Policy Coherence for Development for Food Security at Country Level

Transcription

1 Policy Coherence for Development for Food Security at Country Level A complementary route for progress on PCD Consultation draft for the Global Forum on Agriculture 26/11/12

2 SUMMARY Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) reflects the recognition that policies in OECD countries have impacts, frequently unintended, on development in developing countries. Improving PCD involves taking account of impacts on development in the process of domestic policy formulation and adjusting policies to make their developmental impact more favourable. The impacts of policies such as agricultural support and protection, trade regulation and intellectual property rights have been at the centre of the PCD agenda, but it has broadened to include issues such as the brain drain associated with migration and illicit financial outflows from developing countries. Commitments on PCD are contained in the MDG 8 target to develop an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system and in the specific PCD policies adopted by many OECD countries that sought to ensure that their domestic policies be coherent with development objectives. The OECD has supported members efforts on PCD with analytical work and through the Peer Review process of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). DAC donors have made progress in establishing in their capitals the policies and institutional architecture for PCD. However experience has shown that balancing development objectives against domestic interests in OECD countries has been difficult and there is little evidence of policy change to improve coherence for development. A contributory factor may be that stakeholders in developing countries are not part of the PCD process. The collection of evidence from developing countries on the impacts of developed country policies and the bringing in of perspectives and voices from developing country governments, private sector and civil society are increasingly seen as essential in order to advance the debate on PCD. Obtaining evidence of the positive impacts of coherence, and not just measuring the negative, is also seen as important for convincing domestic OECD policy makers. Based on this review, the paper suggests an additional way forward. That is to add a different, complementary analytical frame on to current efforts, and to conduct more work on the impact in developing countries of donor country policy incoherencies. OECD countries, as donors and as the owners of incoherent policies, need to look at PCD from the perspective of what they can do in the developing countries where they operate to counter the negative impacts of their incoherencies or capitalize on potential synergies. This will involve assessing aid and non-aid policies and actions, and using the developing countries strategies as the reference point around which an analysis is conducted. Practically, the suggestion is to evaluate donor PCD from the stand point of a developing country s food security objectives (not a donor defined PCD objective). The paper looks at a number of areas where policy coherence for food security could be assessed: the donor policy dialogue with government in the context of budget support; donor 2

3 approaches to the role of food reserves and stocks; donor priorities in relation to land policy; and the allocation of donor ODA for food security. The paper suggests that there may be significant coherence issues in these areas, that improved coherence for food security in them could yield substantial benefits. They present opportunities to undertake country case studies of how to improve coherence in concrete areas of mutual concern to donors and developing countries. Questions for discussion: Will changing the analytical framework to focus more directly on the impact in specific developing countries advance efforts to better define and assess policy incoherence, and better estimate the development impact of improving coherence? Are the suggested areas the most useful or priority areas to focus upon? Are there other areas that may be more important and where there are prospects for progress? What would be the preferred ways to proceed to examine practical cases across a number of countries in order to build up an evidence and analytic base, to identify recommendations and to monitor change? 3

4 1. Introduction This paper is prepared as an input to the 2012 OECD Global Forum on Agriculture. The theme of the Global Forum is POLICY COHERENCE FOR FOOD SECURITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. The intention of the forum is to bring together policy makers from both the Agriculture and Development/Food Security communities in OECD countries and emerging economies with policy makers from developing countries to discuss how practical improvements in policy coherence both globally and at country level can help deliver food security outcomes in developing countries. The idea is that this will be a starting point for further analytical work and an ongoing dialogue over the short to medium-term on the positive impact that improved coherence can and will hopefully bring. The discussions will cover the impact of OECD and emerging economy policies on global food markets and the consequent effects in developing countries but it will also discuss the coherence of donor actions both ODA and non-oda in developing countries with national efforts and strategies to improve food security. This paper seeks to explain why, in addition to pursuing Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) through promoting policy change at home, it is important and relevant for donors to assess and plan their policies and actions in developing countries to ensure that they are coherent with food security outcomes - and to counter the negative impacts of development incoherence in their own domestic policies. The paper reviews progress achieved in promoting PCD in the domestic policy arena of OECD countries and goes on to propose the concept of PCD for Food Security at Country Level as a complementary agenda. Issues of how this type of policy coherence might be assessed are discussed and examples from a number of countries are used to demonstrate the relevance of assessing policy coherence for food security in respect of: donor priorities for policy dialogue with developing country governments, donor approaches to specific food security relevant policies land administration and food reserves ODA allocations for food security The paper should be seen purely as a consultative document that explores ideas and possibilities for action, rather than putting forward a definitive point of view. In each of the later sections some possibilities for pursuing practical work for improving coherence are identified. Hopefully discussions of this paper and the process of further developing the concepts and ideas contained in it will identify more opportunities. 4

