ECON 4550 (Summer 2014) Exam 3

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "ECON 4550 (Summer 2014) Exam 3"

Transcription

1 ECON 4550 (Summer 014) Exam 3 Name Multiple Choice Questions: (4 points each) 1. Bob owns a food truck. He offers senior citizens a 10% discount. This behavior by Bob is an example of A. First Degree Price Discrimination (or Perfect Price Discrimination). B. Second Degree Price Discrimination (or Menu Pricing) C. Third Degree Price Discrimination (or Segmented Pricing). D. None of the above answers are correct.. Which of the following is NOT one of the three general ingredients which must be specified when stating a constrained optimization problem? A. Constraints. B. Decision Variables. C. Slack. D. None of the above answers is correct (since each choice is one of the three general ingredients to a constrained optimization problem). 3. In the Mixed Extension of a game, A. at every possible outcome, the sum total of payoffs across all players is equal to zero. B. the strategy choice of each player is allowed to be a probability distribution over his available pure strategies. C. players are never allowed to play Pure Strategies. D. None of the above answers are correct. 4. Vanilla Coca-Cola, Cherry Coca-Cola, and Coca-Cola with Lime are examples of goods that are A. always sold by way of First Degree (or Perfect) Price Discrimination. B. complements to each other. C. vertically differentiated from one another. D. horizontally differentiated from one another. 5. Consider a market in which Firm A and Firm B compete by simultaneously choosing prices ( p and p respectively). The Best Reply Function for Firm A is BR 3 p A ( p B ) 8 4 BR 1 p B ( p A ) 16 A B p, and the Best Reply Function for Firm B is p B A. It follows that at the Nash Equilibrium, Firm A will charge a price of and Firm B will charge a price of. A. ;. B. 8; 16. C. 56; 44. D. 64; 48.

2 6. Consider a seller of two goods, Good A and Good B, which are substitutes for each other. The marginal cost of producing each unit of Good A is $1.75, and the marginal cost of producing each unit of Good B is $.5. Further, own price elasticity of demand is constant for each good, equal to a, pa = 1.5 for Good A and equal to b, p b = 1.5 for Good B. Which of the following pairs of prices are possibly the optimal, profit maximizing prices for this firm to charge? A. p a =$4.40 and p b =$ B. p a =$4.75 and p b =$ C. p a =$5.5 and p b =$11.5. D. p a =$5.80 and p b =$ Consider a Linear Programming problem with the three constraints of x 4y 36, 3x y 4, and x y 11. Which of the following combinations of (, y) feasible? A. ( 3,8) B. ( 5,7) C. ( 7,4) D. More than one of the above combinations of ( x, y) is feasible. x are 8. refers to the general practice of charging a different price for different units sold of an essentially identical good. A. Versioning B. Price Discrimination C. Bundling D. Linear Programming For Question 9, consider the two player simultaneous move game illustrated below: Player 1 Player D E F G A 17, 0 3, 13, 0 9, 1 B 1, 15, 14 5, 8 5, 18 C 19, 6 9, 10 7, 4 11, This game has a unique Nash Equilibrium in which Player 1 plays and Player plays. A. A; F. B. A; E. C. B; G. D. C; G.

3 10. Firms A and B operate in a market with demand of D( p) 4, p. They compete by simultaneously setting prices. Consumers make no distinction between the output of Firm A and the output of Firm B (and will therefore simply buy from the firm offering the lower price). Firm A has production costs of C A ( q) 0q, and Firm B has production costs of C B ( q) 0q. In equilibrium A. each firm will set a price of $35. B. the efficient quantity of the good will be traded. C. each firm will earn a strictly positive profit. D. More than one (perhaps all) of the above answers is correct. 11. Consider a linear programming problem in which a firm must choose levels of output of two products, x and y, in order to maximize total contribution. One of the restrictions on the choice of the firm is an assembly line constraint, which states that the chosen levels of output must satisfy x y 50. At the solution to the linear programming problem: the Slack for the assembly line constraint is 0; the Shadow Price for assembly line capacity is $5; the Upper Range for the Shadow Price of assembly line capacity is 1; and the value of the Objective Function is $1,50. If the firm instead had 54 units of assembly line capacity (i.e., if this restriction had instead been x y 54 ), then the value of the Objective Function at the solution would be A. $1,150. B. $1,54. C. $1,75. D. $1,350. For Question 1, consider the two player sequential move game illustrated below: Player 1 A B Player Player C D E F This game has a unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in which: Player would choose following a choice of A by Player 1; Player would choose following a choice of B Player 1; and Player 1 chooses. A. C; F; A. B. C; F; B. C. D; E; A. D. D; F; B.

4 13. John has reservation prices for good 1 and good of R 1 and R 98. He has the option to buy good 1 at a price of p 1 40, buy good at a price of p 38, or a bundle consisting of both good 1 an good at a price of p b 65. Given these options, John should choose to A. purchase only good 1. B. purchase only good. C. purchase the bundle consisting of both good 1 and good. D. not make any purchase. 14. Consider a Linear Programming problem with the three constraints: (i) x 1 3x 36, (ii) 3x 1 x 66, and (iii) 4x 1 4x 100. Which of the constraints is redundant? A. (i) x 1 3x 36. B. (ii) 3x 1 x 66. C. (iii) 4x 1 4x 100. D. None of the above answers is correct (since none of the constraints is redundant). Suppose that Ty and Logan are playing the game which is partially illustrated by the payoff matrix below. The payoffs of the players are not given in this matrix, but all of the relevant best reply arrows for each player are illustrated. Answer Questions 15 and 16 based upon the information conveyed in this payoff matrix. Ty X Y x Logan y 15. Which of the following strategy pairs is a Nash Equilibrium? A. Ty plays Y and Logan plays x. B. Ty plays X and Logan plays y. C. Neither A nor B are correct (i.e., neither choice A not choice B describe a Nash Equilibrium). D. Both and A and B are correct (i.e., both choice A and choice B describe a Nash Equilibrium). 16. Based upon the different types of games discussed in lecture, this game appears to be A. a Prisoners Dilemma. B. a Cat-and-Mouse Game. C. a Coordination Game. D. an Anti-Coordination Game.

