CHAPTER 4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

Transcription

1 CHAPTER 4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

2 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES The impct nlyses in this chpter focus on those res where the potentil exists for effects on the environment. Ech of the lterntives (the No Action, Consolidtion, nd Consolidtion with Bridge Alterntives) is discussed seprtely in Sections 4.1, 4.2, nd 4.3, respectively. The cumultive impcts ssocited with the lterntives re presented in Section 4.4. Potentil mitigtion mesures re described in Section 4.5. Resource commitments, including unvoidble dverse environmentl impcts, the reltionship between short-term use of the environment nd long-term productivity, nd irreversible nd irretrievble commitments of resources, re presented in Section 4.6. A detiled discussion of ech lterntive is given in Chpter 2 of this environmentl impct sttement (EIS); summry comprison of the environmentl effects mong lterntives is presented in Section 2.5. In this Environmentl Impct Sttement for the Proposed Consolidtion of Nucler Opertions Relted to Production of Rdioisotope Power Systems (Consolidtion EIS), the impct nlyses ssess ll disciplines where the potentil exists for effects on the environment, s follows: Lnd resources Site infrstructure Geology nd soils Wter resources Air qulity nd noise Ecologicl resources Culturl resources Socioeconomics Public nd occuptionl helth nd sfety (ssocited with norml opertions, fcility ccidents, nd trnsporttion) Environmentl justice Wste mngement These disciplines re nlyzed in mnner commensurte with their importnce under specific lterntive the sliding-scle ssessment pproch. For exmple, under the No Action Alterntive, the U.S. Deprtment of Energy (DOE) hs determined tht miniml impcts would be ssocited with lnd resources, noise, wter resources, geology nd soils, ecologicl resources, nd culturl nd pleontologicl resources. This is becuse existing fcilities in developed res would be used, no new lnd disturbnce would tke plce, nd proposed ctivities would be consistent with current opertions. Therefore, impcts ssocited with these resources re ssessed for opertions only. Where construction is n integrl prt of n lterntive (i.e., the Consolidtion nd Consolidtion with Bridge Alterntives), the impcts ssocited with such construction re included in the ssessments. The sliding-scle ssessment pproch hs been pplied in the evlution of ll the lterntives ddressed in this EIS. The environmentl consequence nlyses ssocited with the lterntives ssessed in this EIS were performed in ccordnce with the impct ssessment methods described in Appendix B of this EIS. More detiled descriptions of the impcts development for the evlution of humn helth effects re presented in 4-1

3 Drft EIS for the Proposed Consolidtion of Nucler Opertions Relted to Production of Rdioisotope Power Systems Appendix C nd for trnsporttion in Appendix D of this EIS. For consistency, numericl results re often rounded. Anlyses presented in the following sections include discussion of mitigtion mesures such s those tht would be stndrd prctice during fcility construction. Section 4.5 presents more detiled discussion of possible mitigtion mesures. Approprite mitigtion mesures would be utilized to reduce or void impcts for ech lterntive. 4.1 No Action Alterntive A detiled description of the No Action Alterntive is presented in Section of this EIS. Impcts of opertions t the Fuel Mnufcturing Fcility (FMF) nd Advnced Test Rector (ATR) t Idho Ntionl Lbortory (INL), nd the High Flux Isotope Rector (HFIR) nd Rdiochemicl Engineering Development Center (REDC) t Ok Ridge Ntionl Lbortory (ORNL), re summrized from the Finl Progrmmtic Environmentl Impct Sttement for Accomplishing Expnded Civilin Nucler Energy Reserch nd Development nd Isotope Production Missions in the United Sttes, Including the Role of the Fst Flux Test Fcility (NI PEIS) (DOE 2000f). Assembly nd Testing Fcility opertionl impcts re bsed on informtion presented in the Finding of No Significnt Impct nd Finl Environmentl Assessment for the Future Loction of the Het Source/Rdioisotope Power System Assembly nd Test Opertions Currently Locted t the Mound Site (FONSI nd Mound EA) (DOE 2002c). Impcts of purifiction, pelletiztion, nd encpsultion opertions t the Plutonium Fcility within Technicl Are 55 (TA-55) t Los Almos Ntionl Lbortory (LANL) re lrgely from the Environmentl Assessment for Rdioisotope Het Source Fuel Processing nd Fbriction (DOE 1991) Lnd Resources Lnd Use All ctivities under the No Action Alterntive would tke plce within existing fcilities. There would be no chnge or effect on lnd use t INL, LANL, or ORNL, becuse no dditionl lnd would be disturbed, nd the use of existing fcilities would be comptible with their present missions (DOE 2000f) Visul Environment All ctivities under the No Action Alterntive would tke plce within existing fcilities. There would be no impct on visul resources since the current Visul Resource Mngement Clss IV rting would not chnge Site Infrstructure Utility infrstructure requirements under the No Action Alterntive re summrized in Tble 4 1. It is expected tht electricity consumption, fuel consumption, nd wter use ssocited with storge of neptunium-237 in the existing FMF t the Mterils nd Fuels Complex (MFC) would be negligible. Also, there would be no dditionl utility requirements ssocited with irrdition of neptunium-237 trgets in ATR nd HFIR (should it be required), becuse these rectors re lredy in continuous opertion for other purposes (DOE 2000f). 4-2

