Debating Electoral System Reform Canadian Experiences

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1 Debating Electoral System Reform Canadian Experiences Wilton Park Conference on Accountability under Democratic Constitutions, UK, February 2010 Louis Massicotte Université Laval Québec, CANADA

2 Earlier electoral system changes in Western provinces Manitoba, 1920: STV introduced in Winnipeg for provincial elections Manitoba, 1923: AV introduced outside Winnipeg for provincial elections Alberta, 1924: STV in Calgary & Edmonton, AV outside major centres, for provincial elections British Columbia, 1951: AV provincewide for provincial elections

3 Return to first past the post (1950s) British Columbia, 1953 Manitoba, 1955 Alberta, 1956 Introduction, and later abolition, were decided by the government and passed by the legislature, often on division, without public consultation or debate outside the legislature.

4 Debates during the 1970s and 1980s Canada, 1979: Pépin-Robarts Task Force on National Unity proposed a mixed system for federal elections Canada, 1986: Macdonald Royal Commission on Canadian Economic Union proposed PR for electing the Senate Quebec, 1983: Electoral Boundary Commission held public hearings on PR

5 Experiences during the 2000s Canada: A government agency (the Law Commission) proposed MMP for federal elections British Columbia and Ontario empowered Citizens Assemblies to propose new electoral systems New Brunswick created Commission on Legislative Democracy Prince Edward Island appointed a one-person Royal Commission Quebec s government devised a model and held legislative hearings thereon.

6 Citizens Assemblies Randomly selected citizens gathered for months to learn about electoral systems, to deliberate thereon and to propose a formula to be put directly to the people at a referendum. Legislators did not intervene, but were committed to introduce the CA s formula if ratified by 60% of the people and of districts

7 The BC Citizens Assembly Citizens randomly selected from electoral registers within each district People selected could refuse to serve Any people with ties to political parties were barred from membership of the Assembly Two people (one man, one woman) representing each district, plus two aboriginal representatives (160)

8 How the Assembly worked Learning phase: Members were explained the nuts and bolts of the various systems by researchers and experts Held public hearings Decided on the criteria for choice Deliberated on the issue Agreed on a proposal

9 The outcome The BC Assembly opted for STV Freedom to vote for candidates across party lines was a strong asset of STV Proposal was put to the voters the same day as 2005 provincial election Outcome: 57,7% support, majority in 77 districts out of 79

10 The aftermath Politicians decided to give a second try to STV Legislative districts for STV were delimited Another referendum held on same day as provincial election 2009 Outcome: 39,1% support for STV, 60,9% for FPTP. STV carried 8 ridings out of 85

11 The Ontario Citizens Assembly Same basic model as BC, with variants: Gender parity overall, but a single delegate from each district (103) No ban of people with political affiliations The Ontario Assembly opted for MMP Referendum held on same day as 2007 provincial election: 36,9% support for MMP, 63,1% for FPTP, 5 ridings out of 107 for MMP

12 Prince Edward Island The Royal Commission proposed MMP A referendum was held in November Premier decided he would feel bound by the outcome only if 60% of the people and 60% of districts supported MMP Outcome: Turnout was 33%, MMP got 36,4% and carried two ridings out of 27

13 New Brunswick Commission on Legislative Democracy also came up with MMP in January 2005, and asked for a referendum to be held No referendum was ever held The Lord government was defeated at the 2006 election and the new government is opposed to the change

14 Quebec «États généraux» on democratic reform held Charest government announced intention to reform the system in 2003 Specifics of the MMP model disclosed in December 2004 A special committee of the Assembly empowered to hold public hearings provincewide on the issue A committee of randomly selected citizens allowed to participate to the work of the legislative committee

15 The government refrained from defending its own proposal Most witnesses supported a more small-party friendly version of MMP Legislative committee concluded (Spring 2006) that gov t model should be abandoned, but could not agree on an alternative Citizens committee proposed a more proportional version of MMP

16 Government backbenchers opposed introduction of MMP bill and holding a referendum (Dec. 2006) Issue was referred to Chief Electoral Officer for study. Reported one year later A petition on the web for electoral reform was signed by 20,000 people Quebec s Superior Court refused to declare FPTP unconstitutional (2009)

17 Assessment of Citizens Assemblies By far the most innovative device for involving citizens in complex debates Contribution of experts was important (learning) Did not feel bound by public hearings Deliberations conducted in an exemplary way More expensive ($5 million in BC) Have established that ordinary people can make an informed judgment on complex issues

18 As an instrument for bringing change, CAs have not been very successful so far Rejection of their proposals by the people have cast doubt over their claimed status as microcosms of the people Political context may have played a role: Minority gov ts and coalitions not very popular with the public in Canada now. 60%-threshold was effective

19 Some common findings All reform processes, whatever their nature, ended in failure Vast majority of legislators were opposed to PR, but refrained from campaigning against it Many models were put forward and hotly debated. Reformers were far from unanimous Public was on the whole indifferent to the issue

20 Why are MPs opposed to PR? They like the system as it is, even when it works against them, and are reluctant to share the spoils of office with smaller parties Members representing single-member districts consider list members as «intruders»

21 Thank you!