5 17. In the Cournot Model of competition, firms compete by A. sequentially choosing prices. B. simultaneously choosing prices. C. sequentially choosing quantities of output. D. simultaneously choosing quantities of output. For Questions 18 and 19, consider a firm facing demand and with marginal costs as illustrated below. Marginal Costs of production are minimized if the firm produces 9,000 units of output. Suppose throughout that this firm is able to engage in First Degree (i.e., Perfect) Price Discrimination. $ MC(q) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 9,000 (v) (vi) (vii),500 Demand quantity This firm has Fixed Costs of production equal to $9,000. Finally, the seven regions identified above have areas equal to: Area (i) Area (ii) Area (iii) Area (iv) Area (v) Area (vi) Area (vii) $66,000 $58,500 $7,000 $36,000 $41,500 $61,000 $101, In this market the efficient level of trade is units. When this firm maximizes profit (by way of engaging in Perfect Price Discrimination), it will sell units of output. A. 9,000; 9,000. B. 9,000;,500. C.,500; 9,000. D.,500;, When this firm maximizes profit (by way of engaging in Perfect Price Discrimination), it is able to earn a profit of. A. $407,000 B. $99,000 C. $70,000 D. $41,000

6 0. Jamie has dial-up Internet service at his home through a provider called Old Skool Web. He has the option of choosing either Plan A or Plan B. Under Plan A he would pay a flat fee of $8 per month which would give him 10 free minutes, after which he would have to pay 0 for any additional minutes. Under Plan B he would pay a flat fee of $0 per month which would give him 300 free minutes, after which he would have to pay 10 for any additional minutes. His monthly bill would be lower under Plan A (than under Plan B ) if and only if he uses the Internet for A. less than 10 minutes. B. less than 180 minutes. C. less than 300 minutes. D. more than 300 minutes. 1. Scott and Brad are playing a repeated Prisoners Dilemma with an uncertain end period. Following each period, they will play the game one more time with probability p. Brad is playing a Grim Trigger Strategy. If Scott chooses to cooperate in every period, 3 he realizes an expected payoff of ( c) p p p... If Scott chooses to defect in every period, he realizes a payoff of 3 ( d) 5 10 p 10 p 10 p.... Scott should choose to cooperate in every i p period if and only if (recall: p ) i 1 1 p A. p B. p C. p D. None of the above answers are correct (since there is no range of values of p for which it is best for Scott to choose to cooperate). For Question, consider the following two player simultaneous move game: Player 1 Player Left Right Top 4, 14 8, 0 Bottom 1, 3 6, 9. The game above has a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium in which Player 1 plays Top with probability and Player plays Left with probability. A. p ; q B. p ; q C. p ; q D. None of the above answers are correct, since this game does not have a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium

7 ECON 4550 (Summer 014) Exam #3 Name Score on Multiple Choice Questions: out of 88 points. Score on Short Answer Questions : out of 1 points. Exam #1 Grade: + = out of 100 points.

8 Problem Solving/Short Answer Questions: 1. William manages the Hart Ranch and Museum, which includes a 65 acre animal park featuring a herd of American Bison. To provide nourishment for these animals, William must choose levels of two different types of feed (denoted x and y ). He aims to satisfy a pair of nutritional standards, while minimizing the costs of purchasing feed. Each pound of each type of feed contains levels of two different nutrients ( A and B ) as summarized in the table below: Feed Nutrient A Nutrient B x 10 units 3 units y 5 units 1 units p 15 ;and each pound of y costs p Each pound of x costs x y 10. Each day each bison must be feed at least 90 units of Nutrient A and 360 units of Nutrient B. Analyze William s daily decision of how much to feed each bison. 1A. What are the decision variables for William? ( point) 1B. What is William s Objective Function? ( point) 1C. State inequalities which summarize the restrictions on William s choice of his decision variables. Graphically illustrate the feasible set, clearly labeling all relevant intercepts and points of intersection. (4 points)

9 1D. Determine the solution to his Linear Programming problem. Determine the total daily expenditures on feed per bison at this optimal choice. (4 points)

10 (blank page)

ECON 8010 (Spring 2013) Exam 3

ECON 8010 (Spring 2013) Exam 3 ECON 8010 (Spring 2013) Exam 3 Name Multiple Choice Questions: (4 points each) 1. Nash s Existence Theorem states that A. an equilibrium exists in any game of incomplete information, but never exists in

More information

ECON 8010 (Spring 2012) Exam 3

ECON 8010 (Spring 2012) Exam 3 ECON 8010 (Spring 2012) Exam 3 Name _A. Key Multiple Choice Questions: (4 points each) 1. Which of the following is NOT one of the three basic elements of a game? D. None of the above answers is correct

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2014 Sections 08 & 09) Exam #3D

ECON 2100 (Summer 2014 Sections 08 & 09) Exam #3D ECON 21 (Summer 214 Sections 8 & 9) Exam #3D Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. D. Version D 2. If a firm is currently operating at a point where costs of production