4 Chpter 4 Environmentl Consequences Tble 4 1 Annul Incrementl Infrstructure Requirements Associted with Operting Existing Fcilities Under the No Action Alterntive INL ORNL LANL Indictor FMF ATR SSPSF b HFIR REDC Plutonium Fcility Electricity (megwtt-hours per yer) Negligible 0 2,039 0 Negligible 870 Nturl gs (cubic meters per yer) ,000 Fuel oil (liters per yer) , Wter use (million liters per yer) INL = Idho Ntionl Lbortory, ORNL = Ok Ridge Ntionl Lbortory, LANL = Los Almos Ntionl Lbortory, FMF = Fuel Mnufcturing Fcility, ATR = Advnced Test Rector, SSPSF = Spce nd Security Power Systems Fcility, HFIR = High Flux Isotope Rector, REDC = Rdiochemicl Engineering Development Center. There would be no incrementl impcts of opertion of ATR or HFIR becuse the insertion of trgets does not ffect rector operting conditions. b Also known s the Assembly nd Testing Fcility. Note: To convert from cubic meters to cubic feet, multiply by ; from liters to gllons, by Sources: DOE 2000f, 2002c, 2003d. Requirements for opertion of the Assembly nd Testing Fcility re well within the current INL utility cpcity. Annul electricl energy demnds of some 2,039 megwtt-hours t the Assembly nd Testing Fcility re within INL s current electricl supply cpcity of 481,800 megwtt-hours per yer. The 189,000 liters (50,000 gllons) of fuel oil required to het the fcility is within the rnge of the 2 to 2.5 million liters (550,000 to 650,000 gllons) of totl fuel oil burned ech yer t MFC. The nnul wter requirement of 28 million liters (7.3 million gllons) is within the cpcity of the MFC wter supply system nd INL s wter rights (DOE 2002c). The MFC system cn deliver up to 1,790 million liters (473 million gllons) nnully from its two deep wells (see Section ). Informtion on current utility infrstructure usge nd system cpcities t INL is presented in Section Wter requirements of 2.9 million liters (0.76 million gllons) per yer t REDC is well within the cpcity of the ORNL wter supply system, which cn deliver 9.7 billion liters (2.6 billion gllons) nnully (see Section ). Incrementl electricl consumption for continued opertions would be negligible (DOE 2000f). No dditionl fuel would be required becuse this fcility is lredy being operted for other purposes. Informtion on current utility infrstructure usge nd system cpcities t ORNL is presented in Section The nnul verge electricl energy demnd, n estimted 870 megwtt-hours for the Plutonium Fcility t TA-55, is within LANL s current electricl supply cpcity of 963,600 megwtt-hours per yer. The 78,000 cubic meters (2.8 million cubic feet) of nturl gs estimted to be required is smll percentge of the 38 million cubic meters (1.3 billion cubic feet) of nturl gs used ech yer t LANL. The nnul wter requirement of 0.19 million liters (0.05 million gllons) is well within the cpcity of the Los Almos wter supply system. Informtion on current infrstructure utility usge nd system cpcities t LANL is presented in Section Geology nd Soils All ctivities under the No Action Alterntive would tke plce within existing fcilities. There would be no disturbnce to either geologic or soil resources. Hzrds from lrge-scle geologic conditions t INL, such s erthqukes nd volcnoes, were previously evluted in the Storge nd Disposition of Wepons-Usble Fissile Mterils Finl Progrmmtic Environmentl Impct Sttement (Storge nd Disposition PEIS) (DOE 1996d). The nlysis determined tht these hzrds present low risk to long-term storge fcilities. Further review of the dt nd nlyses 4-3

5 Drft EIS for the Proposed Consolidtion of Nucler Opertions Relted to Production of Rdioisotope Power Systems presented in the referenced document nd the site-specific dt presented in the NI PEIS (DOE 2000f) indictes tht lrge-scle geologic conditions likewise present low risk to the proposed INL fcilities. Ground shking of Modified Merclli Intensity VI to VII (see Tble B 7) t INL ssocited with postulted erthqukes is expected to primrily ffect the integrity of indequtely designed or nonreinforced structures. Dmge to properly or specilly-designed or upgrded fcilities is not expected. Also, the likelihood of future volcnic ctivity during the 35-yer opertionl period evluted under the No Action Alterntive is considered low. The potentil for other nontectonic events to ffect INL fcilities is lso low (DOE 2000f). Hzrds from lrge-scle geologic conditions t ORNL, were previously evluted in the Storge nd Disposition PEIS (DOE 1996d). The nlysis determined tht these hzrds present low risk to long-term storge fcilities. Further review of the dt nd nlyses presented in the referenced document nd the sitespecific dt presented in the NI PEIS (DOE 2000f) indictes tht lrge-scle geologic conditions likewise present low risk to HFIR nd REDC opertions. This is bsed on the fct tht there is no evidence of cpble (ctive) fults on or ner ORNL, nd no volcnic hzrd exists. While sinkholes re present in the Knox Group, the 7900 Are is underlin by the Consug Group, in which krst fetures re less well developed. Thus, sinkholes do not present geologic hzrd to HFIR. The nlysis determined tht these hzrds present low risk to specilly-designed or upgrded fcilities such s HFIR (DOE 2000f) Wter Resources Estimted wter use nd wstewter genertion under the No Action Alterntive re summrized in Tble 4 2. There would be no impct on wter resources ssocited with opertions in FMF, ATR nd HFIR (should it be required), becuse there would be no dditionl incrementl use of surfce wter or groundwter, nd there would be no chnge in the quntity or qulity of effluents dischrged to surfce wter or groundwter. ATR nd HFIR re lredy in opertion for other purposes, so neptunium-237 trget irrdition would not hve mesurble impcts (DOE 2000f). Tble 4 2 Annul Incrementl Wter Use nd Wstewter Genertion Associted with Operting Existing Fcilities Under the No Action Alterntive Indictor INL ORNL LANL (million liters per yer) FMF ATR SSPSF b HFIR REDC Plutonium Fcility Wter use Process wstewter genertion < Snitry wstewter genertion c INL = Idho Ntionl Lbortory, ORNL = Ok Ridge Ntionl Lbortory, LANL = Los Almos Ntionl Lbortory, FMF = Fuel Mnufcturing Fcility, ATR = Advnced Test Rector, SSPSF = Spce nd Security Power Systems Fcility, HFIR = High Flux Isotope Rector, REDC = Rdiochemicl Engineering Development Center. There would be no incrementl impcts of opertion of ATR or HFIR becuse the insertion of trgets does not ffect rector operting conditions. b Also known s the Assembly nd Testing Fcility. c Assumes ll wter used becomes snitry wstewter. Note: To convert from liters to gllons, multiply by Sources: DOE 2000f, 2002c. Opertion of the Assembly nd Testing Fcility would require pproximtely 28 million liters (7.3 million gllons) of wter nnully. Snitry wstewter would be treted in the INL sewge lgoons. The wste strems from the Assembly nd Testing Fcility re within the cpcity of these fcilities (DOE 2002c). Informtion on current wter usge, effluent dischrge, nd wter qulity t INL is presented in Section As summrized in Tble 4 2, wter use nd snitry wstewter genertion would be reltively smll nd lrgely ssocited with stffing requirements t REDC t ORNL nd the Plutonium Fcility t LANL. The only other mesurble wstewter genertion would be 23,000 liters (6,100 gllons) per yer of process 4-4

