Projet d ARC INRIA MENEUR Modélisation en Economie des réseaux et NEUtRalité du Net Network Economics and Net Neutrality Modeling

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1 Projet d ARC INRIA MENEUR Modélisation en Economie des réseaux et NEUtRalité du Net Network Economics and Net Neutrality Modeling EPI INRIA : Dionysos, Maestro, Mescal and P. Bernhard Other academic partners: Telecom Bretagne, FTW, Columbia University, Pennsylvania State University Industrial partners: Alcatel-Lucent Bell Labs, Orange Labs Leader: Bruno Tuffin (Dionysos) Abstract The goal of this project is to study the interest of network neutrality, a topic that has recently gained a lot of attention. The project aims at elaborating mathematical models that will be analyzed to investigate its impact on users, on social welfare and on providers investment incentives, among others, and eventually propose how (and if) network neutrality should be implemented. It brings together experts from different scientific fields, telecommunications, applied mathematics, economics, mixing academy and industry, to discuss those issues. It is a first step towards the elaboration of a European project. Contents 1 Participants EPI Dionysos EPI Maestro EPI Mescal Pierre Bernhard (DR INRIA, member of EPI Comore) GET/Telecom Bretagne FTW, Vienna

2 1.7 Columbia University, USA Pennsylvania State University, USA Alcatel-Lucent Bell Labs France, Semantic and Autonomous Technologies (SAT) department Orange Labs Scientific goals Context Description of activities and respective goals of participants What should be a good definition/implementation of network neutrality? Who brings the most added-value, and who should pay the other in a non-neutral network? What is the impact of neutrality on network investments? What is the impact of non-neutrality on (content) innovation? Shall we (at least) allow service differentiation? Expected results State of the art and positioning Financial appendix 11 2

3 1 Participants 1.1 EPI Dionysos Involved : Bruno Tuffin (CR INRIA), Hai Tran Hoang (PhD student), Jean-Marc Vigne (PhD student). Dionysos is a group working on the identification, the conception and the selection of the most appropriate network architectures of a communication service. Dionysos has acquired an expertise in the area of telecommunication networks pricing, a topic on which the group has been deeply involved for the past eight years, participating in (or leading) many projects at the French and European levels. We can especially remark that the group is currenty leading an ANR project on (economic) competition among providers (see inria.fr and, among references, [12, 13]), a problem for which network neutrality is a new key component. The group will bring this expertise on the mathematical modeling of pricing schemes and of competition among providers. 1.2 EPI Maestro Involved : Eitan Altman (DR INRIA), S. Wong (PhD Student in Law). Maestro is a group working on methods and tools for the performance evaluation, optimization and control of networks. The people involved in the project are more specifically international actors in the theory and application of game theory in telecommunication networks. The group will therefore bring this expertise to the project, game theory being the fundamental tool to analyze the interactions between the economic players depending on whether network neutrality is or is not applied. Note that network neutrality is an important part of a new topic in Maestro named Access to knowledge and culture: The interplay between legislation, Economics and information technology led by Eitan Altman for two years (see members/eitan.altman/accessf.html). S. Wong will bring her knowledge on the law aspect to the project. 1.3 EPI Mescal Involved: Bruno Gaujal (DR INRIA), Corinne Touati (CR INRIA) Mescal is a group working on the efficient design of large scale distributed systems. Mescal has been investigating the establishment of virtual prices, also called shadow prices in congestion networks. These prices ensure a rational use of resources. Equilibria can also be improved by advising policies to mobiles such that any user that does not follow these pieces of advice will necessarily penalize herself (correlated equilibria). Mescal members are leading the selfnets action de recherche within the joint laboratory between INRIA and Alcatel-Lucent on self-optimizing networks. In this ARC project, Mescal members will especially focus on non-symmetrical price problems and the algorithmic issues (synchronization, available information, time and memory complexity). 3