5 2. Policy Coherence for Development progress towards better policies or much ado... PCD the concept Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) has emerged as a concept from the recognition that ODA and development co-operation programmes are not the only external influence on development and poverty reduction outcomes in developing countries, but that other factors such as trade relationships, investment flows, conditions in global commodity markets and migration also play significant roles. The liberalising economic reforms undertaken in many developing countries as part of their stabilisation and structural adjustment processes had the effect of opening their economies to global markets allowing external and global factors to increasingly influence domestic development. The thinking behind PCD is that, in addition to providing ODA and development co-operation programmes, developed countries also should ensure that the public policy measures they adopt which influence global markets or impact on developing countries should be coherent with development objectives. The recognition of the importance of more development friendly policies in these areas can be seen in the establishment of the WTO Doha Development Round and the agreement on developing an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system as the first target under MDG8 Develop a Global Partnership for Development. PCD has initially focussed on developed country policies in areas which are seen as having a significant, and usually negative, impact on growth and poverty reduction in developing countries, such as agricultural support and protection, trade regulation and intellectual property rights. Policies in OECD countries subsidising agricultural production and protecting domestic markets have meant that producers in developing countries have had to compete in their own domestic markets with cheap imports while facing tariff and other barriers when trying to export to developed countries. This has had the effect of reducing prices, demand and market access for the produce on which rural economies and poor rural households livelihoods depend thereby depressing rural economic growth and slowing poverty reduction. (OECD, 2005 & OECD, 2008a) The examination of the importance of domestic policies in developed countries has resulted in a widening of the PCD agenda to other policy areas including the brain drain of skilled individuals, especially health professionals, from developing countries (WHO, 2006) and the flow of corruptly acquired wealth from developing to developed countries. PCD policies and processes Although quite narrowly focussed MDG 8 had the effect of establishing PCD as an element of global development. The 2002 OECD Ministerial Meeting called on the OECD to enhance understanding of the development dimensions of member country policies and their impacts on developing countries. Analysis should consider trade-offs and potential synergies across such areas as trade, investment, agriculture, health education, the environment and development co- 5

6 operation, to encourage greater policy coherence in support of the internationally agreed development goals. (OECD, 2003) From 2002 the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer reviews of DAC donors development programmes began to systematically examine their efforts on PCD and from 2006 peer reviews contained a specific chapter on PCD. (OECD, 2006) A number of OECD donors moved to put their own PCD policies and plans in place. Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, the United Kingdom and the European Union all developed clear policy statements on addressing PCD across government in the formulation of policies affecting developing countries. A number of other countries more narrowly incorporated PCD objectives within their development co-operation policies. The Netherlands progress in building policy coherence for development - Situation in 2006 The ministry had established policy coherence as one of the main priorities of Dutch foreign and development policy in a document called Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities (MFA, 2003). The Netherlands had put in place a combination of political commitment, a clear policy framework and the capacity to deliver through a dedicated Policy Coherence Unit (PCU) located within the ministry. The ministry was given responsibility for leading on policy coherence for development within the Dutch government. The ministry had adopted a three-pronged strategy for policy coherence: Promoting coherence at the European Commission level. Proactive targeting of specific coherence dossiers. Building partnerships and promoting awareness of the importance of coherence. The PCU prioritised structured working with ministries and embassies, and coalition building nationally and internationally. The PCU was aware that it needed to reach beyond traditional likeminded donors and to work with partner countries and civil society. DAC Peer Review of the Netherlands (OECD 2011) Delivering or improving PCD has been very much seen as an internal process within OECD governments in which the policies of different ministries are examined, and hopefully adjusted, to strengthen their coherence (or lessen their incoherence) with development objectives. Although different mechanisms are used PCD management is usually undertaken by a government office with a cross-ministerial mandate, such as the cabinet office, or by an interministerial committee (OECD, 2010). Whatever the coherence mechanism used, the definition of the concept of development against which coherence is assessed is endogenous to the process in the developed country The ministries responsible for development co-operation usually play a leading role and coherence policies are normally defined by reference to the Government s own development co-operation objectives or to the MDGs or both (OECD, 2008b). The 2005 EU Consensus on Development, for example, states the importance of non-development policies assisting developing countries' 6