6 Chpter 4 Environmentl Consequences wstewter ssocited with trget processing t REDC nd 1,130 liters (300 gllons) per yer of rdioctive liquid process wstewter from the Plutonium Fcility (DOE 1991). Specificlly, the 23,000 liters (6,100 gllons) of process wstewter generted per yer would be negligible reltive to the totl volume of process wstewter generted nd treted t the ORNL Process Wste Tretment Complex (DOE 2000f). In ddition, the 1,130 liters (300 gllons) per yer of rdioctive liquid process wstewter is negligible reltive to the totl volume of process wstewter treted nd dischrged from the LANL Rdioctive Liquid Wste Tretment Fcility nnully (11 million liters [3.0 million gllons]) (LANL 2004). Impcts on the quntity or qulity, if ny, of process nd snitry wstewter dischrges would be very smll, with no rdiologicl liquid effluent dischrges to the environment under norml opertions. Overll, no mesurble impct on wter resources t ORNL nd LANL re expected Air Qulity nd Noise Air Qulity Nonrdiologicl Releses It is estimted tht there would be no mesurble nonrdiologicl ir pollutnt emissions t INL nd ORNL ssocited with opertions in FMF, ATR nd HFIR (should it be required). Therefore, there would be no nonrdiologicl ir qulity impcts t INL or ORNL ssocited with these ctivities (DOE 2000f). The primry source of criteri pollutnt emissions due to continued opertion of the Assembly nd Testing Fcility would be from burning fuel oil in the boilers tht provide het nd power for the fcilities t INL. Ech of the boilers hs specific limits on the levels of emissions. Continued opertion of the Assembly nd Testing Fcility would not cuse the boilers to exceed their permitted levels of nitrogen oxide emissions nd other ir pollutnts (DOE 2002c). The nonrdiologicl ir pollutnt concentrtions t ORNL from ctivities t REDC re presented in Tble 4 3. Concentrtions re bsed on dispersion-modeling screening nlysis conducted with mximum expected emission rtes nd set of worst-cse meteorologicl conditions. Criteri pollutnts were modeled for stck height of 76.2 meters (250 feet) t the boundry limit of 5.0 kilometers (3.1 miles). Only those ir pollutnts expected to be emitted tht hve mbient ir qulity stndrds re presented in the tble. The concentrtions were determined to be smll nd would be below pplicble stndrds even when mbient monitored vlues nd the contributions from other site ctivities were included (DOE 2000f). Helth effects of hzrdous chemicls ssocited with this lterntive re ddressed in Section Tble 4 3 Incrementl Ok Ridge Ntionl Lbortory Air Pollutnt Concentrtions Associted with Operting Existing Fcilities Under the No Action Alterntive Pollutnt Averging Period Most Stringent Stndrd or Guideline (microgrms per cubic meter) Modeled Increment (microgrms per cubic meter) Nitrogen dioxide Annul Sulfur dioxide Annul 24 hours 3 hours ,300 Source: Modeled increments re bsed on the SCREEN3 computer code (DOE 2000f) The primry source of criteri pollutnt emissions from LANL s Plutonium Fcility would be from burning nturl gs to provide het. Ech of the boilers hs specific limits on the levels of emissions. Opertions in the Plutonium Fcility would not cuse the boilers to exceed their permitted levels of emissions. The contributions to mbient concentrtions ttributble to purifiction, pelletiztion, nd encpsultion opertions would be minor. 4-5

7 Drft EIS for the Proposed Consolidtion of Nucler Opertions Relted to Production of Rdioisotope Power Systems The ir pollutnt emissions from opertions under this lterntive would be smll nd not subject to Prevention of Significnt Deteriortion (PSD) regultions. Therefore, PSD increment nlysis is not required (see Section B.4.1). The Finl Rule for Determining Conformity of Generl Federl Actions to Stte or Federl Implementtion Plns requires conformity determintion for certin-sized projects in nonttinment res. DOE hs performed review for this lterntive nd concluded tht conformity determintion is not necessry to meet the requirements of the Finl Rule, becuse INL, ORNL, nd LANL re locted in ttinment res for ll criteri pollutnts, except for ozone nd prticulte mtter (PM) with n erodynmic dimeter less thn or equl to 2.5 micrometers (PM 2.5 ) t ORNL, nd threshold emission levels would not be exceeded by the ctivities considered (DOE 2000). See Section D.5.2 for discussion of the humn helth risks from pollutnts emitted by trnsport vehicles. Rdiologicl Releses Rdioctive releses ssocited with storge of neptunium-237 t FMF would be essentilly zero, s the cnisters contining the neptunium-237 would remin in continment vessels during storge. Incrementl releses to the environment from ATR nd HFIR (should it be required) during trget irrdition would be zero, becuse there would be no increse in ctivities in those rectors due to dditionl trget irrdition. An estimted curies per yer of plutonium-238 could be relesed to the environment during trget fbriction nd post-irrdition processing opertions t REDC if the No Action Alterntive is implemented (see Section C.2.1.4). An estimted curies per yer of plutonium-238 could be relesed to the environment from purifiction, pelletiztion, nd encpsultion opertions t LANL s Plutonium Fcility. No releses re expected from the rdioisotope power system (RPS) Assembly nd Testing Fcility t INL, becuse the fcility would hndle only fully encpsulted rdioctive mteril. There would be no other types of rdiologicl releses from RPS nucler production opertions. Impcts of rdiologicl releses re discussed in Section Noise Opertions in FMF nd the Assembly nd Testing Fcility t MFC, nd the ATR t the Rector Technology Complex (RTC) (formerly Test Rector Are), would generte noise levels similr to those presently ssocited with opertions conducted in these res of INL. Onsite noise impcts re expected to be miniml, nd offsite noise levels should not be noticeble, s the nerest site boundry is 6.4 kilometers (4 miles) from MFC nd 11 kilometers (6.8 miles) from RTC. Trffic increses would be smll nd would result in only minor on- nd offsite noise levels. There would be no loud noises ssocited with these opertions tht would dversely impct wildlife (DOE 2000f, 2002c). Noise ssocited with opertions in REDC nd HFIR (should it be required) would be similr to sound levels ssocited with current opertions, s well s other opertions conducted t ORNL. Onsite noise impcts re expected to be miniml, nd offsite noise levels would not be noticeble becuse the nerest site boundry is 2.5 kilometers (1.6 miles) to the southest. Trffic increses would be minor nd would not led to noticeble noise levels either on or offsite. There would be no loud noises ssocited with these opertions tht would dversely impct wildlife (DOE 2000f). Noise ssocited with opertions in the Plutonium Fcility t LANL would be similr to sound levels generted by present Plutonium Fcility opertions, s well s other opertions in TA-55. Onsite noise impcts re expected to be miniml, nd offsite noise levels would not be noticeble. Trffic ssocited would be minor nd would not led to noticeble noise levels either on or offsite. There would be no loud noises ssocited with these opertions tht would dversely impct wildlife. 4-6

