large groups of internally contaminated people

Transcription

1 IAEA-TECDOC-746 Rapid monitoring of large groups of internally contaminated people following a radiation accident INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

2 The IAEA does

3 The originating Section of this document in the IAEA was: Radiation Safety Section International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramerstrasse

4 FOREWORD The widespread use of atomic energy and different sources of ionizing radiation in medicine and industry carries with it a small but finite risk of accidental release of radioactive substances

5 EDITORIAL NOTE In preparing this document for press, staff of the IAEA have made up the pages from the original manuscript (s).

6 CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION General Purpose Scope MONITORING PROGRAMMES: OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN... 8

7 ANNEX I. EXPERIENCE IN THE FORMER USSR SINCE THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT...

8 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1. GENERAL Major accidental releases of radionuclides have the potential for significant radiation exposure in large populations. In order to properly respond to large scale accidents, planning and identification of resources is important. This Guide is intended to highlight the considerations that must be made in the planning process. The accidents at Chernobyl and at Goiania have shown the need for guidance on the design and rapid implementation of programmes for assessing internal contamination in large numbers of individuals. Illustrations

9

10 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS Dose assessment with high precision based

11 for example, CED values of 0.5 msv and 50 msv 1 are selected as appropriate decision levels, then the equivalent internal contamination levels (action level) are established accordingly. To illustrate, in the case of 137 Cs, level A would be 5 x 10 4 Bq. Several days after intake, this would give

12

13 Control would obviously

14 the more obvious consumable requirements would be food and drink for those awaiting initial monitoring

15

16 DATA SHEET Name:... Date

17 A single point source of a given nuclide, in some suitable absorbing medium, may suffice

18

19 camera with collimator removed)

20 5.3. CALIBRATION Existing equipment

21 (ix) (x) (xi) Identification of measuring device Results of measurement Estimated uncertainty. Space for additional comments, such as information relating the individual to the circumstances of the accident, and in particular concerning any residual surface contamination (e.g.

22 6.1. REQUIREMENTS Equipment 6. INVESTIGATION OF INTERNAL CONTAMINATION AT HIGH LEVELS

23 to determine

24

25 REFERENCES [ 1 ] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Protection of the Public in the Event of Major Radiation Accidents: Principles for Planning, Publication 40, Pergamon Press, Oxford and New York (1984). [2] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Principles for Establishing Intervention Levels

26 EXPERIENCE Annex I

27 oo TABLE 1-1. TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS

28 uncertainties in defining the size and location of the sensitive volume and consequently its disposition relative

29 FIG Gamma thyroid radiometer NC-25.

30 ro o r~ D 8 I 8 Minimum detectable activity in the thyroid (kbq) Ol O Ol o 1 - DO (Q B p 01 ICD a. CD Ol ro bi to b

31 FIG Gamma dosimeter SRP

32 cr CO f 0> 100 in O 75 <a O S 50 ' 8 0> 25 'E Background dose rate (j/gy/h) FIG Dependence

33 [1-3] DOLGIREV, E.I., et al., Temporary Methodical Instructions on Express Determination of Caesium-134 and Caesium-137 in the Body of Man, Ministry of Public Health of the USSR, Moscow (1987) (in Russian). [1-4] GUSEV, I.A.,

34 Annex II MONITORING PROCEDURES AFTER

35 FIG The whole body counter improvised in Goiania. FIG

36 raft

37 Andrasi,