Parallel but Separate: Political Recruitment at Three Levels in the UK. Michael Rush (University of Exeter)

Transcription

1 Parallel but Separate: Political Recruitment at Three Levels in the UK Michael Rush (University of Exeter) Paper delivered at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Grenoble, 6-11 April 2001 Workshop 17: Political Careers in a Multi-Level Europe

2 2 Introduction The United Kingdom has had a unitary system of government for most of its history. Formally or constitutionally that continues to be the case, despite the setting up of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales in 1999 and the revival of the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1998, since these arrangements were made by the passing of legislation by the UK Parliament and could be revoked by the same means. In practice, however, revocation or, indeed, modification, is only likely with the agreement of either the electors of these parts of the UK or those institutions themselves, or both. In short, the UK Parliament has created an asymmetrical, quasifederal system. It is asymmetric because, while creating regional political and administrative institutions for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, there are no similar arrangements for England or for the regions of England. It is quasi-federal because in practice it operates in many of the same ways as a federal system. Different political and administrative arrangements for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are not a new phenomenon. Before each of these parts of the UK had, to varying degrees, what was termed devolution. This may be defined as a system of regional decentralisation, which, constitutionally, can be changed at the will of the central or national government. In this devolution may contrasted with federalism, which may be defined as a system of regional decentralisation, which, constitutionally, can be changed only by constitutional amendment, that is with the agreement of the national government and all or a majority of the regional governments, or a majority of the national and regional electorates, or both. Devolution may be legislative, executive or administrative. However, while executive and administrative devolution is possible without legislative devolution, it is difficult to conceive of legislative devolution without the other two.

3 3 Table 1: The Experience of Devolution in the UK A. Pre-1999 Type Wales Scotland Northern Ireland Legislative None None Extensive (suspended 1972) Executive Fairly extensive Extensive Very extensive (suspended 1972) Administrative Fairly extensive Extensive Very extensive B and after Type Wales Scotland Northern Ireland Legislative Secondary only Primary and secondary Primary and secondary Executive Extensive Very extensive Very extensive Administrative Extensive Very extensive Very extensive The UK s experience of devolution is summarised in Table 1. Northern Ireland experienced the combination of all three between 1921 and 1972, when direct rule from London was reimposed, but Scotland and Wales had more limited forms of devolution before These involved executive and administrative devolution, but not legislative devolution. Furthermore, it was considerably more extensive and of much longer standing in Scotland than in Wales. Scotland has had executive and administrative devolution from 1885, when a Secretary for Scotland (later Secretary of State), usually with a seat in the Cabinet, was appointed and a separate Scottish Office or department created. Wales, however, did not have separate ministerial representation until 1951, although there was limited administrative devolution from the early part of the twentieth century, and it was not until 1964 that a Secretary of State for Wales, with a seat in the Cabinet, was appointed and a separate Welsh Office created. In both cases, the responsibility for various policy areas, such as agriculture,

4 4 education, health, and local government all dealt with by separate government departments in England were handled by the Scottish and Welsh Offices and their ministerial teams, centred in Edinburgh and Cardiff respectively. Scotland had also retained its own legal system after the union with England in 1707 and some legislation passed at Westminster was applicable only to Scotland. Northern Ireland constituted a very different case and had the most extensive form of devolution. This resulted from the increasingly bitter struggle between Irish nationalists and successive British governments. At first the nationalists demanded the restoration of the Irish Parliament, abolished in 1800, but the suppression of an unsuccessful rebellion in 1916 led to the almost overwhelming demand for complete independence. This, however, was resisted by the mainly Protestant population of Ulster and resulted in the partition of Ireland in 1920 into the Republic of Ireland, which became independent, in the south and the province of Northern Ireland, which remained part of the UK. Northern Ireland, however, was given extensive devolved or self-government, with its own executive, civil service and legislature. The UK Parliament retained control over foreign affairs and defence, citizenship, customs and excise, income tax, currency, and postal services, but all other matters were dealt with in Belfast. This arrangement lasted from 1921 to 1972, when devolution was suspended following increasing sectarian violence and growing political instability. Subsequent attempts in 1973, 1975 and 1982 to re-establish some form of devolved government foundered and it was not until after the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 that devolved government was restored to Northern Ireland. As before, this involved extensive devolved powers, but now exercised by a power-sharing executive consisting of representatives of all the main parties and responsible to the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Northern Ireland civil service, which remained intact during

