Initiatives of the NEA in Response to the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident

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1 Initiatives of the NEA in Response to the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident Alejandro Huerta OECD Nuclear Energy Agency International Experts Meeting on Protection against Extreme Earthquakes and Tsunamis on the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP IAEA, 4-7 September 2012

2 NEA Mission The mission of the NEA is to assist its Member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international co-operation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for the safe, environmentally friendly and economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. To achieve this, the NEA works as: A forum for sharing information and experience and promoting international co-operation; A centre of excellence which helps Member countries to pool and maintain their technical expertise; A vehicle for facilitating policy analyses and developing consensus based on its technical work. NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 2

3 OECD/NEA Membership Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States Not member of NEA NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 3

4 NEA Strengths Small size and budget (80 staff members; budget of 14 million euros, + voluntary contributions and projects) Large representation (85% of the world s nuclear power capacity) Non-political forum; climate of mutual trust Tries to pool world s best nuclear expertise among developed countries Narrow focus: in-depth scientific, technical, legal work NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 4

5 NEA Strategic Plan Nuclear safety and regulation : CNRA (Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities) CSNI (Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations) OECD/NEA Joint International Research Projects (on Safety Research) 2. Radioactive waste management 3. Radiation protection and public health 4. Nuclear science 5. Economics, resources and technology 6. Legal affairs NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 5

6 NEA Response to the Accident The NEA: Responded quickly to assist Japan after the accident and will continue to do so. Responded to a huge number of media requests to explain the public the accident. Sought immediately to encourage co-ordination among its member countries of how to respond to the accident. Has altered, in large measure, its programme of work to implement activities that will identify the impacts of the accident on nuclear safety. Will continue to support countries in introducing measures to improve safety. Continues to monitor the impact on energy policies and responses. Recognises that learning lessons from the accident will continue for many years. NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 6

7 NEA support to Japan Transfer of NEA Member experience in post-accident management to the Japanese government October 2011 and February 2012 conferences on decontamination and rehabilitation November 2011 and February 2012 seminars on dialogue with the stakeholders National safety reviews and stress tests November 2011 experts meeting, public seminar, and advisory body meeting Enhancements to the Regulatory Infrastructure January 2012 experts meeting on regulatory infrastructure changes in Japan Other specific areas under discussion NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 7

8 G8 - NEA Ministerial Seminar & Regulators Forum 7-8 June 2011 Regulators Forum in conjunction with G8/G20 Ministerial Meeting Reinforcement of Key elements for nuclear safety: The primary responsibility for nuclear safety is with the operator. The regulatory body must provide assurance that nuclear power stations are operated in a safe manner and in accordance with regulation. A strong regulatory body possesses technical ability and independence in decision making; works transparently; strives for continuous learning and improvement; and utilises international networks. Key improvement areas: High standards and continuous improvement for nuclear safety. Safety culture in both operator and regulator. Implementation of specific lessons learned, i.e. emergency power supply, accident management, emergency response, etc. Stakeholder involvement, especially during crisis communication. Reinforce international cooperation. NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 8

9 Background to NEA Activities CSNI, CNRA and CRPPH discussed appropriate strategies and priorities in response to Fukushima Daiichi beginning in late spring 2011 December 2011 Tri-bureau meeting of the CNRA, CRPPH, and CSNI to discuss coordination and integration of NEA response Enhanced cooperation and coordination among involved committees for efficiency Cross-Committee activities identified and prioritized Strategic alignment on new work scope of NEA Agreement on approach to coordinate cross committee activities Cross-committee process defined NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 9

10 NEA Integrated Response Short Duration/High Priority Activities Timeframe within one year Medium Duration/Medium Priority Activities Timeframe within two years Long Duration/Low Priority Activities Timeframe beyond two years Identification of Fukushima Issues Prioritization Task allocation STCs STG-FUKU & PRG STCs Working Groups and Parties STG-FUKU & EPRG - recommendations STCs - decisions STCs: oversight of groups activities Existing Group New Group New Multi- Committee Group STG-FUKU: Crosscutting issue coordination and information exchange Group Outputs: Reports Analyses Etc. Group Outputs: Reports Analyses Etc. Group Outputs: Reports Analyses Etc. EPRG: Crosscutting issues Output reviews and recommendations Continue Longterm? Continue Longterm? STCs NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 10

