Reducing Energy Delivery Risks Using Energy Surety Concepts

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2 Reducing Energy Delivery Risks Using Energy Surety Concepts GovEnergy August 2008 Sandia National Laboratories

3 Presentation Overview Common Energy Infrastructure Protection and Reliability Challenges and Pitfalls Energy Risk Assessment and Management Framework Energy Surety Concepts and Process Optimizing system design and operation to achieve energy security, reliability, and costeffectiveness Military electric power example August 3-6, 2008

4 Energy Infrastructure Security and Reliability Challenges Energy infrastructures are distributed and often remote Difficult to protect using common approaches Expanding interdependencies of the energy infrastructure SCADA and telecommunications Water and energy Electricity and gas Railroad congestion Growing safety, security, and reliability issues August 3-6, 2008

5 August 3-6, 2008 Energy Security and Protection Challenges Common Energy Pipeline Security Approach Back Front

6 Energy System Reliability and Vulnerability Issues Southwest Army base served by two feeders May 2002 forest fire takes out both feeders Base down for 16 hours Est. cost $3M Loss of mission capability Southwest semiconductor plant served by two feeders Forest fire takes out both feeders Chip fab shuts down for 3 months High-value customers cancel orders due to delay Economic loss forces plant to shut down permanently August 3-6, 2008

7 August 3-6, 2008 Crude Oil and Gas Refinery Gas Typical Topology for Fixed Electric Power Installations Transmission Substation Load Oil Generator Distribution Coal Extensive Storage on Generation Side

8 Common Electric Power Security and Reliability Issues Current practice of providing power security often relies on back-up generators Frequently over-sized and under-maintained Low probability of start when needed Dedicated to one building or facility does not share power with other facilities Operations for extended periods often problematic Supply redundancy often not effective Stating 9 s of reliability does not factor in the erosion of critical mission capability for extended outages August 3-6, 2008

9 August 3-6, 2008 Risk Assessment Methodology for Energy Systems (RAM-E) Characterize Facilities Define Threats P A C Determine Consequences Identify P Safeguards E Analyze System Make Changes & Reassess Risk = P A x (1-P E ) x C Compare to System Protection and Performance Goals R Sufficient Protection? N Risk Y End Until Change

10 August 3-6, 2008 Energy Surety Approach Improving Mission Readiness and Response Energy Surety Elements Safety Security Reliability Sustainability Cost Effectiveness Safely supplies energy to end user Maintains power in a malevolent environment Maintains power when and where needed It can be maintained for mission duration Produces energy at lowest predictable cost Distributed Energy Infrastructures are Hard to Protect

11 August 3-6, 2008 Energy Surety Microgrid Surety Microgrid operates when the grid is down X Substation Transmission Distribution Loads Generator Storage and generation on load side to match performance and readiness needs

12 Distributed Generation and Use with Microgrids August 3-6, 2008 Small combustion and µ-turbines Fuel cells IC engines Small hydro and wind Solar electric Energy storage (batteries, flywheels, ) Emerging plug in hybrid vehicles Distribution Substation Full Substation Microgrid Full Feeder Microgrid Partial Feeder Micro-grid Ge n Other Feeders Gen Ref. EPRI Feeder Bulk supply connection (sub-transmission) Ge n Ge n Single Customer Microgrid

13 DoD Energy Goals Increase energy security and decrease dependence on fossil fuels DOD spent $13 billion for 134 million barrels of oil Up from 107 million barrels of oil in FY00. Diversify current use of the electric utilities for primary power and diesel generator back-up power Utilize renewable energy and distributed generation Only 9% of the electricity used by military facilities comes from renewable energy sources Plan to raise that to 25% by 2025 using wind, PV, geothermal, biomass, microturbines, fuel cells August 3-6, 2008

14 August 3-6, 2008 Microgrid Requires Intelligence and Control Technology improvements over past 5 years are making this possible PV Array Energy Storage Internet (Weather Forecast) System Controls Adaptive Logic System Inverter & Charge Control Energy Mgmt System Sub-Panel Motorized Power Control Breakers Unit Loads Critical Loads Smart Loads Service Panel Loads kwkwh Smart Meter & Energy Portal Utility Grid Electric Power Value Information Operations Information

15 August 3-6, 2008 Army Energy Surety Microgrid Demonstration US Army Corps of Engineers Army Construction Engineering Research Lab (CERL) Army perspective, Consequence Model development, Base selection and interface w/candidate Base, Rollout Energy Surety Microgrid to Army/DoD complex Ft. Sill, OK, volunteered to be the first base New Mexico State University: Optimization of energy and fuel storage Leveraging Other Unique Sandia Expertise: NISAC/Sandia Infrastructure Modeling provides Consequence Model Sandia Distributed Energy Laboratory

16 August 3-6, 2008 Ft. Sill Energy Surety Microgrid Consideration

17 August 3-6, 2008 Ft. Sill Electric Distribution Representation Existing Back-up Generation Mission Critical Asset Back-up generation does not match mission critical asset needs Mission Critical Assets Existing Back-up Generation

18 August 3-6, 2008 Consequence Modeling: Insight Into Energy Disruptions Feeder 1 DC Radar 5801 Switch Feeder 1 Switch Feeder 1 DC Utility DC Utility Switch Starship 5960 DC Utility DC Starship 5955 Sw itch 0.00 Radar 5801 Backup Generator Radar 5801 Feeder 1 Utility Wastewater Treatment Plant Backup Generator Wastewater Treatment Plant Wastewater Treatment Plant Sw itch Starship 5955 DC DISRUPTION DAY VAR 5.00 Starship 5955 DC Starship 5955 Starship 5970 Starship , START WEEK VAR Starship 5960 Starship 6050 DC Starship 6050 Switch Starship 5970 DC END 9.00 Starship 5970 DC 5955 Training Factor Outage Factor Starship 5960 DC Starship 5960 Switch Electric System Model Starship 5970 Switch HOUR VAR DISRUPTION Starship 6050 DC LENGTH Interruption Control Model Normal Training Hours Required hr/hr :00: FA RN FA TrainingN FA Training Hours Percentage Additional Training Required Compliance Training CBRN Training FA Training LN Training W4D4 FA Training Undesignated Training W4D1 W4D2 W4D Maximum Impact % W4D1FA W4D2FA W4D3FA 48:00:00 FA TrainingI 5955 Training Factor 0.00 FA Training % Compliance Training 0 % CBRN Training % FA Training % LN Training % Undesignated Training % W02 W03 W04 W05 W06 W07 W08 W09 W10 Mission Impacts FA RI Mission Consequence Model 5 0 W02 W03 W04 W05 W06 W07 W08 W09 W10

19 Grid Sandia Distributed Energy Lab Center for Control System Security 480V Microgrid Other Remote DER sites Various Loads Distributed Energy Resources August 3-6, 2008

20 Energy Surety Microgrid for Energy Risk Management Energy Surety Microgrid is an example of energy risk management approach Matches energy supply to reliability and security within a base critical mission context Consequence modeling analysis graphically illustrates the effect of energy improvements on mission capability Different from stating 9 s of reliability which does not factor in the erosion of critical mission capability Supports critical mission readiness and extended operations during loss of utility power Supports integration of renewables into energy supply infrastructure August 3-6, 2008

21 Would you like to know more about this session? Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico Phone: Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL August 3-6, 2008