4 1.4 Pierre Bernhard (DR INRIA, member of EPI Comore) Pierre Bernhard brings his expertise in game theory, and more specifically in dynamic games, Wardrop equilibria, E.S.S. and evolutionary games. Pierre Bernhard will intervene in the project at a personal level (as an Emeritus DR INRIA), since his EPI INRIA Comore does not work on telecommunications. 1.5 GET/Telecom Bretagne Involved : Patrick Maillé (MdC). The member of this engineering school has developed an expertise in the domain of network pricing and game theory since He has also spent 6 months in 2006 at the Columbia Business School (Columbia University, New York, USA) to work with Nicolas Stier-Moses, who has also recently started an activity on network neutrality in the USA. Patrick Maillé is also a member of ANR Captures project interested in this topic, and will help for the discussion and collaboration with Columbia University. 1.6 FTW, Vienna Involved : Peter Reichl, Ivan Gojmerac (key researchers). FTW (Forschungszentrum Telekommunikation Wien) is a Telecommunications Research Center in Vienna, funded half by the government and half by Industry. The participants in MENEUR project are key researchers in this institute working on future telecommunication ecosystems (an ecosystem is defined as a community of organisms together with their environment, viewed as a system of interactions and interdependent relationships). The network neutrality issue is at the heart of telecommunication ecosystems. FTW will bring to the project the point of view of another European country, their knowledge on the feasibility from the technological point of view, as well as of a European operator as consultants for Telecom Austria. 1.7 Columbia University, USA Nicolas Stier-Moses (Associate Professor) Professor Stier s research focuses on the study of the impact that self-minded agents have on decentralized systems. In particular, his goal is to explore mechanisms that can help align the incentive of agents and result in efficient outcomes. He is trained as a mathematician, computer scientist and operations researcher, and has since specialized in game theoretic models. He developed a strong interest in telecommunication networks since his first visit to INRIA Rennes in After that, he visited INRIA multiples times and continued to do research in this application domain. Recently, he wrote a number of research and outreach articles about network neutrality to highlight how considering investment decisions and competition might influence the choice of policy. This collaboration will bring the North-American point of view to the project. 4

5 1.8 Pennsylvania State University, USA George Kesidis (Full Professor) Professor Kesidis research is about modeling and performance evaluation of communication and computer networking mechanisms, scheduling and routing, Internet security and more importantly for the project, network economics and games. He has already started an activity around network neutrality and initiated a collaboration on this issue with EPI Maestro as illustrated by publication [2]. He will also bring the North-American point of view to the project. 1.9 Alcatel-Lucent Bell Labs France, Semantic and Autonomous Technologies (SAT) department Hélia Pouyllau (Research Engineer) The SAT department of Alcatel-Lucent Bell France focuses on issues in carrier-grade networking, tackling 3 topics of research: network as a service (NaaS), self-* management and traffic-aware routing. The NaaS research activity regroups problematic on metro network issues, delivering QoS across networks and Internet evolutions. The SAT department leads the European Project ETICS on economic and technical problems in inter-carrier service delivery. In the past, they also participated to the French ANR ACTRICE and have published several papers addressing both economic and technical dimensions of the topic. ALBLF will bring its expertise on Internet economics and network interconnection architectures in order to validate the models and solutions proposed by the partners Orange Labs Orange Labs will bring the point of view of an operator to the project. 2 Scientific goals 2.1 Context In the current Internet business model, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) charge both endusers and content providers directly connected to them. ISPs generally have public peering or transit (i.e. customer-provider relation) agreements among them but do not charge content providers that are associated with other ISPs. These agreements structure the Internet in a Tiers architecture at the top of which Tier 1 operators dominate the market. Nevertheless, there is now an increasing traffic asymmetry between ISPs, mainly due to some prominent and resource consuming content providers. The typical example is YouTube (owned by Google), accessed by all users while hosted by a single Tier 1 ISP, whose traffic constitutes now a non-negligible part of the whole Internet traffic. This issue has been the starting point of the debate launched at the end of 2005, by Ed Whitacre (CEO of AT&T) saying that content providers should be charged by ISPs they are not directly connected to: How do you think they re going to get to customers? Through a broadband pipe. Cable companies have them. We have them. Now what they would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain t going to let them do that because we have spent this 5

