A Public Transport Development Authority for Melbourne

Transcription

1 A Public Transport Development Authority for Melbourne Prepared by Professor John Stanley for BusVic January,

2 Executive Summary A key part of the incoming Liberal-Nationals Coalition Government policy platform has been the establishment of an independent Public Transport Development Authority,... to plan, co-ordinate and manage our public transport system. The accompanying paper takes these policy pronouncements as given and looks at a number of matters that will need to be resolved in the process of establishing the PTDA. The paper draws on Victorian State Services Authority thinking about public sector design principles and on broader framework thinking that separates the strategic (or policy), tactical (or system design) and operational (or delivery) levels within the transport sector. The high level organisational arrangements proposed in the paper are as shown. DOT would be responsible for providing Strategic level advice to the Minister and for the sectoral transport planning to support that function, together with matters involving interactions with other portfolios. These responsibilities would include advice to the Minister on portfolio budget/funding bids, which will assist the achievement of an integrated approach at sectoral level. The PTDA and VicRoads would both perform system planning roles, for public transport and roads respectively, consistent with the sectoral policy and planning framework established by the Minister and DOT. They would also each have responsibilities for managing operational level service delivery activities. The Minister would appoint a small group of independent expert advisers to provide advice on portfolio policy and planning matters and on high level system design matters within the public transport and roads areas. 2

3 At a more detailed level, PTDA responsibilities should include matters such as the following: operational planning for the public transport network; planning, purchasing and delivering public transport services, including the scheduling of mass transit services to improve integration; managing and maintaining some infrastructure for public transport services, including (for example), bus stops and on-road bus facilities; delivering and managing infrastructure that is critical for public transport services; improving and expanding the range of public transport services; establishing a single point of contact for public transport customer service issues; managing public transport service contracts; managing integrated public transport ticketing (as delivered by TTA); providing system marketing services (in this regard, Metlink s functions should be rolled into the PTDA. A Board of 10 is proposed for the PTDA, comprising: an Independent Chair 2 local government representatives (including one from outer metropolitan councils) 2 state government representatives (probably one from the transport portfolio and one from the planning side) 2 community representatives 3 persons with high level public transport understanding (not all rail). Establishing the PTDA should provide greater role clarity within the transport portfolio and create opportunities for administrative efficiencies. 3

4 CONTENTS 1. Context Public Sector Design Principles Role of DOT The PTDA Clarity on Planning Roles System Marketing Major Projects Formalising Role Clarity Some Lessons from Elsewhere Roles and Responsibilities Governance: Some Overseas Models TransLink, Vancouver ZVV Zurich Transport for London Queensland and TransLink PTDA Governance High Level Arrangements PTDA Board Composition Staff Skills References

5 1. Context A key part of the incoming Liberal-Nationals Coalition Government policy platform has been establishing an independent Public Transport Development Authority,... to plan, co-ordinate and manage our public transport system. The Sunday 14 th November Press Release, Coalition to Rebuild the Basics of Vic Public Transport Network, argues that: Victoria s and Melbourne s public transport needs have been poorly planned for and badly financed. John Brumby has not provided the safety, reliability and efficiency that Victorians deserve. Trains do not run on time. Commuters feel unsafe at stations and on trains, especially at night. All forms of public transport are overcrowded and uncoordinated. Our public transport projects run over budget, late or both. The Press Release announces the intention to set up a Public Transport Development Authority (PTDA) and provide it with $10 million in funding over four years to rescue the Victorian public transport network. The Authority will be a single public transport authority to administer metropolitan trams, buses and trains, regional trains and buses, replacing Labor s current confusing structure of multiple agencies and authorities. The Department of Transport will be retained under the Coalition s plan. The Press Release goes on to say that: The Authority will be tasked with: Auditing all Victorian public transport assets and reporting publicly on the value and condition of those assets and the cost of renewing them to bring them up to 21 st century standards; Promoting the extension of the public transport network, especially rail; Delivering a safe, punctual, reliable and clean public transport network; Ensuring services are integrated and priorities for expansion are identified and acted on; Analysing service improvement proposals; Allocating funding for maintenance and renewals; Auditing works programs; Actively promoting public transport to Victorian families as an alternative to the car. This is a commendable set of roles, the conduct of which will require far more than $10 million over four years. It is thus assumed that the $10 million is in addition to funding for existing activities that are transferred into PTDA to enable it to undertake the above set of tasks (e.g. Metlink funding; some planning funding from the current DOT; contracts management funding from DOT). The Press Release says that: 5