5 5 the period of direct rule, became the administrative arm of the devolved government. The first elections to the Assembly were held in The more extensive devolution that came into operation in Scotland and Wales in 1999 was the result of the growth of electoral support for nationalist parties demanding independence, on the one hand, and the adoption by the Labour Party of proposals for greater devolution. Labour s first attempt in to extend devolution failed and, since the Conservatives strongly opposed devolution, nothing further happened until Labour returned to power in 1997, after eighteen years of Conservative rule. Greater devolution to Scotland and Wales was part of a wider package of constitutional changes promised by Labour in its election manifesto and was swiftly acted upon once Labour was in power. The devolution proposals were approved by referendums, overwhelmingly in Scotland but only narrowly in Wales. Considerably more extensive powers were devolved to Scotland than to Wales. In particular, the Scottish Parliament has the power to pass primary legislation in wide range of policy areas, whereas the Welsh Assembly has only secondary legislative powers, that is to pass regulations under the authority of primary legislation passed by the UK Parliament at Westminster. The first elections to the two devolved legislatures took place in Expanding the opportunity structures The creation of separate legislative bodies in Scotland and Wales and the restoration of devolution to Northern Ireland constitute a major extension of the opportunities to pursue a political career in the UK. However, these were preceded by the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament (EP) in Before then the EP consisted of delegates from national parliaments. In the 1979, 1984 and 1989

6 6 Euro-elections the UK elected 81 members to the EP, in those of 1994 and members. Political recruitment in the UK has traditionally been conducted largely at the local level, despite the unitary nature of the political system and the development of nationally-organised parties from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. The reasons lie with the much earlier development of representative institutions in the form of periodic parliaments, notably in England but also in Scotland and Ireland. Since these early parliaments consisted of local representatives, their selection fell to local magnates in rural areas and the wealthier citizens in towns and, although from time to time representation was distorted by the packing of parliaments by supporters or opponents of the monarch or rival factions and later by various forms of corruption, the local connection was never broken. Thus, when the first major extension of the franchise took place in 1832 and necessitated the registration of electors, local party organisations became increasingly widespread and in due course inherited the role of political recruitment. With the development of national party organisation later in the nineteenth century and what may be termed the nationalisation of British politics, a shift in the principal locus of political recruitment might have been expected, in accordance with Robert McKenzie s thesis on the distribution of power in British political parties. 1 Political recruitment, however, was the exception to the rule and substantial local autonomy in the selection of candidates remained the norm. The role of the national party organisation in political recruitment was, and for the most part, remains threefold to set the rules governing the selection of candidates and 1 See Robert T. McKenzie, British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power in the Conservative and Labour Parties, Heinemann, London, 1955.

