US climate change impacts from the PAGE2002 integrated assessment model used in the Stern report

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "US climate change impacts from the PAGE2002 integrated assessment model used in the Stern report"

Transcription

1 Page 1 of November 27 US climate change impacts from the PAGE22 integrated assessment model used in the Stern report Chris Hope & Stephan Alberth Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, UK Table of Contents Executive summary...2 Overview of the PAGE22 Model...4 Results...7 Baseline Scenario...7 High-Climate Scenario...11 Baseline Scenario with 3 variations...22 References...54

2 Page 2 of November 27 Executive summary This report presents the US impact results of the PAGE22 model from the Stern report. The baseline scenario and high-climate scenario from the Stern report are considered, both based on the IPCC A2 scenario emission path. Mean results and 9% confidence intervals are shown for the period 21 to 22 for economic, non-economic and discontinuity impacts in four forms: as absolute values, as a percentage of US GDP, cumulated and discounted, and as a percentage of global cumulative discounted impacts. Mean total US impacts remain relatively small up to the 21, when they reach about. of US GDP in the baseline scenario. From 21 to 22 the impacts increase substantially, reaching about 2% of US GDP by 22 in the baseline scenario. Impacts in the high-climate scenario are about 4% higher than in the baseline scenario. The total cumulative US impacts in the baseline scenario over the next 2 s discounted to the 2 amount to $29 trillion with a 9% confidence interval of $3 to $85 trillion. These represent on average of global cumulative discounted impacts with a 9% confidence interval of 1. to 8.; for comparison, the US is responsible for about 2% of global CO 2 emissions between the s 2 and 22 in the non-intervention scenario A2. The results are dominated by non-economic impacts and, after 21, the possibility of discontinuities. Economic impacts are not of great importance. This is because the US economy is assumed to be less vulnerable to climate change than other advanced industrial nations in Europe, and because the economies of all OECD regions are assumed to be able to adapt effectively to moderate levels of climate change. The US share of global cumulative economic impacts rises over time, as the realised temperature rise begins to exceed the 2 degc limit assumed for complete adaptation in the US, but in the baseline scenario only reaches a of.6% of global economic impacts by 22, with a 9 probability of the US share remaining below 1.3 % of the global total even by 22. For comparison, US economic activity is about 13% of the global total in 21 and through the 22 nd century.

3 Page 3 of November 27 Mean US cumulative non-economic impacts amount to about 6% of global non-economic impacts throughout in the baseline scenario; this is because, unlike economic impacts, there is no temperature below which it is assumed there is complete adaptation, even in rich economies like the US. US discontinuity impacts in the baseline scenario are also on average 6% of global cumulative discounted impacts after they enter the picture in 26. Three alternative variations of the PAGE22 model are tested. These include a decrease in the effectiveness of adaptation, an increase to the exponent of the damage function and an increase in the probability and severity of discontinuities. Individually, each assumption increases total impacts by between 3% and 9%, however, when combined, impacts are increased 3 fold. An important result is that because adaptation is assumed to be focused mainly on economic impacts, reduced adaptation leads to economic impacts that are increased 1 fold, while noneconomic impacts increase by only 1/3, thereby increasing strongly the ratio of economic to noneconomic impacts.

4 Page 4 of November 27 Overview of the PAGE22 Model Model Design The PAGE22 model is a stochastic IAM that uses a number of simplified formulas to represent the complex scientific and economic interactions of climate change. Most of the coefficients and data ranges come from the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 21a, 21b, 21c) as described in Hope, 26. The Stern review team modified a small number of inputs when they used the model to calculate the climate change impacts in the Stern report (Stern, et al, 26). These changes are discussed in further detail below. The stochastic features of the model are designed to encompass the uncertainty of the best available knowledge found in the literature. The data ranges are sampled using Latin Hypercube Sampling generated through Excel add-in (Palisade, 24). By using probability distributions as opposed to best guesses to calculate the results, and by iterating through thousands of different possible outcomes, a stochastic model is able to avoid the [f]law of averages 1 as well as present substantial information on the uncertainty of outputs. In this application we use the PAGE22 model with 5 simulations to calculate the impacts of different scenarios. The model includes ten time intervals spanning 2 s, divides the world into eight regions, and considers three different greenhouse gases as described in Table 1. Three types of impact are calculated: economic impacts, which are impacts on sectors such as agriculture and energy use that are directly included in GDP; non-economic impacts, which are impacts on things like health and wilderness areas which are not directly included in GDP; and discontinuity impacts, which are the increased risks of climate catastrophes, such as the melting of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. These three types of impacts are summed to calculate total impacts. Projections of GDP, population and emissions of greenhouse gases are from IPCC Scenario A2 (IPCC, 21a). 1 The term [f]law of averages describes a common error of assuming linearity between inputs and results when in fact the model is non-linear. In other words, it is to assume that by inputting best guess values, the model will also output the best guess result.