7 efforts in achieving the MDGs and commits to take account of the objectives of [its] development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries (EU, 2006). The government itself defines the goalposts for its own coherence policy and these goalposts are usually stated in terms of policy objectives, rather than more specific development policies or strategies through which the objectives should be achieved. PCD therefore assesses specific non-development policies against broad concepts of development defined from a donor country perspective. Where the concept of development against which PCD is assessed is broad and generic it is easier to identify apparent improvements in coherence which may provide some collateral benefit to the affected developing country but do little or nothing to address the specific negative impact of the policy in question. A government may consider that facilitating remittances and increasing aid improves the coherence of recruitment policies that encourage the flow of skilled immigrants from developing countries, although it may do little to address the specific human capital loss. It is in effect making a decision about the development priorities of the sending country effectively prioritising financial flows over human capital. PCD can, therefore also involve decisions between different development priorities. Progress in improving PCD Despite the high profile of PCD since the Millennium declaration and the advances made among OECD donor governments in establishing both policies and co-ordination mechanisms measureable progress on improving PCD has been largely absent. The Doha Development Round, arguably the global flagship of PCD, was supposed to deliver an equitable rules-based trading system by It has been stalled over the seemingly intractable differences on agricultural protection between the larger developed and emerging and developing economies. No overall agreement is likely until these issues have been resolved. (WTO, 2012) Progress by individual developed country governments has been largely procedural. DAC peer reviews are more focussed on countries institutional setups for PCD than on PCD outcomes and impacts. The reviews examine DAC members performance in establishing the three PCD building blocks 1) Political commitment with clear policy statement; 2) Policy co-ordination mechanisms that can resolve conflicts or inconsistencies between policies and maximise synergies; and 3) Monitoring, analysis and reporting systems. A 2008 synthesis of PCD findings from peer reviews showed that out of 23 countries reviewed 1 three had made substantial political commitments to PCD and 14 had made moderate political commitments. Policy co-ordination mechanisms had been substantially established in four countries and moderately established in 11, while monitoring and reporting systems has been substantially established in two and moderately established in ten (OECD, 2008). 1 Including the European Commission 7

8 Although there is no quantitative assessment of changes in OECD country domestic policies that have come about as a result of the establishment and operation of the PCD policies and institutional architecture, DAC peer reviews have systematically asked DAC members to provide examples of how coherence has been strengthened in relation to specific policies. DAC member responses show progress in better co-ordination across government in areas such as taxation, illicit financial flows, environment and climate change but little evidence of policy change driven by developmental considerations in the more contentious areas such as trade, agriculture and migration where established domestic interests make such changes politically difficult. There have of course been significant changes in OECD country policies that affect developing countries and which can be seen to have beneficial impacts, including substantial reductions in policy support to agricultural production (OECD, 2012). There is little evidence to suggest that PCD considerations were drivers of these policy changes. Indeed, after a decade of focus on PCD the OECD Council in 2010 still felt the need to call on members to translate political commitment on PCD into practice and referred to the continuing basic challenge of understanding the results chains through which OECD country policies impact on developing countries (OECD 2010). Constraints politics and interests Despite the strong case for the global benefits, including to developed countries, of development, poverty reduction and stability in developing countries, decisions in OECD countries on whether and how to improve PCD inevitably involve trade-offs between domestic policy priorities and development priorities. The fundamental difficulty of achieving progress on PCD is largely unchanged -competing and conflicting interests and values are involved and the relative power of stakeholders to influence policy is decisive. PCD requires decisions that favour the interests of developing country stakeholders relative to those of domestic stakeholders. As developing country stakeholders are neither present nor influential in domestic politics or policy-making processes, the political feasibility of PCD progress seems largely illusory. In the arena of public policy PCD is championed by development ministries or departments. Their status and influence in relation to the ministries responsible for relevant domestic policy areas such as agriculture, trade, health and migration is limited and increasingly subsumed under foreign affairs, finance or trade ministries. Establishing development outcomes, or even the effectiveness of the government s ODA expenditures, as policy priorities in other more politically important and much bigger-spending ministries is an uphill task. The OECD recognised in 2003 that coherence will always be the subject of competing interests, that coherence is less when the political sensitivity of a given issue is greater and that vested interests in certain areas have been shown to be more powerful than developmental interests (OECD, 2003). The global economic crisis, the widespread economic slowdown across many OECD countries and austerity in budgetary policy is unlikely to have made the politics of PCD any easier. The European Parliament s rapporteur for PCD seemed to reflect this essentially unchanged reality when in 2011 she referred to agricultural subsidies, the common fisheries 8