6 capital and we have to have a return on it. So there s going to have to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes to pay for the portion they re using. Why should they be allowed to use my pipes? The Internet can t be free in that sense, because we and the cable companies have made an investment and for a Google or Yahoo! or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes [for] free is nuts. The underlying concern is that investment is made by ISPs but content providers have an important part of the dividends. The revenue arising from online advertising (meaning showing graphical ads on regular web pages) is estimated at approximately a $24 billion in 2009 [6] while textual ads on search pages has led to a combined revenue $8.5 billion in 2007 [9], those figures increasing every year. Meanwhile, transit prices - which constitutes the main source of revenues for transit ISPs - are decreasing and predicted to be under 1$ per Mbps by ISPs argue that there is no sufficient incentive for them to continue to invest on the network infrastructures if most benefits come to content providers. Another option, if no charging to content providers is implemented by ISPs, is to lower the quality of the traffic coming from distant content providers. As an illustration, this has been the topic of a new controversy in 2007 when Comcast, a main ISP in the USA, started (as an extreme case) blocking P2P applications such as BitTorrent, using the argument that P2P is mostly used to share illegal content. Advocates of neutrality argued here that P2P has legitimate uses and other types of initiatives should be imagined. In both cases, the goal of ISPs is to change the current behavior of the Internet, where all users (of whatever type) have a full access to the network with the same quality at a flat-rate fee. This has led to a lot of protests from content providers and user associations arguing that charging for content or blocking types of flow is an impingement of freedom of speech [17] and/or human rights that will impact the network development. We want to investigate the relevance of arguments from both sides and see if service differentiation should be allowed, and if yes, at which level and how far they should be implemented. This issue has already been a subject of debate at the law and policy makers level. In the US the trend was first to go with imposing network regulation on ISPs to ensure neutrality, but it is not clear who, if any, has the authority to regulate the Internet (for instance the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) lost a lawsuit where the supreme court found that they lack the authority). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released in 2007 a report not supporting neutrality constraints, increasing the debate at the political level. This debate is also active in Europe and in France, as illustrated by the open consultation on network neutrality launched in In its response to the consultation, the French regulation authority, ARCEP, has published a proposal intending to define how net neutrality could be implemented. Among these proposals, some of them catch our attention: i) ISPs should respect the neutrality between applications but should be let free to operate in an efficient manner their network, ii) the efficient management of a network should be made at the detriment of best-effort services, and iii) interconnection contracts should be more transparent. This latter is a clear reference to the emergence of private peering agreements which are constituting some kind of private routes within the Internet and might led to create a parallel premium Internet. Network neutrality also brings some questions at the technological level, highlighting the multidisciplinary aspect of the issue. Service differentiation has indeed been the subject of a vast literature in the last decade to cope with the congestion encountered in access networks, in wireless ones for instance, but not only. This has led to the proposition of architectures such as DiffServ (for Differentiation of Service) that discriminate packets according to the 6