8 Chpter 4 Environmentl Consequences Ecologicl Resources All ctivity under the No Action Alterntive would tke plce within existing fcilities; therefore, direct disturbnce to ecologicl resources t INL, ORNL, nd LANL would not occur. As noted in Section , wildlife would not be ffected by noise ssocited with opertions t these fcilities. There would be no impct on wetlnds or qutic resources becuse there would be no construction, no increse in wter usge, nd no direct dischrge of wstewter (Section 4.1.4). Becuse of the developed nture of the res nd the fct tht no new construction would tke plce, impcts on thretened nd endngered species would not occur (DOE 2000f). Mesurble impcts on popultions of plnts nd nimls on or off the DOE sites re not expected s result of the incrementl increse in exposure to rdionuclides or chemicls tht could result from opertion of fcilities under this lterntive. DOE routinely smples gme species residing on or ner the sites, livestock in the region, loclly grown crops, nd milk for rdionuclides. The results of this monitoring re reported in the nnul environmentl reports prepred for ech site. Concentrtions of rdionuclides in the plnt nd niml smples re generlly smll nd seldom higher thn concentrtions observed t control loctions distnt from the sites. Additionl deposition resulting from implementtion of this lterntive is not expected to led to levels of contminnts tht would exceed the historiclly reported rnges of concentrtions. Therefore, DOE nticiptes miniml impcts on the ecology of the DOE sites, nd on plnt nd niml popultions, s result of exposure to rdionuclides or chemicls under this lterntive Culturl Resources All fcilities locted t INL (FMF, ATR, nd the Assembly nd Testing Fcility), s well s the Plutonium Fcility t LANL nd HFIR t ORNL, re existing structures nd would not require modifiction under this lterntive. REDC t ORNL would require some internl modifictions, but no lnd disturbnce is expected. As no new lnd disturbnce would occur nd ll building modifictions would be internl, no impcts on prehistoric, historic, or Americn Indin culturl resources t INL, LANL, or ORNL re expected Socioeconomics Under the No Action Alterntive, current levels of employment t the INL MFC nd LANL s Plutonium Fcility would remin unchnged. As no new employment or in-migrtion of workers would be required, socioeconomic conditions round INL nd LANL would remin unchnged. Also, no dditionl workers would be required for irrdition of neptunium-237 trgets in ATR t INL or HFIR (should it be required) t ORNL, s these rectors re in opertion nd lredy irrdite trgets for other customers. As noted in the NI PEIS, trget fbriction nd post-irrdition processing of neptunium-237 trgets t ORNL s REDC would require bout 41 workers. This level of employment ws estimted to generte pproximtely 105 dditionl jobs in the region round ORNL. Assuming these re new jobs to the region, the potentil increse of 146 jobs would represent less thn 0.1 percent increse in the workforce. An increse in employment of this size nd other relted economic ctivity in support of RPS nucler production opertions t ORNL would hve no noticeble impct on socioeconomic conditions in the ORNL region of influence (ROI) (DOE 2000f). Since employment in support of RPS nucler production opertions t INL nd LANL would not chnge, trffic volumes would not chnge. The increse in trffic volume t ORNL from RPS nucler production t REDC would be smll nd not likely to be noticed by commuters in the vicinity of ORNL. 4-7

9 Drft EIS for the Proposed Consolidtion of Nucler Opertions Relted to Production of Rdioisotope Power Systems Public nd Occuptionl Helth nd Sfety Assessments of rdiologicl nd chemicl impcts ssocited with the No Action Alterntive re presented in this section. Supplementl informtion is provided in Appendix C of this EIS Construction nd Norml Opertions No construction ctivities re ssocited with the No Action Alterntive. During norml opertions, there could be incrementl rdiologicl nd hzrdous chemicl releses to the environment nd lso incrementl direct in-plnt exposures. The resulting doses nd potentil helth effects on the public nd workers under this lterntive re described below. Rdiologicl Impcts Incrementl rdiologicl doses to three receptor groups from opertions t INL, ORNL, nd LANL re given in Tble 4 4: the popultion within 80 kilometers (50 miles) in the yer 2050, the mximlly exposed individul (MEI) of the public, nd the verge exposed member of the public. The projected number of excess ltent cncer ftlities (LCFs) in the surrounding popultion nd the excess LCF risk to the MEI nd verge exposed individul re lso presented in the tble. A probbility coefficient of LCFs per rem (roentgen equivlent mn) is pplied for the public nd workers. Tble 4 4 Incrementl Rdiologicl Impcts on the Public of Fcility Opertions Under the No Action Alterntive INL ORNL LANL Receptor MFC ATR b HFIR b REDC Plutonium Fcility Popultion within 80 kilometers (50 miles) in the yer 2050 Dose (person-rem) No chnge No chnge yer period excess ltent cncer ftlities No chnge No chnge Mximlly exposed individul Annul dose (millirem) No chnge No chnge yer excess ltent cncer ftlity risk No chnge No chnge Averge exposed individul within 80 kilometers (50 miles) Annul dose c (millirem) No chnge No chnge yer excess ltent cncer ftlity risk No chnge No chnge INL = Idho Ntionl Lbortory, ORNL = Ok Ridge Ntionl Lbortory, LANL = Los Almos Ntionl Lbortory, MFC = Mterils nd Fuels Complex, ATR = Advnced Test Rector, HFIR = High Flux Isotope Rector, REDC = Rdiochemicl Engineering Development Center. Becuse exposure dt re not vilble for neptunium-237 storge exclusively, vlues were conservtively estimted to be 10 percent (DOE 2000f) of the fbriction nd processing component of the totl neptunium-237 trget fbriction, processing, nd storge doses t REDC. These vlues serve s n upper-bound representtion of the potentil impcts tht could be incurred from neptunium-237 storge. b There would be no incrementl rdiologicl impcts of opertion of ATR or HFIR becuse the insertion of trgets does not ffect rector operting conditions or contribute new source of rdiologicl emissions. c Obtined by dividing the popultion dose by the number of people projected to live within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the site in the yer 2050 (ATR t INL = 172,200; MFC t INL = 355,000; REDC nd HFIR t ORNL = 1,438,000; Plutonium Fcility t LANL = 608,800). Source: DOE 2000f. Doses t INL would be ttributed to storge of the neptunium-237 trgets. Assembly nd Testing Fcility opertions t MFC re not expected to relese ny rdioctivity on or offsite becuse the fcility would hndle only fully encpsulted rdioctive mteril. Doses t ORNL would be ttributed to trget fbriction nd 4-8