9 policy and irresponsible practices of resource extraction companies and stated that the most important incoherencies are well-known, that their correction is a matter of political will and that it is never easy to sacrifice short-term interests in favour of long term benefits (CONCORD, 2011). The long standing difficulty in moving beyond the establishment of PCD processes and institutions to achieving policy change in the well known areas of incoherence has been accompanied by changes and evolution in the concept of PCD and in the approaches to addressing it. Evidence and voices from developing countries There has been a recognition that more evidence from developing countries on the negative impacts of incoherence is necessary to help build a more detailed and specific case for PCD domestically in OECD countries. The 2008 OECD synthesis report found that it is the evidence from developing countries that matters most. (OECD, 2008b) From 2008 the DAC peer reviews have asked DAC members to report on how they use their country programmes to gather and feedback evidence from partner governments, civil society and their own staff on the impacts of their domestic policies in partner countries. (OECD, 2008c) Evidence of specific measured impacts in real country situations is felt to be potentially more influential in domestic policy discussions than more theoretical assessment of generic impacts on the MDGs, particularly where domestic policies are formally reported as negatively impacting on the donors own development co-operation programme. Linked to the move to inform PCD processes with evidence from developing countries, there is also an emerging trend promoting a role for developing countries stakeholders government and others in OECD policy processes to review and assess the development impact of policies. This trend can be seen in the OECD calls for work with local stakeholders on PCD analysis that starts from the perspective of developing countries (OECD, 2009) and, more recently, the proposal from CONCORD that the EU establish a formalised complaint mechanism open to developing country stakeholders for all relevant EU policies and agreements. (CONCORD, 2011) These measures to establish formal mechanisms for involving developing country stakeholders in PCD and relevant policy processes can be seen as attempts to strengthen the influence of development interests in decision-making on domestic policies and, thereby, seeking to improve the political feasibility of PCD. Building on positive experiences There has been a tendency to broaden the PCD agenda to incorporate areas where progress is less intractable. One way in which this has happened has been the evolution of what is known as the whole-of-government approach. A positive outcome of the priority given to PCD over the last decade has been the establishment in many DAC member countries of cross-government coordination mechanisms. Since 2006 this has been a basic measure of progress on PCD. 9

10 Although these mechanisms have not resulted in documented cases of significant PCD improvements, they have been positively used to improve the co-ordination between the different ministries that are involved in aid delivery and in international processes of importance to development and developing countries. Perhaps because of the difficulty in identifying and reporting progress on increased coherence in policies, DAC members, when reporting on PCD in peer reviews, have sought to present this improved inter-ministerial co-ordination - on issues such as conflict, climate change, corruption and engagement with international bodies - as constituting delivery on part of the PCD agenda. This apparent desire on the part of DAC members to have cross government co-ordination, and the effort involved in achieving it, recognised has now been formally met. The most recent DAC peer review content guide has expanded the original PCD chapter into a new chapter entitled Development Beyond Aid which deals with both PCD and whole-of-government approaches to aid and development. (OECD, 2010) A further shifting of emphasis is evidenced by the moves to extend or perhaps redirect the PCD focus beyond the do-no-harm agenda. The 2011 EU report on PCD puts forward this concept. This is based on the idea that the PCD agenda is constrained by looking mainly at developmentally negative incoherence impacts of policies in conventional PCD areas (European Commission, 2011). A more positive focus for the PCD agenda can seek to go beyond the do no harm approach and would try to identify domestic OECD policy areas in which improved coherence offers the potential for positive outcomes for development without negatively affecting the domestic policy objectives. Arguably, though, with this new approach the effect is to lessen ambition and to look for a PCD agenda that does not involve significant trade-offs for domestic interests, that is more achievable politically and which can be seen to deliver positive results. However, the objective here is not necessarily to avoid the well-known incoherencies but to provide the PCD process with some momentum of achievement and to establish effective PCD dialogue and collaborative relationships directly between developed and developing country stakeholders. This might provide a basis to address those more intransigent PCD policy areas. 10

