DEVELOPMENT AND COMMON POOL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

Transcription

1 DEVELOPMENT AND COMMON POOL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT Professor: Renaud LAPEYRE Academic Year 2016/2017: Spring semester BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION After working for more than a year in Namibia (Africa) in a community-based association (NACOBTA) which assists communities in managing and using their natural resources through tourism, I did complete my PhD in 2009 about common-pool resources (CPR) and tourism in 2 rural areas in Namibia (with a comparison with South Africa). Thereafter, I stayed two years in Kenya, working on a research project (experiment) about water and sanitation in rural villages. I now work at IDDRI on the political economy analysis of market-based instruments for biodiversity, especially in Indonesia (payments for environmental services). I currently coordinate the EU-Funded INVALUABLE research project. COURSE OUTLINE Session 1: Common-pool resources (CPR): introduction, definition After introducing the course, methods and grading system, this session will introduce definitions and concepts of natural resources, natural capital, GDP of the poor, and most importantly the importance of natural capital and natural resources for livelihoods in poor rural developing economies. WRI (2005), World Resources 2005 The Wealth of the Poor: Managing Ecosystems to Fight Poverty, World Resources Institute (WRI), Washington, 266p. Session 2: The potential over-exploitation (the Tragedy ): theory and empirical illustration This second session will theoretically define common pool resources (CPR), show their importance for rural households, give several empirical examples and finally demonstrate the potential rapid over-exploitation of CPR by profit-maximizing actors (displaying both theory e.g. game theory, or Garrett Hardin, and case studies; e.g. the northern atlantic cod, bluefin tuna, elephants). Overall, this session will provide students with a theoretical framework to understand issues dealt with in this course (efficiency, sustainability, redistribution, etc.)

2 Baland, J.M, Platteau, J.P. (1996), Halting Degradations of Natural Resources: Is there a Role for Rural Communities?, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hardin, G. (1968), The Tragedy of the Commons, Science, vol. 162, Issue 3859, pp Session 3: The potential solutions to the tragedy of CPR: Crafting institutions at the national and local level, especially property rights. After theoretically defining what institutions are, this course will present the model of 4 levels of institutions (O.E. Williamson); It will subsequently define property rights over land and natural resources (see Bromley, Alchian & Demsetz, Pejovitch, etc.) and will analyse the role of property rights in a human society in particular with regards to CPR exploitation and development (generating revenues). Alchian, A., Demsetz, H., 1973, The Property Right Paradigm, Journal of Economic History, Vol 33, N 1, pp Gibson, C. (1999), Politicians and Poachers. The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 245 pp. Session 4: The private property right normative view This session will focus on the normative (evolutionist) view of proponents of the emergence and enforcement of private property rights over land and natural resources (Chicago school). According to these scientists, private property rights allow sustainable exploitation of natural resources and foster economic benefits and development through greater investment. The Coase theorem for better natural resource allocation with property rights will be presented (no mathematics). We will present theory and empirical cases provided by Demsetz (1967) for the trade of fur by the Montagnes Indians around Quebec or will present more recent examples about fisheries (pacific Halibut). In all cases, the session will discuss the benefits and costs of crafting and enforcing private property rights in CPR situations. This session will finally analyse and discuss the views of the new resource economics (NRE) school (Fred Smith, Terry Andersen) and free-market environmentalism proponents. It will provide students with empirical examples of these views, e.g. Rhino conservation in private concessions or wildlife conservation in Southern Africa, and will discuss the hotly debated CITES and the role of banning rhino and elephant ivory trade versus liberalizing it with property rights over wildlife. Presentation of the first exposés Boudreaux, K. (2005), The role of Property Rights as an Institution: Implications for Development Policy, Mercatus Policy Series, Policy Primer n 2, Mercatus Center, George Mason University. Session 5: An alternative view: the Common Property School: Ostrom, Agrawal and others