7 7 ensure broad uniformity of practice, to maintain lists of would-be candidates 2 to make available to local parties, and to retain a right to veto candidates chosen by local parties but unacceptable to the national leadership. In practice, setting the parameters of local selection processes, exercising a broad form of quality control, and retaining the right to veto unacceptable local choices have led neither to the central domination of recruitment nor to the frequent or regular imposition of centrally-favoured candidates in reluctant local parties. There have, nonetheless, been changes in the recruitment process, notably in the form of more openness and greater participation by party members, although the Labour Party in particular has also taken steps leading to a more dirigiste policy. 3 This dirigiste policy was the product of Labour s long period in opposition, when the party found itself challenged internally by left-wing extremists and externally by centre-right defectors who formed the Social Democratic Party. 4 As a consequence, the Labour Party gradually shifted ideologically from the left to the 2 The Conservative list has always consisted of approved candidates, that is individuals who would have the support of the party leadership if selected by a local party, though this did not preclude anyone not on the list from applying directly to a local party for consideration. In contrast, the lists (those who would be financially-sponsored by a trade union or the Co-operative Party, non-sponsored candidates, and a women s list) maintained by the Labour Party always consisted of available candidates, who were still subject to approval by the Party s National Executive Committee if selected by a local party. Strictly speaking, since the 1997 election the unions and the Co-operative Party no longer sponsor candidates but constituencies a change brought following recommendations from the Committee on Standards in Public Life (then the Nolan Committee) on the financial relationships between MPs and organisations outside Parliament. However, the lists used by Labour for the Scottish, Welsh and European elections consisted of approved candidates. 3 For a discussion of political recruitment in the UK see Michael Rush, The Selection of Parliamentary Candidates, Nelson, London, 1969; Michael Rush, 'Political recruitment, representation and participation' in John P. Mackintosh (ed.), People and Parliament, Saxon House, 1978, pp ; Michael Rush, 'The "Selectorate" Revisited: Selecting Parliamentary Candidates in the 1980s', in Lynton Robins (ed.), Political Institutions in Britain: Development and Change, Longman, 1987, pp ; Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament, Cambridge University Press, 1995; Michael Rush and Valerie Cromwell, Continuity and Change: Legislative Recruitment in the United Kingdom in Heinrich Best and Maurizio Cotta (eds.), Parliamentary Representatives in Europe , Oxford University Press, 2000, pp ; Jonathan Bradbury, David Denver, James Mitchell and Lynn Bennie, Devolution and candidate selection for the 1999 Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly elections, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 6, 2000, pp ; and Michael Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament Since 1868: From Gentlemen to Players, Oxford University Press, 2001 (forthcoming), Chap. 4.

8 8 centre ground of British politics. The earlier part of this period was marked by a number of by-election defeats, attributed in part, rightly or wrongly, to the selection of unsuitable or poor candidates, with the result that Labour s National Executive Committee resurrected a largely defunct power that allowed it to play a much more pro-active role in selection, to the point, if necessary, of imposing a candidate on a local party. During the Parliament the Conservative Party also became concerned about the quality of it by-election candidates, given the often intense media interest in by-elections, and consequently began to play a more prominent role, not to the extent of imposing candidates, but focusing more on managing the subsequent byelection campaign. The same phenomenon could be found at work in respect of political recruitment for the post of London mayor and the Greater London Authority, both set up in fulfilment of another of Labour s manifesto commitments. The Labour leadership made strenuous and ultimately successful efforts to secure the selection of Frank Dobson, a member of the Cabinet, as Labour s candidate for mayor, but at the price of seeing him pushed into third place by Ken Livingstone, the former Labour leader of the Greater London Council (abolished in 1986) and a maverick Labour MP. The leadership also sought to ensure that Blairite candidates were chosen for the constituency seats and favourably positioned to secure lists seats under the addedmember electoral system of proportional representation (AMS) adopted. The Conservative leadership intervened in the selection of the Conservative candidate for mayor by forcing the London selectors to think again, after they had rejected Steve Norris, a former junior transport minister. 4 See Ivor Crewe and Anthony King, SDP: The Birth, Life and death of the Social Democratic Party, Oxford University Press, 1995.

