Taiwan. Predatory Pricing

Transcription

1 Taiwan Predatory Pricing This questionnaire seeks information on ICN members analysis and treatment of predatory pricing claims. Predatory pricing typically involves a practice by which a firm temporarily charges low prices in order to limit or eliminate competition, and thereby allows the firm to raise prices subsequently. This questionnaire concerns only treatment of single product discounts; rather than pricing practices involving multiple products (including bundling, tying, and related prices). Unless otherwise stated, the questions concern conduct by a dominant firm or firm with significant market power. Respondents should feel free not to answer questions concerning aspects of your law or policy that are not well developed. Answers should be based on agency practice, legal guidelines, relevant case law, etc., rather than speculation. Analysis (elements and evidence) 1. Please provide the main relevant texts (in English if available) of your jurisdiction s laws and guidelines on predatory pricing. The Article 10 of The Fair Trade Act (FTA): No monopolistic enterprises shall:1.directly or indirectly prevent any other enterprises from competing by unfair means;2.improperly set, maintain or change the price for goods or the remuneration for services;3.make a trading counterpart give preferential treatment without justification; or4.otherwise abuse its market power. In issuing its Regulatory Notes on the Telecommunications Industries under the Fair Trade Act and Policy Statements on the Business Practices Cross-Ownership and Joint Provision among 4C Enterprises, the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (referred to the FTC) defines predatory pricing such that monopolistic enterprises set a price much lower than cost, at the price of sacrificing short-term profit to drive competitors from the market or block their entry into it, so as to gain excessive profits in the long-term. 2. Please list your jurisdiction s criteria for an abuse of dominance/monopolization based on predatory pricing. (a) the enterprise in question is a monopoly or has certain market power (the market share of the enterprise must be above 50%) in the relevant market; 1

2 (b) the price in question is much lower than cost (different measures of cost may be applied in different types of cases); (c) the enterprise in question is capable of hindering or excluding competitors operating with the same efficiency; and (d) a significant entry barrier exists, which enables the enterprise in question to compensate its previous loss and raise price above the competitive level to earn excessive profits after having forced competitors out of the market. 3. Please explain the circumstances under which a firm s pricing is, or may be, considered predatory in your jurisdiction, by responding to the following questions: a. As part of your analysis, does the price have to be below one or more measures of cost? Yes i. If yes, please identify which of the following measures is/are used, as applicable: Cost benchmark/measure Used? Comment Yes No Below marginal cost (the cost of producing one more unit of output) Below average variable cost (cost that varies with output) Y The Areeda-Turner s Average Variable Cost Test (the AVC test) Average Variable Cost is close to the concept of marginal cost and is the usual criteria for examining static economic efficiency. Below average avoidable cost (all costs that can be avoided by not producing some or all output) Below average long run incremental cost (average variable costs and productspecific fixed costs) Y 2

3 Below average total cost (cost including variable, fixed and sunk non-recoverable costs) Other measure of cost (Please identify) b. For each cost measure employed, please provide the definition of the measure used in your jurisdiction. In issuing its Regulatory Notes on the Telecommunications Industries under the Fair Trade Act, the FTC defines incremental cost such that it includes all the direct or indirect costs provided within an increment of a product, service or quantity in telecommunication sector. As to the term long -run, it s defined as that even capital input and network capacity can vary in response to a change in demand. c. Is the same cost measure applied in all cases? No i. If different cost measures can be applied, for example on the basis of industry, please explain and provide examples, as available. In general, the FTC takes Areeda-Turner s Average Variable Cost Test (the AVC test) to measure costs when examining predatory pricing cases. However, in sectors characterized by significant economy of scale or economy of scope, such as telecommunication, the fixed cost or common cost of a monopoly comprises a significant proportion of the total cost, which substantially minimizes the effectiveness of the AVC. The FTC, therefore, needs other instruments with which to measure cost in such a case. For example, in the telecommunications sector, the FTC uses the Long-Run Incremental Cost (the LRIC) to decide whether a pricing in question is predatory. ii. If more than one cost measure can be applied in any individual case, please explain why and whether, in practice, this has raised issues. Up to now, we haven t such case as this question mentioned. 3