10 Chpter 4 Environmentl Consequences post-irrdition processing t REDC. Doses t LANL would be ttributed to purifiction, pelletiztion, nd encpsultion ctivities t the Plutonium Fcility in TA-55. There would be no incrementl dose nd no excess LCFs from opertions t ATR nd HFIR (should it be required) becuse there would be no increse in rdiologicl releses to the environment from either of these rectors ssocited with this lterntive (DOE 2000f). The highest popultion, MEI, nd verge exposed individul doses would occur t ORNL from ctivities t REDC. The nnul popultion dose t ORNL would be person-rem, with 35-yer excess LCF risk of The nnul MEI dose would be millirem, with 35-yer excess LCF risk of The nnul verge exposed individul dose would be millirem, with 35-yer excess LCF risk of Doses to involved workers from norml opertions re given in Tble 4B5; these workers re defined s those directly ssocited with process ctivities. The incrementl nnul verge dose to workers from irrdition ctivities t ATR nd HFIR would be negligible; to REDC, FMF, nd Plutonium Fcility workers, pproximtely 170 (DOE 2000f), 17, nd 240 (LANL 2005) millirem, respectively. No LCFs would be expected from these exposures. Doses to individul workers would be kept to miniml levels by instituting bdged monitoring nd s low s is resonbly chievble (ALARA) progrms. Tble 4 5 Incrementl Rdiologicl Impcts on Involved Workers of Fcility Opertions Under the No Action Alterntive INL ORNL Receptor Involved Workers MFC ATR b HFIR b REDC LANL Plutonium Fcility Totl dose (person-rem per yer) 1.2 c No chnge No chnge 12 d 19 e 35-yer excess ltent cncer ftlities No chnge No chnge Averge worker dose (millirem per yer) 17 No chnge No chnge yer excess ltent cncer ftlity risk No chnge No chnge INL = Idho Ntionl Lbortory, ORNL = Ok Ridge Ntionl Lbortory, LANL = Los Almos Ntionl Lbortory, MFC = Mterils nd Fuels Complex, ATR = Advnced Test Rector, HFIR = High Flux Isotope Rector, REDC = Rdiochemicl Engineering Development Center. The rdiologicl limit for n individul worker is 5,000 millirem per yer (10 Code of Federl Regultions [CFR] 835). However, the mximum dose to worker involved with rdiologicl opertions would be kept below the DOE Administrtive Control Level of 2,000 millirem per yer (DOE 1999e). Further, DOE recommends tht fcilities dopt more limiting, 500-millirem-per-yer, Administrtive Control Level (DOE 1999e). To reduce doses to ALARA levels, n effective ALARA progrm would be enforced (see Section 4.5.5). b There would be no incrementl rdiologicl impcts of opertion of ATR or HFIR becuse the insertion of trgets does not ffect rector operting conditions or contribute new source of rdiologicl emissions. c Becuse exposure dt re not vilble for neptunium-237 storge exclusively, vlues re conservtively estimted to be 10 percent (DOE 2000f) of the totl dose from neptunium-237 trget fbriction/processing nd neptunium-237 storge, nd serve s n upper-bound representtion of the potentil impcts tht could be incurred from neptunium-237 storge. d Bsed on n estimted 75 bdged workers. e Bsed on n estimted 79 bdged workers nd n verge of 0.24 rem per worker t LANL (LANL 2005). Hzrdous Chemicl Impcts Hzrdous chemicl impcts t INL would be unchnged from bseline site opertions becuse no new chemicls would be emitted to the ir from storge of neptunium-237 in FMF t MFC or irrdition of neptunium-237 trgets in ATR t INL nd HFIR t ORNL (DOE 2000f). Crcinogenic nd noncrcinogenic helth effects of exposure to hzrdous chemicls emitted from opertions in REDC t ORNL were evluted nd reported in the NI PEIS (DOE 2000f). The hzrdous chemicl helth effects re summrized in Tble 4B6. The Hzrd Index for ctivities t ORNL is estimted to be much less 4-9

