Questioning the Executive at European Level. Fabio Sozzi University of Genova Department of Political Sciences

Transcription

1 Questioning the Executive at European Level. Fabio Sozzi University of Genova Department of Political Sciences Parliamentary Questions (PQs) and in particular PQs within the European Parliament (EP) are one of the less studied political behaviour in legislature. Our knowledge of PQs is based on few theoretically and empirically analysis both at national (Wiberg 1995; Rasch 1994; Rozenberg and Martin 2011) and (much more at) supranational level (Raunio 1996; Proksch and Slapin 2010). In this paper we do not investigate the reasons behind this empty in literature (a possible explanation can be, for example, the leading role of American political scientist, in particular in the field of legislative research, and the relatively low diffusion in U.S. Congress of PQs) but rather we will try to fulfill (as much as possible) this gap focusing our attention to the EP. Since the seminal work of Hix (1994) the European Union (EU), the EP and the others institutions and actors at European level have been studied from a comparative perspective, increasing our knowledge on how the EU works day- by- day. Following this strategy of enquiry we shall use comparative knowledge, deriving from previous research in legislative studies both at national and supranational level, in order to understand why Members of European Parliaments (MEPs) and European Parliamentary Groups (EPGs) spend their (scarce) time in a (relatively) unbeneficial activities as seem to be oral and written questions at EU level. The puzzle about parliamentary questions revolves around the reasons why MEPs devote time and energy to an apparently secondary task: PQs do not influence directly policy- making process (like reports or amendments) and they do not have the dramatic effect of other control mechanism, such as vote of no- confidence. Moreover, PQs have a (very) low visibility in public opinion therefore MEPs (at first sight) can not use them in order to gain vote in their constituency (re-election). In this paper we will argue that

2 rationale behind asking PQs is to be found in the relationship between dual executive and legislative institution at European level: following Gallagher (2000) we can see an inter-party model at European level. The paper will be articulated into 3 part. In the first part, we will present development of PQs in the EP since its first direct election in 1979 to In this section we will focus on general trends of PQs as well as on party politics dynamics related to it. In the second part, we shall take into account the individual level and in particular we will try to understand reasons behind the choice of MEPs to ask PQs within the EP. Finally, in the third part we will summarize our findings and formulate some suggestions for further research. Parliamentary Questions at European Level: a general overview. The right for the MEPs to ask questions to the Commission (the High Authority as it was then called) was recognized in the article 23 of the Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community, which said: The High Authority shall reply orally or in writing to all questions put to it by the Assembly or its members. Originally, the Council was not concerned by the questioning procedure although the Treaty provided that, as for the Commission, the members of the Council could attend the meetings of the parliament and could be heard at their request. However, the Council agreed to answer questions put to it by the EP in 1973 (Corbett et al. 2003) and this practice was consolidated in the 1983 Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on European Union (Raunio 1996). In 1976, at the Paris summit, the Heads of State and Government accepted to extend this procedure to the Foreign Ministers meeting in European Political Co-operation (EPC) (this distinction disappeared following the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993). In 2002, the EP extended the written questions procedure to the European Central Bank (ECB). Actually four types of questions can be distinguished. 1 - Questions for oral answer with debate (article 108 of the Rules of Procedure) may be addressed to the Commission or to the Council by a committee, a political group or at least 40 MEPs. The Conference of Presidents decides whether and in what order questions should be placed on the agenda of Parliament. Questions not placed on the

3 agenda within three months of being submitted lapse. Questions to the Commission must be referred to that institution at least one week before the sitting on whose agenda they are to appear and questions to the Council at least three weeks before that date. One of the questioners may move the question for five minutes. One member of the institution concerned shall answer. The reply of the Commission or Council is followed by a debate. A committee, a political group or at least 40 MEPs may the propose a motion for resolution, which is put to the vote on the same day. 2 - Question time with the Council and Commission (article 109 of the Rules of Procedure) is organized at each session. Any member may put one (but only one) question at each session. Questions shall be submitted in writing to the President, who shall rule on their admissibility and on the order in which they are to be taken. This procedure was introduced in 1973 following the example of the British parliament (Corbett et al. 2003). Answers are given by one commissioner and by the president of the Council during distinct 90-minute periods. 3 - Written questions to the Commission and to the Council (article 110 of the Rules of Procedure) may be asked by any MEP. The content of questions is the sole responsibility of their authors provided that they: fall within the competence and sphere of responsibility of the institution concerned and be of general interest; be concise and contain an understandable interrogation; not contain offensive language; and do not relate to strictly personal matters (Annex II of the Rules of Procedure). The questions are submitted in writing to the President who decides about their admissibility and forwards them to the institution concerned. There are two types of written questions. Questions requiring an immediate answer are to be answered within three weeks with each member entitled to put one such priority question per month and non-priority questions are to be answered within six weeks. 4 - Written questions to the European Central Bank are organized according to article 111 of the Rules of Procedure. Any member may put such questions, which shall be submitted in written form to the chair of the committee responsible, who shall forward them to the European Central Bank. This kind of PQs, since the highly technical nature of monetary policy, is not widely used by MEPs: in 2004 only 8 questions are submitted to ECB, in and 20 in 2006.