More information

ECON 4550 (Fall 2011) Exam 1

ECON 4550 (Fall 2011) Exam 1 ECON 455 (Fall 211) Exam 1 Name Multiple Choice Questions: (4 points each) 1. Jimmy is risk neutral. He is faced with a random payoff with expected value of $2,. Further, for this payoff the highest possible

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2016 Sections 10 & 11) Exam #3C

ECON 2100 (Summer 2016 Sections 10 & 11) Exam #3C ECON 21 (Summer 216 Sections 1 & 11) Exam #3C Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. C. Version C 2. is a market structure in which there is one single seller of a unique

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2016 Sections 10 & 11) Exam #3D

ECON 2100 (Summer 2016 Sections 10 & 11) Exam #3D ECON 21 (Summer 216 Sections 1 & 11) Exam #3D Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. D. Version D 2. is a market structure in which there is one single seller of a unique

More information

ECONS 424 STRATEGY AND GAME THEORY MIDTERM EXAM #2

ECONS 424 STRATEGY AND GAME THEORY MIDTERM EXAM #2 ECONS 424 STRATEGY AND GAME THEORY MIDTERM EXAM #2 DUE DATE: MONDAY, APRIL 9 TH 2018, IN CLASS Instructions: This exam has 6 exercises, plus a bonus exercise at the end. Write your answers to each exercise

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2014 Sections 08 & 09) Exam #3A

ECON 2100 (Summer 2014 Sections 08 & 09) Exam #3A ECON 21 (Summer 214 Sections 8 & 9) Exam #3A Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. A. Version A 2. Average Fixed Costs of Production A. must remain constant as the level

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2012 Sections 07 and 08) Exam #3C Answer Key

ECON 2100 (Summer 2012 Sections 07 and 08) Exam #3C Answer Key ECON 21 (Summer 212 Sections 7 and 8) Exam #3C Answer Key Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. C. Version C 2. is a market structure in which there is one single seller

More information

ECON 2100 (Fall 2018 Section 11) Exam #3B

ECON 2100 (Fall 2018 Section 11) Exam #3B ECON 21 (Fall 218 Section 11) Exam #3B Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. B. Version B 2. Market Power refers to a situation in which A. a firm charges different consumers

More information

ECON 2100 (Fall 2018 Section 11) Exam #3A

ECON 2100 (Fall 2018 Section 11) Exam #3A ECON 21 (Fall 218 Section 11) Exam #3A Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. A. Version A 2. Market Power refers to a situation in which A. a firm has some control over

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2015 Sections 07 & 08) Exam #3C

ECON 2100 (Summer 2015 Sections 07 & 08) Exam #3C ECON 21 (Summer 215 Sections 7 & 8) Exam #3C Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. C. Version C 2. is a market structure in which there is one single seller of a unique

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2013 Section 06) Exam #3 (Version A)

ECON 2100 (Summer 2013 Section 06) Exam #3 (Version A) ECON 21 (Summer 213 Section 6) Exam #3 (Version A) Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. A. Version A 2. At the most basic level, profit is defined as A. Total Revenues

More information

ECON 2100 (Fall 2018 Section 11) Final Exam Version B

ECON 2100 (Fall 2018 Section 11) Final Exam Version B ECON 21 (Fall 218 Section 11) Final Exam Version B Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. B. Version B 2. Which of the following could never lead to a change in demand for

More information

ECON 2100 (Fall 2018 Section 11) Final Exam Version A

ECON 2100 (Fall 2018 Section 11) Final Exam Version A ECON 21 (Fall 218 Section 11) Final Exam Version A Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. A. Version A 2. Which of the following could never lead to a change in demand for

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2016 Sections 10 & 11) Exam #4C

ECON 2100 (Summer 2016 Sections 10 & 11) Exam #4C ECON 2100 (Summer 2016 Sections 10 & 11) Exam #4C Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. C. Version C 2. was the first economist to argue that the problem of externalities

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2016 Sections 10 & 11) Exam #4D

ECON 2100 (Summer 2016 Sections 10 & 11) Exam #4D ECON 2100 (Summer 2016 Sections 10 & 11) Exam #4D Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. D. Version D 2. was the first economist to argue that the problem of externalities

More information

Do not open this exam until told to do so. Solution

Do not open this exam until told to do so. Solution Do not open this exam until told to do so. Department of Economics College of Social and Applied Human Sciences K. Annen, Fall 003 Final (Version): Intermediate Microeconomics (ECON30) Solution Final (Version

More information

Economics 323 Microeconomic Theory Fall 2016

Economics 323 Microeconomic Theory Fall 2016 green=b SECOND EXAM Chapter Ten Economics 323 Microeconomic Theory Fall 2016 1. The markets for many come close to satisfying the conditions required for perfect competition. a. agricultural goods b. transportation

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2015 Sections 07 & 08) Exam #3A

ECON 2100 (Summer 2015 Sections 07 & 08) Exam #3A ECON 2100 (Summer 2015 Sections 07 & 08) Exam #3A Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. A. Version A 2. For a firm with market power Marginal Revenue, while for a firm

More information

UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (EWMBA 201A)

UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (EWMBA 201A) UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (EWMBA 201A) Monopoly and oligopoly (PR 11.1-11.4 and 12.2-12.5) Advanced pricing with market power and equilibrium oligopolistic

More information

Preface. Chapter 1 Basic Tools Used in Understanding Microeconomics. 1.1 Economic Models

Preface. Chapter 1 Basic Tools Used in Understanding Microeconomics. 1.1 Economic Models Preface Chapter 1 Basic Tools Used in Understanding Microeconomics 1.1 Economic Models 1.1.1 Positive and Normative Analysis 1.1.2 The Market Economy Model 1.1.3 Types of Economic Problems 1.2 Mathematics

