What Constrains Farmers Adoption of NRM Technologies?

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1 What Constrains Farmers Adoption of NRM Technologies? Jenny C. (Tufts University) Session on Improving how NRM Innovations are Promoted and Scaled Washington, DC February 27, 2018

2 The Sahel: Land, Water, Forest 50% of farmland in West Africa suffers from poor soil fertility (Scherr 1999) Farmers previously engaged in extensive agriculture to deal with poor rains and degraded soils High population density and shorter fallow periods have made this an unsustainable strategy (Warren, Batterbury and Osbahr 2001).

3 Rainwater harvesting (RWH) techniques Techniques that seek to increase level and duration of water in the soil and replete of soil nutrients Examples: Rainwater conservation, microcatchments (zai, demi-lunes and banquettes) Variations adapted in other semiarid zones (Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda)

4 Demi-Lunes Research station and on-farm trials suggest that these techniques can significantly reduce soil erosion, the risk of crop failure and increase yields Adoption of RWH techniques remains low, despite decades of policy interventions to promote them o 10 percent of farmers use micro-catchments on any part of their land (WOCAT 2009) Why?

5 Calendar planning Land preparation Land selection Access to credit Crop selection Context, Knowledge, Market Input provision Processing, Storage, Transport Access to credit Labor (access to credit) Water, fertilizer, pest management Modified from Ghandi et al (2009).

6 What Constrains Farmers Adoption of NRM Techniques? Information asymmetries Credit market frictions Labor market allocations Land market imperfections *Positive externalities, profits and common pool resources

7 Demi-Lunes Half-circle earthen bunds within the field (private or common) Collect soil runoff and increase nutrient content

8 What Constrains Farmers Adoption of Demi-Lunes? Information asymmetries Credit market frictions Labor market allocations Land market imperfections

9 Information Asymmetries What is the technique (awareness)? For what types of soils is it appropriate? How do I construct it? Slope, depth, size, distance, timing, number What do I need (costs)? What are the benefits and when? And what is the minimum adoption level required?

10 Credit Market Frictions Estimated cost is $US 90 for one hectare For norm of 250 demi-lunes per ha Primary inputs are labor and some materials Must be done during the dry season, after the harvest Upfront capital investment Dependence upon informal financial services

11 Labor Market Allocations Family and local labor availability are highly seasonal In the Sahel, 60% of households have at least one male migrant during the dry season (January- May), when demi-lunes need to be constructed Dependence upon family labor, mainly children

12 Land Market Imperfections Land ownership is Niger is primarily private But, a significant gender gap

13 SPIA Impact Evaluation 30 villages in the Dosso region of Niger All have degraded land, mainly in Northern Dosso 20 beneficiaries per village Degraded land,.5 5 ha, stratified by gender Randomized control trial, stratified by commune (ethnicity) Villages randomly assigned to one of three interventions: Training. Interactive training on demi-lunes, booklets and shared materials (Aframes, etc) UCT. Training plus an unconditional cash transfer ($US40) ½ of construction costs CCT. Training plus an conditional cash transfer (CCT) worth the per demi-lune value of UCT No pure control, UCT up-front, CCT is what everyone does

14 What were the impacts? Information 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% Demand for training is high 85% attended, regardless of the intervention Training only Content UCT and CCT quality of training matters how do adults learn? 0% Participated in Training (%) Constructed any Demi-Lunes (%)

15 Initial Adoption: Extensive Margin 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% Training only UCT CCT UCT and training groups most likely to adopt CCT less likely 30% 20% 10% 0% Participated in Training (%) Constructed any Demi-Lunes (%)

16 Nombre de Demi-Lunes ** Construites ** Initial Adoption: Intensive Margin Farmers adopted but well below the technical norms of 250 demilunes per year ** ** But even in the training only villages, households adopted the following two seasons at about the same level 0 Number of demi-lunes Constructed Number of demi-lunes constructed (norms) Training only UCT CCT

17 Nombre de Demi-Lunes Agricultural Production ** Construites ** Self-reported number of demi-lunes Quantity of millet produced Quantity of sorghum produced Quantity of cowpea produced Household well-being Assets Training UCT CCT

18 Input Use Nombre de Demi-Lunes ** Construites ** 1 Figure 4. Agricultural Input Use ** Used fertilizer Used improved seeds Used organic fertilizer Training UCT CCT

19 Nombre de Demi-Lunes Issues Surrounding ** Demi-Lune Construites Adoption ** Adoption levels are well below the norms (test and learn) The content of the training matters how do adults learn? The credit constraint partially binds higher in UCT villages Women construct fewer than men (correlated with information, credit, labor, etc) These issues become even more complicated if the technology is adopted on common resource land (externalities, common pool resource, etc) What about sustained adoption?

20 Nombre de Demi-Lunes The Broader Picture ** Construites ** Demi-lunes are one technology - easy to measure adoption Much more complex once we start talking about techniques with multiple components (inputs, benefits, timing, etc) Which constraints bind the most in the given context? For whom? Heterogeneity and stratification Is the technology even profitable? And if so, at what level? Many policy interventions in this context use conditional transfers - which may not overcome credit constraints and on common land How can we fit in?

21 The Broader Picture Information asymmetries (Beaman et al 2016, Cole 2018) Credit market frictions (Jack 2013, Jack et al 2015, Alix-Garcia et al 2011, Arrigada et al 2012, Kremer et al 2016) Labor market allocations (Fink and Jack 2018, de Janvry et al 2016) Land market imperfections (Deiniger and Jing 2006, Ali et al 2011)