4 d. If price must be shown to be below cost, for which of the dominant firm s sales must this be shown? We have little experience in this area. i. Is the only relevant comparison between the cost measure and the dominant firm s average price for all of its sales in the relevant market? 1. If no, over which of the dominant firm s sales can cost be compared? e. Could a firm s price above average total cost ever be found to be predatory? No i. If so, please explain the instances in which this might occur, and identify whether this has been the basis for actual enforcement. f. If prices do not have to be below a cost benchmark to be considered predatory, please explain the circumstances under which the firm s prices are considered predatory Up to now, we haven t such case as this question mentioned.. 4. To be unlawful, must the alleged predatory pricing occur in the market in which the firm holds a dominant position/substantial market power? Yes a. If no, please explain. 5. Apart from the cost criteria referenced in question 3 above, must other objective criteria, such as the duration or continuity of the pricing behavior, be demonstrated for a finding of liability under a predatory pricing theory? Yes a. If so, please explain. For example, if the behavlior must be sustained over a certain time period, why, and for what period? In some specific industries, such as telecommunication sector, the FTC considered the impact on an enterprise s profit caused by its reduction in price for analyzing predatory pricing. If the enterprise s profit does not significantly decrease on account of the lower price, then it may reasonably claim that the lower price induces stronger demand which, in turn, increases income and, therefore, makes up for the loss from the decrease in price. This practice shall be deemed as ordinary pricing competition as opposed to predatory pricing. 6. On what type of evidence do you rely to prove predatory pricing? Please explain, including examples as appropriate. a. Are cost data used? Yes i. If so, are cost data from the firm used? Yes 4

5 b. Are there circumstances when cost data of other firms can be used? Yes i. If so, please specify the circumstances. There was once a case in which a new entrant to the telecommunications sector complained that the incumbent was misusing its market power to set its price above its own cost but lower than the new entrant s prices so as to unduly squeeze the profit of the new entrant, meanwhile, the FTC will consider other firms cost data. c. What other data or information is used, if any? Please provide examples as relevant. The FTC hasn t made any decision that a company s conduct violates Fair Trade Act in predatory pricing cases. Therefore, we have little experience to answer this question. 7. Does pricing below a particular cost benchmark create a presumption of predatory pricing? No a. If yes, is this presumption rebuttable or irrebuttable? Please explain. b. If the presumption is rebuttable, what must be shown to rebut the presumption? 8. Is there a safe harbor from a finding of predatory pricing for pricing above a particular cost benchmark? No a. If yes, please explain, including the terms of the safe harbor. 9. Is recoupment (obtaining additional profits that more than offset profit sacrifices stemming from predatory pricing) required for a finding of liability under predatory pricing rules in your jurisdiction? Yes If so: a. Is this assessment conducted separately from the analysis of the firm s market power and the predation? No b. What factors are employed in assessing recoupment in your jurisdiction? To establish the presence of predation is dependent upon whether a predator is able to raise price above the competitive level to recoup its previous loss after having excluded competitors out of the market. If the predator is not able to raise price due to a low entry barrier that makes it unable to prevent competitors from easily returning to or entering the market, or if there is a price cap regulation in the relevant market, then predatory pricing can do little harm to competition and is, of course, beneficial to consumers. c. Is there a specific recoupment calculation or amount to be shown? No 5

6 i. If so, what is this? d. Is there a relevant time period for recoupment? No i. If so, what is it? a. Is it possible for recoupment to occur in a market different than the one in which the predatory pricing took place? Up to now, we don t have any real case related to this question. i. If so, please explain and provide relevant examples. b. What degree of likelihood of recoupment is required (e.g., possibility or probability)? The FTC needs to prove the predator is able to compensate its previous loss via raising price after excluding competitors from the market, but it does not have to prove the predator has actually collected its loss. ii. Please provide examples of the recoupment standard of likelihood employed as part of your recoupment assessment. Up to now, the FTC has no predatory pricing case, which is decided as infringement of Fair Trade Act. Therefore, we have little experience in this area. 10. Is the firm s intent relevant in predatory pricing cases? Yes. The FTC decides a firm s intent in predatory pricing cases, for instance, the FTC will review whether a firm intends to eliminate a competitor in the relevant market, however, there hasn t been a predatory pricing case which is decided as infringement of Fair Trade Act until now. Therefore, we have little experience in this area. a. If so, please describe the relevant type(s) of intent, and the evidence used to show the required intent, providing available examples. b. If objective conditions for predatory pricing -- for example, pricing exceeding a certain cost benchmark or recoupment are not demonstrated, does intent matter? i. If so, please explain. 11. In addition to proving below-cost pricing, must effects, such as market foreclosure or consumer harm, be demonstrated to establish liability? Yes a. If yes, please explain the elements assessed (e.g., exit or delayed entry of competitors, price increases, prevention or delay of price decreases) and the types of evidence required to do so. Through predatory pricing, the predator conveys a strong signal that warns potential competitors not to enter the market (reputation effect). If the reputation effect can be effectively produced and lead potential entrants to believe that severe 6