6 The Authority will be governed by an independent board including a Chair, a community representative and other members with high-level expertise in the rail industry. The Authority will be the primary liaison point with franchisees and other agencies in the public transport sector, working co-operatively with them to improve the integration of their functions and services. This paper takes these policy pronouncements as given and looks at a number of matters that will need to be resolved in the process of establishing the PTDA. In section 2, it summarises some high level institutional design considerations that need to be taken into account in the establishment of the new entity. Section 3 considers the role of the Department of Transport in an institutional setting that includes a Public Transport Development Authority. Section 4 discusses some roles of the PTDA, highlighting some areas where boundary issues will require attention to assure clarity in roles and responsibilities. Section 5 draws on some well regarded models that involve an entity similar to PTDA, to help inform how the PTDA might be established and further elaborate the roles it might perform. Section 6 considers some specific governance issues of importance to the PTDA. The paper does not attempt to be exhaustive in its scope or coverage but it does suggest a way forward and highlights a number of issues, the resolution of which will be instrumental in determining the success of the proposed entity. 2. Public Sector Design Principles Before exploring possible institutional design for the proposed PTDA, it is helpful to think more broadly about generic public sector design principles, within which the specific issues associated with establishing a Victorian PTDA can be explored, since the new Authority will need to operate within an established institutional environment. That environment includes, importantly, the Department of Transport and VicRoads, as the major governmental agencies with land transport responsibilities that impinge directly and closely on what PTDA might do. The Victorian State Services Authority (2008) 1 points out that governance encompasses processes by which organisations are directed, controlled and held to account. This refers to the processes whereby decisions important to the future of an organisation are taken, communicated, monitored and assessed. It refers to the authority, accountability, stewardship, leadership, direction and control exercised in the organisation. The SSA has developed public sector governance and institutional design principles as part of its broader governance mandate. Box 1, which is drawn from a report that was lead authored by the present writer when a part-time Commissioner of the SSA, outlines these general principles of public sector governance and institutional design (SSA 2008). They provide important background to thinking about the PTDA. The SSA (2008) report used five criteria with which to evaluate alternative possible institutional arrangements between the Department of Transport and VicRoads, which are equally relevant to consideration of institutional design for the new PTDA within the Transport portfolio. Those five criteria were (SSA, 2008, p. 27): 1 State Services Authority (2008). Review of the Governance and Operational Capability of VicRoads, Final report. 6

7 governance - all relevant agencies have clear roles and responsibilities; functions are appropriately allocated (in line with public sector design principles); there are clear reporting and monitoring arrangements; integration - the arrangements improve integration of transport policy and planning across modes and support co-ordination between transport and land use planning; sustainability - the arrangements provide adequate mechanisms to engage the community and other levels of government; capability attraction and retention of the appropriate mix of skills and capabilities is facilitated and positive organisational branding and corporate knowledge is retained; and implementation the arrangements can be implemented efficiently and effectively. Box 1: Public Sector Design Principles (drawn from SSA 2008, p. 22). Role of a Minister Accountable to Parliament for portfolio matters including the application of Government policies to activities within the portfolio. The Minister responsible for a public entity is accountable to the Parliament in respect of the exercise by the public entity of its functions, and the exercise by the Minister of his or her powers in relation to the public entity. Role of a Department (such as DOT) General: Principal source of advice to the Minister for portfolio matters. This includes high level policy and strategic planning functions for the portfolio, and regulatory policy. Policy functions should sit with the Department rather than public entities. Manages portfolio budget. This includes controlling major portfolio revenue sources and developing high level expenditure priorities within parameters set by the Minister and Cabinet. Performs the purchaser or customer role in major procurement. Undertakes service functions that warrant a high level of Governmental or Ministerial control over how they are carried out. Regarding public entities: Advises the Minister on the design of public entities in the portfolio. This includes function mix, accountability and performance relationships, and other administrative and governance matters. Monitors the performance (financial and non-financial) of public entities in the portfolio. Has regular contacts with public entities in the portfolio and should be aware at an early stage of significant initiatives being developed by the entities. Where practicable, the Department can prepare advice in advance of an entity briefing the Minister. Role of a Public Entity (such as PTDA, VicRoads) Complementary to Departmental role. Undertakes functions warranting a degree of independence and less Governmental or Ministerial control. Purchases and delivers services on behalf of the Government in accordance with plans and budgets agreed with the Minister and the Department. The entity s board and management are accountable for the efficient and effective operation of the entity. 7

8 In analysing governance arrangements between DOT and VicRoads, SSA (2008) distinguished between the Strategic (policy), Tactical (system design) and Operational levels of transport. Figure 1 indicates the kinds of activities that are typically included in each of these stages within the transport portfolio. Direction setting takes place at the Strategic or policy level, which the SSA framework (Box 1) clearly designates as the role of the responsible Minister, advised by their Department. Putting the systems/networks in place to achieve the policy directions is the Tactical level role, which can also include some activities that cross operational boundaries (e.g. system/service marketing). It is particularly at this Tactical level that role allocation between the Department and sectoral public entities is often uncertain and needs a focus on providing clarity, for effective and efficient performance. Sections 4 and 5 consider such issues in more detail. Delivery is the Operational level function. With respect to the PTDA, role allocation between the Authority and service deliverers will need a clear focus, particularly on activities where both can argue legitimate domain, depending on the contractual setting (e.g. service marketing versus system marketing). Figure 1: Strategic, Tactical and Operational Levels in Transport Against this generic background on institutional design, some of the key issues to consider in designing the PTDA can be outlined. 8