7 type of application they are associated with. The principle is that some applications may accomodate a worse quality of service in terms of delay, loss or other characteristics, and this could be used towards a better experienced overall service. Network neutrality therefore brings the question about whether or not this type of differentiation at the application type level, not between content providers, should be applied. There is indeed a difference between user (and/or content providers) discrimination and service differentiation that network neutrality issue is raising. The notion of fair discrimination, between applications and/or between users is subject to controversy. The project is a follow-up to the response from INRIA researchers to the french consultation on network neutrality [1] where they have exposed their ideas and posed the questions that constitute in most part this proposal. 2.2 Description of activities and respective goals of participants The goal of this ARC proposal is to model the economic relationships between end-users, ISPs and content providers, and analyze the impact of non-neutrality versus neutrality. The entire debate has raised a number of unanswered questions. The main (but nonexhaustive list of) questions we aim at answering are described below. The complementarity of the groups involved in the project, in terms of technological, economical, legal and mathematical knowledge will foster the discussions on the models and their analysis. In all cases, the models will be solved via game-theoretic tools that capture the interactions between different actors What should be a good definition/implementation of network neutrality? There is no very clear view of what network neutrality is. Our goal in this part would be to bring an acceptable definition that will be validated by our models in terms of social welfare (social welfare measuring the total level of satisfactions of all actors, ISPs, content providers and end-users). In other words, we will study the impact of various definitions of neutrality on social welfare and other objective functions, and consider a satisfactory one at this level. The point of views of all partners from different fields (mathematics, telecommunications, economics, law) and with different perspectives (academic, ISP, content provider or network architects) will be confronted here. To give a broader idea of the issue, a network is often said to be weakly neutral if it prohibits user discrimination, which means it does not charge users differently for the same service. It is said to be strongly neutral if in addition it prohibits service differentiation, that is if it does not allow to manage packets differently. In a strongly neutral network, an architecture such as DiffServ could not be implemented. What if subscribers do choose among different classes of priority of service: does it bring a real neutrality issue then? What would be the best vision of a network in terms of social welfare or in terms of user welfare is still an open question that will be discussed. The legal aspect is also important here and needs to be discussed; indeed, since P2P BitTorrent (for instance, even if its proportion of the total traffic is declining) and streaming video (the increasing part) generate huge data volumes of illegal (copyrighted) material, ISPs cannot be blamed for facilitating theft if neutrality is kept in its current form. 7

8 2.2.2 Who brings the most added-value, and who should pay the other in a non-neutral network? The issue of network neutrality has come up because ISPs claimed that it acts as a disincentive for investment and capacity expansion of their networks. The validity of this argument has to be verified. For instance, in [4], the authors studied this argument and came to the conclusion that, under net neutrality, ISPs invest to reach a social optimal level, while they tend to under/over-invest when neutrality is dropped. In their setting, ISPs stand as winners while content providers (CPs) are left in a worse position, and users who pay the ISPs for preferential treatment are better off while other consumers have a significantly worse service. ISPs often justify charging CPs by quantifying the large amount of network resources big content providers use. On the other hand, the content a CP offers does contribute to the demand for Internet access, and thus benefits the access providers. This aspect is not considered in the ISPs claim. For instance, some customers subscribe to ISPs because they want to have access to CPs such as YouTube, Amazon or facebook; this has to be taken into account. Some references have already advocated the use of the Shapley value as a fair way to share profits between the providers, see, e.g., [10, 11]. The Shapley value is such that each provider (CP or ISP) will receive a share of the revenue proportional to its contribution to the total revenue and bargaining power. One of the main benefits of this approach is that it yields Pareto optimality for all players, and requires in particular that CPs, many of whom receive third-party income such as advertising revenue from consumers demand, help pay for the network access that makes this new income possible. All the models studied for now are nevertheless quite simple and need to be made closer to reality. We expect to represent all actors in a model: End-users who decide which ISP to be associated with depending on access price, QoS level (which depends itself on the number of customers) and choice of CPs they can reach; (Competitive) CPs making money thanks to advertising (the more end-users that visit, the larger the revenue) and pay an access price to a provider they are connected to (the choice of this provider could be considered fixed or a decision possibility, typically chosen as the one maximizing the CP revenue). Competitive ISPs who offer a given capacity and propose an access price to end-users and directly connected CPs, and/or a transit price to other ISPs. Demand will spread among providers according to those offers and the CPs that are reachable. Those assumptions illustrate the interdependences of strategies among all players. We will study the model in the neutral case as presented just above and compare the results with those in the non-neutral situation where ISPs are in addition allowed to charge distant CPs, but those CPs are entitled to refuse to be connected to that ISP. In that case, the ISPs take the risk of losing some customers to competitors which have made that connection. We will compare the Shapley value of ISPs and CPs to investigate whether this claim that value is brought by ISPs is true or not (note that we do not assume cooperation here, the Shapley value coming from cooperative game theory, but we just want to compute the share if revenue that can be assigned to come from each party) What is the impact of neutrality on network investments? The question of disincentive for ISPs to invest in network technologies and infrastructures on a long term, as brought by opponents of network neutrality, is also worth being studied deeper. 8