7 predatory pricing will occur and, thus, weaken their intention to enter the market, then predatory pricing is considered to be at work is considered to be going on. Moreover, vertical price squeezing would be a more effective tool for blocking competition. Raising the price of essential input only affects the predator s perceived marginal cost. This will, nevertheless, increase the new entrant s actual marginal cost, squeeze its profit margin and decrease its competitiveness in the market. Justifications and Defenses 12. What type of justifications or defenses, if any, are permitted for predatory pricing, e.g., an efficiency, meeting competition or objective necessity defense? Please explain and provide examples, as relevant. Because the FTC hasn t made any decision that the conduct of enterprise violates Fair Trade Act until now, we have little experience in this area. However, the FTC never regarded loss leader strategies as predatory pricing. For instance, hypermarkets used to set the prices of certain daily goods, e.g. tissue paper, rice, etc., way below costs with the aim of attracting consumers to enter their stores to purchase those goods and, at the same time, other profitable products. The purpose of this strategy is to increase overall sales volume rather than exclude competitors. This strategy often cannot produce a strong enough effect to exclude horizontal competitors. The FTC never takes loss leader strategies as being predatory. a. What is the standard of proof applicable to these defenses? Who bears the burden of proof? What evidence is required to demonstrate that these defenses or justifications are met? We have little experience in this area. Enforcement 13. Please provide the following information for the past ten years (as information is available): a. The number of predatory pricing cases your agency reviewed (investigated beyond a preliminary phase). Up to now, the FTC has reviewed 9 cases. b. The number of these cases that resulted in (i) an agency decision that the conduct violates antitrust rules; (ii) a settlement with relief. Both are none. 7

8 c. The number of agency decisions issued, if any, that held that the practice did not violate your jurisdiction s predatory pricing rules (i.e., clearance decisions ). 9 cases d. Each of the number of agency decisions or settlements that were (i) challenged in court and, of those, either (ii) overturned by court decision or (iii) confirmed by court decision. Zero 14. Does your jurisdiction allow private cases challenging predatory pricing? Yes a. Please provide a short description of representative examples, as available. 15. Is predatory pricing a civil and/or a criminal violation of your jurisdiction s antitrust laws? Yes a. If both, what are the differences in the criteria applied to these categories? We have little experience in this area. b. On what basis does the agency choose to bring a criminal or civil case? In accordance with the article 35 of Fair Trade Act, only the injured party can bring a civil suit. As to criminal case, the FTC will refer the case, which the same enterprise have the same or similar violation again, to the prosecutor for filing a litigation. 16. As relevant, please provide a short English summary of the leading predatory pricing decisions/cases in your jurisdiction, including information on the method used to calculate costs, to the extent applicable, and, if possible, a link to the English translation, an executive summary or press release of the case. In 1999, all private mobile phone operators filed a complaint with the FTC, alleging the 3 rd Tariff Adjustment Program of the state-owned monopoly Chunghwa Telecommunications Co. approved by the Directorate General of Telecommunications (DGT) under the Ministry of Transportation and Communications engaged in predatory pricing, cross-subsidization, and undue fidelity discounts. According the Program, the adjustments to the mobile phone rates were as follows: (1) general preferential rate plan: monthly charges: NT$600, connection charges during regular hours: NT$0.10 per second, connection charges during discount hours: NT$0.05 per second; (2) local preferential rate plan: monthly charges: NT$420, connection charges during regular hours: NT$0.08 per second, connection charges during discount hours: NT$0.05 per second; (3) economical preferential rate plan: monthly charges: NT$200, connection charges during regular hours: NT$0.15 per second, connection charges during discount hours: NT$0.08 per second; (4) 8