9 How can the focus on providing an integrated transport system be sustained when an additional sectoral entity is being established? How should planning/prioritisation responsibilities be divided between the DOT and the principal agencies responsible for network performance, PTDA and VicRoads? Related to this, what level of autonomy should PTDA have in setting priorities? How should the marketing functions be allocated between DOT, the PTDA and operators? Will the establishment of PTDA necessitate a revision of existing contractual arrangements with PT operators (franchisees)? How important should community consultation/engagement be in the work of the PTDA? What particular capabilities are required for directors of the PTDA? How will the PTDA acquire suitably skilled staff? 3. Role of DOT As noted above, the Strategic or policy level is widely accepted as being a role for a Minister, advised by their Department. In transport at State Government level, this advice will include policy integration (within the portfolio and across portfolios), sectoral transport planning and advice cross all relevant modes of transport and across sectors that impact on, and are impacted by, transport. Land use is very important in this regard but strong connections are also apparent between transport and areas such as economic development, social policy, educational policy, environmental policy, etc. The incoming government s Press Releases appear to accept the logic of this position. This paper thus assumes that, with the importance placed on integration in the case for setting up an Authority, the incoming government will generally agree with the high level triple bottom line goals set out in the current Victorian Transport Integration Act, which says (in Clauses 8, 9 and 10), that the State s transport system should:... provide a means by which persons can access social and economic opportunities to support individual and community wellbeing... facilitate economic prosperity actively contribute to environmental sustainability. Similar goals appear in most international transport legislation. The decision-making principles set out in the Transport Integration Act are also contemporary and relevant in a continuing sense for the PTDA. In announcing its intention to retain the DOT and establish the PTDA, including the associated listing of the PTDA s functions (as outlined in Section 1 above), the incoming government is suggesting that the DOT s roles with respect to public transport will probably contract from the current span and will focus on tasks such as: 1. advising the Minister on sectoral policy (including transport policy within a whole-ofgovernment context), including preparation of a sectoral transport plan to achieve the intent of the new government s policy framework and provide a key platform for integration. This task will require integration of the activities of the PTDA and VicRoads, as the two principal land transport entities within the portfolio with land transport network responsibilities; 9

10 2. assembling portfolio funding bids, to the State and Federal Governments, to contribute to portfolio program delivery (with all the associated work this requires, such as forward programming at the sectoral level, working with the operating entities, such as PTDA); 3. performing a range of supporting tasks that inform the high level policy function, examples of which are included in Figure 1. This is consistent with the SSA public sector design principles outlined in Box 1. The Department should not be involved in system marketing, which is a Tactical level task, but it should retain an important research role, to support its transport policy and transport network planning functions and a sufficient modal capability to be able to judge proposals from the key delivery agencies and to monitor the performance of those entities. This research role should include extensive consultation with portfolio stakeholders about research priorities and there should be widespread dissemination of findings, to raise understanding and awareness. Much valuable departmental research is not made publicly available, such as the Melbourne Bus Plan studies. Making such material publicly available, as an expectation, should help to improve community understanding of transport issues and possible solutions, plus relevant funding opportunities and constraints. Joint research projects between DOT, PTDA and public transport operators should be pursued, as a useful way of aligning thinking across the portfolio. Figure 1 suggests that the evaluation of major public transport improvement projects, such as an airport rail link and interstate high speed rail, might conceivably be given to DOT or to the PTDA. The incoming State Government has specifically indicated that it will establish a high speed rail advocacy unit within the PTDA, to push for the construction of inter-capital high speed rail links between Melbourne and Sydney, Canberra, Brisbane and Adelaide. If this advocacy role is to be located in the PTDA, then implicitly the planning function on which that advocacy is founded might also be established within PTDA. This task allocation raises the issue more generally of when planning and decision taking responsibility passes from DOT to the PTDA (and VicRoads), a matter to which I turn in Section The PTDA The PTDA will become the responsible system planning/delivery agency for public transport, complementing the VicRoads role for roads and roles of port authorities. This discussion focuses on the public transport Tactical side. The PTDA Tactical function is not public transport service delivery, which is operational, but filling the space between policy and operations. That means, inter alia, developing integrated public transport plans for the various parts of the State, planning and managing the delivery of relevant services (inc. contract management in Victoria s privatised public transport service delivery systems), undertaking public transport system marketing (subsuming the current Metlink role), service integration (across trains, trams and buses), integrated ticketing and, most likely, given the incoming government s expressed dissatisfaction with performance on the major projects front, major public transport project management (evaluation, planning and implementation, as the case may be). The performance of these tasks will involve many of the specific activities noted in the Press Release above, such as undertaking system audits and ensuring integrated service delivery across the various networks. A number of issues need attention in this regard. 10