4 Figure 1. PQs general trends over time ( ). Source: author calculus based on official resource of the European Parliament As we can see in figure 1 the total number of PQs has steadily increased since the direct election of the MEPs in 1979 (from 3082 in 1980 to 8266 in 2008) even if it is possible to found a cyclical movement during the same EP term: the number of PQs tends to increase in the first half of legislature and, in the second half, it progressively declines achieving minimum level in the years of elections. From figure 1 it emerges also a clear relationship between the openness of PQs and the number of PQs: written questions the most open procedure are by far also the most popular of the procedures, followed by questions time and finally by oral PQs. Another possible explanation can be found in the institutional context in which MEPs operate: since the EP is predominantly a law- making legislature and in consequence of the high technicality of legislation within it the MEPs have much more interest in asking written than oral questions. In fact, written questions given their scarce publicity can go into more detail and ask technical information. By contrast, oral questions appear to be more appropriate for political theatre and controversies (Norton 1993) between parliament and government but at European level a truly government does not exist thus MEPs have less incentive to ask oral questions for dialectical reasons.

5 Figure 2. Average number of PQs by MEPs ( ). The growing number of questions can be seen as a result of several factors: the first one can be considered the enlargement of the competences of the EU; the second one the progressive empowerment of the EU and, finally, the number of MEPs. As figure 2 shows the average number of PQs asked by each MEPs during the last 30 years seems to be not changed over time (also in this case we found a cyclical movement during the same legislature). If we go down of one level in our analysis (from institutional to parliamentary groups) it is clear from data in figure 3 and 4 that MEPs belonging to the opposition groups (i.e. GUE/NGL, VERTS, UEN and NI) ask much more questions than MEPs within major groups (PES, EPP and ALDE). This result seems to corroborate our hypothesis that inter- party model rise as the principal kind of relationship within the EP.

6 Figure 3. EPGs Written Questions (relative frequencis / oo ) ( ). Note: the histogram in figure represent the relative frequencies in / oo of each EPGs in the six EP terms. In order to normalize our frequencies we divided the average number of PQs of each group for the total number of PQs asked in each legislature. Figure 4. EPRGs Oral Questions (relative frequencies / oo ) ( ). Note: see figure 3

7 Why do MEPs ask Parliamentary Questions? MEPs, as all others MPs, are power- seekers actors (Stoppino 2001) and they operazionalize this goal in terms of policies, offices and re- election/ re- selection (Strom 1990). In order to achieve and maintain these power resources MEPs behave in a strategic and instrumental way. In other words, MEPs behaviour is the product of calculus that (generally) take into account how their behaviour can help them to obtain and maintain their actual power (offices and policies) as well as their potential power (re-election). MEPs choice is (almost) never free from institutional constrain (e.g. EP Rules of Procedure; political parties internal regulations; electoral systems; candidate selection and so on...) both at national and supranational level. As a consequences different parliamentary activities are linked to different sets of ties and benefit that influence (if not determine) MEPs behaviour. In particular MEPs are involved within a complex strategic and instrumental environment (the EP) forcing them to make rough choice. Different pressures for MEPs derive from different national setting: different electoral systems; someone belong to governing parties others to opposition parties; some are high- profile politicians other are (almost) unknowns. Furthermore, different strategic situations rise once in the EP and make pressure on MEPs: the EP as the end or beginning of carrier; how long they have been in the EP; how influential is their national party within the EPG; how powerful is their EPG vis a vis to the others. All these condition (at national as well as at supranational level) will affect what they seek to do in the EP and what they can do realistically. We can identify several conditions influencing the probability to ask PQs but one of the most important it is belonging to an opposition group within the EP. MEPs joining EPGs such as GUE/NGL, UEN, IND/DEM and NI have much less opportunity to influence policymaking within the EP (and probably in the European Commission and the European Council because are not present within them) in comparison to their counterpart in EPP, PES and ALDE as a consequence of the high proportionality in distributing mega-office and reports among EPGs. Opposition groups, consequently, tend to use PQs as an instrument to oversight dual European executive. Obviously, several others constrains and incentives make pressure to MEPs but the political insulation of the EP connected to the second- order nature of European election

