European strategic autonomy and Brexit

Transcription

1 European strategic autonomy and Brexit Peter Round, Bastian Giegerich, Christian Mölling June 2018 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

2 Key takeaways The United Kingdom is among the few European Union member states with full-spectrum military and defence-industrial capabilities. Through Brexit, the EU could lose 20% of its military and 40% of its defence-industrial capabilities, and thereby its influence and credibility as a security actor. The pertinent question is how to arrange the UK s future participation in European defence. Decision-making on defence matters in the international arena requires skilled diplomacy and the momentum to carry plans through the scrutiny of multiple parliaments. The EU risks inaction through inertia without the UK s soft powers, placing strategic decision-making at risk. The Union needs the UK s military enablers, but only until it can deliver its own. In addition, with the UK s special relationship with the United States suffering, London s influence is on the wane. More autonomy for the EU is possible within a framework of political partners that reaches beyond the EU, incorporating actors such as the UK, and also Norway. The EU s ambition for strategic autonomy The EU Global Strategy tells us this is no time for global policemen and lone warriors, and that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security. The strategy says that EU member states must have the technological, industrial and military capabilities to ensure their own security, and that these are obtained by having a sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry [which] is essential for Europe s strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP [Common Security and Defence Policy]. 1 The EU Global Strategy was drafted before, but signed off after, the 2016 referendum on membership of the EU. Part of the document s message was that the EU must use its obvious economic and industrial strength to influence the world in a way it had not done previously. This aspiration is supported widely across EU member states. However, the UK one of the partners with the greatest recent experience in defence and security issues is about to depart the Union. Immediately after the referendum, the UK made it clear it would no longer block the EU s defence ambitions. This came at a point when the European Commission, driven by a prosperity agenda, was looking at ways to stimulate industry through funding focused mainly on research and development. The new attitude on both sides changed important aspects of the defence-policy conversation in the EU. Suddenly, defence was no longer a taboo subject, with money and jobs to be made and ambition for influence in the world. This is traditional ground for the UK, but because of Brexit, the UK may be unable to offer its years of soft- and hard-power experience to shape the EU s direction. Consequently, the EU has launched the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on defence, is initiating a Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and is agreeing budget lines to support the European Defence Fund (EDF). All of these initiatives might have faced difficulties with the UK as a member state. From the outside, the EU s progress in defence matters over the past two years looks healthy, but it is hard to see how the EU can support its ambitions for strategic autonomy across capabilities, decision-making and defence-industrial capacity without the UK and its full-spectrum military power. Autonomy and military capabilities When the UK leaves the EU, the Union s military capability will shrink significantly. About 25% of the key enabling capabilities and 20% of all military capabilities within the EU are held by the UK. Capability is crucial 2 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

3 to any military ambition. In order to exercise real military power, or indeed use military power in a coercive way, all the aspects of military capability must be in place. Importantly, these capabilities must be believable; they must be available, trained and exercised. While there is much speculation that the UK s modern military capability does not match the country s global ambition, it has demonstrable global reach and a history of effectively using its assets. Whilst the UK retains a limited capacity for autonomous expeditionary operations (most recently Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone in 2000), when partner countries have needed assistance (for example France, during its operations in Mali) the UK that has shown the ability and, importantly, the will to assist. In operations over Libya in 2011, it was the UK that had the airlift and air-to-air-refuelling capabilities with sufficient reach to deliver effect (although without US support the operation would have struggled). The European Air Transport Command supported the Libya operation, but had to manage significant differences in the political positions of its constituent nations, meaning the possibility of losing air-transport capability was present throughout the campaign. How will the EU fare without this experienced military leader? The answer is it will need to learn. The EU knows it must not duplicate NATO structures, but at the same time wants to show its independence and autonomy. However, the execution of this ambition will be difficult. The UK always red-lined any new command structures, vetoing any that risked countermanding NATO command and control, but as the EU grows into its security and defence role, such structures will inevitably develop. Under certain circumstances, this situation may please Washington, as it could lead to less EU dependency on the US. However, it will just as likely cause alarm in Washington as a more autonomous EU would also be harder to influence. Given that the UK s influence in both camps is on the wane, London will struggle for relevance in this conversation. In capability terms, the EU does not have strategic autonomy without the UK, and only in a limited way with the UK. European reliance on the US is still significant, but with the UK involved in its defence activity, Figure 1: The UK s share of overall military-equipment holdings in the EU, 2018 (Source: IISS) UK 53% UK 42% UK 39% UK 38% 47% 58% 61% 62% Combat intelligence, surveillance and reconnaisance heavy UAVs Airborne early-warning and control aircraft and helicopters Heavy transport aircraft Electronic-intelligence aircraft UK 30% UK 27% UK 18% UK 18% 70% 73% 82% 82% Tanker/transport aircraft Heavy transport helicopters Frigates Vehicle-launched bridges UK 16% UK 14% UK 13% UK 5% 84% 86% 87% 95% Amphibious vessels Attack helicopters Fighter/ground-attack aircraft Main battle tanks European strategic autonomy and Brexit 3

