Hydro-Hegemony in Southern Africa

Transcription

1 HydroHegemony in Southern Africa Second HydroHegemony Workshop 67 May 2006 London Water Research Group Goodenough College Dr. Anthony Turton GibbSERA Chair in Integrated Water Resource Management President: Universities Partnership for Transboundary Waters AR Turton, 2006.

2 Hydrohegemony Theory Posits that t the hegemon defines the terms of agreement. The instrument used is mostly the international agreement, commonly called a regime. Zeitoun suggests that the regime is generally skewed in favour of the hegemon. But is this always so?

3 The Bigger Picture The Basins at Risk project found a number of basins to be at risk and hypothesized in general lthat tthe level l of conflict potential ti increases as the rate of change increases within the basin without a similar change in the capacity to absorb the shock. This was the first large n study and it found 17 basins to be at risk, 8 of which h are in Africa. But is this true?

4 The Bigger Picture The BAR project found that interactions on record were mostly of a cooperative nature at a ratio of 2:1. It also found that most interactions were mild. And that water acts as a magnifier reflecting and amplifying other niggles. The largest single cause of extreme events were related to volumes of water and hydraulic infrastructure.

5 The Bigger Picture Ken Conca (2006) built on this by focusing specifically on regimes, and asked whether there is any convergence around global norms? This was also a large n study of 150 basinspecific agreements (regimes) on record. 62 Agreements were extracted and analyzed statistically with reference to the UN Convention These occurred in 36 international basins, or 1/7 of the global total.

6 The Bigger Picture Af these, only a quarter (16 in total) were first agreements for that given basin. Of the remaining 46, there were prior agreements in existence, suggesting g that ¾ of the agreements studied were in basins with a previous history of cooperation. There is no evidence to suggest that shared governance via a regime is diffusing to new previously uncovered basins (Conca, 2006:107).

7 The Bigger Picture Of the entire dataset (62), 46 are bilateral while 16 contain three or more parties. Two thirds of the bilateral agreements are in basins that have more than three riparian states. This suggests that in complex basins, the likelihood of reaching a multilateral agreement is significantly lower than reaching a bilateral agreement (Pike s Law at work).

8 The Bigger Picture However, 2/3 of the global international river basins have only 2 riparians (176 of the 263 known basins). BUT more than ¾ of the agreements are found in basins with more than two riparians. i AND within the multilateral basins, the most common agreement is a bilateral regime by a ration of 2:1. There are two clusters of issues emerging (openness), but no convergence is evident regarding the states right to water.

9 The Bigger Picture So one cluster of issues are arranged around principles of openness and sustainability. A second distinct cluster is around rights to water. HOWEVER, no evidence exists that these norms are being diffused outwards. There is little compelling evidence to suggest that a common normative structure is emerging in the sphere of interstate cooperation over water (Conca, 2006:121).

10 The Bigger Picture FURTHERMORE, there is no statistical evidence to suggest that international legal principles are taking on greater depth, or even moving in a discernable direction (Conca, 2006:121). Conca concludes that the international freshwater agreement (or regime) is a blunt instrument indeed, and asks why it is still in so much hf favour? This is generally consistent with Hydro Hegemony Theory.

11 So what does this mean for Hydro Hegemony? The Oslo School found that a history of previous cooperation was a good indicator of future cooperation (Gleditsch et al., 2005). The political make up of the dyad is important. There is a correlation between basin size and conflict potential. There is no statistical relevance to number of river crossings in a given basin.

12 So what does this mean for Hydro Hegemony? The Oslo School found that there is no statistical link between water stress and specific events. There is evidence that dryer states have a high risk of interstate conflict, so there is data to suggest that where endemic scarcity occurs in a shared river basin, there might be substantial longterm incentives for the investment in water management measures that avoid conflictual outcomes.

13 Shared River Basins Africa s shared river basins contain: 61 % of the area 77 % of the people 93 % of the water Pete Ashton N Kilometre s 1000

14 Dependence on Neighbouring States for River Inflows / Water Transfers Degree of Dependence on Neighbouring States 0% 0 10 % % % N Pete Ashton > 50 % Kilometre s

15 WATER AVAILABLE PER PERSON IN 2002 AND Pete Ashton Water security Adequate water Water stress Chronic scarcity Absolute scarcity

16 MEAN ANNUAL D. R. C. TANZANIA RAINFALL ANGOLA ZAMBIA MOZABIQUE MALAWI = 860 mm isohyet = World average rainfall SADC Average Annual Rainfall = 948 mm Pete Ashton km NAMIBIA BOTSWANA SOUTH AFRICA ZIMBABWE LESOTHO SWAZILAND Mean Annual Rainfall (mm)

17 Southern Africa was place where the Cold War got hot. But does this have any correlation to conflict over water? A R Turton 1982

18 HydroPolitical Complex International River Basins Pivotal Impacted Riparian States Orange Limpopo Incomati Okavango Cunene Maputo Pungué SaveRunde Zambezi Pivotal States Namibia Botswana South Africa Zimbabwe SC Angola Imp pacted St tates Mozambique Swaziland Lesotho Zambia Malawi Tanzania Legend: = Pivotal State = Impacted State SC = Special case A R Turton, 2004 Ashton & Turton, 2005

19 The Facts Today A recent study (Turton, 2005) showed that of the 6 Basins at Risk in Southern Africa, all of these had basinwide agreements in place. Incomati (TPTC, JWC and KOBWA) Cunene (PJTC & JCA) Limpopo p (TPTC, JPTC, LBPTC & JWC) Okavango (PJTC, OKACOM, JCA & JPWC) Orange (JPTC, LHDA, TCTA, LHWC, PWC, NVJ, JIA & ORASECOM) Zambezi (ZRA, ZACPLAN, ZAMCOM)

20 The Facts Today Another recent study (Ashton et al., 2006) showed that in excess of 59 agreements exist to which South Africa (a regional hegemon) is a signatory. These two findings are totally at odds with the Basins at Risk Thesis, and the empirical findings of Conca (2006). These findings suggest that Gleditsch et al., (2005) are probably correct in their assertion that endemic scarcity is a considerable incentive to cooperate. It also goes contrary to the HydroHegemony hypothesis.

21 Conclusion Hydropolitical Studies are highly nuanced. Large n studies are useful, but only as good as the quality of their datasets and assumptions. Hydrohegemony is one potentially ti powerful way to explain state behaviour under a specific set of conditions, but could get lost in nuanced circumstances. There is evidence to suggest that a unit of analysis other than the river basin could be considered on occasion.

22 Now the Cold War guns stand silent as Southern Africa engages in reconstruction centered on the management of transboundary water resources The first regional protocol signed when South Africa joined SADC was the protocol on shared watercourse systems A R Turton 1999