8 makes, for example, much less probably that a MEP can use PQs in order to cultivate publicity in his constituency. Furthermore, the different degree of openness of oral and written questions gives to MEPs different incentives and they become a tools for frontbenchers in the former case and for backbenchers in the later (Rasch 2011): oral questions have restricted access implying at least some degree of coordination as well as of centralization of agenda power to the party leadership within the EPG and/or among different EPGs. In other words individual discretion becomes less important and the power to allocate spontaneous questions among M[E]Ps in practice gravitates towards the leadership of the parliamentary party groups (Rasch 2011). On the other side, in written questions parliamentary parties do not have any role in allocating plenary time hence the decision to table a question is left to the discretion of individual MEPs. Not only, oral questions is much more probably related to general issues as a consequence of their greater publicity than written questions (Martin 2011) as well as of their much more expressive and proactive nature (Bonanni 2010). Conversely, written questions can go into more detail given that their answers are not meant to be diffusely widely. As a consequence the ideological distance between a MEP and the executive can be a significant variable: in fact, we can hypothesise that an additional motive for asking (oral) PQs may be obstructionism or ideological dialectic between government and opposition. In particular we will expect that the grater is the Euclidean distance between a MEP and the European Council or the European Commission (especially in pro/anti European integration dimension) much more probably he will ask oral questions. In addition, if we consider the European Commission as the bureaucratic and technical institution at EU level while the European Council as the political organism, we can also expect that MEPs tend to ask much more written questions to European Commission than to European Council. Summarizing, in the next section we will test three different hypothesises. First of all, the executive/ legislative relationship at European level follows an inter-party model (Gallagher 2000) thus MEPs belonging to opposition groups within the EP ask more questions to the executive in order to both oversight its actions and obtain information. The second hypothesis is that oral questions are a frontbench arena while written questions are much more a backbencher instrument. Finally, increasing ideological distance between a MEP and the European Council or the European Commission foster

9 the probability to ask PQs (both in written and oral form) in order to control and receive information from the executive. Data and variables. Our dependent variable is the number of PQs asks by each MEPs during the sixth EP term ( ). The data have been collected from the EP website ( Moreover, we split out database into two different panel: the first one concerns the PQs to the European Commission while the second one considers questions to the European Council. Furthermore, the two panels distinguish between oral and written questions. In this way we have 7 dependent variables (see figure 5): 1) total amount of PQs, 2) total amount of PQs ask to the European Commission; 3) total amount of PQs to the European Council; 4) written questions to the European Council; 5) written questions to the Commission; 6) oral questions to the European Council and 7) oral questions to the Commission. In this way we can investigate if there are some differences in asking written or oral questions to the European Council and to the Commission. Figure 5. Dependent variables Total W(PQs) W(PQs) to Commission W(PQs) to Council Total PQs Total O(PQs) O(PQs) to Commission O(PQs) to Council