9 9 Until 1999, UK Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were elected by the same first past the post or simple plurality electoral system used for national and local elections, with parliamentary constituencies being grouped together to create Euro-constituencies. Consequently, all that was required was the adaptation of existing selection procedures to select candidates for larger, regional constituencies. The only exception was Northern Ireland, which operated a proportional single transferable vote (STV) system to elect its three MEPs. However, for the 1999 elections Britain was, like all other EU members, obliged to adopt a form of proportional representation and this had important implications for political recruitment. Most obviously, it meant that relationship between seats and votes would no longer be seriously distorted, but it also meant the parties had to devise means of selecting candidates for multi-member rather than single-member constituencies. Similarly, the elections to the devolved legislatures in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales were all based on proportional representation. This presented no problem for Northern Ireland, since it used the STV in the assembly elections of 1973 and 1982 and in the elections to the constitutional convention in 1975, but the adoption of AMS for the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly required a significant modification of the recruitment process in those parts of the UK. The Scottish Parliament has 129 Members (MSPs), 73 directly-elected by first-pastthe-post for territorial constituencies and 56 added or top-up Members to ensure basic overall proportionately. The 60-member Welsh Assembly similarly consists of 40 directly-elected and 20 added Members (all Members known as AMs). All the parties contesting the Scottish and Welsh elections were concerned to widen the range of candidates available and increase the number of women

10 10 candidates. 5 In each case selection was the responsibility of the party organisation in those parts of the UK, with varying degrees of involvement by national party or regionally party organisations, in the case of the Conservatives, Labour or Liberal Democrats, and Edinburgh- and Cardiff-based in the case of two nationalist parties - the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru (PC National Party of Wales) respectively. The procedures for selecting constituency candidates did not differ markedly from those used to choose Westminster candidates. The party organisations constructed panels of approved candidates for both constituency and lists purposes, starting with a process of self-nomination, followed by a filtering process to produce lists or panels of approved candidates an important change for Labour. 6 Table 2: Panels of approved party candidates for the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, Party No. of applics. No. placed on panel % of approved cands. Scot. Cons. Party c Welsh Cons. Party c Scot. Lab. Party Welsh Lab. Party Scot. LD Party c Welsh LD Party c SNP c PC c Source: Bradbury et al. op. cit. For the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, and PC, this resulted in a high rate of approval, rather less so for the SNP, but a very substantial reduction in the number finally making it onto Labour s panel of approved candidates, to the point that this produced ratios of only 1.3 Labour candidates per seat in Scotland and 2.5 in Wales. The figures also illustrates that both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, especially the former, had some difficulty in attracting applicants, reflecting the fact 5 This account is based on Bradbury et al., op. cit. Unfortunately, no information is available on the

11 11 that both parties are very much third parties in Scotland and Wales. It is the Labour figures which are of particular interest, however, since they are an indication of the strong element of central direction by Labour, largely regionally through the Scottish Labour Party but very much at the instigation of the national leadership in London. Once each local party had chosen the constituency candidates, this element of central direction by Labour repeated itself more forcefully with the list candidates, who, crucially, had to be placed in rank order by their parties. It was here that some concern about more central intervention or influence came to the fore in some other parties, notably the Conservatives. The Labour leadership, however, was intent on securing the selection and subsequent election of as many Blairite candidates as possible and two sitting Scottish MPs failed even to get as far as the approved panel. Moreover, while Blair s choice of Donald Dewar, then Secretary of State for Scotland, as putative First Minister in Scotland was welcomed, his eventual nominee for First Secretary in Wales, Alun Michael, also a Cabinet minister, was included on the Welsh party list only after much manoeuvring and manipulation. 7 Nonetheless, despite varying degrees of central intervention, there is little doubt that the process of self-nomination used by all parties opened up recruitment on the supply side of the equation to a larger number of candidates than would otherwise have been the case and probably a wider range as well. selection of candidates in Northern Ireland. 6 See note 2 above. 7 Blair s initial choice for First Secretary, again one that was welcomed, was Ron Davies, then Secretary of State for Wales, but Davies resigned his Cabinet post as a result of a personal scandal and an alternative candidate had to be found. However, Davies remained a candidate for the Welsh Assembly and was subsequently elected.