11 3. PCD for Food Security at Country Level Faced with the political difficulties described above, approaches to PCD among DAC members seem to be evolving in two ways. The first seeks to address the political difficulties by strengthening the influence of developmental interests in policy making relative to other domestic interests. This would be achieved by formally reporting on the impact of specific domestic OECD policies in individual developing countries and by engaging developing country stakeholders, including governments, in PCD discussions and in formally assessing the coherence of OECD country policies. The second seeks to identify policy areas where PCD does not involve major conflicts between developmental and domestic interests or where significant positive benefits of improved coherence can be demonstrated. This paper proposes another, complementary route focussing also on impacts in developing countries and on positive benefits, along which PCD can also be pursued. This involves: broadening the target for PCD to include OECD country policies and actions in developing countries a field level perspective; and focusing on a more specific development objective food security when assessing and promoting coherence. This is not an effort to reframe PCD in developed countries as a developing country issue. The subject is still OECD country policies and actions - and the objective is still to improve them. However we need to acknowledge that pursuing PCD in OECD domestic policy-making has had limited impact and that OECD countries, as donors and as the owners of the incoherent policies, need to decide what they can do in practice in the developing countries where they operate to counter the negative impacts of their developmentally incoherent policies. This will involve actions in relation to ODA programmes and non-oda actions. (Where import tariffs and production subsidies in developed markets are undermining growth in rural incomes and poverty reduction in a developing country, an ODA relationship can support market based measures to minimize the negative impacts in that country) PCD deal with country level impacts. We suggest that OECD countries should continue to promote PCD through policy change at home, but where this is unsuccessful they should consider taking measures to prevent and counter the negative impacts of the resulting incoherence in developing countries. This can be done through appropriate decisions and actions in the OECD country s development cooperation programme and in its economic and political relationship in individual developing countries. For example, a developed country, despite PCD concerns, may have adopted a policy to encourage the recruitment of skilled health workers from developing countries as a means of limiting the costs of its health service. However, in a given developing country its development 11

12 co-operation programme and diplomatic representation may choose to support the partner government s efforts to retain health staff in the national health service by funding and advocating for improved pay and incentives and decide to avoid promoting its own domestic policy by opting disseminate publicity or facilitate recruitment drives. Development objectives carry more weight in the developing country context This approach recognises that, when PCD efforts are unsuccessful domestically and incoherent OECD country policies are adopted or maintained, proponents of PCD can still act - and have the responsibility to do so. Developmental interests may be subordinated in specific areas of an OECD country s domestic policy, but this does not delegitimize its development policies and objectives. When acting in a developing country context, it is these policies that will have greater weight. An OECD country s policies and actions in a given developing country, therefore, need not reflect the subordination of developmental interests evidenced in its own domestic policymaking. In the developing country context the incoherence could in practice be resolved in favour of the developmental outcome. In the health worker example above a failure to cater for development outcomes in formulating domestic health policy has led to incoherence between that policy and government development co-operation objectives. This failure does not mean that the development co-operation objectives should be subordinated in all contexts to the health policy objectives. The manifestation of this specific policy incoherence at developing country level can quite reasonably be that development policy implementation acts against the donor country s domestic health policy. Such an approach may be contested, but development objectives and development co-operation policies are official government policies in just the same way as other policies are. For an OECD country s development co-operation programme in a given partner country to conceive and implement a PCD agenda that, in the pursuit of development policy objectives, acts against the impact of its own incoherent domestic policies is as legitimate as the pursuit of domestic policies at home that negatively impact on its development efforts. More support, less opposition, greater feasibility PCD success at developing country level does not necessarily require changing the incoherent OECD domestic policy, it can be achieved by preventing the impact of incoherent policies through challenging specific decisions (see the example referred to below) or by incorporating measures into development co-operation programmes to specifically counter the negative impacts. While this may be seen as a lower level of ambition, it has the potential advantage of delivering practical positive outcomes while reducing or avoiding inter-ministerial disputes over policy priorities. The argument for addressing PCD problems is likely to be more compelling when it is related not to generic development issues but to specific developing country-related problems and OECD country development initiatives in that country. 12