3 This session will present Ostrom views on the possibility of CPR sound management through the devolution of property rights to community groups, rather than through the sole enforcement of private property rights. We will present critics of the private property right school and will show that privatization is not compulsory in order to avoid the tragedy and foster development. In this latter case we will show that investment and development is not strongly related with private property rights, for example in African contexts. We will analyse the theory of the bundles of rights (Ostrom & Schlager) so as to analyse the different types of rights over resources and thus will show that securization does not automatically mean privatization. This will be applied to empirical cases for several natural resources (Abalone fisheries in Australia, forest resources in Guatemala). This will in fine prove that there is no dichotomy between private property and public property over CPR, but rather a continuum of different types of rights over CPR allocated to different actors, going from privatization, to several different community rights (enter right, use right, management right, proprietor right and finally ownership right) and to State property. Schlager, E., Ostrom, E. (1992), Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis, Land Economics, n 68(3), pp Session 6: Governance structures in CPR: definition and typology, and presentation of the transaction costs theory Following Oliver E. Williamson, once property rights have been crafted and enforced, several institutional arrangements can emerge for each type of property right. In this session we will define what governance structures are in CPR. In this regard, we will briefly present the new institutionalist theory of transaction costs, as applied to natural resources (Bittmer & Wittmer, John Mburu in Kenya). The session will subsequently propose a typology of all possible governance structures which potentially emerge to regulate CPR (Birner and Wittmer, 2004), depending on local communities capacity, a well as State s and NGOs capacity. Adhikari, B., Lovett, J.C. (2006), Transaction costs and community-based natural resource management in Nepal, Journal of Environmental Management, n 78, pp.5-15 Behera, B., Engel, S. (2006), Institutional analysis of evolution of joint forest management in India: A new institutional economics approach, Forest Policy and Economics, n 8, pp Session 7-9: One possible governance structure: how community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) can contribute to CPR management and poverty alleviation, and the link with national States

4 CBNRM programmes have gained much political support (e.g. the World Bank) in the 1990 s. This community model was indeed thought to contribute simultaneously to natural resources conservation and poverty alleviation in rural and coastal areas. Against this backdrop, we analyse in these 3 sessions the characteristics, conditions and limits of such CBNRM structures in particular in light with the theory of collective action (Olsen). Building on scientific articles, grey literature and NGOs reports, we will further present several cases studies to provide examples of success and failure in CBNRM for several types of resources in different geographical contexts. We will show examples of community-state partnerships for forestry in India and Nepal. Possibly two (2) outside presenters from implementing NGOs and research will come here and expose community-based natural resource management programmes they lead or analyse (to be confirmed) Lauren Persha,Arun Agrawal,Ashwini Chhatre (2011) Social and Ecological Synergy: Local Rulemaking, Forest Livelihoods, and Biodiversity Conservation,, SCIENCE, 331 (1606) Session 10: Hybrid Governance: How the private sector can partner with communities and the State to sustainably use natural resources and foster rural development This session will analyse relations between the private sector and the State on the one side and local communities on the other side. On the one side, we will theoretically present structures as private concessions and commercialization in National Parks (NP) and conservation concessions, and will study related cases in Zambia, South Africa (SANParks), Kenya and Australia. On the other hand, we will present examples of payments for ecosystem services, where private sector partners pay communities to conserve wildlife. Illustration will be presented with a case from Tanzania. Gladman Thondhlana, Sheona Shackleton and Edwin Muchapondwa (2011), Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park and its land, claimants: a pre- and post-land claim conservation and development history, Environ. Res. Lett. 6 Session 11: A case study of several CPR management structures simultaneously: the Namibian programme and the possibility for poverty alleviation

5 Building on our professional as well as academic experience in Namibia we will present in details the Namibian situation. This session will help understand the whole continuum of CPR management structures which regulate CPR and foster sustainable development in Namibia. LAPEYRE, R., 2011, Governance Structures and the Distribution of Tourism Income in Namibian Communal Lands: a New Institutional Framework, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 102(3), pp Session 12: Summary of key messages (Video Session) Building on a long video, this session will propose a real local case where students will collectively be asked to solve a problem related to CPR overexploitation and subsequent better management. As a result, it will conclude this course by highlighting key messages. TBD