12 12 Table 3: The gender balance in the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, Scottish Parliament Welsh Assembly Totals Party Male Female Male Female MSPs AMs Cons Lab LD SNP PC Others Source: Bradbury et al, op. cit. The gender issue was approached in one of two ways by some form of affirmative action, on the one hand, and by doing nothing, on the other, essentially leaving the matter to chance. This latter was the Conservative approach and ultimately produced a mere three women MSPs and none at all in the Welsh Assembly. Labour, however, adopted the practice of twinning constituencies by geographical proximity and electoral winnability, with one constituency in each pair being required to select a male and the other a female candidate through a joint selection procedure. To facilitate this all shortlists had to consist of four men and four women. As far as list candidates were concerned, the electoral board responsible for selecting and rank-ordering them was required to ensure gender balance. The result is clear an exact gender balance in Scotland and a balance in favour of women in Wales. 8 The two nationalist parties considered adopting a process known as zipping for list candidates, that is listing candidates alternately by gender according to the number of votes received at a delegate conference. In the event, the SNP rejected zipping and PC adopted it, resulting in four of the latter s successful women candidates being elected via the regional list. 8 The subsequent resignation of Alun Michael as First Secretary and his replacement as an AM by Delyth Evans changed the male/female proportions for Labour to 42.9 and 57.1 respectively.

13 13 For the Euro-elections the Labour government had to decide what type of PR system would be adopted and its choice would, of course, be binding on all political parties. In spite of strong opposition from the other parties, the government used its huge majority in the House of Commons and the provisions of the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949, allowing it to override the veto of the House of Lords, to force through a closed regional list system. This meant that the electors could choose only between parties, not candidates. Once again, in spite of a measure of regional party involvement, Labour was much more dirigiste in deciding which applicants secured places on its panel of approved candidates and, even more crucially than in the Scottish and Welsh regional lists, what the rank order of candidates would be. Until devolution for Scotland and Wales was in place, however, the European Parliament offered the only opportunity for pursuing a political career in the UK outside local government and Westminster, with the important exception of Northern Ireland. But the latter was for long the exception to the general rule. Between 1921 and 1972 it had not only its own parliamentary system, but operated largely separately from the rest of the UK. None of the mainstream UK parties operated in Northern Ireland, although until direct rule in 1972 the Ulster Unionist MPs took the Conservative whip at Westminster and there was a small but ineffective Northern Ireland Labour Party with informal links to the mainland UK Labour Party. Devolution to Scotland and Wales has significantly extended the structure of opportunities in political recruitment, but with what effect is less clear. Parallel but separate political recruitment The UK has moved from a unitary, with only local and national elective offices and a relatively limited political career pattern, to a much more complex multi-level situation, with other career opportunities developing and the possibility of moving

14 14 from one level to another. It is, for example, fairly common for state or provincial politics in federal systems, such as the United States and Canada, to be steppingstones to a career in national politics. What indications are there that political careers at the sub-national level in the UK could be stepping-stones to national politics? Similarly, given the limited role of the EP, what evidence is there that supra-national experience can lead to a national political career in the UK? Table 4: Inter-legislative movement between the EP and UK Parliament, A. Transfer from the EP to the UK Parliament Position Cons. Lab. LD Other Total % of UK MEPs MP 4 8* Peer Total B. Transfer from the UK Parliament to the EP Circumstances Cons. Lab. LD Other Total % of UK MEPs Post-election defeat 8 5* Post volunt. retirement Peers Dual mandate Total 18 6* *Including Robert Cryer, Labour MP for Keighley (when he was defeated) and for Bradford North , who served as an MEP The data in Table 4 unequivocally show that there is very little movement between the EP and the UK Parliament in either direction, although there is more movement from Westminster to Strasbourg than vice-versa. Moreover, movement in either direction is likely to decline marginally, since the Labour Party bans all but temporary dual mandates and the Conservative Party discourages them. What these figures suggest is that for most UK MEPs Strasbourg is not a stepping stone to Westminster, but an alternative and separate political career. This was hypothesised in the research conducted by Martin Holland into the first elected MEPs from the