More information

UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (EWMBA 201A) Fall 2013

UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (EWMBA 201A) Fall 2013 UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (EWMBA 201A) Fall 2013 Pricing with market power and oligopolistic markets (PR 11.1-11.4 and 12.2-12.5) Module 4 Sep. 28, 2013

More information

Chapter 9: Static Games and Cournot Competition

Chapter 9: Static Games and Cournot Competition Chapter 9: Static Games and Cournot Competition Learning Objectives: Students should learn to:. The student will understand the ideas of strategic interdependence and reasoning strategically and be able

More information

Principles of Microeconomics Assignment 8 (Chapter 10) Answer Sheet. Class Day/Time

Principles of Microeconomics Assignment 8 (Chapter 10) Answer Sheet. Class Day/Time 1 Principles of Microeconomics Assignment 8 (Chapter 10) Answer Sheet Name Class Day/Time Questions of this homework are in the next few pages. Please find the answer of the questions and fill in the blanks

More information

Oligopoly Theory (11) Collusion

Oligopoly Theory (11) Collusion Oligopoly Theory (11) Collusion Aim of this lecture (1) To understand the idea of repeated game. (2) To understand the idea of the stability of collusion. Oligopoly Theory 1 Outline of the 11th Lecture

More information

UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (EWMBA 201A) Monopoly Behavior Advanced Pricing with Market Power

UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (EWMBA 201A) Monopoly Behavior Advanced Pricing with Market Power UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (EWMBA 201A) Monopoly Behavior Advanced Pricing with Market Power Session VI Sep 25, 2010 In a competitive market there are

More information

ECMC02H Intermediate Microeconomics - Topics in Price Theory

ECMC02H Intermediate Microeconomics - Topics in Price Theory 1 ECMC02H Intermediate Microeconomics - Topics in Price Theory Answers to the Term Test June 23, 2010 Version A of the test Your name (Print clearly and underline your last name) Your student number 1.

More information

ECON 230D2-002 Mid-term 1. Student Number MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question.

ECON 230D2-002 Mid-term 1. Student Number MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question. ECON 230D2-002 Mid-term 1 Name Student Number MULTIPLE CHOICE. Choose the one alternative that best completes the statement or answers the question. Scenario 12.3: Suppose a stream is discovered whose

More information

Economics 101A (Lecture 19) Stefano DellaVigna

Economics 101A (Lecture 19) Stefano DellaVigna Economics 101A (Lecture 19) Stefano DellaVigna November 9, 2004 Outline 1. Monopoly 2. Price Discrimination 3. Oligopoly? 4. Game Theory 1 Profit Maximization: Monopoly Monopoly. Firm maximizes profits,

More information

Name: I pledge to obey the Duke University Honor Code during this exam. ECON201 - Final Exam - Spring 2018 Professor Chelsea Garber

Name: I pledge to obey the Duke University Honor Code during this exam. ECON201 - Final Exam - Spring 2018 Professor Chelsea Garber Professor Chelsea Garber Name: Please answer all questions in the space provided. You do NOT need to provide explanations for your answers unless the question specifically asks for an explanation. If it

More information

Econ Microeconomic Analysis and Policy

Econ Microeconomic Analysis and Policy ECON 500 Microeconomic Theory Econ 500 - Microeconomic Analysis and Policy Monopoly Monopoly A monopoly is a single firm that serves an entire market and faces the market demand curve for its output. Unlike

More information

Chapter 12: Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence

Chapter 12: Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence Chapter 12: Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence Learning Objectives: Students should learn to: 1. Define and give examples of predatory conduct. 2. Explain stylized facts about the entry of firms into industries.

More information

ECON 115. Industrial Organization

ECON 115. Industrial Organization ECON 115 Industrial Organization 1. Review of the First Midterm 2. Review of Price Discrimination, Product Differentiation & Bundling 3. Introduction to Oligopolies 4. Introduction to Game Theory and Cournot

More information

Econ 101A Solutions for Final exam - Fall 2006

Econ 101A Solutions for Final exam - Fall 2006 Econ 101A Solutions for Final exam - Fall 2006 Problem 1. Shorter problems. (35 points) Solve the following shorter problems. 1. Consider the following (simultaneous) game of chicken. This is a game in

More information

14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007 Chia-Hui Chen November 7, Lecture 22

14.01 Principles of Microeconomics, Fall 2007 Chia-Hui Chen November 7, Lecture 22 Monopoly. Principles of Microeconomics, Fall Chia-Hui Chen November, Lecture Monopoly Outline. Chap : Monopoly. Chap : Shift in Demand and Effect of Tax Monopoly The monopolist is the single supply-side

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2010 Sections 05 and 06) Exam #3 (Version C)

ECON 2100 (Summer 2010 Sections 05 and 06) Exam #3 (Version C) ECON 21 (Summer 21 Sections 5 and 6) Exam #3 (Version C) Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. Average Fixed costs of Production A. are defined as Fixed Costs of Production divided by quantity

More information

Game Theory Exam, June 2015

Game Theory Exam, June 2015 Game Theory Exam, June 2015 Name Group: You have two and a half hours to complete the exam. I. Short questions (5 points each) I.1 Show an example of a static game that has no Nash equilibrium in pure

More information

Ecn Intermediate Microeconomic Theory University of California - Davis June 11, 2009 Instructor: John Parman. Final Exam

Ecn Intermediate Microeconomic Theory University of California - Davis June 11, 2009 Instructor: John Parman. Final Exam Ecn 100 - Intermediate Microeconomic Theory University of California - Davis June 11, 2009 Instructor: John Parman Final Exam You have until 8pm to complete the exam, be certain to use your time wisely.