11 Drft EIS for the Proposed Consolidtion of Nucler Opertions Relted to Production of Rdioisotope Power Systems thn 1 (0.006), nd the cncer risk to be less thn 1 in 1 million. Therefore, no chemicl helth effects re nticipted under the No Action Alterntive. Nonrdioctive ir emissions from ctivities t the Plutonium Fcility t LANL would be minly from the glovebox gses rgon nd helium. These re inert nd nonhzrdous. Ethnol, used s solvent t LANL, is likewise not hzrdous. Vpors of hydrofluoric nd nitric cids, used in decontmintion, would be emitted t rtes well below threshold vlues (DOE 1991). Tble 4 6 Incrementl Hzrdous Chemicl Impcts on the Public round Ok Ridge Ntionl Lbortory Under the No Action Alterntive Chemicl Modeled Annul Increment (milligrms per cubic meter) RfC to Inhltion (milligrms per cubic meter) Unit Cncer Risk (risk per milligrm per cubic meter) Hzrd Quotient Cncer Risk REDC t ORNL Diethyl benzene Methnol NA NA Nitric cid NA NA Tributyl phosphte NA NA Hzrd Index = RfC = reference concentrtion, NA = not pplicble (the chemicl is not known crcinogen or it is crcinogen nd only unit risk will pply). Note: For diethyl benzene, the RfC for ethyl benzene nd the unit cncer risk for benzene were used to estimte Hzrd Quotient nd cncer risk becuse no informtion ws vilble for diethyl benzene. For tributyl phosphte, the RfC for phosphoric cid ws used to estimte the Hzrd Quotient becuse no informtion ws vilble for tributyl phosphte. Source: DOE 2000f Fcility Accidents This section discusses potentil ccident impcts under the No Action Alterntive. Detiled descriptions re provided in Appendix C of this EIS. The ccident scenrios chosen for nlysis hve impcts tht bound the suite of ccidents tht hve occurred nd could occur t the fcilities. The selection of ccident scenrios described in Appendix C of this EIS include the review of ccident history s presented in Sections , , nd The ccident scenrios tht were nlyzed result in higher public nd noninvolved worker risks thn historic ccidents. Incrementl rdiologicl doses to three receptor groups from postulted ccidents t INL, ORNL, nd LANL re estimted: the popultion within 80 kilometers (50 miles), the MEI of the public, nd the noninvolved worker. The projected number of excess LCFs in the surrounding popultion nd the excess LCF risk to the MEI nd noninvolved worker re lso presented. A probbility coefficient of LCFs per rem is pplied for the public nd workers. Rdiologicl Impcts Potentil ccidents under the No Action Alterntive hve been evluted by DOE in previous Ntionl Environmentl Policy Act (NEPA) documents (DOE 2000f, 2002c). Neptunium-237 Storge At INL, neptunium-237 would be stored in the FMF vult. While the postulted beyond-evlution-bsis erthquke my cuse portions of the fcility to collpse, the storge cns would not be stressed to level tht would brech the double continment of the cn design (DOE 2000f). Trget Irrdition For ATR trget irrdition ccidents, the nnul incresed risk of n LCF to the offsite MEI nd noninvolved worker ssocited with plutonium-238 production would be nd , 4-10

12 Chpter 4 Environmentl Consequences respectively. The nnul risk in terms of the incresed number of LCFs in the surrounding popultion would be (DOE 2000f). For HFIR trget irrdition ccidents, the nnul incresed risk of n LCF to the offsite MEI nd noninvolved worker ssocited with plutonium-238 production would be nd , respectively. The nnul risk in terms of the incresed number of LCFs in the surrounding popultion would be These trget irrdition ccident risks were clculted in the NI PEIS (DOE 2000f). Trget Fbriction nd Post-irrdition Processing For REDC trget fbriction nd processing ccidents, the nnul incresed risk of n LCF to the offsite MEI nd noninvolved worker ws estimted to be nd , respectively. The nnul ccident risk in terms of the incresed number of LCFs in the surrounding popultion ws estimted to be Assembly nd Testing Opertions A rnge of ccidents were considered for the Assembly nd Testing Fcility, including welding fire ccidents, ctstrophic filure of one or more of the fuel elements, nd the potentil for wind-driven missile to penetrte fcility wll nd glovebox. However, becuse of the solid cermic form of the plutonium nd the multiple protective fetures of the Ctegory 3 building, ny relese to the environment from these ccidents would be negligible. Any dverse effects would be mitigted by ir filtrtion systems, room nd building brriers, nd ir locks tht contin releses (DOE 2002c). Becuse the probbility of occurrence nd, relese of rdioctive mterils outside of the building for these ccidents ws estimted to be less thn 1 in 1 million per yer, the risks to noninvolved workers nd the public were not considered further. Plutonium-238 Purifiction, Pelletiztion, nd Encpsultion The consequences nd risks of plutonium-238 purifiction, pelletiztion, nd encpsultion ccidents re shown in Tble 4 7. Four potentil ccidents were postulted: An unmitigted evlution-bsis fire during plutonium-238 powder-to-pellet fbriction. Unmitigted conditions ssume filure of heting, ventilting, nd ir conditioning (HVAC) nd fire suppression systems. The estimted frequency of this ccident is per yer. An unmitigted evlution-bsis erthquke (0.3-g 1 ccelertion), cusing filure of the HVAC, fire sfety equipment, nonsfety-clss ductwork, nd internl nonsfety-grde structures, but not the structure shell itself. The estimted frequency of this ccident is per yer. A beyond-evlution-bsis fire similr to the evlution-bsis fire, but involving two gloveboxes nd the ssumption tht exterior doors re open for the durtion of the fire, providing direct unfiltered relese to the environment. The estimted frequency of this ccident is per yer. A beyond-evlution-bsis erthquke (0.5-g), with ll the sme ssumed filures s the evlution bsis erthquke but in ddition, 50-percent degrdtion in high-efficiency prticulte ir (HEPA) filter removl efficiency. The estimted frequency of this ccident is per yer. The risks of the postulted ccidents re shown in Tble 4 8. The ccident with the highest risk is n unmitigted evlution-bsis erthquke. If this ccident were to occur, the nnul risk of n LCF would be nd for the MEI nd noninvolved worker, respectively. The nnul risk for the offsite popultion would be The 35-yer risk for the highest-consequence ccident, n unmitigted evlution-bsis erthquke, for the MEI, noninvolved worker, nd offsite popultion would be , , nd , respectively. 1 In mesuring erthquke ground motion, the ccelertion (the rte of chnge in velocity) experienced reltive to tht due to Erth s grvity (i.e., pproximtely equl to 980 centimeters per second squred). 4-11