15 15 UK; 9 and it does not appear to have changed since. A handful of UK MPs start as MEPs and then transfer to Westminster when the opportunity arises, often in the form of a seat within their Euro-constituency, and for a few more for Strasbourg is a post- Westminster career. The biggest group here, however, is the three-fifths who lost their seats at Westminster. Thus, in 1999 eight Conservatives and two Liberal Democrats defeated in the 1997 general election became MEPs. Table 5: Inter-legislative movement between the UK parliament and the devolved legislatures. A. No. of MP (ex-mps) Legis. Cons. Lab. LD SNP PC Other Union SDLP Sinn Total Fein Scot. 2(2) 7(1) 3(1) 7(1) (5) Welsh (1) (1) NI (1) 2 12(1) Total 3(2) 11(2) 3(1) 7(1) 4(1) 1 6 4(1) 2 41(7) B. % of MP (ex-mps)* Legis. Cons. Lab. LD SNP PC Un. Nat. %dev. legis. Scot Welsh NI % UK MPs * I.e. % of each party s Members in the legislature concerned. I.e. Ulster Unionists, Democratic Unionists, Progessive Unionists, & UK Unionist. I.e. Social Democrat and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein. Table 5 does not radically alter the picture presented on MEPs interlegislative movement between Westminster and the devolved legislatures is no greater than that between Westminster and Strasbourg. Of course, the recent creation of the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly and Northern Ireland Assembly means that the initial movement could only be from Westminster to Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. 9 See Martin Holland, Candidates for Europe: The British Experience, Gower, Aldershot, 1986.

16 16 However, it could be hypothesised that such movement might have been greater at these, the first elections, and particularly for the Scottish and Welsh bodies. The attractions of the latter to those Scottish and Welsh MPs strongly in favour of devolution are obvious enough, not least the prospect of being bigger fish in a smaller pond. Nonetheless, only five Labour MPs and two former MPs were elected to the Scottish Parliament and four Labour MPs to the Welsh Assembly, although all but two reaped the reward of office. Of the Scots, four have become ministers in the Scottish executive and two committee convenors. The Welsh situation was more complicated: one MP became the Assembly s Deputy Presiding Officer, but after the parachuting in and subsequent resignation of Alun Michael as First Secretary, Rhodri Morgan, his Deputy, another MP, replaced him, leaving only Ron Davies, the former Secretary of State without office. For the Liberal Democrats there were also rewards. In Scotland, one of the two MPs became Deputy First Minister in the Scottish executive and the former MP, Sir David (Lord) Steel, became the Parliament s Presiding Officer. The numbers and proportions of nationalist MPs securing election to the Scottish and Welsh legislatures are considerably higher than for Labour MPs. Only six out of fifty-six (10.7 per cent) of Scottish Labour MPs became MSPs. 10 Similarly, four of the thirty-four Welsh Labour MPs (11.8 per cent) became AMs. In contrast, all six SNP MPs and three of the four PC MPs were elected to the devolved legislatures. The incentives here are much stronger: ever since the rise in electoral support for the two nationalist parties and their first electoral successes at Westminster in the 1960s, devolved legislatures have been the immediate objective of 10 The proportion of Liberal Democrats becoming MSPs is, fact, higher 20 per cent, but this is from a low base of ten Scottish Liberal Democrats, and no Liberal Democrats became AMs. No Conservative MPs were elected to Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly, since none were returned to Westminster for Scottish or Welsh seats, although two former MPs became MSPs and one an AM.

17 17 the SNP and PC. One PC MP has already given up his Westminster seat, another has given notice to that effect, and only one SNP MP, Alex Salmond (the party s erstwhile leader) will be contesting his Westminster seat at the next general election. Indeed, since the legislature establishing the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly forbids dual mandates after the forthcoming UK election, the die has already been cast. For the Conservatives the devolved bodies, whose creation in Scotland and Wales they mostly opposed, provide an opportunity to rebuild the party s fortunes in those parts of the UK. In 1997 the Conservatives failed to win any parliamentary seats in either Scotland or Wales, in spite of winning a higher share of the vote than the Liberal Democrats in both areas. They therefore started from a low base: it is the nationalists who form the official opposition in Scotland and Wales, not the Conservatives, and for the latter office even in a coalition remains a distant prospect at best. The Conservatives main eye will inevitably remain on the UK Parliament. Northern Ireland follows the nationalist pattern, with all three SDLP and both Sinn Fein MPs becoming members of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the various unionist parties go a considerable way down the same road, with six out of thirteen of their MPs becoming members of the Assembly. The absence of the UK parties from Northern Ireland, however, makes its politics much more introverted, although it remains an important question whether Scottish and Welsh politics will become increasingly distinctive under the impact of devolution.

