DECLASSIFIED -PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2017)0025 -DÉCLASSIFIÉ -MIS EN LECTURE P U B L IQ U E POSSIBLE VISIT OF MINISTER HARMEL TO MOSCOW

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1 '?L-y /ufa To: From: Secretary General Cc. Deputy Secretary General ASG for Political Affairs j&sg for Defence Planning and Policy Executive Secretary Deputy Executive Secretary Record of a private meeting of the Council held on Wednesday. 5th February. 19&9 I. POSSIBLE VISIT OF MINISTER HARMEL TO MOSCOW II. POSSIBLE ENLARGEMENT OF THE 18 NATIONS DISARMEMENT COMMITTEE (ENDC ) III. CZECH PROTESTS AGAINST EXERCISE "REFORGER I" IN GRAFENWOEHR/ GERMANY /I. IV. VIOLATION OF THE AIR SPACE OF NEUTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Chairman: Mr. Manlio Brosio POSSIBLE VISIT OF MINISTER HARMEL TO MOSCOW The CHAIRMAN stated that he had called the meeting at the request of the Belgian Representative who wanted to make a communication concerning the possibility of a visit of the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Moscow. 2. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE, referring to the information he had communicated to his colleagues the day before, stressed the point that Mr. Harmel had not yet received an invitation. The Government of the Soviet Union had only taken soundings; it would however issue a formal invitation if Mr. Harmel let it be known that he could accept. 3* The Minister found himself before a rather difficult decision which in his view warranted a thorough.and early consultation of the members of the Alliance# He was aware of the fact that a trip to Moscow should neither be a touristic enterprise nor a goodwill mission. On the other hand, such a visit might clarify the atmosphere presently surrounding East-West relations. 4. As topics for a possible conversation, the question of European security seemed to recommend itself. It could also be useful for Mr. Harmel to point out to the Russians the "thèses occidentales", especially the Western position vis-à-vis the decisions of Karlo Vivary..

2 DECLASSIFIED -PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2017)0025 -DÉCLASSIFIÉ -MIS EN LECTURE P U B LIQ U E As far as the timing was concerned,he wished to state that there were some reasons in favour of a visit prior to the Spring Ministerial meeting in Washington. However, the fact that President Nixon was now to visit European capitals before the meeting in Washington, might influence the choice of the date. 6. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that it was entirely a matter for the Belgian Government to decide whether Mr. Harmel should accept an invitation from the Soviet Union. One of the reasons for the Russian initiative might "be the wish of the Soviet Union to liquidate the quarantine which had been imposed upon the Soviet Union after her invasion into Czechoslovakia. 7. Speaking without instructions, he stated that he did not have any objection against the visit. He only felt that Mr. Harmel, when undertaking such a trip, should avoid the impression of making it under instructions from NATO. 8. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE stated that the Under-Secretary of State of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry favoured the visit in question. Certainly, the many problems involved were not overlooked in Norway. It could be said that, in accepting such an invitation, the Western countries were giving in to the Soviet desire to come back to "business as usual"; if, on the contrary, the invitation was declined, the Soviet Union could draw propaganda advantage from the refusal in saying that NATO countries were opposed to detente. As far as the timing was concerned he expressed himself in favour. of the visit prior to the Spring Ministerial meeting. The Soviet Embassy in Oslo had not extended a similar invitation to the Norwegian Foreign Minister. 9. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE, speculating on the motives of the Soviet Union behind the invitation said that the Russians knew that NATO was now discussing East-West relations; they were of course aware of the active rôle Mr. Harmel had played in defining NATO's position with regard to détente. 10. He was interested to learn whether in the Belgian view, the invitation was the consequence of the Belgian position in NATO or perhaps also in the Group of Ten, or was based on the bilateral situation. 11. The Soviet Union was apparently looking for a symbole to end the quarantine; it wanted to remove the mistrust built up by the Czech invasion at no cost to herself. It could well be that such an invitation would put Belgium and all her NATO partners in a dilemma: a refusal would mean no NATO interest in détente; the acceptance would be explained as the end of the strong position taken by NATO during the last Ministerial meetings, and that would weaken our defence outlook. In this way, the invitation might be intended to interrupt and to prejudice the discussion of East-West relations NATO was presently engaged in and, at the same time, give propaganda advantages to the Soviet Union. -2-

