnson. That is, when the demand is sufficiently elastic, vertical integration preferably occurs downstream, leaving potential outsourcing of inputs further upstream Sony Integration (Affiliate) Outsourcing Johnson & Johnson Outsourcing Integration (Affiliate)

10 FIRM-LEVEL DOWNSTREAMNESS Frequency a) Parent downstreamness (Down) b) Affiliate downstreamness (Down)

11 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY Three different procedures have been implemented: I. Simple OLS, with and without controls for time-invariant country characteristics (country fixed effects) and controls for composition effects (excluding possible horizontal strategies, pure upstream, only newly established affiliates, only manufacturing affiliates). II. Endogenous treatment, maximum likelihood procedure: the new choices of vertical integration based on the previously internalized supply chains. III. Quantile regression: untying the complementarity/substitutability indicator by Antras and Chor (2013) and track the relationship in the downstreamness range [0,1]

12 Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) OLS and OLS fe and OLS and OLS fe and affiliate downstreamness OLS firm firm OLS firm firm (DuseTuse or Down) controls controls controls controls RESULTS (I): OLS parent DuseTuse.150***.224***.231*** (.005) (.009) (.008) parent Down.212***.330***.327*** (.005) (.010) (.008) complements -.040*** -.055*** -.062*** -.022*** *** (.004) (.007) (.006) (.003) (.006) (.005) complements*parent DuseTuse.060***.102***.108*** (.005) (.011) (.009) complements*parent Down.025*** *** (.006) (.012) (.010) (log of) labor productivity.009***.007***.015***.013*** (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) (log of) capital intensity -.011*** -.008*** -.021*** -.020*** (.002) (.001) (.002) (.001) (log of) size.006***.006***.004***.002*** (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (log of) established affiliates -.007*** -.006*** -.002** (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (log of) age -.006*** -.004*** -.007*** -.008*** (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) multinational group -.034*** -.042*** -.033*** -.024*** (.006) (.005) (.006) (.005) contractibility -.191*** -.205*** -.120*** -.123*** (.010) (.009) (.007) (.006) rule law (.008) (.008) entry cost -.004***.001 (.001) (.001) Constant.487***.518***.206***.400***.415***.345*** (.003) (.012) (.013) (.003) (.012) (.011) Parents show a greater propensity to integrate suppliers that enter further downstream when the final demand is sufficiently elastic. Parents tend to control production stages proximate to their main activity. Each parent and its suppliers tend to be relatively close along a supply chain. Observations 90,279 30,342 39,811 90,279 30,342 39,811 R-squared Country fixed effects NO NO YES NO NO YES Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

13 Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) OLS with OLS with OLS with OLS with OLS with OLS with OLS with DuseTuse Down DuseTuse Down DuseTuse Down DuseTuse affiliate downstreamness (DuseTuse or Down) excluding horizontal excluding horizontal manufacturing affiliates only manufacturing affiliates only upstream affiliates only upstream affiliates only new affiliates only OLS with Down new affiliates only parent DuseTuse.063***.314***.502***.167*** (.009) (.011) (.012) (.018) parent Down.203***.428***.387***.260*** (.010) (.011) (.010) (.018) complements -.080*** -.019*** -.050*** -.011* -.051*** -.037*** -.077*** -.028** (.007) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.010) (.006) (.013) (.012) complements*parent DuseTuse.124***.090***.094***.140*** (.011) (.013) (.014) (.021) complements*parent Down **.043***.051** (.012) (.013) (.012) (.022) (log of) labor productivity ***.010***.012*** ***.011***.017*** (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (log of) capital intensity -.009*** -.023*** -.009*** -.016*** -.013*** -.012*** -.012*** -.020*** (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.003) (log of) size.005***.004***.008***.002**.002** ***.003** (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (log of) established affiliates -.005*** -.002* -.007*** *** *** -.005*** (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) (log of) age *** -.008*** -.008*** -.007*** ** (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) multinational group -.024*** -.027*** -.038*** -.020*** (.007) (.008) (.006) (.006) (.008) (.007) (.007) (.007) contractibility -.252*** -.169*** -.117*** -.093*** -.095*** -.030*** -.203*** -.132*** (.011) (.007) (.010) (.008) (.011) (.006) (.020) (.013) rule law ** *** (.009) (.009) (.009) (.008) (.009) (.008) (.013) (.014) entry cost -.005*** *** -.002*** -.005*** *** (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) Constant.605***.481***.448***.375***.241***.218***.508***.412*** (.013) (.014) (.015) (.014) (.015) (.012) (.021) (.021) Observations 25,352 25,352 23,293 23,293 13,217 13,818 8,404 8,404 R-squared Country fixed effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO

14 RESULTS (II): ENDOGENOUS FORMATION, TREATMENT EQUATION Treatment equation Treatment variable: newly integrated Yes/No (log of) established affiliates -.039** -.050*** -.034** -.047*** (.016) (.016) (.015) (.015) (log of) labor productivity -.114*** -.088*** -.123*** -.097*** (.030) (.026) (.029) (.025) (log of) capital intensity ** (.030) (.025) (.029) (.024) (log of) size -.118*** -.095*** -.122*** -.098*** (.013) (.013) (.013) (.013) (log of) age -.065*** -.075*** -.054*** -.066*** (.018) (.016) (.015) (.015) Constant 1.386*** 1.124*** 1.329*** 1.560*** (.144) (.126) (.135) (.021) rho -.391*** -.331*** -.703*** -.698*** sigma.186***.185***.211***.210*** lambda -.073*** -.061*** -.148*** -.147*** Observations 30,340 39,808 30,340 39,808 Log pseudolikelihood -7, , , , Wald test for independent equations 35.30*** 31.14*** *** *** Clustered errors by parent YES YES YES YES Country fixed effects NO YES NO YES Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of the independence of the outcome from the treatment equations. Already bigger and more productive parents integrate less likely new stages of production at the margin

15 Outcome equation Dependent variable: affiliate downstreamness (DuseTuse or Down) (1) (2) (3) (4) Endogenous Endogenous treatment fe treatment Endogenous treatment Endogenous treatment fe RESULTS (II): ENDOGENOUS FORMATION, OUTCOME EQUATION parent DuseTuse.224***.231*** (.036) (.032) parent Down.316***.316*** (.026) (.026) complements -.055** -.062*** *** (.028) (.025) (.017) (.005) complements*parent DuseTuse.101**.108*** (.044) (.040) complements*parent Down *** (033) (.009) (log of) labor productivity.014***.011**.026***.022*** (.005) (.041) (.005) (.004) (log of) capital intensity -.013** -.010** -.025*** -.024*** (.005) (.005) (.005) (.004) (log of) size.011***.009***.013***.010*** (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (log of) established affiliates (.004) (.003) (.004) (.003) (log of) age (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) multinational group ** (.010) (.009) (.010) (.010) contractibility -.192*** -.204*** -.118*** -.120*** (.031) (.027) (.024) (.020) rule law (.013) (.012) entry cost -.004*** (.001) (.001) newly integrated (Yes/No).120***.103***.244***.242*** (.021) (.020) (.016) (.016) Constant.392***.348***.177***.181*** (.052) (.074) (.035) (.055)

16 Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) OLS and OLS fe OLS and OLS fe affiliate downstreamness OLS firm and firm OLS firm and firm (DuseTuse or Down) controls controls controls controls Parent DuseTuse.174***.274***.282*** (.003) (.007) (.006) Parent Down.226***.350***.356*** (.004) (.008) (.007) Parent demand elasticity -.002*** -.002*** -.002*** ***.001 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) Parent demand elasticity*dusetuse.002***.002***.003*** (.001) (.001) (.001) Parent demand elasticity*down * (.001) (.001) (.001) (log of) labor productivity.009***.007***.015***.013*** (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) (log of) capital intensity -.010*** -.007*** -.022*** -.020*** (.002) (.001) (.002) (.001) (log of) size.007***.008***.003***.002*** (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (log of) established affiliates -.007*** -.006*** -.002** (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (log of) age -.005*** -.004*** -.007*** -.007*** (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) multinational group -.037*** -.046*** -.033*** -.025*** (.006) (.005) (.006) (.005) contractibility -.186*** -.199*** -.123*** -.124*** (.010) (.009) (.007) (.006) rule law -.013*.005 (.008) (.008) entry cost -.004***.001 (.001) (.001) Constant.474***.482***.322***.387***.404***.381*** (.002) (.012) (.014) (.003) (.012) (.012) RESULTS (III): UNTYING ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION, CONDITIONAL MEDIAN Observations 90,279 30,342 39,811 90,279 30,342 39,811 R-squared Country dummies NO NO YES NO NO YES

17 RESULTS (III): PERCENTILES OVER DOWNSTREAMNESS source of statistical non-significance

18 CONCLUSIONS Overall, the prediction according to which a higher demand elasticity of the final output implies vertical integration choices for activities that are (relatively) more proximate to the final consumer. But firm heterogeneity matters: more productive, bigger and less capital-intensive firms are more able to reach stages proximate to the final consumer And also the previous extent of the supply chain matters: bigger and older corporate networks, more productive parents, are less likely to integrate at the margin. The main prediction of the theoretical model by Antràs and Chor (2013), but also by Alfaro et al. (2015), is not statistically significant for activities that approach the final consumer, after the VIII decile of the affiliate downstreamness from our sample. It can be due to horizontal integration strategies that are not accounted for by the sequential theory until now.

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