11 Where does the DOT planning role end and the PTDA role commence? What role should individual service providers have in public transport marketing? How will DOT manage its integration function if it is not undertaking the front end tasks in major project management? With the PTDA exercising significant roles, including system marketing, should service delivery contracts for train and tram change towards management contracts, with incentive/penalty provisions (i.e. with less net cost orientation than current contracts)? 4.1 Clarity on Planning Roles In drafting the SSA report on VicRoads governance arrangements (SSA 2008), the present author proposed that that the relevant decision criterion for deciding which governmental entity should have responsibility for transport planning should be whether the decisions that flow from the relevant planning affect the achievement of higher level governmental policy and resource allocation decisions as between the key portfolio entities (e.g. public transport or roads). If they do, then the Department of Transport should be responsible for the planning. If they do not, then the relevant delivery agency should have planning carriage (e.g. VicRoads for arterial road matters; PTDA for public transport planning, in a relationship with franchisees). Figure 2 draws on this criterion and on the Australian Transport Council National Guidelines for Transport System Management 2 to suggest where the relevant organisational roles might lie in a Victorian institutional setting that includes a new PTDA. At the transport system or network level, which includes all modes of transport (including walking and cycling), DOT should have lead planning responsibilities (integrating across person and freight movement and into areas such as land use planning and other key cross government areas). The PTDA should provide proactive input on the public transport system within this process and active operator engagement will also be appropriate on many issues. In shaping its views on such matters, PTDA should consult widely (including with operators), to help ensure sectoral and community buy-in to, and accountability for, its proposals. In that sense it can act as an advocate for public transport within the sectoral resource allocation process, a process that is ultimately settled at the level of the Minister and Department. This ability to act as an advocate is a major benefit of establishing PTDA as a separate statutory authority, since departments traditionally struggle with consulting widely and advocating freely (because of their obligation to advise the Minister). The transport corridor sits below the network within the transport hierarchy. Because transport solutions within a metropolitan corridor (and in interstate corridors) will require resolution of competing bids between (for example) public transport and roads, DOT should lead corridor transport planning, until such time as priorities are settled. The PTDA and VicRoads should again be active participants in this priority determination process and should again engage relevant operators and the community around possibilities and advocate openly for solutions, in the interests of transparency and accountability. Once corridor priorities are determined, the PTDA (and VicRoads, as the case may be) would lead delivery activities in their respective areas of responsibility. 2 Australian Transport Council 2006, National Guidelines for Transport System Management in Australia, Australian Transport Council, Canberra. 11

12 The PTDA will have statewide responsibilities for public transport service delivery. In some cases, it is easier to think of an area than a corridor (e.g. a country town). Public transport planning and priority setting at this level is more reasonably a responsibility for the PTDA, working with the area service provider(s), with the DOT role being a higher level role of balancing competing demands within the overall sectoral resource and funding envelopes. This role allocation is because, in regional and rural areas, the fewer cross-modal impacts that exist, for both freight and passenger movement, will see the logical boundary for role definition tending to be set higher. At the route or link levels, the PTDA would have responsibility for public transport planning and prioritisation, working with the relevant service provider(s). The provider(s) would be expected to proactively identify opportunities to boost patronage and provide better service, with the PTDA leading the planning/priority setting process (and similarly VicRoads for road initiatives). Transport System (Network) Corridor Area Route Link Fig. 2: Transport Planning Levels 4.2 System Marketing As cited above, the incoming government has said that: The Authority will be a single public transport authority to administer metropolitan trams, buses and trains, regional trains and buses, replacing Labor s current confusing structure of multiple agencies and authorities. Removing some of this complexity should include moving the system marketing function to PTDA and abolishing Metlink/Viclink, although there may be some merit in retaining these particular brands (if not the organisation) for their brand recognition in relation to passenger information (e.g. the Metlink journey planner; bus stop branding). Such issues should be informed by market research into the value of the respective brands but it does seem unnecessarily wasteful to seek to re-brand a whole public transport network (at least at the level of passenger information), less than a decade after that had most recently been undertaken. If the marketing function is taken over by the PTDA, the implication is that system marketing becomes more removed from operator control. A corollary is that the train and tram operators will have less control over the public transport revenue stream, which forms part of their remuneration. They should, 12

13 therefore, be exposed to less revenue side risk. This suggests that the relevant train and tram contracts should probably morph into gross cost contracts with patronage, operational performance and service quality incentive components. Provided a patronage incentive remains in operator/franchisee contracts, then marketing of individual operator services should remain as an opportunity for operators. 4.3 Major Projects Transport Plans need to make provision for upcoming major land transport projects, some of which will be public transport projects. If DOT has responsibility for transport system planning, then by implication it should be responsible for the process that settles priorities on major projects, especially where the preferred mode is contestable. For the very largest projects, such as the East-West Tunnel, special study teams are probably the best approach, drawing across the major likely affected entities and managed by DOT, provided the departmental management process does not stifle the opportunity for extensive community engagement. If the major transport project is nominally a public transport project, such as the rail tunnel, there is still much to be said for the initial evaluation/planning to be undertaken by DOT, because intermodal considerations and interactions outside the transport portfolio will be substantial. The PTDA would clearly need to be intimately involved in the evaluation/planning, as both a contributor to analysis and an advocate. Responsibility would shift to the PTDA once a decision is taken to go ahead with a particular public transport solution or if advocacy for a particular public transport major project is required (as for high speed rail, as included in the incoming government s policy position). 4.4 Formalising Role Clarity In establishing a new independent authority, safeguards are important to ensure that the authority acts in accordance with portfolio policy intent, particularly as regards to integration. The preceding discussion has attempted to provide a basis for role delineation between DOT and PTDA and Section 5 takes up this matter in greater detail. The legislation that creates the PTDA (considered further in Section 5) will provide a vital means of providing role clarity and this can be supported by: an annual Ministerial Statement of Expectations (as applies to VicRoads), which would include the requirement for PTDA to consult closely with the Secretary of DOT (to support portfolio integration) and set out specific directional requirements that the Minister requires of the authority in the next year (e.g. to take account of rail freight needs when planning passenger priorities); the requirement to produce annual plans, with associated funding requirements, for Ministerial approval, through a process managed by DOT at portfolio level (couched within the directions established by the longer term portfolio Transport Plan). Section 5.1 below outlines how TransLink in Vancouver uses base and supplementary plans for this purpose, an approach that should be considered by PTDA/DOT; the establishment of a peak portfolio management group for land transport, that includes the Secretary of DOT and CEOs of PTDA and VicRoads. 13