11 Cross-committee Follow-up Integrated list of 3 Committees ideas and proposals for new Fukushimarelated work shared with all 3 STCs CNRA STG-FUKU coordinates new cross-committee Fukushima related work Supports information exchange between NEA Members and between Working Groups, Parties, and Task Groups of the 3 STCs Coordinates activities between STC subgroups as needed CSNI PRG (expanded) reviews and makes recommendations on crosscommittee Fukushima related work products Joint and Tri-Bureau Meetings NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 11

12 NEA Main Lines of Post-Fukushima Activities Building on an integrated approach (CNRA, CSNI and CRPPH tri-bureau meeting, December 2011), activities are being conducted or planned in at least the following areas: Accident management including human factors and organisational issues related to the response to the accident. Reassessment of Defence-in-Depth. Evaluating the methodologies for defining and assessing initiating internal and external events, including coupled events, as well as methodologies defining the design basis criteria. Evaluation of operating experience for events that may be precursors to events that could challenge the safety of nuclear power plants given the insights from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. Communication with the public, media and other stakeholders. (See NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 12

13 Cross-committee Topical Areas 1. Accident Management and Progression CNRA CRPPH CSNI a. TRANSITION: Review of on-site accident management programmes and procedures to address the transitional conduct of operations from normal to accident conditions to severe accident conditions, and to the implementation of protective measures under the emergency preparedness plans. This includes onsite and offsite decision-making processes. b. ACCIDENT PROGRESSION: Enhanced understanding of accident progression analyses methods and techniques. c. HUMAN PERFORMANCE: Human and organisational performance issues under accident response conditions. L S S S S L S S L d. OFFSITE: Improvement of off-site emergency preparedness by sharing knowledge on core melt accident progression and source term quantification to improve off-site emergency procedures and technical tools. S L S 2. Crisis or Emergency Communications (primary information exchange between CNRA and CRPPH) a. PUBLIC: Communication with the public, media and other stakeholders including Japanese organisations. L S b. REGULATORS: Communication with the regulators in other countries and with international organisations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE). L L c. ONSITE OFFSITE: Crisis communications between onsite and offsite emergency response organisations. L L 3. Reassessment of Defence-in-Depth S L 4. Evaluating the methodologies for defining and assessing initiating internal and external events, including coupled, as well as methodologies defining the design basis criteria 5. Reassessment of Operating Experience and prior opportunities to identify or address conditions that could challenge nuclear safety. a. OP E: Evaluation of operating experience for events that may be precursors to future events that could challenge the safety of nuclear power plants given the insights from Fukushima. b. RESEARCH: Review and gap analysis of safety research relevant to the analysis of the accident. S L S L S L 6. Balancing deterministic and probabilistic approaches to regulatory decision making L S 7. Regulatory Infrastructure L 8. Radiological Protection and Health Physics L 9. Decontamination and recovery (onsite and offsite) L NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 13

14 CSNI Ongoing Activities within NEA Working Group on Accident Management and Analysis (WGAMA) F-CAPS (2012)1 Position paper on filtered containment venting F-CAPS (2012)2 - International benchmarking project on fast-running software tools used to model fission product releases during accidents at nuclear power plants Working Group on Human and Organisational Factors (WGHOF) F-CAPS (2012)3 Human performance and intervention under extreme conditions NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 14

15 CSNI Cont d Ongoing Activities within NEA Working Group on Integrity of Components and Structures (WGIAGE) F-CAPS (2012)4 Metallic component margins under high seismic loads (MECOS) Task group to develop a proposal for a task to study the impacts of extreme natural hazards Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRISK) F-CAPS (2012)5 Workshop on PSA of natural external events including earthquakes NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 15

16 CSNI Cont d Ongoing Activities within NEA Other ongoing work within CSNI includes: Development of a discussion paper on Defence-in-Depth for the purposes of identifying future technical topics (joint effort with CNRA) Re-constitution of DiDELSYS TG to investigate the issue of electrical system robustness in light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident Joint international research project being established: Benchmark Study of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 16