13 Drft EIS for the Proposed Consolidtion of Nucler Opertions Relted to Production of Rdioisotope Power Systems Tble 4 7 Plutonium-238 Purifiction, Pelletiztion, nd Encpsultion Annul Accident Consequences t Los Almos Ntionl Lbortory Under the No Action Alterntive Accident Mximlly Exposed Individul Dose (rem) Ltent Cncer Ftlity Popultion to 80 Kilometers (50 miles) Dose (personrem) Ltent Cncer Ftlities b Dose (rem) Noninvolved Worker Ltent Cncer Ftlity Unmitigted evlution-bsis fire , Unmitigted evlution-bsis erthquke Beyond-evlution-bsis fire Beyond-evlution-bsis erthquke b Likelihood of n LCF. Number of LCFs. Tble 4 8 Plutonium-238 Purifiction, Pelletiztion, nd Encpsultion Annul Accident Risks t Los Almos Ntionl Lbortory Under the No Action Alterntive Accident Mximlly Exposed Individul Popultion to 80 Kilometers b (50 miles) Noninvolved Worker Unmitigted evlution-bsis fire Unmitigted evlution-bsis erthquke Beyond-evlution-bsis fire Beyond-evlution-bsis erthquke b Incresed likelihood of n LCF. Incresed number of LCFs. Chemicl Impcts Storge of neptunium-237 would not involve hzrdous chemicls. Therefore, no chemicl ccidents would be ssocited with storge of neptunium-237 in FMF (DOE 2000f). Irrdition of neptunium-237 trgets t ATR nd HFIR (should it be required) would not introduce ny dditionl hzrdous chemicls. Thus, no postulted chemicl ccidents would be ttributble to irrdition of neptunium-237 trgets (DOE 2000f). Trget processing ssocited with plutonium-238 production t REDC, including storge of neptunium-237 nd plutonium-238; neptunium-237 trget fbriction; nd post-irrdition processing to extrct plutonium-238 nd to recycle the unconverted neptunium-237 into new trgets would not require ny chemicls tht re not lredy in use in the fcility. The quntities of in-process hzrdous chemicls for the plutonium-238 production progrm would be bounded by the quntities of the mteril currently stored in the fcility. Therefore, the impcts of in-process hzrdous chemicl ccidents ssocited with plutonium-238 production would be bounded by the impcts of hzrdous chemicl ccidents ssocited with existing chemicl storge fcilities t REDC (DOE 2000f). Plutonium-238 purifiction, pelletiztion, nd encpsultion would not require the use of hzrdous chemicls. 4-12

14 Chpter 4 Environmentl Consequences Trnsporttion Trnsporttion impcts consist of impcts of incident-free or routine trnsporttion nd impcts of trnsporttion ccidents. Incident-free trnsporttion impcts include rdiologicl impcts on the public nd workers from the rdition field surrounding the trnsporttion pckge. Nonrdiologicl impcts of potentil trnsporttion ccidents include trffic ccident ftlities. See Section D.5.2 for discussion of the humn helth risks from pollutnts emitted by trnsport vehicles. The impct of specific rdiologicl ccident is expressed in terms of probbilistic risk, which is defined s the ccident probbility (i.e., ccident frequency) multiplied by the ccident consequences. The overll risk is obtined by summing the individul risks from ll resonbly conceivble ccidents. The nlysis of ccident risks tkes into ccount spectrum of ccidents rnging from high-probbility ccidents (fender bender) of low consequence to high-consequence ccidents tht hve low probbility of occurrence. Only s result of severe fire nd/or powerful collision, which re of extremely low probbility, could trnsporttion pckge of the type used to trnsport rdioctive mteril be dmged to the extent tht there could be relese of rdioctivity to the environment with significnt consequences. In ddition to clculting the rdiologicl risks tht would result from ll resonbly conceivble ccidents during trnsporttion of rdioctive mterils, DOE ssessed the consequences of mximum resonbly foreseeble ccidents with probbility greter thn (1 chnce in 10 million) per yer. The ltter consequences were determined for tmospheric conditions tht would previl during ccidents. The nlysis used the RISKIND computer code to estimte doses to individuls nd popultions (Yun et l. 1995). Rdiologicl ccident risk is expressed s dditionl LCFs, nd nonrdiologicl ccident risk s dditionl immedite (trffic) ftlities. Incident-free risk is lso expressed s dditionl LCFs. In determining the trnsporttion risks, per-shipment risk fctors were clculted for the incident-free nd ccident conditions using the RADTRAN 5 computer progrm (SNL 2003) in conjunction with the Trnsporttion Routing Anlysis Geogrphic Informtion System (TRAGIS) computer progrm (Johnson nd Michelhugh 2003) to choose trnsporttion routes in ccordnce with U.S. Deprtment of Trnsporttion (DOT) regultions. The TRAGIS progrm provides popultion estimtes bsed on the 2000 census long the routes for determining the popultion rdiologicl risk fctors. The nlysis pproch nd detils on modeling nd prmeter selections re provided in Appendix D of this EIS. Under the No Action Alterntive, DOE would trnsport neptunium-237 from its storge loction in FMF t INL to the REDC trget fbriction fcility t ORNL. Nonirrdited neptunium-237 trgets would be trnsported from REDC to ATR t INL (nd lso to HFIR t ORNL, should it be required). Following irrdition in ATR (nd HFIR), the trgets would be returned to REDC for processing. The seprted plutonium-238 products would be shipped to the Plutonium Fcility t LANL for purifiction, pelletiztion, nd encpsultion within strong cldding mteril. The encpsulted plutonium-238 would be shipped to the Assembly nd Testing Fcility t INL for RPS ssembly nd testing. The neptunium nd plutonium mterils would be trnsported between the sites using DOE Sfe, Secure Trilers (SSTs), nd the nonirrdited nd irrdited fbricted trgets would be trnsported using commercil trucks. It ws ssumed tht HFIR would produce bout 1 to 2 kilogrms (2.2 to 4.4 pounds) of plutonium-238 per yer. These ssumptions re consistent with those used in the NI PEIS (DOE 2000f). Under the No Action Alterntive, 595 truck shipments of rdioctive mterils would be mde between the sites involved. The totl distnce trveled on public rods would be 1.92 million kilometers (1.2 million miles). 4-13