14 5. Some Lessons from Elsewhere 5.1 Roles and Responsibilities Examination of experience with bodies similar to PTDA elsewhere, especially bodies which are widely recognised as successful, provides a few pointers to how the PTDA should be tasked with performing its functions. As argued above, clarity in the policy directions being required by government is fundamental and, in jurisdictions with successful bodies performing functions like PTDA will perform, the legislation that establishes the entity takes care to spell out the systemic goals to be pursued. These goals are typically expressed in terms of variants of the triple bottom line. For example, the purpose of Vancouver s TransLink (known more formally as the South Coast British Columbia Transportation Authority or SCBCTA), under the SCBCTA Act (section 3) is:... to provide a regional transportation system that: (a) moves people and goods, and (b) supports (i) the regional growth strategy (ii) provincial and regional environmental objectives, including air quality and greenhouse gas emission reduction objectives, and (iii) the economic development of the transportation service region. These purposes specify goods movement because TransLink also has important responsibilities in relation to major roads, a role that will not be relevant for the PTDA. The key point is that Translink s purpose is clearly grounded in high level provincial goals. It was noted above that Victoria s Transport Integration Act provides a useful framework in this regard, which seems consistent with Liberal- Nationals intent at the highest goal level. Beyond high level goals, the specific responsibilities of the entity must be clear, to avoid the ambiguities that the incoming government has recognised with existing lines of authority/responsibility. Legislation frequently goes to some detail to set out expectations in this area. For example, the WA Public Transport Authority Act 2003 sets down clearly in its Clause 21 the content requirements of a public transport operational plan that is to be sent to the Minister for approval. Queensland s Transport Operations (Passenger Transport) Act 1994 also sets out in some detail required contents of passenger transport strategies. A particularly useful approach is followed in Vancouver, where the legislation requires TransLink to prepare an annual base plan that sets out what they intend to do in the period covered by the plan, at (effectively) existing funding levels. This is essentially a care and maintenance plan, with minimal improvement. The incoming government s roles for the PTDA specifically refer to allocating funding for maintenance and renewals, which is achieved in Vancouver through the base plan. If the Authority (Translink) wants to undertake improvements that require additional funding (it is no surprise that it does!), the base plan must be accompanied by a supplementary plan that argues the case for the improvements and proposes funding mechanisms. This distinction between a base plan and supplementary plan provides good clarity of purpose and the foundation for a robust debate about the merits of proposals, in which the entity can act as an advocate. Extensive consultation is required by the SCBCTA Act on a range of matters, including such plans, which also assists transparency and accountability. 14

15 5.2 Governance: Some Overseas Models Governance will be a critical issue for the success of the PTDA. In this regard, one major concern in regard to the responsibilities of the PTDA is the heavy focus on rail in the Press Releases that announce the policy. This emphasis is both in relation to tasks that PTDA will undertake and also in relation to governance, particularly board positions that require high level rail expertise in the rail industry. The emphasis on rail in the policy announcement must not see a PTDA Board that lacks understanding across tram and bus, land use or that lacks the skill sets that support balanced analysis and decision-making towards an integrated public transport system, within the state s wider transport and delivery areas (critical for an integrated approach). Equally, the heavy emphasis on rail must not distract from the operational requirement to deliver and market a seamless, customer oriented public transport system, not simply react to years of under-performance in heavy rail. I return to board structure in Section TransLink, Vancouver Figure 3 sets out the broad governance arrangements within which TransLink in Vancouver operates. Recognising that the responsibility for public transport service provision in Canada is a local government responsibility and that, in metropolitan areas, this responsibility is typically exercised by local government acting jointly at regional level, TransLink has a Board of Directors who are accountable to a Council of Mayors of the 21 municipalities of the Greater Vancouver region, as well as the Tsawwassen First Nation. The Board is essentially skills based. A Transport Commissioner has also been established, to provide a public performance audit type of role in relation to certain TransLink tasks, as indicated in the Figure. A major difference between TransLink and the PTDA is that the former also has responsibilities in relation to the major road network, which will not be the case with the PTDA. 3 The strong links to local government, however, are noteworthy, particularly in view of the much closer attention now being paid to land use/transport integration in the pursuit of triple bottom line goals in our cities and regions, and the roles that local government plays at this level. Also, with community engagement being increasingly recognised as an essential ingredient in successful urban program planning and delivery, as noted by the Grattan Institute 4, a focus on greater engagement of local government in Victoria s (and Melbourne s) public transport system planning seems desirable. 3 Another major difference is that service delivery is primarily by government owned operating businesses in Vancouver, such as Coast Mountain Bus Company. 4 Jane Francis Kelly (2010). Cities: Who Decides? Grattan Institute Report No , October. 15