More information

1. Fill in the missing blanks ( XXXXXXXXXXX means that there is nothing to fill in this spot):

1. Fill in the missing blanks ( XXXXXXXXXXX means that there is nothing to fill in this spot): 1. Fill in the missing blanks ( XXXXXXXXXXX means that there is nothing to fill in this spot): Quantity Total utility Marginal utility 0 0 XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX 200 0 = 200 1 200 XXXXXXXXXXX

More information

This paper is not to be removed from the Examination Halls

This paper is not to be removed from the Examination Halls ~~EC2066 ZA d0 This paper is not to be removed from the Examination Halls UNIVERSITY OF LONDON EC2066 ZB BSc degrees and Diplomas for Graduates in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences,

More information

In each case: fixed firms in the market, then entry/exit

In each case: fixed firms in the market, then entry/exit Main structure Firms are price-takers (Perfect competition) Firms have market power (Imperfect competition) (Sessions 1 6) (Firms decisions &equilibrium) Firms decisions Equilibrium (Sessions 7 11) (Sessions

More information

Oligopoly: How do firms behave when there are only a few competitors? These firms produce all or most of their industry s output.

Oligopoly: How do firms behave when there are only a few competitors? These firms produce all or most of their industry s output. Topic 8 Chapter 13 Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition Econ 203 Topic 8 page 1 Oligopoly: How do firms behave when there are only a few competitors? These firms produce all or most of their industry

More information

SUBJ SCORE # Version D: Page 1 of 9. (signature) 2. Please write your name and GU ID carefully and legibly at the top of this page.

SUBJ SCORE # Version D: Page 1 of 9. (signature) 2. Please write your name and GU ID carefully and legibly at the top of this page. SUBJ SCORE # Version D: Page 1 of 9 Economics 001 NAME Professor Levinson GU ID # Midterm #2 November 12, 2012 DO NOT BEGIN WORKING UNTIL THE INSTRUCTOR TELLS YOU TO DO SO. READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST.

More information

SUBJ SCORE # Version A: Page 1 of 9

SUBJ SCORE # Version A: Page 1 of 9 SUBJ SCORE # Version A: Page 1 of 9 Economics 001 NAME Professor Levinson GU ID # Midterm #2 November 12, 2012 DO NOT BEGIN WORKING UNTIL THE INSTRUCTOR TELLS YOU TO DO SO. READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST.

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2015 Sections 07 & 08) Exam #2C

ECON 2100 (Summer 2015 Sections 07 & 08) Exam #2C ECON 21 (Summer 215 Sections 7 & 8) Exam #2C Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. C. Version C 2. A Price Control generally refers to A. who bears the burden of a tax,

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2012 Sections 07 and 08) Exam #3A

ECON 2100 (Summer 2012 Sections 07 and 08) Exam #3A ECON 21 (Summer 212 Sections 7 and 8) Exam #3A Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. A. Version A 2. Excess Capacity refers to the A. quantity of output at which Average

More information

Econ 121b: Intermediate Microeconomics

Econ 121b: Intermediate Microeconomics Econ 11b: Intermediate Microeconomics Dirk Bergemann, Spring 01 Week of 3/6-4/3 1 Lecture 16: Imperfectly Competitive Market 1.1 Price Discrimination In the previous section we saw that the monopolist

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2009 Section 06) Final Exam. Multiple Choice Questions: (2 points each)

ECON 2100 (Summer 2009 Section 06) Final Exam. Multiple Choice Questions: (2 points each) ECON 2100 (Summer 2009 Section 06) Final Exam Multiple Choice Questions: (2 points each) 1. Price Elasticity of Demand is defined as A. the unique price at which Total Consumer Expenditures on a good are

More information

7 The Optimum of Monopoly, Price Discrimination

7 The Optimum of Monopoly, Price Discrimination Microeconomics I - Lecture #7, March 31, 2009 7 The Optimum of Monopoly, Price Discrimination 7.1 Monopoly Up to now we have analyzed the behavior of a competitive industry, a market structure that is

More information

Oligopoly Pricing. EC 202 Lecture IV. Francesco Nava. January London School of Economics. Nava (LSE) EC 202 Lecture IV Jan / 13

Oligopoly Pricing. EC 202 Lecture IV. Francesco Nava. January London School of Economics. Nava (LSE) EC 202 Lecture IV Jan / 13 Oligopoly Pricing EC 202 Lecture IV Francesco Nava London School of Economics January 2011 Nava (LSE) EC 202 Lecture IV Jan 2011 1 / 13 Summary The models of competition presented in MT explored the consequences

More information

ECON 2100 Principles of Microeconomics (Summer 2016) Monopoly

ECON 2100 Principles of Microeconomics (Summer 2016) Monopoly ECON 21 Principles of Microeconomics (Summer 216) Monopoly Relevant readings from the textbook: Mankiw, Ch. 15 Monopoly Suggested problems from the textbook: Chapter 15 Questions for Review (Page 323):

More information

Lecture 7 Pricing with Market Power

Lecture 7 Pricing with Market Power Lecture 7 Pricing with Market Power 1 Introduction Once firms face a downward sloping demand curve they have the ability to affect market price Up to now we have been assuming that a firm can only charge

More information

Thanksgiving Handout Economics 101 Fall 2000

Thanksgiving Handout Economics 101 Fall 2000 Thanksgiving Handout Economics 101 Fall 2000 The purpose of this handout is to provide a variety of problems illustrating many of the ideas that we have discussed in class this semester. The questions