9 A way to tackle this problem is to consider a repeated version with infinite horizon of the above game where ISPs also have the possibility to invest on technologies and capacities. Here too, a comparison between the neutral and the non-neutral cases will give an answer to the question. If neutrality has an impact on investment, one could imagine introducing rules to enforce ISPs to invest a part of their revenues in the infrastructure. This could typically be implemented when selling licences in the wireless context. Remark that this regulatory rule can be supported by the article 3.1 of the directive 2002/22/CE (in french): Les Etats Membres veillent à ce que les services énumérés dans le présent chapitre soient mis à la disposition de tous les utilisateurs finals sur leur territoire, indépendamment de leur position géographique, au niveau de qualité spécifié et, compte tenu de circonstances nationales particulières, à un prix abordable. This would also deserve to be analyzed What is the impact of non-neutrality on (content) innovation? Another common idea, brought by the advocates of network neutrality this time, is that non-neutrality will prevent innovation, entrepreneurship and investment at the content level [5]. Indeed, it is often argued that Google, facebook or Twitter, among others, might not have developed in the case of a non-neutral network if they would have to pay the distant ISPs at the beginning of their business, and that many new services would be prevented from appearing due to these additional costs, at the expense of the whole system future value. This claim has to be verified. We want to model innovation (in terms of content) as a function of costs and investigate if there is a threshold over which non-neutrality would curb the development of the network and if it would eventually also induce losses for the ISPs also. The investment stage (which can be understood as choosing the quality of the content provider) has rarely been modeled explicitly, specially in a setting where ISPs also select quality and investment Shall we (at least) allow service differentiation? While all the above questions deal with the IPSs charging CPs for the traffic they send on their network, we would like to address the interest of weak neutrality being acceptable or not, by allowing service differentiation in case of congestion to allow a better perceived QoS, but without differentiation based on CP or end-user identity. Including the induced management costs in the previous models, we will compare the results on social welfare, user welfare, innovation with respect to a fully neutral network. But the decision of implementing service differentiation being at the appreciation of the ISP, this will depend on the resulting potential revenue increase. A related issue is about migrating from the pure flat-rate pricing to a scheme where the real value of the service could be taken into account, and how to implement it smoothly. Indeed, changing for instance to a volume-based pricing of flows may solve problems of security, intellectual property protections of content, and (potential) under-funding growth in network infrastructure [7]. The impact on the network neutrality and entrepreneurship aspects can be studied. 2.3 Expected results The objective of this project is to study the validity and interest of network neutrality and to answer the above questions thanks to mathematical models. This will give useful information to a policy maker before taking strategical decisions. 9