13 Looking at PCD issues in the specific context of individual developing countries puts development ministries and agencies at an advantage. Contrary to the situation in the domestic policy arena, development ministries and agencies are frequently the dominant player at developing country level when it comes to deciding on country strategies and programme priorities. In this arena, development represented by large budgets, institutional capacity and expertise is arguably the senior partner if policy differences arise. Of course development cooperation is not the only or necessarily the most important aspect of an OECD country s engagement with a developing country, trade, investment and security are often significant interests. But where a significant development objective or the success of a specific development programme is threatened by a decision in a non development area the developmental interest is more likely to be robustly defended and the trade-offs carefully considered. The 2002 UK sale of military radar equipment to Tanzania is arguably such a PCD case. The sale was vigorously opposed by the Department for International Development (DFID) as undermining the UK s increases in aid for public expenditure in Tanzania and only went ahead after the direct intervention of the Prime Minister. DFID was able to robustly, though ultimately unsuccessfully, defend the developmental interest at the level of Tanzania in way that it would be unlikely to be able to do in domestic discussions of the export strategy for the UK defence industry. (Tanzanian Affairs, 2007) The stakeholders in favour of PCD and who are likely to benefit from it are present and influential in the policy making processes. While OECD donors ultimately determine the policies and strategies of their own programmes, there is a widespread recognition that aid is more effective and its impacts more sustainable when it supports, and is supported by, the partner government s own development efforts. This has been reflected in the commitments on the harmonisation and alignment of aid in the 2005 Paris Declaration and at the subsequent high level forums. As a result partner governments have become more influential in defining the incountry ODA priorities and strategies of OECD countries. Also importantly the stakeholders expected to benefit from PCD, in this case food insecure people, are present as citizens and electors and therefore have the potential to be part of the national political process and exert influence to further their interests. While their influence on donor policies is formally intermediated by the democratic process and government, many donors put a high priority on accountability and participatory approaches in delivering their ODA, in principle allowing beneficiary groups to influence programme decisions. Synergies with domestic PCD efforts This approach would build on the existing consensus around the critical role of both evidence and stakeholders from developing countries in defining and delivering PCD priorities. The OECD s 2008 PCD synthesis report and the 2010 Council Recommendation both stressed the importance of field level perspectives, evidence of PCD impacts from developing country level and co-operation with developing country governments. (OECD, 2008b & OECD 2010) The 13

14 current DAC peer review encourages DAC members to gather country evidence and views from partner governments, civil society and their own field level staff on the development impact of its domestic policies. It also assesses whether members use a whole-of-government approach within the Embassy/field office in order to ensure policy coherence... (OECD 2010b) It would be a relatively small, but important and logical, step to use these processes, not only for providing feedback for PCD efforts at home, but also as the basis for in-country policies and actions. Field level PCD can move beyond measuring and witnessing the impacts of incoherence to acting positively against it. Food Security a tangible focus for coherence We suggest that there are advantages in assessing the coherence of OECD country policies and actions with the somewhat more specific objective of food security, rather than with a broad concept of development. Attempts to make PCD analysis more robust and influential have tended to focus on better understanding the development impacts of a specific OECD domestic policy, for example migration. Where the objective of the exercise is to effect changes to the migration policy this appears quite a valid approach. It does, however, involve the risk that PCD priorities are set by the policies being assessed for coherence what might be called the PCD Numerator rather than by the development objectives for which coherence is assessed the PCD Denominator. From the perspective of a developing country it might be more appropriate to turn this approach around by using a specific development outcome, such as food security, as the starting point to examine the PCD of a range of donor policy and actions. There are a number of reasons for more closely specifying the coherence denominator in terms of a specific development objective in this way. Firstly the focus will be on PCD issues impacting on food security rather than a broader analysis of all the potential developmental impacts of a specific policy. The negative impact on food security of a particular policy will be less easily justified with a plausible developmental impact in another area. Secondly the PCD issues and the required reforms to OECD country policies and actions will be identified and prioritised by their relevance to food security. This means that the PCD agenda is defined by the development priority rather than by the developed country policy pipeline. Importantly also the objective of the exercise and measure of success will be improved food security outcomes rather than improved developed country policies. Better defining the PCD Denominator policy coherence with what? The concept of development with which coherence is desired has normally been defined by the OECD country whose policies are being assessed for PCD. As mentioned above, the PCD denominator is consequently usually defined by reference to the MDGs or to the country s development co-operation objectives. In either case a specific policy is being assessed for coherence with a broad development objective or series of objectives. However, once PCD is being considered in the specific context of an individual developing country, the concept of 14