3 12. In view of these thoughts, the United Kindom Representative expressed himself in favour of a cautious attitude vis-à-vis the invitation. One might be able to avoid a straight answer bydiscussing first the details of a possible agenda before fixing the date of the visit. Such an attitude would also confirm the business character of the journey, and would rule out any ressemblance to a goodwill mission. If such a visit was to take place it should not be before the Washington meeting, since the "thèses Occidentales would only be finalized at the Spring M inisterial meeting. 13. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE, commenting on the last remark of his British colleague, stated that in using the term "thèses occidentales" he had not meant that Mr. Harmel would prejudge the outcome of the Washington meeting. He only had thought of certain fundamental Western positions which were basic to NATO s policy such as the question of German re-unifieation which was wellknown to everybody. II4. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that the instructions he had received from the highest authorities presently available in Bonn were close to the views expressed by his French and British colleagues. If the Belgian Government felt that by accepting such an invitation it could really help the cause of the Alliance, it should accept. In any case, a cautious attitude was warranted. The German Government had so far no definite views as to the timing of such a visit. 15. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE, having stated that his Government s ideas were similar to those expressed by France, the United Kingdom and Germany, said that his Government saw the Soviet move as an effort to renew the discussions on détente as well as to resume normal relations with the West after the Czech invasion. He warned that a visit before April would detract world attention from the Washington meeting where possibly a new détente policy was to be created. He therefore expressed himself in favour of such a visit after the Spring Ministerial meeting. Then Mr. Harmel, who was so closely identified with the détente policy of the Alliance, could symbolize any new decisions NATO might have taken in Washington. 16. He concluded his intervention by stating that no Soviet ouvertures had been noted in Ottawa with regard to an invitation of the Canadian Secretary for External Affairs to Moscow. 17. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE, also speaking without instructions, felt that thanks to the personality of Mr. Harmel, the Alliance only could gain profit from a visit of the Belgian Foreign Minister to Moscow. The contents of such discussions, and the timing of the visit,needed, however, careful consideration. It might be preferable to accept an invitation in general, and then to await the outcome of the visit of President Nixon to European capitals and the result of the Washington meeting. -3-

4 18, The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE felt that the Russian initiative had started a new category of contacts between East and West, In accepting such an invitation one should take into account the consequences it might have for some members of the Alliance* He drew attention to the fact that e.g, Germany was still the object of violent Soviet attacks and accusations. The Dutch Government, before engaging discussions on the merits of such a visit, would also like to have a better knowledge of the impressions which Mr. Harmel s journey might have on Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, Why had the -Russians chosen precisely this moment for their initiative? Had the rehabilitation of Stalin, which seemed to be under way right now, something to do with it? He felt that close consultation on all details of this important issue was warranted before taking a decision, 19«The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE started his intervention by saying that yesterday he probably had given the wrong impression to his colleagues as far as the Soviet invitation extended to his Foreign Minister was concerned. There had been an invitation standing for Mr, Hartling for October I968, which had been postponed after the Czechoslovakian incident. The following months inquiries had been made by the Soviet Government on a lower echelon. However, since the new Russian Ambassador had arrived in Copenhagen a few weeks ago, this issue had not been raised again. Therefore, the Danish situation could not be compared with the invitation now offered to Mr. Harmel. 20, The Danish Government would like to refrain from giving special advice to Belgium since it was for Mr. Harmel to decide whether he would accept or not, Denmark knew however that sooner or later contacts with the East had to be resumed but not necessarily with the Soviet Union. Of course, a visit of the Belgian Foreign Minister would be used by the Soviets as an icebreaker or as a mission de sondage". It could be an asset if it served to achieve a better understanding without compromising the plans and ideas of the Alliance. 21, The timing of such a visit was of course most difficult. It would be useful to know the attitude of the United States before taking any decision. In general, a cautious line seemed to be appropriate. 22. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, also speaking without instructions, stated that before taking a final stand it was necessary to evaluate the risks such an invitation might entail for the Alliance. He shared the view expressed by others that the impression of a goodwill trip had to be avoided, that more details with regard to the agenda of such talks should be available and that the timing should be seen in relation to the present situation in Eastern Europe. 23. The LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE expressed himself for a visit after the Washington meeting.