10 Legislation on Network Neutrality will shape the future Internet, and will thus have an enormous impact on its nature. The Internet is expected to centralize around 30% of the French economic activity in the coming years, and hence its evolution is a central strategic aspect in French economy. This ARC has as main objective to ensure that French experts in the French academia and research institutes will be aware of the issues that are being decided and would be able to contribute to this debate. We should mention that in parallel to the French public consultation on network neutrality, that was launched by the government on April 2010, the French telecom regulation authority, ARCEP, organized an International workshop on this issue with representatives of all economic actors including Academia. Not one representative from the Academia came from France. We are aware that the topic of Net Neutrality is a complex one since it involves both technological aspects as well as economics and law. We therefore have as a secondary objective to create an interdisciplinary active group that involves experts in networking, economics and law that would study and analyze the current issues that concern the future Internet. Moreover, in order to understand the impact on French economy, our group will include researchers from industry. Typically, a goal is, hopefully in the first year of the project (due to the very hot nature of network neutrality), to set up a European project on this issue, arising from the initial discussions within the group, and within INRIA an Action d Evergure on this broader aspect of Network Economics, a topic which could be highlighted more in the institute. 2.4 State of the art and positioning The response from the INRIA researchers to the French consultation [1] was not the only one; we can mention among others the response from the regulation authority ARCEP [3]. A summary of public consultations can be found in [19]. Network neutrality analysis has attracted a lot of attention recently. The reader can for instance go to and check the number of publications associated with keyword Network Neutrality (184 on October 5) or the book [8]. Tim Wu (Columbia University) is considered as the inventor of the expression Network Neutrality ; his web page contains useful informations and definitions. There exist several projects on this theme. We have identified Network Neutrality Squad ( is an open-membership, opensource effort, project that aims at keeping Internet fair, by fostering discussion on detection, analysis, and incident reporting of any anticompetitive, discriminatory, or other restrictive actions from ISPs. This project is a networking-oriented, and explictly favors neutrality. Dynamic platform Standards Project for Real Network Neutrality ( com/) is also a project lobbying for neutrality. Media Access Project is a non-profit law firm and advocacy organization promoting freedom of speech. They have a special section on network neutrality. GTNOISE Network Access Neutrality Project at Georgia Tech ( net/nano/) develops a monitoring tool to identify performance degradations due to network neutrality violation by ISPs. 10

11 But all those projects are user or technological projects typically defending neutrality. Our goal is rather to study neutrality from the mathematical modeling and analysis point of view. Among the most prominent groups working on this last specific point, we can mention: In the USA: (N. Stier and G. Weintraub (Columbia University) with P. Njoroge and A. Ozdaglar (MIT) have started a similar work on network neutrality modeling and analysis [16]. In the preliminary work, they have used game theory to create a model that mimics a two-sided market for Internet access with at one side ISPs receiving payment streams from consumers and CPs, so that platforms compete for consumer and CP fees, and at the other side, CPs. N. Stier (a former collaborator of several EPI INRIA, among which Dionysos) is part of our proposal to bring their point of view. G. Kesidis (Penn State University) is also an active member o network neutrality analysis via game theory. He is also part of the project, cooperating with EPI Maestro on this [2], and will also bring the North-American aspect and point of view. Another stream of works is by J. Musachio (UC Santa Cruz), G. Schwartz and J. Walrand (UC Berkeley)[15, 14] who also study how the network regime (neutral or non-neutral) affects provider investment incentives, network quality and user prices. A. Odlyzko (University of Minnesota) [17] who rather analyzes the historic aspects, the price discrimination precedents, and the value of bits and content versus connectivity. In Europe, basically in France: the already mentionned and preliminary modeling work [2] within INRIA; the noticeable work of Claudia Savedraa, finishing her PhD jointly at Orange Labs and École Polytechnique and who started to study the bargaining power between CPs and ISPs [18]. In Asia: The work at the Chinese University of Hong-Kong, in collaboration with Columbia University, [10, 11] where the authors make use of cooperative game theory and Shapley value to share the revenue among actors. As can be seen, all the initiatives we have found about the mathematical modeling aspect are quite individual ones. This project is to our knowledge the first that brings officially together academics and industry (network architects and providers), mixing experts in telecommunications technology, applied mathematics, law and economics on those modeling aspects. 3 Financial appendix We estimate the necessary budget for the two years of this ARC at 73 ke (86.6 ke counting the total cost of a post-doc). This budget can be decomposed into the following way: Organization of a kick-off workshop followed by one day of (internal) brainstorming: 12 ke 11

