Future Electricity Markets. Dr. Daniel Matuszak Clean Coal and Carbon Management Office of Fossil Energy U.S. Department of Energy May 24, 2016

Transcription

1 Future Electricity Markets Dr. Daniel Matuszak Clean Coal and Carbon Management Office of Fossil Energy U.S. Department of Energy May 24, 2016

2 FERC s national policy 1. Foster competition in wholesale power markets by facilitating entry of new generators. 2. Guard the consumer from exploitation by non-competitive power companies. Competition Regulation 2

3 Infrastructure, key forces that led to restructured markets Generation Transmission Distribution Ownership: vertically integrated utility (originally) Regulated Market 1978 PURPA. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act was first to allow competition. Required utilities to purchase from Qualifying Facilities at avoided cost Energy Policy Act. Promotes competition, provides incentives. Expanded FERC authority, e.g. allowed ordering a transmitting utility to provide service and transmitting capacity to an applicant FERC Orders 888/9. Forced transmission facilities to provide services on the open market. Established OASIS, allowing customers to schedule and reserve capacity on the regional energy grids. 3

4 Major ISO/RTO balancing areas 4

5 Remainder of the country Locally managed by Balancing Authorities (BAs) 5

6 NERC regions, Balancing Authorities 6

7 Energy Imbalance Market started Y14 Drive to connect the disparate balancing authority areas Motivation to make the most of variable generation resources 7

8 Characteristics of markets Deregulated Energy-only Deregulated Energy & Capacity Hybrid Traditional Regulated ERCOT ISO-NE NYISO PJM CAISO MISO SPP SERC FRCC WECC Stay tuned: the Quadrennial Energy Review (QER 1.2) is in progress and includes a comprehensive description of markets. 8

9 Forces/themes acting on the system Clean Power Plan PTC & ITC Demand Response State RPS DER Generation Transmission Distribution e- Paris, 450ppm target Microgrids Supports Restricts 9

10 Future Capacity Changes Future capacity additions are mostly solar, wind, and flexible capacity (i.e., demand response, battery storage, and fast-ramping gas) 10

11 $/MWh Generation Stack early demand peak demand mcp peak mcp early Everyone that offers less than the Market Clearing Price (mcp) shall generate and receive the mcp as compensation. 11

12 $/MWh Effect of a hypothetical RE addition +20GW of RE to serve as an example of short-run impact early demand peak demand original mcp peak original mcp early More renewable energy (RE) reduces everyone s revenue by suppressing the Market Clearing Price (mcp). 12

13 Effect of changing generation mix Retirements of coal plants attributable to the shift in the curves from Y Loss of coal plants as a result of competition with gas plants makes price spikes more likely during peak hours. 13

14 Given the projected capacity additions, the day-ahead and real-time energy markets are going to be less welcoming for existing and new coal plants (without an increase in natural gas prices). New markets are need that monetize coal s value proposition not just selling commodity electrons, but providing stability, etc 14

15 Capacity markets still need help PURPOSE: incentivize the buildout of new generation so that energy can be made available during the most demanding times. ISSUES: Generation is not being built, or it s not being built where it is needed most (i.e. to optimize employment and investment). Previously, inexpensive MISO capacity flowed into PJM and depressed prices. Import limits were then set in PJM. Minimum offer price rules are deemed unfair and keep the capacity auction prices artificially high. Too much price volatility. Capacity revenues are highly discounted by institutional investors. 15

16 Volatility in capacity auction prices Unstable revenues from capacity auctions leads to 50-70% discount rates when evaluated by institutional investors. 16

17 States also discounting capacity auctions: Maryland CfD s program ISSUE: Maryland lost confidence that PJM s capacity auctions could incent new generation in Maryland. Launched CfD program. ACTION: a 20-year contract for differences between a new generator and a Load Serving Entity, which passes costs to customers through retail rates. RESULT: SCOTUS decided on Hughes vs. Talen on April 19. Courts judged that this conflicts with FERC policies and jurisdiction, has the potential to seriously distort the PJM auction price signals. (Rule of thumb applied w.r.t. FERC s policy #1: a successful CfD program if exploited could create barriers for entry of new generators.) 17

18 AEP & FirstEnergy: Electric Security Plan in Ohio ISSUE: Concerns over challenged coal and nuclear plants that support the local economy and provide fuel diversity. ACTION: Affiliate PPAs were approved by PUCO. FERC intervened and blocked the PPAs. FirstEnergy just resubmitted a modified plan to PUCO that would place a surcharge on retail rates (based on estimated costs instead of variable wholesale prices). RESULT: TBD (will it bypass FERC review?) (Could the successful approach be exploited to create barriers for the entry of new generators? Could the approach be used to exploit consumers by non-competitive power companies?) 18

19 Relevant problems with current markets Current markets do not provide enough incentive for diversifying the generation fleet. There is zero incentive for low-carbon power: nuclear, coal w/ CCS. Bilateral markets are seeing a reduction in the rate of PPAs signed. Natural gas plants, at least, have more incentive to remain in the spot energy markets under current conditions. 19

20 CL&P Electric Rates To Jump 26 Percent Starting In January [ 15] The unwelcome spike in electricity generation prices is a direct result of bottlenecks in natural gas pipelines. SOURCE: 20

21 Alisso Canyon: worst leak in US History Southern California could have up to 14 days of service interruptions this summer to millions of customers. Various mitigation efforts are underway in an Action Plan. This highlights the value of fuel diversity for reliability and resilience. 21

22 Bilateral market opportunity Buyers and sellers that could not close on a bilateral agreement felt that the primary obstacle was different expectations regarding future prices and different levels of willingness to accept risk. Walter Brockway at Alcoa: We found no supplier willing to discuss supplying us with anything other than electricity priced to reflect peak load generation, as well as placing on us all the risk of transmission congestion. 22

23 Cost of Uncertainty Example Max = Min = 4.32 Median = Average = Contract Price for one month of service giving the contract s seller a Reward/Risk ratio of 2 equals

24 Innovation in futures markets indicates a market need to reduce uncertainty Products include futures contracts at nodes up to 5 years out The incumbents offer contracts at the hubs. 24

25 Long term outlook Energy is required to sustain growth. More opportunities for bilateral contracting can be expected. 25

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