9 discount plan for long-time customers and large accounts: 20 to 40% off their monthly charges; (5) preferential plan for subscriber-to-subscriber connections: NT$0.05 per second. In reviewing whether the Chunghwa Telecom s pricing programs were predatory, the FTC took the following into consideration: a) The FTC took the FAC( Full Allocated-Cost) as the indirect indicator to examine whether the price in question was lower than the LRIC. The FAC includes the direct cost of providing a specific service as well as operation fees and allocation of other common cost. Therefore, in most cases, if the price of a specific telecommunications service is higher than the FAC, then it is reasonable to believe that the said price will not be lower than the LRIC. b) In the said case, the FACs of the Chunghwa to provide mobile phone services were: NT$ /min for on-net services, NT$ 4.895/min for off-net services, NT$ 3.366/min for fixed-tomobile services; Against this, the retail prices of the said services were NT$ 3~4.8/min for on-net services, and NT$ 6~9/min for off-net or fixed-to-mobile services. All retail prices were obviously higher than the fully allocated costs (the FACs). c) Last but not least, the FTC examined the relationship between tariff adjustment and the profit of the Chunghwa Telecom. In analyzing predatory pricing, the FTC considered the impact on an enterprise s profit caused by its reduction in price. If the enterprise s profit does not significantly decrease on account of the lower price, then it may reasonably claim that the lower price induces stronger demand which, in turn, increases income and, therefore, makes up for the loss from the decrease in price. This practice shall be deemed as ordinary pricing competition as opposed to predatory pricing. In the said case, the tariff adjustment program contributed NT$ 3 billion to the Chunghwa Telecom and was not regarded as predatory pricing by the FTC. 17. Please provide any additional comments that you would like to make on your experience with predatory pricing rules and their enforcement in your jurisdiction, including, as appropriate but not limited to: 9

10 a. Whether there have there been or you expect there to be major developments or significant changes in the criteria by which you assess predatory pricing, explaining these developments as relevant. NO b. Whether there are significant policy and/or practical considerations that may lead to greater or lesser agency enforcement against predatory pricing pursuant to unilateral conduct rules in your jurisdiction, e.g., concern with the risks of false positives/false negatives, the existence of related laws such as a general ban on below-cost pricing, limited evidence of consumer harm, and/or difficulties in obtaining reliable cost data (please provide explanation as relevant). No 10

11 Exclusive Dealing/Single Branding This questionnaire seeks information on the analysis and treatment of exclusive dealing (referred to as single branding in some jurisdictions) by ICN member competition authorities. For purposes of this questionnaire, we refer to exclusive dealing and single branding as conduct that requires or induces customers or suppliers to deal solely or predominantly with that firm. Nevertheless, this questionnaire does not cover tying, bundling, loyalty discounts, rebates or related practices, which your responses should therefore not address. Unless otherwise stated, the questions concern conduct by a dominant firm or firm with significant market power. Respondents should feel free not to answer questions concerning aspects of your law or policy that are not well developed. Answers should be based on agency practice, legal guidelines, relevant case law, etc., rather than speculation. Legal Basis and Specific Elements 1. Please provide the main relevant texts (in English if available) of your jurisdiction s laws and guidelines on exclusive dealing/single branding. The Subparagraph 6, Article 19 of The Fair Trade Act (FTA): No enterprise shall have any of the following acts which is likely to lessen competition or to impede fair competition: ( 6 ) limiting its trading counterparts' business activity improperly by means of the requirements of business engagement. The FTC defines the circumstances of limiting its trading counterparts business activity further in the Paragraph 1, Article 27 of the Implementing Rules of the FTA such that includes, but not limits to tie-ins, exclusive dealing, territory, customers, use. According to the Paragraph 2, Article 27 of the Rules, the FTC determines whether the limitations are reasonable, the totality of such factors as the intent, purposes, and market position of the parties, the structure of the market to which they belong, the characteristics of the goods, and the impact that carrying out such restrictions would have on market competition shall be considered. 2. Please list your jurisdiction s criteria for an abuse of dominance/monopolization based on exclusive dealing. (a) the enterprise in question is a monopoly or has certain market power (the market share of the enterprise is at least 10%) in the relevant market; (b) the enterprise in question restricts the business activity of its supplier or purchaser that engages in or concludes transactions with.; (c)the above restriction needs to cause a likelihood of decreasing relevant 11