12 costs are made of participants trips and expenses for two days, and the invitation of two international experts. Trips for bilateral or multi-lateral internal meetings over the two years: 20 ke Organization of a final workshop: 10 ke costs are made of participants trips and expenses for two days. Recruiting a postdoc for one year, in EPI Dionysos. 31 ke(counting salary only; 44.6 ke if talking about total cost). The workshops will be organized in Rennes, Paris or Sophia-Antipolis in order to minimize the costs. The postdoc will work on the game-theoretic analysis of the models designed by the participants. References [1] E. Altman, C. Barakat, P. Bernhard, E. Fleury, P. Jacquet, A. Legout, C. Touati, B. Tuffin, and S. Wong. Réponse à la consultation sur la neutralité du net. http: //www-sop.inria.fr/members/eitan.altman/doc/conult-fr-sbm.pdf, [2] E. Altman, P. Bernhard, S. Caron, G. Kesidis, J. Rojas-Mora, and S. Wong. A study of non-neutral networks with usage-based prices. In Proceedings of the 3rd ETM Workshop, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, September [3] ARCEP. Neutralité de l internet et des réseaux: propositions et orientations. net-neutralite-orientations-sept2010.pdf, [4] H. K. Cheng, S. Bandyopadhyay, and H. Guo. The Debate on Net Neutrality: A Policy Perspective. Information Systems Research, Forthcoming, [5] R. Frieden. Internet Packet Sniffing and its Impact on the Network Neutrality Debate and the Balance of Power between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers. Technical report, SSRN, id= [6] A. Ghosh and A. Sayedi. Expressive auctions for externalities in online advertising. In Workshop on the World Wide Web (WWW), Raleigh, NC, USA, April [7] G. Kesidis. Congestion control alternatives for residential broadband access. In Proceedings of the IEEE Network Operations and Management Symposium (NOMS), pages , apr [8] T.M. Lenard and R.J. (Eds.) May. Net Neutrality or Net Neutering: Should Broadband Internet Services be Regulated. Springer, [9] D. Liu, J. Chen, and A.B. Whinston. Competing keyword auctions. In Proc. of 4th Workshop on Ad Auctions, Chicago, IL, USA, Jul

13 [10] R.T.B. Ma, D.-M. Chiu, J.C.S. Lui, V. Misra, and D. Rubenstein. Interconnecting eyeballs to content: A Shapley value perspective on isp peering and settlement. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Economics of Networked Systems (NetEcon), pages 61 66, [11] R.T.B. Ma, D.-M. Chiu, J.C.S. Lui, V. Misra, and D. Rubenstein. On cooperative settlement between content, transit and eyeball internet service providers. In Proceedings of the ACM International Conference on Emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies (CoNEXT), [12] P. Maillé and B. Tuffin. Analysis of price competition in a slotted resource allocation game. In Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM, April [13] P. Maillé and B. Tuffin. Price war in heterogeneous wireless networks. Computer Networks, 54(13): , [14] J. Musacchio, G. Schwartz, and J. Walrand. A two-sided market analysis of provider investment incentives with an application to the net-neutrality issue. Review of Network Economics, 8(1):Article 3, [15] J. Musacchio, J. Walrand, and G. Schwartz. Network neutrality and provider investment incentives. In Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC Conference Record of the Forty-First Asilomar Conference on, pages , nov [16] P. Njoroge, A. Ozdaglar, N. Stier-Moses, and G. Weintraub. Investment in two sided markets and the net neutrality debate. Technical Report DRO , Columbia University, Decision, Risk and Operations Working Papers Series, [17] A. Odlyzko. Network neutrality, search neutrality, and the never-ending conflict between efficiency and fairness in markets. Review of Network Economics, 8(1):40 60, [18] C.V. Saavedra. Bargaining power and the net neutrality debate. sites.google.com/ site/claudiasaavedra/attachments/bargaining_power.pdf, [19] S. Wong, Rojas-Mora; J., and E. Altman. Public consultations on Net Neutrality 2010: USA, EU and France. Technical report, SSRN, papers.cfm?abstract_id=