15 Drft EIS for the Proposed Consolidtion of Nucler Opertions Relted to Production of Rdioisotope Power Systems Impcts of Incident-Free Trnsporttion The dose to trnsporttion workers from ll trnsporttion ctivities under the No Action Alterntive hs been estimted to be 15 person-rem, nd the dose to the public would be 22 person-rem. Accordingly, incident-free trnsporttion of rdioctive mteril would result in LCFs mong trnsporttion workers nd LCFs in the totl ffected popultion over the durtion of trnsporttion ctivities. LCFs ssocited with rdiologicl releses were estimted by multiplying the occuptionl (worker) nd public dose by LCFs per person-rem of exposure. Impcts of Trnsporttion Accidents As stted erlier, two sets of nlyses were performed for the evlution of trnsporttion ccident impcts: impcts of mximum resonbly foreseeble severe ccidents nd impcts of ll conceivble ccidents (totl trnsporttion ccidents). The mximum resonbly foreseeble offsite trnsporttion ccident under the No Action Alterntive (probbility of occurrence: more thn 1 in 10 million per yer) is medium to high ctegory impct with fire ccident involving shipment of irrdited neptunium trgets to REDC t ORNL. The consequences of such n ccident in terms of popultion dose in the rurl, suburbn, nd urbn zones re: 0.019, 0.43, nd 3.0 person-rem, respectively. The likelihood of occurrence of such consequences per yer is less thn , , nd in rurl, suburbn, nd urbn zones, respectively. This ccident could result in dose of rem to hypotheticl individul exposed to the ccident plume for 2 hours t distnce of 100 meters (330 feet), with corresponding LCF risk of As described in Appendix D, Section D.7 of this EIS, estimtes of the totl trnsporttion ccident risks under this lterntive re s follows: rdiologicl dose to the popultion of person-rem, resulting in LCFs, nd trffic ccidents resulting in 0 (0.036) ftlities, bsed on 1.9 million kilometers (1.2 million miles) trveled Emergency Prepredness Under the No Action Alterntive Trnsporttion of rdioctive mterils would occur between INL, ORNL, nd LANL. Rdioctive wste shipments would occur to offsite wste mngement fcilities under ll lterntives. This section ddresses emergency mngement nd response long trnsport routes nd t the DOE sites. The emergency mngement nd response infrstructure tht supports current RPS production ctivities nd tht would support response to ctivities within INL boundries is discussed in the emergency prepredness nd security sections in Chpter 3 of this EIS. Stte nd locl governments re responsible for emergency prepredness, mngement, nd response progrms. These progrms must be cpble of mnging ll hzrds, rnging from nturl dissters to hzrdous mteril incidents, on dy-to-dy bsis. To mintin these progrms, vrious Stte, Tribl, nd locl governments receive Federl funding. DOE, long with other Federl gencies (e.g., DOT, The U.S. Nucler Regultory Commission [NRC], Federl Emergency Mngement Agency, U.S. Deprtment of Defense, nd U.S. Environmentl Protection Agency [EPA]), would provide support nd ssistnce to Stte, Tribl, nd locl government gencies responsible for responding to rdioctive mteril incident (DOE 1996b). Rdioctive Mteril Trnsporttion Rdioctive mteril shipments trnsported by truck crrier would be subject to the sme potentil problems s ny other hzrdous mteril shipment severe wether, mechnicl problems, derilments, nd collisions. Rdioctive mteril shipments, like other hzrdous mteril shipments, hve been involved in ccidents or incidents. In most cses, no rdioctive mteril ws relesed 4-14

16 Chpter 4 Environmentl Consequences into the environment. When releses hve occurred, the mteril hs been clened up, with no identifible hrm to the public or environment (DOE 1999d). DOE fulfills its role nd responsibilities s the Federl gency tsked with developing nd mintining the cpbility to sfely trnsport rdioctive mterils, in prt by setting overll progrm mngement responsibility nd policy for trnsporttion nd emergency mngement nd response; resolving policy questions; issuing guidnce; providing informtion; nd ccomplishing oversight by including regultory complince requirements in its rdioctive-mteril-relted contrcts nd by monitoring the performnce of those involved (DOE 1996b). In 2002, there were 5,028 rdioctive mteril shipments (DOE 2003b). To dte, no one hs ever been killed or seriously injured in n ccident involving rdioctive mterils s result of the rdioctive nture of the crgo (DOE 1999d). Sttes nd tribes re responsible for notifying DOE of ny conditions tht could ffect the sfe, nd secure trnsport of shipments through their jurisdictions. Sttes coordinte with locl jurisdictions on emergency plnning nd informtion. DOE provides technicl dvice nd ssistnce to the shippers nd ffected government jurisdictions to ensure sfe trnsporttion (DOE 1996b). Nonsecurity-Risk Rdioctive Mterils nd Wste Shipments During trnsport of the nonsecurity-risk rdioctive mterils nd wstes, DOE nd the commercil crrier re required to ensure tht ll ctivities conform to regultory requirements. For shipments identified s Highwy Route Controlled Quntity, DOE requires the shipper, on behlf of DOE nd/or the crrier, to provide DOE Hedqurters Ntionl Trnsporttion Progrm shipment pln with routing identified 45 dys in dvnce of the shipment. The crrier must provide written route pln to the shipper nd the driver prior to deprture (DOE 1999d). DOE provides the governor or the governor's designee written notice in dvnce of unclssified spent nucler fuel nd high-level rdioctive wste shipments within or through their stte. DOE lso notifies tribl governments of DOE shipments through their jurisdictions. This written notice includes the plnned schedule(s), route, shipment description, nd crrier s nme nd ddress (DOE 1999d). Rdioctive mteril shipments re trcked by either the commercil crrier or stellite trcking system similr to DOE s originl Trnsporttion Trcking nd Communictions System (TRANSCOM). TRANSCOM2000 is n updted trcking system used to monitor the progress of vrious unclssified, highvisibility-shipments. It is vilble to more thn 300 uthorized DOE shipping nd trnsporttion clients, including stte, locl, nd tribl governments. TRANSCOM2000 uses onbord stellite Globl Positioning Systems to trck truck nd ril shipments from origin to destintion. Shipment position nd messging dt re mde vilble over the TRANSCOM2000 Website in 4- to 7-minute intervls (TCC 2005). If sitution rose (e.g., severe wether, mechnicl difficulties, protesters, security thret, personnel illness or injury) tht presented hzrd or thret to highwy shipment, DOE would hve rrnged through memorndum of greement for the commercil crrier to divert to ny Federl instlltion (e.g., DOE site or militry bse) nd request SAFE PARKING t tht fcility until the sitution is resolved. The receiving fcility would ssist in providing security nd logisticl support until the shipment ws prepred to deprt. The stellite trcking system would be used to coordinte SAFE PARKING requests (DOE 1996b). Security-Risk Rdioctive Mteril Shipments In ddition to the bove requirements for nonsecurity-risk rdioctive mteril shipments, security-risk rdioctive mterils would be shipped using SSTs. These re specilly-designed, operted, nd monitored vehicles tht contin vrious security fetures not found in typicl commercil trucks. Security-risk mteril shipments re trcked by TRANSCOM2000. Rdioctive mterils trnsported by SST would be subject to the sme potentil problems s ny other hzrdous mteril shipment tht trvels dily by these mens, nmely, severe wether, mechnicl problems, nd collisions (DOE 1996b). 4-15