10 The independent variables are divided into three categories: in the first group there are variables concerning MEPs ideological position on the two most important dimensions within the EP: left- right and pro/anti European integration (Hix et al. 2007). The second group of variables tell us government or opposition status both at national and supranational level of MEPs parties. The third one are control variables such as attendance or leading position within the EP or EPG and concern specifically features of each MEP. In order to calculate MEPs position both on left- right and pro/anti European Integration dimensions we used as a proxy MEP s national party position calculated from Budge et al. (2006). As a result we have MEPs position on left- right dimension (RILE) as well as on pro/anti European Integration (PROEU). We calculated also the Euclidean distance on these two dimension between each MEP and the European Commission (MEP_COMM_rile and MEP_COMM_proEU) as well as the Council (MEP_COUNC_rile and MEP_COUNC_proEU). We estimated the ideological position of two European institutions calculating mean position of parties making- up them on the two dimensions. Composition of dual executive at European level derived from an update of Political Make- Up dataset (Warntjen et al. 2008). The second set is composed by three dummy variables describing government or opposition status of national as well as supranational MEP s party: a) we included a dummy variable representing if MEP belong to one of the major EPGs in the EP (it takes the value 1 if MEP belong to EPP, PES and ALDE and value 0 otherwise) (MEP_EPG); b) if MEP s national party is in government during all period considered here (from July 2004 to June 2009) (value 3), if his party spend sometimes in opposition and sometimes in government variable (value 2), if national party is in opposition throughout the period of investigation (value 1) (NP_GOV). The composition of national government derived from Doring and Manow (2010). c) if a Commissioner belong to the same national party of the MEP hence variable takes value 1, otherwise value 0 (NP_COMM). The third set of variables concern MEPs characteristics. In particular we controlled if MEPs attendance influences the probability to ask question (ATTENDANCE). Moreover, we are interested in verify if MEP s role within the EP and in the EPG is related to his behaviour. In order to do this we calculated 3 dummy variables that

11 express: 1) if MEP is an EPG leader (it takes value 1 if MEP is in the Bureau of the Group or he is party leader, 0 if not) (PARTY_LEADER); 2) if MEP is member of a key committee within the EP (if MEP belong to one of the following committees takes value 1: environment; budget; economic and monetary; industry; value 0 otherwise) (KEY_COMMITTEE); 3) if MEP is Chair or Vice- Chair of Committee (value 1) (COMMITTEE_LEADER). In addition we include 24 dummy variables indicating the nationality of each MEP capturing the country fixed effects (Bulgaria and Romania have been deleted because their MEPs joining the EP only in 2007, Germany is target group). We know that some MEPs, such as those from United Kingdom, come from countries with a strong tradition of using parliamentary questions or, moreover, institutional features, such as electoral systems, may lead MEPs from some countries to ask more questions than others. Fixed effects is one of the techniques that permit to avoid this kind of problem. Results. From data reported in tables 1 to 3 our hypothesis that MEPs belonging to the major groups within the EP ask lesser PQs (both in oral and written form) than their counterpart from opposition parties seems to be confirmed (direction of coefficient is always negative and the variable is always statistical significant). Also our hypothesis related to the distance between MEPs and dual executive seems to be confirmed: on one side, in written questions the distance is not so relevant in asking questions since the technicality of issues; while on the other side, number of oral questions is much more linked to the ideological distance on European integration dimension with the Council whereas on left-right continuum with the Commission. This difference can be explain once again with different nature of the two institutions: the former is a political organism with leading role in the process of European integration, the later is a technical and bureaucratic organism much more oriented to legislation. Finally, also the third explanatory model founds empirical evidence in our statistical model: when we control the incidence of group leadership on the probability to ask oral PQs with restricted access in plenary time it have a positive and statistical significant coefficient. In other words, this means that in a context of restricted access leadership