More information

2003/2004 SECOND EXAM 103BE/BX/BF Microeconomics, Closed part

2003/2004 SECOND EXAM 103BE/BX/BF Microeconomics, Closed part 1 2003/2004 SECOND EXAM 103BE/BX/BF Microeconomics, Closed part Note 1: Always read all the options before choosing one, and then select the best option. Sometimes the final option may read like all the

More information

ECON 8010 (Spring 2014) Exam 1

ECON 8010 (Spring 2014) Exam 1 ECON 81 (Spring 214) Exam 1 Name A. Key Multiple Choice Questions: (4 points each) 1. The states that a rational decision maker should undertake an action if and only if the Marginal Benefit from taking

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2014 Sections 08 & 09) Exam #1A

ECON 2100 (Summer 2014 Sections 08 & 09) Exam #1A ECON 21 (Summer 214 Sections 8 & 9) Exam #1A Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. A. Version A 2. In regards to a Production Possibilities Frontier, which of the following

More information

Finance 510 Midterm #2 Practice Questions

Finance 510 Midterm #2 Practice Questions Finance 50 Midterm # Practice Questions ) ) Consider the following pricing game between Dell and Gateway. There are two types of demanders in the market, High and Low. High demanders value a computer at

More information

This paper is not to be removed from the Examination Halls

This paper is not to be removed from the Examination Halls ~~EC2066 ZA d0 This paper is not to be removed from the Examination Halls UNIVERSITY OF LONDON EC2066 ZA BSc degrees and Diplomas for Graduates in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences,

More information

Department of Economics. Harvard University. Spring Honors General Exam. April 6, 2011

Department of Economics. Harvard University. Spring Honors General Exam. April 6, 2011 Department of Economics. Harvard University. Spring 2011 Honors General Exam April 6, 2011 The exam has three sections: microeconomics (Questions 1 3), macroeconomics (Questions 4 6), and econometrics

More information

DO NOT OPEN THIS BOOKLET OR TURN IT OVER [until told to do so]

DO NOT OPEN THIS BOOKLET OR TURN IT OVER [until told to do so] (last, first): ON YOUR QUESTION BOOKLET: ON YOUR SCANTRON: 5 points DURING THE EXAM: MUST DO NOT OPEN THIS BOOKLET OR TURN IT OVER [until told to do so] p. 1 v. 09 Figure SSD. The graph below describes

More information

CS 486/686 Lecture 17 2-Player Normal-Form Games 1. Determine dominant-strategy equilibria of a 2-player normal form game.

CS 486/686 Lecture 17 2-Player Normal-Form Games 1. Determine dominant-strategy equilibria of a 2-player normal form game. CS 486/686 Lecture 17 2-Player Normal-Form Games 1 Learning goals: By the end of the lecture, you should be able to Determine dominant-strategy equilibria of a 2-player normal form game. Determine pure-strategy

More information

1.4 Applications of Functions to Economics

1.4 Applications of Functions to Economics CHAPTER 1. FUNCTIONS AND CHANGE 18 1.4 Applications of Functions to Economics Definition. The cost function gives the total cost of producing a quantity of some good. The standard notation is: q = quantity,

More information

Choose the single best answer for each question. Do all of your scratch work in the margins or in the blank space at the bottom of the last page.

Choose the single best answer for each question. Do all of your scratch work in the margins or in the blank space at the bottom of the last page. Econ 0, Section 2, S0, Schroeter Exam #4, Special code = Choose the single best answer for each question. Do all of your scratch work in the margins or in the blank space at the bottom of the last page..

More information

Choose the single best answer for each question. Do all of your scratch work in the margins or in the blank space at the bottom of the last page.

Choose the single best answer for each question. Do all of your scratch work in the margins or in the blank space at the bottom of the last page. Econ 0, Section 2, S0, Schroeter Exam #4, Special code = 2 Choose the single best answer for each question. Do all of your scratch work in the margins or in the blank space at the bottom of the last page..

More information

PRACTICE QUESTIONS FOR THE FINAL EXAM (Part 1)

PRACTICE QUESTIONS FOR THE FINAL EXAM (Part 1) The following is the first sample problem set for your final examination. I will also post here more problem sets (with questions mostly needing calculations), as well as a previous final exam (all multiple

More information

Commerce 295 Midterm Answers

Commerce 295 Midterm Answers Commerce 295 Midterm Answers October 27, 2010 PART I MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS Each question has one correct response. Please circle the letter in front of the correct response for each question. There

More information

This paper is not to be removed from the Examination Halls

This paper is not to be removed from the Examination Halls ~~EC2066 ZA d0 This paper is not to be removed from the Examination Halls UNIVERSITY OF LONDON EC2066 ZB BSc degrees and Diplomas for Graduates in Economics, Management, Finance and the Social Sciences,

More information

EXAMINATION #4 VERSION C General Equilibrium and Market Power November 24, 2015

EXAMINATION #4 VERSION C General Equilibrium and Market Power November 24, 2015 Signature: William M. Boal Printed name: EXAMINATION #4 VERSION C General Equilibrium and Market Power November 24, 2015 INSTRUCTIONS: This exam is closed-book, closed-notes. Calculators, mobile phones,

More information

2014 $1.75 $10.00 $ $1.50 $10.50 $ $1.65 $11.00 $ $2.00 $11.50 $150

2014 $1.75 $10.00 $ $1.50 $10.50 $ $1.65 $11.00 $ $2.00 $11.50 $150 Economics 101 Fall Homework #4 Due Tuesday, November 14, Directions: The homework will be collected in a box before the lecture. Please place your name, TA name, and section number on top of the homework