16 Figure 3: TransLink Key Governance Arrangements Mayor s Council. Composed of all mayors in Metro Vancouver. Appoints Chair of Council Appoints TransLink Directors. Appoints Commissioner and Dep. Commissioner. Receives and approves transportation and financial plans as laid out in the legislation TransLink Board of Directors. Appoints Chair of board. Appoints CEO. Establishes subsidiaries and appoints boards and chairs. Supervises the management of TransLink s affairs. Prepares and implements long term transport strategies (30 years) & 10 year transport and financial plans. Proposes to the Commissioner a customer satisfaction survey process & conducts surveys annually. Proposes to the Commissioner a customer complaints process and implements it. Publishes an annual report. Holds a public AGM. Approves project and program public consultation plans Commissioner. Advises whether parameters and assumptions (inc. financial estimates) in 10 year transport & financial plans are reasonable. Approves short term fares. Approves customer satisfaction survey process. Approves customer complaint process. Oversees sale of major assets. Publishes an annual report and submits it to the Mayor s Council. 16

17 5.2.2 ZVV Zurich Zurich has become the darling of many public transport commentators, noted for its high quality public transport system and its associated high modal share within the Zurich travel market. Figure 4 outlines top level governance arrangements, within which public transport is planned, managed and provided by ZVV. Responsibility for public transport planning, management and operation sits at Canton level and the ZVV Board is answerable to the cantonal government. Canton Zurich parliament controls ZVV s overall direction through a framework financial appropriation, approved on a two-yearly basis, and a medium/long term strategy. Canton Zurich, which covers an area of 1834km 2 and contains Switzerland s main economic hub, is divided into 171 local government units or communes. The Cantonal role in public transport is the policy role, while the communes have involvement on a number of important issues that are largely tactical (Figure 4), particularly timetables and fares, both levels of government working in conjunction with ZVV. The ZVV Board role is strategic (and, of course, business management), unless the cantonal parliament has specified particular strategic positions. The Chair of the ZVV Board is a representative of the Cantonal government (the shareholder) and the communes are represented, along with the cities of Zurich and Winterthur. Again the strong involvement of local government is apparent. The federal authorities also have a Board position. An interesting element of the ZVV model is the 44 companies that perform either a regional marketing role or public transport service provision. Eight regional marketing companies sounds unnecessarily complex but, if the 44 service providers are not involved in marketing, the marketing delivery model is less complicated. Fig. 4: ZVV (Zurich) Key Governance Arrangements Canton Cantonal government and parliament committee on energy, transport and the environment 171 Communes Marketing, timetable, consultations about fares Principles concerning development, services and fares, framework financial appropriation, budget ZVV Transport Council (or Board of Directors), top management Strategic marketing and finances Eight companies with regional market responsibilities Planning services, tactical marketing and production licensed transport operators and contract carriers Production

18 Figure 5: ZVV Organisational Structure ZVV s responsibility covers strategic leadership, high level service planning, marketing for the integrated system and financing. Figure 5 shows that ZVV has a traditional organisational structure in the public transport arena, based on these roles. Figure 5: ZVV Organisation Structure Worki ng within the strategic framework established by ZVV, the eight regional companies are in charge of operations on a regional basis. They may provide services themselves or contract them out. The regions are vital in service co-ordination between the operators who are active within their respective regions (and in co-operation with the other regions). This has been a problem in Melbourne and the idea of a series of regional committees, organised by PTDA, to help improve network integration in Melbourne, is worth close examination. PTDA staffing could include provision for regional service planning managers, whose role is to support the integration of services within parts of the metropolitan area (with close attention to integration at boundaries, to avoid gaps or non-alignment across boundaries, which will be largely arbitrary). Regional committees should include, at least, service providers and local government representatives from within the region. Definition of regional boundaries should be such as to make regions as self-contained as possible but there will remain a need for close consultation between neighbouring regions to handle service integration for through routes. 18