12 market competition. Exclusive Purchasing and Supply Arrangements 3. How does your jurisdiction define single branding or exclusive dealing? For example: Must a firm require that all purchases come from it or that all sales go to it? Can something less than all purchases or all sales be considered single branding or exclusive dealing? Please specify (providing actual percentages, as relevant). According to our empirical experience, in determining single branding or excusive dealing case, the firm basically requires that considerable purchases come from it or that considerable sales go to it. 4. Is the duration of the arrangement relevant to your assessment? Up to now, only in an exclusive dealing case, which one chain convenient store filed a complaint against a leading chain convenient store for monopolizing collecting the charge of the private telecom enterprises, the FTC mentioned it could be reasonable for a leading chain convenient store to make one year contract with private telecom companies in order to obtain the right to collect exclusively. The FTC thinks that one year exclusive dealing contract conforms to general business practice. However, this case didn t be determined to violate the FTA and the duration of the arrangement is not relevant to our assessment in the most exclusive dealing or single branding case. a. If so, please explain how and why, providing examples. 5. Must the firm s use of such arrangements cover a substantial portion of the market? Pursuant to the Subparagraph 6, Article 19 of the FTA, vertical trade restriction, which is likely to lessen competition or to impede fair competition. In most infringement cases, the enterprises use of such arrangements covered a substantial portion of the market and consequently were regarded as lessening competition in the relevant market. However, we haven t developed a clear standard for the relevant percentage of the purchase or supply covered. a. If so, how do you interpret this requirement, including any relevant percentage thresholds for the purchase or supply covered, and the evidence needed to determine whether this is met? 6. Does it matter whether the arrangement was requested by the non-dominant customer or supplier? No. a. If so, how and why? 12

13 7. Might otherwise legal exclusive dealing/single branding arrangements be deemed abusive if they contain other provisions, e.g., an English Clause (requiring e.g., the customer to report any better offers to the supplier, and prohibiting the customer from accepting the offer unless the supplier does not match it), rights of first refusal (right of, e.g., the supplier to enter into an agreement with the customer according to specified terms, before the customer is entitled to enter into an agreement with a third party)? No. The FTC has to decide whether the action impairs competition in the market by the rule of reason. a. If so, please explain and provide examples. Presumptions and Safe Harbors 8. Are there circumstances under which a firm s use of single branding or exclusive dealing arrangements is presumed illegal? No. a. If so, please identify the circumstances. b. Is the presumption rebuttable? Yes/No i. If so, what must be shown to rebut the presumption? 9. Is there a safe harbor from a finding of liability under your single branding/exclusive dealing provisions? No. a. If so, please explain, including its terms. Effects 10. Must a market foreclosure effect be shown for an abuse? No. On the Basis of the Subparagraph 6, Article 19 of the FTA, one of such vertical restricted act s criteria is likely to lessen competition or to impede fair competition, but needn t to show the market foreclosure effect. Likewise, in most exclusive dealing or single branding cases, the FTC mainly concern whether the act lessen the market competition. a. How is market foreclosure defined in your jurisdiction? b. Which factors are taken into account to assess a market foreclosure effect (level of dominance, percentage of market demand/purchases or supply covered by the arrangement, existence of alternative sources of supply, entry barriers, scale economies, possibility and practicability of switching, others)? Please specify the factors considered, including, as relevant, the percentage of demand/supply covered. c. What evidence is used to demonstrate these effects and must the effects be actual, likely or potential effects? 11. Must other effects, e.g., on consumer welfare, be shown for an abuse? We have little experience on this area. But in 1999, there is one case which a chain convenient store filed a complaint against a leading chain 13