More information

ECN 3103 INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION

ECN 3103 INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION ECN 3103 INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION 5. Game Theory Mr. Sydney Armstrong Lecturer 1 The University of Guyana 1 Semester 1, 2016 OUR PLAN Analyze Strategic price and Quantity Competition (Noncooperative Oligopolies)

More information

5/2/2016. Intermediate Microeconomics W3211. Lecture 25: Recap 2. The Story So Far. Organization for the Week. Introduction

5/2/2016. Intermediate Microeconomics W3211. Lecture 25: Recap 2. The Story So Far. Organization for the Week. Introduction 1 Intermediate Microeconomics W3211 Lecture 25: Recap 2 Introduction Columbia University, Spring 2016 Mark Dean: mark.dean@columbia.edu 2 The Story So Far. 3 The Story So Far. 4 Topic Topic 1 The Consumer

More information

Chapter 1 Basic Microeconomic Principles

Chapter 1 Basic Microeconomic Principles Chapter 1 Basic Microeconomic Principles Prof. Jepsen ECO 610 Lecture 1 December 3, 2012 copyright John Wiley and Sons Outline Course outline Economics review (Chapter 1) Costs Demand Profit maximization

More information

1. The amount of money that a firm receives from the sale of its output is called a. total cost. b. profit. *. total revenue. d. depreciation.

1. The amount of money that a firm receives from the sale of its output is called a. total cost. b. profit. *. total revenue. d. depreciation. Econ 101, section 4, S07 Schroeter Exam #4, Red Choose the single best answer for each question. 1. The amount of money that a firm receives from the sale of its output is called a. total cost. b. profit.

More information

c) Will the monopolist described in (b) earn positive, negative, or zero economic profits? Explain your answer.

c) Will the monopolist described in (b) earn positive, negative, or zero economic profits? Explain your answer. Economics 101 Summer 2015 Answers to Homework #4b Due Tuesday June 16, 2015 Directions: The homework will be collected in a box before the lecture. Please place your name, TA name and section number on

More information

6. The law of diminishing marginal returns begins to take effect at labor input level: a. 0 b. X c. Y d. Z

6. The law of diminishing marginal returns begins to take effect at labor input level: a. 0 b. X c. Y d. Z Chapter 5 MULTIPLE-CHOICE QUESTIONS 1. The short run is defined as a period in which: a. the firm cannot change its output level b. all inputs are variable but technology is fixed c. input prices are fixed

More information

UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (EWMBA 201A) Leftovers, review and takeaways Lectures Oct.

UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (EWMBA 201A) Leftovers, review and takeaways Lectures Oct. UC Berkeley Haas School of Business Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (EWMBA 201A) Leftovers, review and takeaways Lectures 13-14 Oct. 1, 2011 Pricing While there is some involved analysis required,

More information

Econ 3542: Experimental and Behavioral Economics Exam #1 Review Questions

Econ 3542: Experimental and Behavioral Economics Exam #1 Review Questions Econ 3542: Experimental and Behavioral Economics Exam #1 Review Questions Chapter 1 (Intro) o Briefly describe the early history of market experiments. Chamberlin s original pit market experiments (1948)

More information

Ecn Intermediate Microeconomic Theory University of California - Davis December 10, 2009 Instructor: John Parman. Final Exam

Ecn Intermediate Microeconomic Theory University of California - Davis December 10, 2009 Instructor: John Parman. Final Exam Ecn 100 - Intermediate Microeconomic Theory University of California - Davis December 10, 2009 Instructor: John Parman Final Exam You have until 12:30pm to complete this exam. Be certain to put your name,

More information

CH short answer study questions Answer Section

CH short answer study questions Answer Section CH 15-16 short answer study questions Answer Section ESSAY 1. ANS: There are a large number firms; each produces a slightly different product; firms compete on price, quality and marketing; and firms are

More information

DO NOT OPEN THE QUESTION PAPER UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO DO SO BY THE CHIEF INVIGILATOR. MICROECONOMICS TWO HOURS (2 Hours)

DO NOT OPEN THE QUESTION PAPER UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO DO SO BY THE CHIEF INVIGILATOR. MICROECONOMICS TWO HOURS (2 Hours) January Examinations 2016 DO NOT OPEN THE QUESTION PAPER UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO DO SO BY THE CHIEF INVIGILATOR Department Module Code Module Title Exam Duration (in words) ECONOMICS EC1000 MICROECONOMICS

More information

Choose the single best answer for each question. Do all of your scratch-work in the side and bottom margins of pages.

Choose the single best answer for each question. Do all of your scratch-work in the side and bottom margins of pages. Econ 0, Sections 3 and 4, S, Schroeter Exam #4, Special code = 000 Choose the single best answer for each question. Do all of your scratch-work in the side and bottom margins of pages.. Gordon is the owner

More information

EconS Oligopoly - Part 1

EconS Oligopoly - Part 1 EconS 305 - Oligopoly - Part 1 Eric Dunaway Washington State University eric.dunaway@wsu.edu November 19, 2015 Eric Dunaway (WSU) EconS 305 - Lecture 31 November 19, 2015 1 / 32 Introduction We are now

More information

Economics II - October 27, 2009 Based on H.R.Varian - Intermediate Microeconomics. A Modern Approach

Economics II - October 27, 2009 Based on H.R.Varian - Intermediate Microeconomics. A Modern Approach Economics II - October 7, 009 Based on H.R.Varian - Intermediate Microeconomics. A Modern Approach GAME THEORY Economic agents can interact strategically in a variety of ways, and many of these have been

More information

1.. Consider the following multi-stage game. In the first stage an incumbent monopolist