15 development against which coherence is judged can become much more specific. It can now take into account the specific developmental context of the country involved, its levels of poverty and economic development, demographics, natural endowments and economic structure. Most importantly, PCD can be seen as policy coherence for nationally defined development objectives and priorities. When considering PCD for food security in a specific developing country the coherence numerator can become even more precise. Prioritisation between availability and access measures, the relative importance of food consumer and producer prices and the relevance of global price volatility will all become clearer. Again most importantly, OECD country policies and actions can be assessed for coherence not only with food security objectives or outcomes but also with the policies and strategies that the developing country itself has put in place to achieve food security. Addressing PCD at country level puts the developing country and its priorities at the centre of the concept of development underlying PCD. Development co-operation programmes ODA policies as a PCD numerator. Development policies are not unconnected to domestic policy and in very general terms many donor countries feel that their own development experience should inform development in partner countries and that their development co-operation programmes should project the social values and economic ground rules that have evolved in their own countries and the values and positions they support in global governance and markets. Policy coherence more generally is of course double-edged and may function in opposition to PCD. Many governments, or ministries within them, feel that development co-operation, should be supportive of other policy objectives, particularly foreign policy and trade objectives, and used to further national positions in international processes. Weak PCD in domestic policies may, therefore, give rise to PCD issues in the policy and implementation of development co-operation programmes. There is a long history of ODA being used to leverage economic opportunity for firms from donor country and to gain access to commodities and markets. The work on aid effectiveness and on untying aid has been largely successful in removing domestic economic opportunity as an explicit benefit or objective of development co-operation provided by DAC members. However donors do use their development co-operation and the policy dialogue associated with it to promote policies in developing countries that facilitate market access, investment and economic opportunity for firms from developed countries. Private sector development, investment and cross-border trade are important for development, for properly functioning national food markets and for both the access and availability aspects of food security. However choices such as what investments and which private actors to support, what sectors and markets to focus on and what types of governance, regulatory and policy instruments to use will determine what benefits are delivered and to whom they accrue. Support for these areas is not necessarily, or even usually, provided as part of a specific programme 15

16 focussed on food security. Using a PCD for food security approach to assess coherence across its ODA programme would enable donors to look beyond components of their programme that are focussed on food security and ensure, for example, that their work on economic development of the type mentioned above includes and supports measures that are designed and targeted to help deliver the food security outcomes that other parts of their programme are pursuing. The provision of aid has always involved dialogue on development objectives and strategies between donors and governments. The move away from donor designed and implemented projects to the provision of support to government programmes and the establishment of coordinated multi-donor budget support programmes in many countries has been accompanied by the establishment of formal and structured policy dialogue processes between government and most major donors present in a given country. These usually involve a high level annual review process in which key indicators of development performance are reviewed and new targets and measures to achieve them are agreed. These targets and measures and the policy areas they relate to constitute high priorities for both government and donors - performance against them influences the level and targeting of future ODA. The coherence of these targets with food security strategies and objectives should be a key focus of promoting PCD in ODA programmes. Coherence is also potentially an issue within ODA for food security particularly in relation to coherence with the partner government s own policies and strategies related to food security. While government and donor partners can usually reach agreement on overall food security objectives, there can be significant differences over the measures and policy instruments used to achieve them. This may mean that parts of national food security strategies are underfunded as donors opt to put their support behind measures they have more confidence in. For example donors may be more comfortable supporting agricultural research and extension as a means of increasing productivity and rural incomes and less willing to fund the use of subsidies or other price related mechanisms. There may also be differences over how specific policy instruments are used. Donors may wish to see food reserves that they support operating purely for emergency food assistance in acute crisis situations while governments may see them more as a preventive measure or as a mechanism for price stabilisation or addressing market failures. These differences can make the establishment of food reserves a difficult process and result in complex and inflexible operating and management procedures that limit the effectiveness of the reserve for either purpose. Differences may arise over the use of social protection or social transfers for food security on issues such as financing, duration, targeting and eligibility. Finally, when promoting policy coherence for food security, the coherence of ODA policies in non-food security areas is an important consideration. Government s own policies in other influential sectors such as land, roads, energy, trade and economic governance may have elements that are incoherent with food security. The Global Donor Platform for Rural Development in a 2011 study of four developing countries found instances where countries own 16

17 trade rules undermined national policies for agriculture and rural development. (GDPRD, 2011) ODA in such sectors may be both aligned and coherent with national programmes and policies in these areas, but arguably be incoherent with both donor and government priorities and strategies for food security. This ODA incoherence may be seen as deriving from, or justified by, incoherence in recipient government policies, but the influence of OECD development cooperation and non-aid relationships on national policies may also be considered as a potential driver of these incoherencies. 4. How can we see and assess PCD for Food Security To assess country-level PCD for food security it will be useful to identify: the coherence denominators the policies or strategies with which coherence is desired; the coherence numerators the policies or strategies the coherence of which is being assessed; and the ways in which coherence and incoherence will be seen. Coherence with what? As mentioned earlier one of the key opportunities of a country level focus is to define national policies and strategies as the PCD denominator. In the more specific case of food security national defined strategies and targets for achieving food security should constitute a PCD denominator. The question immediately arises of what is a national food security strategy. The multiplicity of factors influencing food security, diversity among hungry people and the range of sectors across which action is required make the development of distinct food security strategies a complex process. In most countries where hunger and food insecurity is a significant issue overarching policy documents such as national development plans, poverty reduction strategies or rural development strategies will identify key measures and strategies for improving food security. Some countries have developed specific cross-sectoral food security strategies, however, even where specific strategies do not exist, programmes, measures and actions aimed at delivering food security objectives can be found in the strategies of sectors such as agriculture, health, social welfare and education. Donors own country-level food security strategies and programmes are also an important PCD denominator. The case for coherence is perhaps clearer and incentives certainly stronger when examining potential negative impacts of other ODA, or non-oda, actions on the donors own programme, especially as decisions on PCD issues at country level will be influenced, and 17