17 Ongoing Activities within NEA Safety Research/Joint Projects The importance of future safety research has been highlighted New safety research will be identified using a phased approach within NEA: Comprehensive review of past safety research - done Gap analysis based on research issues from Fukushima - ongoing Discuss possible expansion of existing projects and/or New R&D project proposals CSNI review of research direction ongoing NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 17

18 Safety Research/Joint Projects PRISME PRISME-2 HEAF SETH/PKL PKL - PKL-2 ROSA - ROSA-2 PKL-3 LOFC LOFT H 2 SETH -SETH-2 HYMERES THAI THAI2 BIP BIP-2 STEM TMI-VIP OLHF RASPLAV MASCA Halden SCIP -SCIP2 CIP SFP SERENA MCCI MCCI-2 NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 18

19 CNRA Ongoing Activities within NEA CNRA Senior Task Group on Impacts of Fukushima Daiichi Accident (STG-FUKU) established to coordinate CNRA and ultimately cross-committee response to Fukushima Daiichi accident New Task Group on Accident Management established Enhancements of on-site accident management procedures Decision-making and guiding principles in emergency situations Guidance for instrumentation, equipment and supplies for addressing long-term aspects of accident management Guidance when taking extreme measures for AM NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 19

20 CNRA Cont d Ongoing Activities within NEA Working Group on Operating Experience (WGOE) Task on pre-cursor events - evaluation of various initiators and situations for new lessons in light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and improvements in implementing lessons learnt. WGRISK to cooperate in a risk analysis of precursor events exercise NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 20

21 CNRA Cont d Ongoing Activities within NEA Working Group on Regulation of New Reactors completed a report of site selection and preparation (NEA/CNRA/R(2010)3) Supplemental report is underway to: Multi- unit sites Site layout considerations Consideration of external events or combinations of hazards a the siting stage Land use/population density Emergency preparedness arrangements/feasibility Social acceptability NPP design parameters are enveloped or suitable for a given site NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 21

22 CNRA Cont d Ongoing Activities within NEA Working Group on Public Communication (WGPC) completed workshop on Crisis Communication (Madrid, May 2012) Safety of Research Reactors Task Group (SORRTG) Task on peer review workshop of country comprehensive safety assessments (stress tests) of high risk RR facilities. NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 22

23 CRPPH Ongoing Activities within NEA Established Expert Group on Radiological Protection Aspects of the Fukushima NPP Accident (EG-RPF) Working Party on Nuclear Emergency Matters (WPNEM) INEX 4 evaluation report and workshop planning EGIRES report on optimization in emergency preparedness and response with special focus on reference levels Update of report on Short-term Countermeasures in Case of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2003) Survey on emergency management lessons learned NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 23

24 CRPPH Cont d Ongoing Activities within NEA Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE) Expert Group on Severe Accident Management (EG- SAM) Lesson learned in management of occupational exposure in high radiation areas Other CRPPH Activities Support to Japanese government workshops on decontamination and recovery and other NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 24

25 Conclusions The Fukushima Daiichi accident is very important and it is going to influence the future of nuclear power. It was caused by highly unexpected external natural events, and not as TMI or Chernobyl by failure of equipment or maloperation. The accident caused the evacuation of more than 80,000 people and contaminated a large area; there has been no radiation-related fatalities, while the earthquake and the tsunami caused 20,000 deaths. All plants in operation are being reviewed by independent safety regulators. NPPs are safe to operate according to the very demanding standards in place today Enhancements to further improve safety continue to be identified and implemented NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 25

26 Conclusions (contd contd) For many countries, the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident does not question nuclear power as such, but it does question the choice of specific locations and designs at these locations. Better understanding of external hazards and their consequences Broader application of defence-in-depth A more balanced use of deterministic and probabilistic approaches Policies may evolve in radiological protection, emergency and post-accident management in areas such as: Societal impacts beyond radiation hazards Enhancements to crisis (emergency) communications Enhanced offsite capabilities to respond to severe accidents Continued emphasis on strong international coordination and cooperation to enhance safety NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 26

27 Thank you for your attention 27