Enhancing Cooperation to Prevent WMD Terrorism:

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1 Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Project on U.S. Global Engagement Enhancing Cooperation to Prevent WMD Terrorism: Lessons for the New U.S. President 18 February 2009 SUMMARY In the fourth installment of a series of events on the presidential transition, the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation hosted a panel discussion on Enhancing Cooperation to Prevent WMD Terrorism: Lessons for the New U.S. President. The discussants were Richard Cupitt from the United Nations Security Council s 1540 Committee Group of Experts; O'Neil Hamilton, a Visiting Fellow with the Henry L. Stimson Center; and Andrew Semmel, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations at the U.S. State Department. Center Director, Alistair Millar, moderated the event. In its December 2008 report, the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism assessed that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of Preventing such an attack and the potentially catastrophic consequences requires cooperation from a range of actors, including governments, multilateral bodies, and the private sector. The discussion focused on how to improve cooperation among these actors and strengthen the capacity of all states to prevent WMD and related materials from getting into the wrong hands. The discussants considered successes and challenges in U.S. and global efforts to prevent WMD terrorism and highlighted key lessons learned for the new administration. The workshop was conducted under the Chatham House Rule, i.e., all of the discussion was off the record and not for attribution. The following summary highlights some of the key themes identified during the meeting. It is not an official or complete record of the proceedings and does not necessarily reflect the views of the meeting sponsors or participants. The discussion centered on a number of important, but largely ad hoc, initiatives launched by the Bush administration in the aftermath of 9/11 to plug perceived gaps in the international nonproliferation regime and help minimize the chances of a WMD terrorist attack. Chief among these initiatives were the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

2 With regard to the G8 Global Partnership, it was noted that with less than four years remaining in its original 10-year timeline, by its own estimates, only $7.8 billion has been expended toward Global Partnership projects, less than half the targeted $20 billion amount. It was argued that those figures are not a particularly fair or accurate gauge of an initiative that has substantially advanced and expanded cooperative threat reduction activities in Russia and the Ukraine. It was further noted that, through mid- 2007, funds committed by the United States had already exceeded more than half its $10 billion pledge. The Global Partnership, it was argued, is a critical preventive tool in efforts to keep WMD and related materials out of the hands of terrorists and perhaps one of the most promising ones available. Although it may not be perfect, the Global Partnership combines key elements including a coordinating mechanism for key donors in the form of the G8 Global Partnership working group and substantial amounts of pledged funding to be brought to bear on the problem. Looking ahead, it was emphasized that the donor-recipient relationship with Russia needs to be translated into a true partnership and that the United States, Russia, and other partner countries need to work together to transfer the experiences and lessons learned to third countries. Other recommendations for improving the Global Partnership included renewing it for another ten years, expanding the geographic and thematic focus of its activities to address new and emerging threats, as well as expanding its donor base to include other potential donors, such as China and Saudi Arabia. It was noted that the United States already spends about $400 million per annum in cooperative threat reduction programs outside the former Soviet Union. Although there has been some reluctance on the part of Russia to changes that might dilute the partnership s activities there, it was argued that with the proper assurances this need not be a problem, and recent G8 statements suggest some incremental progress toward expanding the partnership s focus. It was suggested that the United States should and would likely be willing to commit an additional $10 billion to extend the partnership another 10 years. It was also noted that there is still an opportunity for more resources to be allocated to the partnership to support initiatives that could continue with those funds for expenditure well past 2012, the end of the ten year commitment. It was hoped that the worsening economic situation would not affect spending levels on what were described as relatively cost effective preventive efforts. With regard to PSI, although senior officials, including former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, have cited a number of PSI interdictions, there is little public information about the specifics of these interdictions. It was noted that, even without all the details about the nature and scope of the interdictions, the initiative has helped raise awareness of the threat of WMD proliferation and improved coordination among and within participating states. In light of the Obama administration s stated intention to expand and institutionalize PSI, participants discussed possible options. It was explained that UN Security Council Resolution 1540, while not explicitly endorsing PSI, does endorse the principles and activities of the initiative generally. Participants expressed skepticism as to whether efforts to formalize PSI would include seeking explicit Security Council backing given the initiative s selective membership and the fact that 2