12 position play a central role. An unexpected result is the negative and also significant coefficient rises from key committee variable. Table 1. Determinants of total PQs in the EP ( ). total PQs W (PQs) O (PQs) β t-stat. sig. β t-stat. sig. β t-stat. sig. (Constant) -,400,689 -,419,675 1,371,171 ATTENDANCE,063 1,560,119,063 1,562,119,021,538,591 NP_GOV,074 1,352,177,070 1,282,200,098* 1,863,063 MEP_EPG -,135*** -3,120,002 -,130*** -3,002,003 -,136*** -3,277,001 NP_COMM,025,517,605,024,496,620,026,571,568 COMMITTEE_LEADER -,004 -,112,911 -,014 -,374,708,263*** 7,348,000 PARTY_LEADER,004,112,911,001,034,973,096*** 2,662,008 RILE -,034 -,754,451 -,025 -,553,580 -,241*** -5,651,000 PROEU -,147*** -3,113,002 -,149*** -3,163,002,076* 1,685,092 KEY_COMMITTEE -,020 -,539,590 -,073** -2,020,044 AUSTRIA -,005 -,112,911 -,003 -,087,931 -,037 -,973,331 BELGIO,058 1,415,158,058 1,411,159 -,044-1,119,263 CYPRUS,083** 2,199,028,081** 2,150,032,067* 1,849,065 CZECH_REP -,045-1,098,273 -,048-1,175,241,091** 2,329,020 DENMARK -,012 -,294,769 -,008 -,216,829 -,060-1,594,111 ESTONIA -,032 -,833,405 -,032 -,844,399 -,012 -,333,739 FINLAND -,023 -,589,556 -,019 -,483,629 -,068* -1,796,073 FRANCE -,079-1,596,111 -,078-1,568,117 -,062-1,310,191 GREECE,122*** 2,889,004,125*** 2,955,003 -,064-1,588,113 HUNGARY -,032 -,776,438 -,035 -,844,399,042 1,048,295 IRELAND,119*** 3,071,002,123*** 3,168,002 -,088** -2,385,017 ITALY,054 1,119,263,054 1,125,261,022,484,628 LATVIA -,030 -,795,427 -,031 -,818,414,018,500,617 LITHUANIA -,042-1,074,283 -,039-1,016,310 -,053-1,433,152 LUXEMBOURG -,012 -,312,755 -,009 -,245,806 -,029 -,790,430 MALTA -,007 -,178,859 -,005 -,123,902 -,003 -,072,942 NETHERLANDS,058 1,412,158,056 1,383,167,014,371,711 POLAND -,073-1,607,108 -,077* -1,700,090,076 1,739,082 PORTUGAL,035,820,412,034,779,436,009,219,827 SLOVAKIA -,017 -,427,670 -,019 -,493,622,044 1,189,235 SLOVENIA -,026 -,682,496 -,025 -,650,516 -,042-1,148,251 SPAIN,008,155,877,010,195,845 -,073-1,446,149 SWEDEN -,024 -,610,542 -,023 -,562,574 -,023 -,612,541 UK,090 1,564,118,090 1,570,117,027,492,623 Note: OLS with parameter of the model estimated with fixed effects related to nationality; dependent variable: number of total PQs per each MEPs; number of total written questions per each MEPs: W(PQs); number of total oral questions per each MEPs: O(PQs). Observation: 673. Adjusted R 2 : total PQs: 0.090; W(PQs): 0.090; O(PQs): * p 0.1; ** p 0.05; p 0.01.

13 Table 2. Determinants of written EPQs to the Commission and to the Council ( ). W(PQs)_COMM W(PQs)_COUNCIL β t.stat. sig. β t.stat. sig. (Constant) -,052,958 1,173,241 ATTENDANCE,055 1,357,175,034,845,398 MEP_EPG -,136*** -3,117,002 -,171*** -3,846,000 COMMITTEE_LEADER -,021 -,568,571,034,909,364 NP_COMM -,004 -,094,925 PARTY_LEADER,002,039,969 -,032 -,831,406 RILE -,035 -,752,452 -,012 -,259,796 PROEU -,143-1,379,168 -,272*** -2,859,004 KEY_COMMITTEE -,016 -,424,672 -,086** -2,266,024 NP_GOV,048 1,027,305 MEP_COMM_rile,084 1,648,100 MEP_COMM_proEU -,040 -,447,655 MEP_COUNCIL_rile,026,528,598 MEP_COUNCIL_proeu -,262*** -3,180,002 AUSTRIA,004,081,935 -,021 -,474,636 BELGIO,051 1,205,229,131*** 3,154,002 CYPRUS,088** 2,295,022,056 1,457,146 CZECH_REP -,048-1,112,267 -,071* -1,656,098 DENMARK -,007 -,183,855 -,054-1,319,188 ESTONIA -,027 -,690,490 -,032 -,837,403 FINLAND -,020 -,476,635 -,039 -,921,357 FRANCE -,052 -,976,330 -,095-1,726,085 GREECE,136*** 3,178,002,054 1,250,212 HUNGARY -,013 -,280,779 -,067-1,398,163 IRELAND,127*** 3,138,002,080** 2,012,045 ITALY,054,942,347,008,145,885 LATVIA -,026 -,633,527 -,042-1,050,294 LITHUANIA -,030 -,735,463 -,053-1,307,192 LUXEMBOURG -,007 -,167,867 -,008 -,211,833 MALTA -,002 -,049,961 -,021 -,545,586 NETHERLANDS,060 1,321,187,032,700,484 POLAND -,056-1,003,316 -,110** -2,007,045 PORTUGAL,033,712,477 -,008 -,177,860 SLOVAKIA -,019 -,490,624 -,021 -,531,596 SLOVENIA -,018 -,453,651 -,043-1,089,276 SPAIN,034,754,451,122** 2,410,016 SWEDEN -,027 -,639,523 -,009 -,224,822 UK,144** 2,182,029,065,938,349 Note: OLS with parameter of the model estimated with fixed effects related to nationality; dependent variable: number of written questions to the Commission; number of written questions to the Council. Observation: 673. Adjusted R 2 : written PQs to the Commission: 0.084; written PQs to the Council: * p 0.1; ** p 0.05; p 0.01.