18 sometimes determined, by people whose professional performance may be judged by the success of the food security programme. Coherence of what? In this paper we are proposing a country level PCD approach that focuses on donor policies and actions as manifested at country level through ODA and non-aid relationships. The coherence of developing country government policy with food security is not considered except in as much as incoherence with food security in donor policies and actions may be a driver of government incoherence. The coherence of donor ODA programmes for Food Security and Nutrition with national food security strategies and targets should be assessed. This can be done in two main ways: Examining whether ODA funding support for national food security strategies is available across all components or is earmarked for specific elements and leaves significant gaps and whether ODA funds food security activities that are not priorities under the national strategy. Examining whether donors and government have and promote different roles or objectives for the same policy instrument leading to parallel approaches and duplication or complex, and inflexible operating procedures. Potential policy instruments to look at here would be food reserves, subsidies, social protection and export controls. A second numerator would be relevant elements of donor ODA programmes that do not specifically target food security. These would need to be assessed in terms of their coherence with both numerators the donor s own food security programme and the government s food security strategy. Relevant areas of support where PCD for food security could be pursued would include land administration, private sector development and trade as well as system wide issues such as public financial management, governance and accountability. The coherence of the action and targets discussed and agreed in high level donor-government policy dialogue mechanisms, such as budget support annual reviews, would provide a good overall assessment of country level PCD for food security. A third numerator would be non ODA actions on the part of donors. These could be in relation to economic co-operation, bilateral trade, specific inward investments, migration or security. In essence the treatment should differ little from that of the second numerator. Coherence would be assessed in terms both national and donor approaches to food security but this would be done on a one-off basis for each individual action or investment, rather than in relation to the broader domestic policy underlying it, although evidence from these assessments could support domestic PCD efforts for policy reform. 18

19 Some practical cases for PCD The purpose of remaining part of this paper is to look at some of the ways in which policy coherence for food security can be seen and assessed and where there might be practical opportunities for strengthening coherence. It is far beyond the scope of this paper to do this in an exhaustive or complete manner. The objective is to promote and initiate discussion on the value of more strongly linking PCD type analysis to donor country policies and actions in developing countries with a view to identifying priority areas of policy that could be assessed and entry points through which this could be done. The next section will attempt to examine the policy coherence for food security in relation to the content and priorities in high level donor policy dialogue with partner governments by examining the performance assessment frameworks associated with general budget support in Tanzania, Rwanda and Mozambique. This draws on work underway on whole of programme approaches to food security. This will be followed by a section looking briefly at the possibilities of assessing coherence for food security in ODA funding and the relevance and opportunities for coherence in relation policies on land and on food reserves. 5. Priorities in Policy Dialogue coherence for food security General Budget Support a forum for dialogue on high level policy priorities. General Budget Support (GBS) is an aid modality which provides ODA resources directly to the recipient government s national budget. GBS is not earmarked or targeted on any particular sector or activity it is intended to provide support across the whole public expenditure programme 2. Dialogue between government and donors on public policy and expenditure priorities is an integral part of the GBS modality. GBS is not unconditional support, it is provided on the basis of an agreed set of key development outcomes and a programme of government actions to achieve them. These outcomes and actions are set out in a results matrix, commonly known as the GBS performance assessment framework (PAF). The GBS programme and the PAF are usually reviewed annually or semi-annually when government and donors meet to discuss performance of agreed actions and progress towards the outcome targets. The review also updates the PAF programme defining new actions and resetting timelines and targets as necessary. The review provides donors with the opportunity to 2 A number of donors have, however, tied specific amounts of funding to the performance of specific actions by government. These performance tranches are only disbursed when the specified action has been completed. 19