3 certain Council members have even called into question its legality. It was noted, for example, that the Security Council has been unable to formalize relations with the various self selecting export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which are generally less controversial than PSI. It was suggested that the Security Council might be asked to explicitly endorse the principles and aims of the initiative, but that endorsement would likely require a good deal of political capital and would not likely rank high on the new administration s agenda. Much of the discussion focused on efforts to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (April 2004), which imposed a series of obligations on states to prevent the proliferation and transfer to terrorists and other non-state actors of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons; their delivery systems; and related materials. There was some question as to whether the Security Council, which generally plays the role of enforcer in the UN system, is the most appropriate vehicle through which to promote implementation of Resolution 1540, which has become largely a capacity building exercise. It was noted that while there may have been some initial backlash against the requirements imposed by the Security Council, the years since its adoption have seen regional organization after regional organization endorse the resolution and there is now widespread political support for it. The suggestion that the functions of the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts might somehow be better accomplished through another arm of the UN, e.g. the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), was met with skepticism. In fact, it was suggested that the opposite may be the case. While acknowledging that UNODA cooperates extensively with the committee and its Group of Experts and could effectively undertake many of their tasks, it was noted that UNODA lacks the political gravity that the 1540 Committee commands as a Security Council body. It was also suggested that UNODA might have trouble coordinating the activities of other UN agencies, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which view themselves as equals to the 1540 Committee. It was also stressed that the permanent five members of the Security Council intentionally established the 1540 Committee as a Security Council body for a number of reasons, including a desire to limit the growth of the Secretariat bureaucracy and dissatisfaction with the support it had been providing on other issues. Although it was acknowledged that these are concerns more characteristic of the Bush administration than the current one, it was argued that they still likely persist to some degree among the permanent five members of the Security Council. It was noted that the 1540 Group of Experts has acknowledged the important role that regional and functional organizations have to play in building the capacity of states to implement the requirements of the resolution and has sought to engage with them. With regard to regional organizations in particular, it was noted that they can lend political support and legitimacy to the resolution by endorsing it in political statements; can work to devise and share regional standards and best practices; and can even help facilitate, and in some cases provide, capacity building assistance. It was argued, however, that more needs to be done at the regional and sub-regional level to implement the resolution. Resolution 1540 was described as a good framework but not itself a vehicle for implementation of the obligations it imposes. It was posited that it is not realistic to expect countries with limited resources and competing priorities 3

4 to implement the obligations on their own. The example of the 2007 Cricket World Cup in the West Indies and the successful regional coordination of security efforts for the event was cited as a possible model for how regional organizations can help prod and assist their members towards implementation and suggested the importance of dedicated focal points within regional and sub-regional organizations. It was observed that implementation of Resolution 1540 can help contribute to building more general state capacity and the achievement of development objectives. For example, recent research was cited indicating empirically that implementation of export controls by Singapore correlated with increased levels of trade in nuclear related materials there, which supports the notion that better regulation, rather than being a barrier, can actually facilitate trade and investment. Framing the issue of implementation of 1540 and related capacity building in the context of development, it was suggested, is a novel approach that may help reconcile the development priorities of the global south with the security priorities of the global north. Among the key recommendations to emerge from the discussion was to affect a bureaucratic reorganization of the U.S. government which gives the issue of preventing WMD terrorism the organizational importance it has commonly been ascribed rhetorically, including by both presidential candidates in the 2008 election. The Obama administration was commended for the appointment of a White House czar for coordinating U.S. government efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism and was urged to endow the position with the necessary staff, resources, and mandate to enable that person to play the role envisioned. It was suggested, however, that a deeper bureaucratic reorganization, for example, within State Department, would also be required to rationalize, prioritize, and ensure better coordination of related efforts. In addition to organizational changes, participants stressed the need to secure adequate funding and additional full time staff equivalents (FTEs) from Congress for threat reduction and relevant nonproliferation programs. Other countries and regional and sub-regional organizations were urged to appoint similar high level focal points on these issues and to allow these coordinators/focal points to meet and share information. Donors were urged to consult more frequently and to include in such consultations not only donor states, but also relevant regional and functional organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. The importance of multilateralism and working with partners was stressed. It was noted that tone and process, as builders of trust and confidence with others, are often as important as substance. The May 2009 Preparatory Conference for the 2010 review of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was identified as a key near-term opportunity for the United States to demonstrate a renewed commitment to constructive engagement on a number of nonproliferation issues, including arms control, to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and create a more cooperative environment. 4

5 In order to improve engagement with nongovernmental organizations and the private sector and coordination across and between governments, it was recommended that raises and promotions for certain government functionaries be contingent upon such outreach. Finally, the U.S. government was urged to improve its outreach to states in need to raise awareness of the array of useful U.S. government assistance programs available. 5