1. Consequences of eastwards enlargement on E.U. institutions

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1 E.U. INSTITUTIONS AND EASTWARDS ENLARGEMENT By Giedre Matelyte-Garbacauskiene Introduction The idea of the United Europe before becoming political conception and long-term goal was only know to philosophers and scientists. The phenomenon of European Union is not homogeneous. The E.U was formed through many years and was effected by many factors. Past decade has left significant impact on the development of E.U. The main goals of the European Union state that is sought to create ever closer union for the citizens of Europe. While creating European there were established the institutions of the European Union: EU Council, EU Parliament, the European Commission and the Court of Justices. These institutions became the crucial tools for the carrying out the goals of the EU. Agenda 2000 states that the important argument which equally serves for the interests of the candidate states as well as for the union itself is the one that the union while accepting new members is not going to slow down the speed of its own integration. In other words we can say that it is significant to note that not only candidates, but also the E.U. has to be prepared for the planned enlargement. The objective of this article is to present some ideas or speculations regarding the eastern enlargement of the E.U. and dwell upon its consequences on E.U. institutions. E.U. institutions are main bodies that are going to administer the process of the accession of new members; therefore it is important to try to foresee what is going to happen. The study tries to answer into question whether the procedure and principals created in E.U. having at that moment 6 members are sufficient and effective for the union including 25 or even more member-states? In addition, the work presents brief analysis of the consequences of eastwards enlargement on the work of E.U Council and Commission. The idea of the increased influence of small states in the work of the Council will be presented in this part. In addition, there also to be discussed the issue of the presidency of E.U. and the procedure of decision making after the eastern enlargement. 1. Consequences of eastwards enlargement on E.U. institutions As it was previously mentioned, differently form the previous enlargement stages, eastwards enlargement emphasizes the fact that not only the candidate countries, but also E.U. itself has to be prepared for this process. According to the principles of the proportionality new member-states have to be represented in all E.U. institutions: from the Council to Committee of Regions and etc. It is common knowledge that while changing the structure of the institutions it will be undergone administrative and financial expenses (Presidency Conclusions, 1999). Thus, all analysis and discussion pay the biggest attention to 3 central E.U. institutions: to the Council, the Parliament and the Commission. First of all, these institutions are significant due to the political decisions that they are adopting. In addition, they are also main executive bodies. Besides, the principle of the proportionality of the representation of the member-states in such institutions influences the process of the decision making. After the previous stages of E.U. enlargement and with the accession of new members, the principles of the representations of countries have not been changed: the number of votes in the Council is given according to the number of population of the country. Every country is represented in the European Commission. For example, one commissioner represents Luxembourg

2 ( population) as well as one commissioner stands for the Netherlands (15.7 million of population). Therefore, the question arises whether the principles and procedure created for 6 member-states are still valid and are effective when now we are going to have 25 or even more countries represented in the E.U. institutions? What are going to be the consequences of E.U. enlargement to the work of its institutions? 1.1 The increasing influence of small countries to the work of the Council According to Ludlow the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the E.U. can cause the decreasing of the legitimacy, effectiveness and flexibility of the work of the Council, Commission and Parliament. However, it is foreseen that the main influence could be to the work of the Council. It is caused by the distribution of votes among the member-states and by the procedures of decision making. Now the biggest number of the decisions is adopted based on the principle of unanimity. A number of researchers state that if this principle is not going to be revised and new member-states are going to be accepted, then small countries are going to gain bigger voting power (See table 1). Thus, according to the given data we can draw the following conclusions: 1) While accepting new members, the previous voting capacity is decreased, for example: voting power of four largest countries is decreased from 11,2 % to 8,5 %, while Luxembourg s from 2,3% to 1,9%; 2) Accession of Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) could cause such fact that the power of voting of small countries is going to change less than that of the larger countries; 3) it is worthwhile mentioning that the larger majority of votes is needed for the adoption of certain decisions, the bigger voting power small countries are going to have. Such differentiation of voting power has a vital influence to the decision making at the Council. It is quite probable that if the principle of unanimous voting is still required, it will be much more difficult to reach one common decision as countries may have very different interests. If the qualified majority voting changes unanimous voting procedure, then countries may form coalitions. Such coalitions may be especially prevailing when Central and Eastern European countries are accepted to the E.U. (for example, three Baltic states) Table No. 1 Differentiation of voting at the Council in case of 1) simple majority voting, 2) 2/3 qualified majority, 3) 90% majority voting, the E.U. 15 members Countries Votes (87) ½ (44/87) 2/3 (58/87) Qualified majority (70/87) France, 90% (78/87)

3 Germany, Italy, the U.K. Spain Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal Austria, Sweden Denmark, Finland, the Eire Luxembourg Table Nr. 2. Differentiation of voting at the Council in case of 1) simple majority voting, 2) 2/3 qualified majority, 3) 90% majority voting, provided that the E.U. has 22 member Countries Votes (87) ½ (44/87) 2/3 (58/87) Qualified majority (70/87) 90% (78/87) France, Germany, Italy, the U.K. Spain, Poland Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, the Czech republic, Hungary Austria, Sweden Denmark, Finland, the Eire Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Slovenia Source: Raunio T., Wiberg M. Winners and Losers in the Council: Voting Power Consequences of EU Enlargements.// Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 36, No. 4 P. 553, 557 However, the differentiation of the voting power is not the only one consequence of the eastward enlargement to the work of the Council. In addition, we have also dwell upon the question of the presidency at the Council. Now every country based on the rotation basis holds the presidency for 6 months every 7,5 years. Provided the E.U. has 26 member-states, every country will hold the presidency every 13 years. This situation may cause several negative consequences: 1) after the accession of CEE countries, the number of the small countries will increase. Thus, the