4 the EU has a chance of acting as a coherent grouping. Today, it is in the EU s interests to keep the UK in the Union, but the EU will nevertheless quickly learn to operate without the UK, and industry on the continent will benefit from the process through research and development, production and maintenance contracts with reduced competition from the UK. Decision-making autonomy To be of use, military capability requires political will and the freedom to exercise that will. The advantage of having full-spectrum capability is to remove dependence on any other actor in order to carry out military operations. If the UK were absent from all EU defence planning and, more importantly, activity, the latter would still possess significant military capability but lack the enablers for strategic- and operational-level action. The European External Action Service relies on lead nations to deliver headquarters functions and support. Without the UK, the only member states able to deliver such activity are France, Germany, Italy and Spain. At the strategic level, in order to reach a decision on an EU military operation (with or without passage through the United Nations) each participant will require domestic parliamentary approval, followed by approval at the EU level. Whilst this process is no different with or without the UK s presence, reaching a decision often depends on a strong champion and their willingness to act independently if necessary. This approach can then lead to other member states joining after the initiation of an operation. If the remaining big four EU member states do not take such a strong lead, leadership will need to come from outside the Union (probably the US and possibly the UK) and all autonomous decision-making rights will have been forfeited. When the decision to mount an operation needs to be made, a strong leader is required. In the past, France and the UK frequently filled this role and many EU member states were content to let that happen. The risk of an EU member state not taking on a leadership role is a delay in strategic decision-making that leads to inactivity. At the operational level, decision-making should lie with the relevant headquarters, while the range of military options available depends on the capabilities at hand and therein lies the problem. As the available capabilities become more limited, either the operational ambition is commensurately curtailed or there is a dependency on external actors who will influence and even control the decision-making process. If the UK is not involved in EU defence planning and the operations that might result, there is a risk of reduced momentum at the strategic level and reduced freedom of action at the operational level. Defence-industrial autonomy Almost any defence-industrial strategy in the Western alliance contains a page saying maintain an industrial capability to deliver the materiel our armed forces need to defend our country, or similar. However, industrial autonomy is often a desire instead of a reality. For example, many British voters will likely tell you that the ability to build a fighter aircraft, suitably arm it and train the pilot needed to operate it is essential for the UK. The reality is that most countries (and all of those in Europe) cannot afford to act independently on military capability. It is either too expensive, too difficult or the domestic industry does not exist to deliver the capability. The result is the interconnected (and, in part, fragmentary) defence industry that exists in Europe today. The components that make up the industrial capacity to deliver high- or low-end capabilities are scattered across Europe; however, there is no doubt that between them, the EU member states have the ability to supply most, if not all, of their military-capability needs. The UK has a buoyant defence industry, which forms part of this interconnected system. Yet in many ways the UK defence industry has not been focused on the European market, and whilst it has comparatively little to lose in terms of sales, through Brexit, it has much to lose in research funding and interaction with other European defence industries. Returning to the theme of fighter aircraft, France and Germany are already talking about a cooperative project for a next-generation system. So far, the UK government and armed forces have shown only limited interest. As there is no need for such a project to be opened up to competition from a non-eu state, it is probable that UK industry will not be invited to participate. 4 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

5 There are therefore scenarios in which the UK s departure from the EU could be good news for the EU s defence industry. However, the British defence industry is intimately entwined with the EU s defence-industrial base. In addition, skills and technology exist in the UK that can t be found elsewhere and some projects (e.g. the F-35 combat aircraft) rely on UK component manufacture. The European Global Strategy puts prosperity near the top of the agenda. The European Commission has expended a great deal of effort in using defence as a way of stimulating research and technology investment and manufacturing activity, and these opportunities are likely to be closed to the UK. However, the UK will retain its traditional markets in the Middle East and there are plenty of defence capabilities in Europe that rely on UK expertise. In the short-term, several defence-industrial players in the EU will see opportunities from reduced competition from the UK. In the long-run, if the UK s defence industry is to remain engaged and relevant, it must protect its relationships with its subsidiaries, partners and parent companies in Europe and further afield. Notes 1 European Union, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, pp. 4, 46, globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_ review_web_13.pdf. European strategic autonomy and Brexit 5

6 The International Institute for Strategic Studies owes no allegiance to any government, group of governments, or any political or other organisation. Its assessments are its own, based on the material available to it from a wide variety of sources. The IISS would like to thank the various individuals who contributed their expertise to the compilation of this report. The views expressed herein do not, and indeed cannot, represent a consensus of views among the worldwide membership of the Institute as a whole. IISS and DGAP work on the defence-policy and defence-industrial dimensions of Brexit has been supported by grants from a consortium of privatesector companies in the defence and aerospace sector, as well as the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018 The International Institute for Strategic Studies UK Arundel House 6 Temple Place London wc2r 2pg UK t. +44 (0) f. +44 (0) e. iiss@iiss.org The International Institute for Strategic Studies Americas 2121 K Street, NW Suite 801 Washington, DC USA t f e. iiss-americas@iiss.org The International Institute for Strategic Studies Asia 9 Raffles Place #51-01 Republic Plaza Singapore t f e. iiss-asia@iiss.org The International Institute for Strategic Studies Middle East 14th floor, GBCORP Tower Bahrain Financial Harbour Manama Kingdom of Bahrain t f e. iiss-middleeast@iiss.org