18 18 Conclusion Table 6: Pre-election local government experience of MPs, MEPs and members of the devolved legislatures. Party UK MPs MEPs MSPs AMs NIAs. Cons Lab LD (2/10) SNP (1/2) PC (2/2) Unionists (1/2) Nationalists (0/1) The European Parliament and the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland extend the opportunity structures in political recruitment in the UK, but the evidence available suggests that they have opened alternative career patterns, rather than interchangeable ones. This contrasts with the role of local government as a pathway to Westminster. For many MPs local government experience was an important step to a national political career and this is widely the case for members of the devolved legislatures, though less so for MEPs. There are, however, significant party variations: local government experience has always been much more important in the Labour Party and, rather more recently, among Liberal Democrats than for Conservatives. Conservative MSPs, however, are more likely than their Westminster counterparts to have served in local government, while Labour MSPs have considerably less such experience than Labour MPs. In almost every other respect, however, Labour MPs, MEPs, MSPs, and AMs are socio-economically similar, so that MEPs and members of the devolved legislatures reflect the increasing homogeneity of the Parliamentary Labour Party at Westminster. Conversely, Conservative MEPs, MSPs and AMs, though having broadly similar occupational backgrounds, are less likely to be graduates, particularly of Oxford and Cambridge,

19 19 and far less likely to have attended a public school (i.e. major private school) than Conservative MPs in short, they are less elitist. For the nationalists at Westminster - Scottish, Welsh and Irish local government experience never loomed large, but for PC and the two nationalist parties in Northern Ireland (and, indeed the unionists) it is much more important. It is worth noting here, moreover, that threequarters of the unionists in Northern Ireland and twothirds of the nationalists have served on one or more of the various short-lived elected bodies set up between 1973 and In fact, in terms of socio-economic background, the unionists invariably have more in common with their nationalist colleagues in the Assembly than with the Conservatives whose whip they once took. These similarities and differences should come as no surprise. The Labour Party has always been the most dirigiste of the parties in the UK and has become more so under the leadership of Tony Blair, but what is more significant is the manner in which the opportunity structures have been extended. In the cases of the EP and the Northern Ireland Assembly, they came about as a result of EU policy and events in Northern Ireland respectively, and the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly resulted largely from Labour s reaction to the growth of support for the nationalist parties. Extending the opportunity structures were an important but incidental product of these developments, an adaptation of the existing unitary system into an asymmetric, quasi-federal system, rather than the systematic creation of a multi-level system. There is also an important element of isolation, greatest perhaps in the case of the EP, which is institutionally remote from the UK Parliament and, for that matter, any other UK political institution, but it is considerable in Northern Ireland, the product of unresolved conflict and of a compromise that satisfies none of the parties. As for Scotland and Wales, both have a cultural distinctiveness unmatched in any

20 20 other region of mainland Britain. Moreover, this distinctiveness has always expressed itself to some degree in the politics of Scotland and Wales, even before the prominence of the SNP and PC. Both experienced significant degrees of executive and administrative devolution, of greater importance and longer duration in Scotland than in Wales, but enough to contribute towards distinctive sub-systems in UK politics. The distinction has been reinforced and extended by legislative devolution, especially the adoption of fixed-term legislatures and PR and then the development of coalition politics. It is a distinction that is likely to grow and ensure that political recruitment in the UK continues to develop along parallel but separate paths.