4 previously mentioned countries more often and for longer periods will potentially hold presidency (after the accession of 10 CEE countries and of Cyprus, small memberstates will hold presidency for 9,5 years form total 13 years); 2) Dehousse et al state that small countries are less heard in the arena of international politics, however they can pay great role in the affairs of the E.U. Having these ideas in mind we can say that if small, newly accepted E.U. countries are going to hold presidency for longer period, this may influence bigger weight of such countries in international politics; 3) besides, so long rotation period may also slow down the initiation of the reforms (Dehousse, 1998) 1.2 Consequences of the enlargement to the work of European Commission The role of the European Commission is exceptional compared to the other E.U. institutions. It carries out the analysis of E.U. policies, determines general interests of the activities of the E.U., makes decision on the implementation of the E.U. policies and reviews the budget of the E.U. Now about civil servants and consultants work for the Commission. It has 20 commissioners (each country appoints one commissioner with the exception of the biggest countries which each appoints 2 commissioners) who are appointed based on the national principle. It is common knowledge that each commissioner has its own sphere of which he or she is responsible. Provided that CEE countries are accepted to the E.U. and the number of the commissioners is then increased to 31 or even more, we may claim this process is fair but, the question arises whether the Commission is able to operate effectively. Dehousse claims that the increasing of the number of the commissioners may cause the split of the areas of responsibility among the commissioners or in other words more than one commissioner may be responsible for certain sphere. Due to this reason the level of the responsibility of the commissioners may be lower and much narrower. The same may happen if the number of the commissioners is not increased but they are going to rotate for certain periods. Besides, the increased number of the commissioners and their quite different interests could also influence the difficulties in the decision making process - it may become slower. The Commission can sometimes be similar to the debate club. Besides, the previously mentioned differentiation of national interests at the Commission may influence the slower speed of the E.U. integration (Dehousse, 1998). 1.3 E.U enlargement and institutional reforms While participating in the process of decision making the power and influence of the E.U. member-states is not equal: small countries have greater power of voting and are unproportionally better represented at the E.U. institutions. It goes without saying that the process of decision making in the E.U. is not flexible and quite complicated. Based on the ideas that were previously expressed the accession of CEE countries to the E.U. may cause bigger influence of the small states and the decrease of the voting power of the larger states. In addition, the increased numbers of commissioners and MPs may also impose the differentiation of interests among new and old, bigger and smaller states. This differentiation in its turn could make the process of decision making even

5 more complicated. Therefore, E.U. eastwards enlargement without institutional reforms may have negative consequences to the work of E.U. institutions, especially having in mind the aspects of flexibility and effectiveness. Therefore, institutional reforms are necessary. According to the Action plan of the reforming of the Commission the reforms should be carried out in two years i.e. to the year However, member-states can not agree on even minimal changes as well as their discussions are not open to the general public. This last fact is especially sensible for the citizens of Europe. Although one or the other way institutional reforms are inevitable. In fact, institutional reforms are directly connected with the success of eastwards enlargement. Summarizing it could be noted that eastward enlargement is an essential circumstance, which serves for the stimulation of institutional reforms. In this case E.U. enlargement is a positive consequence for further enhancement of E.U. integration and its administrative capacities. Institutional reforms should bring the strengthening of E.U. position. It may become influential and effectively operating supranational institution. Moreover, it is significant to mention that the expressed ideas are pure theoretical speculations. The author of this article does not attempt to provide final solutions or analysis. The topic could be especially interesting and important for the civil servants of candidate states who work with E.U. issues in order to better understand the process of eastern enlargement and to draw the conclusions from possible difficulties that E.U. institutions could face during that period. In fact, we have to realize that not only candidate countries have to undergo administrative reforms and improve public administration systems, but also E.U. institutions feel urgent need of institutional reform and changes in procedures and principles. This topic is quite new in Lithuania and is not widely discussed in our academic society. At the moment the biggest attention is paid to the problems of the current E.U. development, especially Lithuanian society is interested in Lithuania s possibilities to become the member of the E.U. However, the E.U. may not be physically prepared to accept new members without first undergoing institutional reforms. Finally, the article attempts to present some suppositions what could give useful hints how to improve and change in order to avoid many administrative difficulties as well as make eastwards enlargement a success. List of reference 1. Agenda 2000 (Komisijos nuomonė apie Lietuvos paraišką narystei ES)(1997) Vilnius 2.Amsterdamo sutartis ir Lietuvos pasirengimas narystei Europos Sąjungoje(konferencijos medžiaga) (1997) Vilnius 3. Baldwin, R.E (1994)Towards an Integrated Europe. London: Center of Economic Policy 4. Cini, Michelle (1996) The European Commission. Leadership, Organization and Culture in the E.U. Administration. Manchester: Manchester University Press

6 5. Dehousse, Renaud (1998) European Institutional Architecture after Amsterdam: Parliamentary System or Regulatory Structure? European University Institute, Warking Paper, RSC No. 98/11 6. Europe: the Impossible Status Quo. (1997) Brussels: European Integration University 7. Giering, C. (1998) Chances for Institutional Reform. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers 8. Raunio, T., Wilberg, M. (1998) Winners and Losers in the Council: Voting Power Consequences of E.U. Enlargement. Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 36: Williams, Allan M. (1996) Europos Bendrija: Integracijos Prieštaravimai. Vilnius: Alma Litera