14 Table 3. Determinants of oral EPQs to the Commission and to the Council ( ). O(PQs)_COMM O(PQs)_COUNCIL β t.sta. sig β t.sta. sig (Constant),153,878 1,028,304 ATTENDANCE,014,375,708 -,001 -,030,976 MEP_EPG -,095** -2,321,021 -,178*** -4,339,000 COMMITTEE_LEADER,274*** 7,739,000,184*** 5,287,000 PARTY_LEADER,101*** 2,812,005,067** 1,918,056 RILE -,183*** -4,209,000 -,362*** -8,474,000 PROEU,259*** 2,668,008,120 1,372,171 KEY_COMMITTEE -,080** -2,237,026 -,061* -1,739,083 NP_COMM,053 1,317,188 MEP_COMM_proEU,069,814,416 MEP_COMM_rile,196*** 4,100,000 MEP_COUNCIL_rile -,036 -,472,637 MEP_COUNCIL_proeu,201*** 4,335,000 NP_GOV,082* 1,905,057 AUSTRIA,034,818,414 -,042-1,046,296 BELGIO,003,067,946 -,041-1,065,287 CYPRUS,105*** 2,903,004,058* 1,652,099 CZECH_REP,125*** 3,120,002,043 1,090,276 DENMARK -,038 -,985,325 -,064* -1,697,090 ESTONIA,016,439,661 -,016 -,457,648 FINLAND -,033 -,834,404 -,074* -1,909,057 FRANCE,055 1,111,267 -,077-1,520,129 GREECE,023,567,571 -,117*** -2,957,003 HUNGARY,146*** 3,295,001,032,730,466 IRELAND -,032 -,842,400 -,087** -2,356,019 ITALY,145*** 2,677,008 -,039 -,743,458 LATVIA,071 1,852,064,017,456,648 LITHUANIA,017,446,656 -,068* -1,822,069 LUXEMBOURG,016,424,671 -,040-1,108,268 MALTA,004,121,903,009,252,801 NETHERLANDS,069 1,606,109,036,858,391 POLAND,284*** 5,373,000 -,043 -,847,397 PORTUGAL,067 1,551,121 -,035 -,828,408 SLOVAKIA,097*** 2,609,009 -,039-1,072,284 SLOVENIA,008,212,832 -,039-1,056,292 SPAIN,009,220,826 -,081* -1,733,084 SWEDEN,024,606,545 -,063-1,626,104 UK,181*** 2,917,004,122* 1,906,057 Note: OLS with parameter of the model estimated with fixed effects related to nationality; dependent variable: number of oral questions to the Commission; number of oral questions to the Council. Observation: 673. Adjusted R 2 : oral PQs to the Commission: 0.190; oral PQs to the Council: * p 0.1; ** p 0.05; p 0.01.

15 Conclusions. There are multiple avenues for MEPs to achieve their multi-goals: attending; voting; writing questions; asking questions; amending reports; speaking in plenary and so on. While we have theoretical and empirical foundation on most of these different kind of behaviour we have only just began to understand why MEPs choose to ask questions to the European Commission and to the European Council. In this paper we find three factors that seem to increase the probability of a MEP to ask PQs: the first one is his EPG, if a MEP belong to an opposition group he has more probability to ask a questions. This conclusion is important because underlines a model of relationship between the executive and legislative institutions at European level that pushes the European political system some steps forward in its normalization process, that is from this point of view is similar to the other parliamentary systems at national level. The second one is that MEPs chose to whom ask questions on the basis of ideological distance from the Council and the Commission. The choice is not only limited to ideal point of the two actors but also included the political (the Council) and bureaucratic (the Commission) nature of them: left- right dimension will be a central variable in asking PQs to the Commission while European Integration become central when MEPs send a question to the Council. Finally, our research found also that written questions are a backbencher activities since it is without any kinds of restrictions, while the oral questions are a frontbench arena in which the leadership of parliamentary group play a central role.

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