5 The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE stated that the acceptance of such an invitation could be interpreted by the world as an absolution of the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia and also as an absolution for any futuie acts the Soviet Union might commit in other Satellite countries. He shared the opinion of other speakers that a visit after the Washington meeting would be preferable. 25. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE, also speaking à titre personelle", expressed the view that the Alliance seemed nolens volens to enter a period of what he called "neo-detente". Before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the detente efforts were directed towards the Soviet Union and the Satellite countries. However, now the question was whether NATO s ambitions would be less, and whether they would only be directed towards the Soviet Union. Was the time already ripe enoughvfor such a new détente? He was not sure himself whether the envisaged mission or Mr. Harmel would help the case of the Alliance since it was certain that the Russians would exploit such a journey. In spite of Mr. Harmel's perspicacity, was it not better tocfelay a final answer? 26. The ICELANDIC REPRESENTATIVE felt personnally that Mr. Harmel should accept the invitation and travel before the Washington meeting. 27. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE in commenting on the remarks made by his colleagues stated the following: (1) It was certain that Mr. Harmel, when accepting the invitation in question, would not accept any mandate from NATO. (2) He felt that the invitation probably had several reasons: the wellknown rôle of Mr. Harmel in defining NATO policies (Harmel Report) aswell as the Belgian position in the Group of Ten and the bilateral situation. (3) As to the timing, he was astonished to hear that so many of his colleagues had favoured a visit after the Washington meeting. This might be rather difficult for Mr. Harmel because in this case he would most certainly appear as the "mandataiie* of the Alliance. On the other hand, if he went before the Spring Ministerial meeting, he could take a much more independant attitude since no decisions as to the future policies of NATO would have been taken by then. (4) Referring to the Turkish remarks on the dangers of a neo-détente, he said that it was always appropriate to negotiate; it could be of advantage also to the Alliance to end the period of the Soviet quarantine. He finalized his comments by stating that he would, submit all the views expressed this morning to Mr. Harmel. -5-

6 6 NAT O SECRET 28. The CHAIRMAN, in summing up the discussion, first expressed, his gratitude and satisfaction for the thorough and fruitful consultation which had taken place. Four points had emerged from the discussions: (1) It was now evident, that Mr. Harmel, so far, was the only NATO-Foreign Minister whom the Soviet government wanted to invite. (2) There was agreement that it was solely for the Belgian Government to decide whether Sir Harmel should accept an invitation. (3) There would never "be any mandate from NATO for the Belgian Foreign Minister with regard to such a visit, regardless whether the journey would take place before or after the Washington meeting. However, the situation for Mr. Harmel would naturally be different after April, since he would then travel knowing the policy decisions of the Atlantic Alliance. He noted that all members of the Council had voiced their appreciation of the opportunity offered by Belgium to consult on a very important issue. (U) Four questions needed further clarifications: (a) The motivation of the Soviet Union to invite the Belgian Foreign Minister* (b) The psychological effect on public opinion of such a visit (considering the present climate created by the Czechoslovakian invasion). (c) The subjects to be discussed on such a visit. (d) The timing. II. POSSIBLE ENLARGEMENT OF THE 18 NATIONS DISARMEMENT COMMITTEE (ENDC) 29. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE explained that his Authorities in Washington were presently examining the outcome of the Council debate of 30th January which had reflected a general feeling that an additional member of NATO should be included in any ENDC re-organization. The United States Government was inviting views of member governments in this r spect. He stated further that his Government would possibly resume the discussion with the Soviet Union in the middle of February. 30. The CHAIRMAN recalled that during the last debate in the Council, it had been decided that Permanent Representatives wanted another discussion during the month of February, taking into account the fact that the ENDC would resume its deliberations on March 6th. How did this plan fit in with the timing just outlined by the United States Representative?

7 -7-3I The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE answered that he had thought it useful that members of the Alliance were informed of the present plans of his Administration. 32. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE wanted to be informed about the mechanics of the approval of a possible expansion of the ENDC The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE answered that as far as he knew, an enlargement of the ENDC did not need the approval of the United Nation General Assembly. 34* The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE expressed the opinion that the decision to enlarge the ENDC had to be taken by the two Co-Chairman of this body, and had then to be submitted to the General Assembly. 35. In the view of the UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE, no formal submission to the General Assembly was necessary; it was sufficient that no opposition to the planned extension was to be foreseen. He felt that the Council should decide quickly as to who the new NATO member in the ENDC was going to be. 36. The CHAIRMAN, in concluding the discussion on this point, stated that he would put this question on the agenda of one of the next Council meetings. III. CZECH PROTESTS AGAINST EXERCISE "REFORGER I" IN GRAFENWOEHR/ / GERMANY 37«The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE, referring to comments made by several of his colleagues in a previous session of the Council, stated that the Czechoslovakian Ambassador in Paris had mentioned in the Quay d'orsay that his Government had protested in Washington against the Exercise 'Reforger I. ^IV. VIOLATION OF THE AIR SPACE OF NEUTRAL COUNTRIES 38» The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE announced that he would shortly circulate a letter emphasizing the concern of his Government about the overflights of Allied Aircraft over Austrian Territory. The Austrian Government had protested to the German Authorities, since the aircraft in question had started from airfields in Germany. 39. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE stated that the United States Authorities, after a careful review, were confident that no United States aircraft had overflown Austrian territory. All United States pilots were constantly kept aware of the existing regulations.