19 Zurich attributes much of the credit for its success (as evidenced through high public transport mode shares) to its integrated ticketing system and integrated and high quality operations, usually at high frequency. Integration is much easier at high frequency. If Melbourne is to make much progress towards service integration, then increased service frequencies on low frequency routes will be a critical ingredient for success. Current Melbourne frequencies are too low in outer urban areas, in particular. Ideally, frequencies on connecting services would be the same, with short (e.g. 15 or 20 minute) headways. Budget realities will mean that this remains an ideal in some cases. Harmonisation of frequencies then becomes a vital contributor to improving integration, such that connecting services work to timetables that align available services (e.g. 15 minute train services and 30 minute connecting buses, not 40 or 45 minute bus frequencies) Transport for London Transport for London was created as a statutory body by the Greater London Authority Act The GLA is a strategic regional authority, with powers over transport (the delivery of which is exercised through Transport for London), policing (Metropolitan Police Authority), development (London Development Agency) and fire and emergency planning (London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority). Section 141 (1) of the GLA Act says that: The Mayor shall develop and implement policies for the promotion and encouragement of safe, integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities and services to, from and within Greater London. Section 142 requires that: (1)The Mayor shall prepare and publish a document to be known as the transport strategy containing (a) his policies under section 141(1) above... The various London Borough councils are then required (by Clause 145 of the Act) to prepare local implementation plans, containing their proposals for implementing the transport strategy in their area, for approval by the Mayor of London. Section 154 of the GLA Act establishes Transport for London as a body corporate, with a duty to facilitate the discharge by the GLA of the duties under Section 141(1) (the strategic transport plan). TfL is provided with powers to provide, or secure the provision of, public passenger transport services to, from or within Greater London (under Section 173(1)). TfL is accountable to the Mayor of London, who also sits as Chair of the 16 person skills based TfL Board (which is appointed by the mayor). TfL s responsibilities extend to most aspects of London s transport system, including public transport, main roads, traffic management and the London congestion charging scheme. A Commissioner for Transport heads TfL. Internal organisation is based around a top level structure based on 6 Managing Directors: Finance, Surface Transport, London Underground and London Rail, Corporate Counsel, Planning, Marketing and Communications. It is the system marketing function, through the latter directorate, that is perhaps TfL s most public face (e.g. journey planner, smart card). TfL has a trading body (Transport Trading Limited) and a substantial number of functional subsidiaries (e.g. Crossrail Limited, Docklands Light Railway Limited, London Underground Limited, London Bus 19

20 Services Limited). The vast array of subsidiaries may increase focus on delivery but seems likely to create a questionable layer of complexity, for integration, and an added administrative burden. TfL appears close to Vancouver s TransLink in roles and responsibilities, but operating on a larger scale. A significant difference seems to be that, while regional local government is the basis of authority in each of the cities, individual local councils (/boroughs) seem to have a stronger role in Vancouver than in London. The Mayors Council in Vancouver has no parallel in London. London appears a more centralist approach. This presumably reflects a stronger bottom-up influence in the establishment of the Authority in Vancouver, whereas the GLA was the result of national government action in the UK. The Canadian tradition of local government being a public transport service provider, as distinct from the UK tradition of contracting out of public transport to the private sector (since Thatcher times), is also probably relevant to the different standing of individual municipalities as between the two approaches. Melbourne is somewhere in between on this continuum Queensland and TransLink Public transport provision in Brisbane is shaped by the Transport Operations (Passenger Transport) Act 1994 and the Transport Operations (TransLink Transit Authority) Act TransLink was originally a division with Queensland Transport but was established as a separate statutory authority in Queensland has been well recognised for its focus on integration of transport and land use and strong growth in public transport patronage, as is Victoria. These new Queensland arrangements are thus of interest for the PTDA. The Transport Operations (Passenger Transport) Act, or TOPTA, sets out the objectives for provision of passenger transport, which are broadly similar to Victoria s objectives. The Act (Section 5) requires the Chief Executive (the Director of Transport) to develop passenger transport strategies for the Minister s approval and sets down what those strategies are to include (Section 6). Clause 6(1) says that: Passenger transport strategies must include (a) a statement of the specific objectives sought to be achieved; and (b) proposals for the provision of public passenger transport; and (c) criteria for deciding priorities for government spending on public passenger transport, and options for raising the necessary finance; and (d) appropriate performance indicators for deciding whether, and to what extent, the objectives of the strategies have been achieved. Clause 7 requires shorter term passenger transport implementation plans to be prepared for the Minister s approval. Clause 37 gives the chief executive the power to enter into service contracts for the provision of public passenger transport services. The Transport Operations (TransLink Transit Authority) Act 2008 establishes TransLink as a body corporate, to deliver the best possible mass transit services at reasonable cost to government and the community, while keeping government regulation to a minimum, in the TransLink area. Under Clause 14(2), these powers include: (a) operational planning for a mass transit network; 20

21 (b) planning, purchasing and delivering the services, including, for example, by coordinating the scheduling of mass transit services; (c) managing and maintaining infrastructure for the services, including, for example, bus stops and onroad bus facilities; (d) delivering and managing infrastructure that is critical for the services; (e) improving and expanding the range of services; (f) establishing a single point of contact for customer service issues, including, for example, the provision of service information and complaints handling; (g) managing the introduction of new technology to improve services...; 5 (h) improving the governance of services, with local government, consumer and independent expert representations; (i) managing service contracts and other contracts to (i) ensure value for taxpayers through performance based incentives that promote integration, on-time running and customer service; and (ii) minimise fare evasion; (j) managing integrated ticketing, including, for example, by developing fare products; (k) providing information to passengers; (l) carrying out commercial activities related to services to obtain revenue for the performance of its other functions...; (m) making recommendations to them Minister about fare strategies and service levels; (n) giving information to help the development of plans and strategies under other Acts relating to transport; (o) implementing government policies for, or in association with, other government agencies. This comprehensive statement of functions seems a very good starting point for discussion for establishing the PTDA, since the scope of roles for the organisation seems quite consistent with the intent of the incoming government s press releases in relation to the PTDA. TransLink does not have the power to enter into service contracts in its own right, Clause 37 of the TOPTA Act giving this power to the TOPTA CEO. However, it does have this right as the delegate of the TOPTA CEO. TransLink has a board of 7, which includes an independent chair, the TOPTA Chief Executive, a local government CEO and 4 other persons. Feedback from Queensland insiders suggests that TransLInk understands that approval of its network plans depends on close liaison with higher level transport strategies that are prepared by Department, which include the SouthEast Queensland regional Transport Plan. This supports integration within the portfolio. 6. PTDA Governance 6.1 High Level Arrangements The preceding sections have considered a number of issues related to the roles and governance of the proposed PTDA. Figure 6 sets out the core high level relationships that are implied by State Services 5 An example is given, of new ticketing technology. 21