14 convenient store for monopolizing collecting the charge of the private telecom enterprises. In this case, the FTC thought this exclusive dealing contract enhanced the channel of collecting charge for private telecom firms users. It s one of reasons that the FTC determined the act of leading chain convenient store didn t violate the FTA. a. If yes, please specify what must be demonstrated and the evidence required. Justifications/Defenses 12. What justifications/defenses are available to the dominant firm, e.g., an efficiency, meeting competition or objective necessity defense? Please specify. We have little experience in this area. a. If there is an efficiencies defense, what efficiencies are considered (e.g., relationship-specific investments, facilitating innovation, reduced transaction costs)? How are claims of improved service quality or reputation assessed? b. Are efficiencies balanced against competitive harm to determine whether liability attaches, or do they provide a complete defense without consideration of harm? c. Is there a meeting competition defense? Yes/ No. i. If yes, please explain. d. What is the standard of proof applicable to these defenses? What type of evidence is required to demonstrate that the defenses are met? Enforcement 13. Please provide the following information for the past ten years (as information is available): a. The number of exclusive dealing/single branding cases your agency reviewed (investigated beyond a preliminary phase). 15 cases b. The number of these cases that resulted in (i) an agency decision that the conduct violates antitrust rules 6 cases ; (ii) a settlement with relief. 2 cases. c. The number of agency decisions issued, if any, that held that the practice did not violate your jurisdiction s exclusive dealing/single branding rules (i.e., clearance decisions ). 7 cases d. Each of the number of agency decisions or settlements that were (i) challenged in court and, of those, either (ii) overturned by court decision or (iii) confirmed by court decision. Zero. 14

15 14. Does your jurisdiction allow private cases challenging exclusive dealing/single? Yes. a. Please provide a short description of representative examples, as available. 15. As relevant, please provide a short English summary of the leading exclusive dealing/single branding cases in your jurisdiction and, if possible, a link to the English translation of the decision, an executive summary or the press release of the case. In 1995, complaints were brought to the FTC regarding the following matters: (1) Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC) suspended its acceptance of applications for becoming its lubricant distributors.(2) CPC's private franchisees have the option of purchasing gasoline from CPC on credit, if collateral is provided, or by cash, while non-franchisees can only purchase by cash.(3) CPC's private franchisees may only distribute CPC's Kuo Kuang lubricants, excluding all other brands of lubricants. Regarding Fact (1) that Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC) suspended its acceptance of lubricant distributor applications, this Commission found that CPC set qualification requirements for its distributors as part of its marketing strategies to increase its sales volume when facing the market competition. Based on its respect for an enterprise's free choice of distributors, the FTC didn t find such act of CPC in violation of the FTA. With respect to Fact (2), CPC explained that it was a misunderstanding due to the ambiguity of the contract. CPC further clarified this by stating that it had never rejected any purchase of its petroleum on credit by non-franchisees. CPC should have explained its position to private gas station owners that it would agree to any non-franchisee's purchase of its gasoline and diesel fuel on credit, if such non-franchisee is willing to provide collateral whose security is verified by the CPC. Therefore, such act of CPC is not in violation of the Fair Trade Law. As for CPC's requirement that its private franchisees may only distribute CPC's Kuo Kuang lubricants, the FTC found that CPC was the only supplier in the market of gasoline and diesel fuel, and that CPC, at the same, also manufactured lubricants. CPC imposed such restrictions with an intent to exercise effective control over gas stations as a distribution channel for lubricants and to ensure its advantageous position in such distribution channel. In addition, gas stations operated directly by CPC or by private franchisees account for 99% of the total market. Therefore, CPC had a significant power in the market for the distribution of automobile and motorcycle lubricants. Automobile and motorcycle lubricants come in different grades to satisfy various consumer needs. The transactions of lubricants 15

16 are diversified and of small-quantity. Although CPC claims that its requirement of exclusive sale of its brand lubricants is to ensure the quality of automobile and motorcycle lubricants and to protect CPC's corporate image, Kuo Kuang lubricants designated by CPC may not fully meet the need of automobile and motorcycle users for different grades of lubricants. Further, if the private franchisees are allowed to sell lubricants with no lower quality than Kuo Kuang lubricants to increase their own competitiveness and meet the needs of more consumers without damaging the consistency of the franchise system, the ancillary functions of gas stations and the sales of their gasoline/diesel fuel will be enhanced. Under the present circumstance, CPC's restriction makes it difficult for gas stations to enhance their ancillary functions and impede efficiency competition in the gas station market. Since the distribution channel through gas station is almost exclusively owned by CPC, no other brands of lubricants can go through such distribution channel. Such act of CPC has also violated the principle of fair competition in the market of automobile and motorcycle lubricants and thus has violated Article 19(vi) of the FTA, which outlaws improper restrictions on trading counterparts' activities. 16. Please provide any additional comments that you would like to make on your experience with exclusive dealing/single branding rules and their enforcement in your jurisdiction, including, as appropriate but not limited to whether there have there been or you expect there to be major developments or significant changes in the criteria by which you assess exclusive dealing/single branding, explaining these developments as relevant. None 16