1.. Consider the following multi-stage game. In the first stage an incumbent monopolist University of California, Davis Department of Economics Time: 3 hours Reading time: 20 minutes PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION FOR THE Ph.D. DEGREE Industrial Organization June 27, 2006 Answer four of the six

More information

Chapter 15 Oligopoly

Chapter 15 Oligopoly Goldwasser AP Microeconomics Chapter 15 Oligopoly BEFORE YOU READ THE CHAPTER Summary This chapter explores oligopoly, a market structure characterized by a few firms producing a product that mayor may

More information

MARKETS. Part Review. Reading Between the Lines SONY CORP. HAS CUT THE U.S. PRICE OF ITS PLAYSTATION 2

MARKETS. Part Review. Reading Between the Lines SONY CORP. HAS CUT THE U.S. PRICE OF ITS PLAYSTATION 2 Part Review 4 FIRMS AND MARKETS Reading Between the Lines SONY CORP. HAS CUT THE U.S. PRICE OF ITS PLAYSTATION 2 On May 14, 2002 Sony announced it was cutting the cost of its PlayStation 2 by 33 percent,

More information

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST CAPE COAST - GHANA BASIC OLIGOPOLY MODELS

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST CAPE COAST - GHANA BASIC OLIGOPOLY MODELS UNIVERSITY OF CAPE COAST CAPE COAST - GHANA BASIC OLIGOPOLY MODELS Overview I. Conditions for Oligopoly? II. Role of Strategic Interdependence III. Profit Maximization in Four Oligopoly Settings Sweezy

More information

Sloan School of Management / FINAL EXAMINATION (Tuesday, December 18, 2001, 9:00 a.m. to noon)

Sloan School of Management / FINAL EXAMINATION (Tuesday, December 18, 2001, 9:00 a.m. to noon) Sloan School of Management 15.010/ 15.011 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Economic Analysis for Business Decisions FINAL EXAMINATION (Tuesday, December 18, 2001, 9:00 a.m. to noon) Directions: This

More information

What Is Covered. Econ 2 Final Exam. The Big Concepts. An Outline of Topics Covered In Econ 2

What Is Covered. Econ 2 Final Exam. The Big Concepts. An Outline of Topics Covered In Econ 2 What Is Covered Econ 2 Final Exam Where: Price Center Theatre Date: Friday March 24 Time: 8:00-11:00 a.m. Final is cumulative Heavier emphasis on chapters (14&15) not covered on earlier midterms Format:

More information

Hours needed to produce one unit of manufactured goods agricultural goods Pottawattamie 6 3 Muscatine 3 2

Hours needed to produce one unit of manufactured goods agricultural goods Pottawattamie 6 3 Muscatine 3 2 Econ 101, sections 2 and 6, S06 Schroeter Makeup Exam Choose the single best answer for each question. 1. A "zero sum game" is one in which a. every player breaks even in the long run. b. there is only

More information

FINAL EXAMINATION ECON 200 Spring 2006 STUDENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER:

FINAL EXAMINATION ECON 200 Spring 2006 STUDENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER: FINAL EXAMINATION ECON 200 Spring 2006 STUDENT'S NAME: STUDENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER: PLEASE CIRCLE YOUR TEACHING ASSISTANT'S NAME: Robin Banerjee Owen Haaga Fernando Im Andrew Weaver Alex Whalley BEFORE

More information

INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS (EC201)

INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS (EC201) INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS (EC201) Course duration: 54 hours lecture and class time (Over three weeks) Summer School Programme Area: Economics LSE Teaching Department: Department of Economics Lead Faculty:

More information

ECON 2100 (Summer 2014 Sections 08 & 09) Exam #1D

ECON 2100 (Summer 2014 Sections 08 & 09) Exam #1D ECON 21 (Summer 214 Sections 8 & 9) Exam #1D Multiple Choice Questions: (3 points each) 1. I am taking of the exam. D. Version D 2. Economics can be defined as the social science that studies how people

More information

Lecture 6 Pricing with Market Power

Lecture 6 Pricing with Market Power Lecture 6 Pricing with Market Power 1 Pricing with Market Power Market Power refers to the ability of a firm to set its own price, as opposed to firms that are price takers and take market price as given.

More information

Static (or Simultaneous- Move) Games of Complete Information

Static (or Simultaneous- Move) Games of Complete Information Static (or Simultaneous- Move) Games of Complete Information Dominated Strategies Nash Equilibrium F.Valognes - Game Theory - Chp 2 1 Outline of Static Games of Complete Information Introduction to games

More information

Midterm 2 - Solutions

Midterm 2 - Solutions Ecn 100 - Intermediate Microeconomics University of California - Davis November 12, 2010 Instructor: John Parman Midterm 2 - Solutions You have until 11:50am to complete this exam. Be certain to put your

More information

ECON 115. Industrial Organization

ECON 115. Industrial Organization ECON 115 Industrial Organization 1. Review the Quiz 2. Reprise 3 rd Degree Price Discrimination 3. A problem and its implications 4. Introduction to non-linear (1 st & 2 nd Degree) Price Discrimination

More information

Chapter 14. Chapter Outline

Chapter 14. Chapter Outline Chapter 14 Labor Chapter Outline A Perfectly Competitive Firm s Demand for Labor Market Demand Curve for Labor An Imperfect Competitor s Demand for Labor Labor Supply Market Supply Curve Monopsony Minimum

More information

Chapter Outline McGraw Hill Education. All Rights Reserved.

Chapter Outline McGraw Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. Chapter 14 Labor Chapter Outline A Perfectly Competitive Firm s Demand for Labor Market Demand Curve for Labor An Imperfect Competitor s Demand for Labor Labor Supply Market Supply Curve Monopsony Minimum

More information