22 Authority public sector design principles, as applied to this case (extending the thinking embodied in the SSA 2008 review of VicRoads governance arrangements). In a set of jurisdictional arrangements where surface transport responsibility is mainly vested in the State Government, the Department of Transport s role (through the Secretary, DOT) is to support the Minister at the State strategic/policy advice level, undertaking the tasks that are needed to perform this role, many of which have been outlined earlier in this report. An update of the Victorian Transport Plan, to reflect the incoming government s priorities, should be an early priority. It is noteworthy that all the good practice case studies outlined in this paper place high importance on getting the strategic/policy framework right and supporting this with a medium to long term transport plan and shorter interval implementation plans. They are also strong on separation of this strategic/policy role from the operational/delivery role. As usual, it is the matter of responsibility for the Tactical or system planning function, which sits between policy and operations, which tends to be the grey area. It is here that problems frequently arise, often concerning who is actually responsible for particular decisions and outcomes. This paper has proposed a way of determining whether planning responsibility should vest in the DOT or in a major delivery agency (e.g. PTDA). To repeat the relevant paragraph from section 4.1: In drafting the SSA report on VicRoads governance arrangements (SSA 2008), the present author proposed that that the relevant decision criterion for deciding which governmental entity should have responsibility for transport planning should be whether the decisions that flow from the relevant planning affect the achievement of higher level governmental policy and resource allocation decisions as between the key portfolio entities (e.g. public transport or roads). If they do, then the Department of Transport should be responsible for the planning. If they do not, then the relevant delivery agency should have planning carriage (e.g. VicRoads for arterial road matters; PTDA for public transport planning, in a relationship with franchisees). Section 4.1 above illustrated what this is likely to mean in practice. PTDA and VicRoads are each shown in Figure 6 as having direct lines of responsibility and accountability to the Minister and interacting closely with DOT on strategic and transport system tactical level issues. PTDA and VicRoads would also need to work closely with each other on many tactical and operational matters, such as public transport on-road priority. Section 4.4 outlined ways in which role clarity can be encouraged between PTDA and other portfolio organisations, particularly DOT, from establishing a solid initial legislative foundation, supported by an annual Statement of Expectations, planning/budgeting processes and other means. In terms of the specific functional responsibilities (established through legislation) that should vest in a new PTDA, the example of TransLink in Queensland, suitably amended to reflect local geography over which responsibility is intended (e.g. such that the PTDA will have responsibility state-wide, with the resourcing and capabilities this requires, not just in Melbourne), provides a good basis for thinking. As cited in section 5.2.4, those responsibilities extend across public transport network planning and operations, system marketing, ticketing, infrastructure, complaint handling, contract management, performance monitoring, etc., subject to conformity with relevant system plans and Ministerial approval on key items. The Transport Ticketing Authority s implementation role should be completed, after which on-going system maintenance/improvement should become the responsibility of PTDA. The Public Transport Ombudsman should remain as a distinct entity, to preserve the independence of that 22

23 role (which could involve hearing criticism of the PTDA). Transport safety regulation should also remain separate for the same reason. Figure 6: Proposed PTDA Governance Arrangements Figure 6 adds the proposal that the Minister should appoint some expert advisers who can provide him/her with independent advice on strategic/policy matters across the portfolio, including matters that relate to the establishment and bedding down of the PTDA within an integrated transport portfolio. This would include independent advice on system development opportunities, major transport plans and on major transport project evaluations, as well as on transport funding options. Sustainable funding is becoming a particularly important issue, given the low rates of transport infrastructure spending that characterised the last three decades of the 20 th century. It is noted that, in 2008, Barry O Farrell, NSW Opposition Leader, proposed an advisory group along these lines as part his ideas for establishing a NSW Integrated Public Transport Authority 6. The SSA (2008) Review of VicRoads governance arrangements proposed a similar arrangement, which was not taken up by the responsible Minister. However, with the establishment of a separate PTDA, the case for adding a small group of independent expert advisers to the Minister is stronger, especially if the main delivery agencies within the portfolio (e.g. VicRoads, PTDA, Port of Melbourne) are enabled to exercise stronger advocacy roles within their responsibility areas (complementing their service delivery functions), as proposed herein. This should help to foster a wider community buy-in to thinking about policy for, and planning of, the state s and Melbourne s transport system and services. This should help to increase the accountability and transparency of the central transport policy making and planning processes, since independent statutory bodies public proposals will need a response from 6 The Expert Advisers in O Farrell s model were advisers between the Minister and the proposed Integrated Public Transport Authority. This paper proposes advising the Minister across the portfolio. 23