5 Page 5 of November 27 As shown, the model uses shorter time steps at the beginning and longer time steps towards the end. This is to allow computational effort to be concentrated in the earlier s because emission forecasts become less accurate with time, and because later emissions have a smaller influence on costs and impacts to 22 (Hope, 26). We present results from the model for the period 21 to 22. Table 1 Definition of gases, regions and s g Gas i Year 1 Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 2 (base ) 2 Methane (CH4) Sulphur Hexafluoride (SF6) 2 22 r Region 3 21 The European Union (focus region) The United States of America Other OECD nations Africa and the Middle East China and Centrally Planned Asia India and South East Asia Latin America Former Soviet Union & E. Europe Model changes introduced for the Stern Report A full description of the basic PAGE22 model can be found in Hope (26). The version used in the Stern report differed by using purchasing power parity exchange rates throughout, and by calculating the discount rates for each time period and region (dr r,i ), using a Ramsey type optimal growth function (Cline, 24) with a pure rate of time preference (ptp). This is shown in equation 1 where e u is the negative of the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, and g and p represent the growth rates of GDP and population respectively, with variables indexed by region r and period i. ( g p ) dr r, i ptp + eu r, i r, i = (1) The Stern review used values of.1% per for ptp, and 1 for e u. (Stern, et al, 26). This gave a lower discount rate than had previously been used in the model. Previous runs with PAGE22 have typically used a range of <1, 2, 3> for the ptp rate (where here, and throughout the report, the

6 Page 6 of November 27 triangular brackets denote a triangular probability distribution with <minimum, most likely, maximum> parameter values). As a result, the Stern review gave a estimate of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) of $85 per tonne of CO 2 ($312 per tonne of carbon) (Stern, et al, 26), higher than most estimates in the literature (Tol, 25), and most previous estimates using PAGE22 which have been in the range of $2 to $65 per tonne of carbon (Hope, 25, 26). One other minor change made by the Stern team for their baseline scenario was to change the range for the climate sensitivity (the equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO 2 concentration) from a range of <1.5, 2.5, 5> to <1.5, 2.5, 4.5> (Stern, et al, 26). The Stern team also investigated a high-climate scenario. The stimulation of CH 4 emissions from increasing temperature was included with a range of <35, 7, 14> MTonnes/degC of realised temperature rise, on top of anthropogenic emissions that in the base were 323 Mtonnes. The value for the CO 2 emissions to air that remain in the atmosphere indefinitely was increased from 3 to 4 for the high-climate scenario. The proportion of CO 2 emitted to air was also changed from a fixed range of <46, 6, 74> % to a temperature dependent range of a 6% base plus <1, 4, 8> % per degc of realised temperature rise.

7 Page 7 of November 27 Results The results from PAGE22 for the US are shown in a graphical format, first for the baseline scenario from the Stern report followed by the high-climate scenario. For each scenario, graphical representations for economic impacts, non-economic impacts, discontinuity impacts and total impacts are included. For each of these impact types, impacts in the US are shown over time in absolute amounts (all expressed in US$ of the 2), as a percentage of US GDP, as cumulative discounted dollars and as a percentage of global impacts. Apart from the first two figures, which are stacked line graphs, nearly all the graphs show 9% confidence intervals as well as results. Baseline Scenario Figure 1 % of GDP Mean US impacts by type in the baseline scenario economic 22 non-economic discontinuity -2. Figure 1 shows total US impacts for the baseline scenario broken down by type of impact, as a % of US GDP.

8 Page 8 of November 27 Economic impacts are not of great importance. This is because the US economy is assumed to be less vulnerable to climate change than other advanced industrial nations in Europe (only one quarter as vulnerable on average), and because the economies of all OECD regions are assumed to be able to adapt effectively to moderate levels of climate change, reducing economic impacts to zero for temperature rises of less than 2 degc, and reducing economic impacts by 9% for temperature rises larger than 2 degc (Hope, 26). However figure 1 only shows the values and, as shown by the following graphics, their importance does remain uncertain. The results are dominated by non-economic impacts and, after 21, the possibility of discontinuities. It is assumed that no regions can adapt to either of these very effectively, only to the extent of 2 of impacts for the non-economic sector, and not at all for discontinuities (Hope, 26). Mean total US impacts are the sum of economic, non-economic and discontinuity impacts, and are shown by the bottom line in figure 1. They remain relatively small in terms of % of GDP up to the 21, when they reach about. of US GDP. From the 21 to 22 the impacts increase substantially, reaching about 2% of US GDP by 22. Looking more closely at the baseline economic impacts in Figure 3, it is easy to see the relatively large uncertainty for this type of impact, which we will see replicated in figures 4 and 5 for noneconomic and discontinuity impacts (Figures 3 to 18 are collected together in landscape format at the end of the report). The 9% confidence interval for the annual economic impacts in the 22 spans the range from $9 billion to just under $5 billion, with a value of $15 billion. In terms of GDP loss in 22 this represents from well under.1% to just under.2% with a value of about.. The US cumulative economic impacts over the next 2 s come to $77 billion when aggregated and discounted to the base 2. This curve is still increasing steadily in 22, showing that with the low discount rates used in the Stern report, the model time horizon of 22 is cutting off potentially important contributions to discounted impacts that occur after 22. The US share of global cumulative economic impacts rises over time, as the realised temperature rise begins to exceed the 2 degc limit assumed for complete adaptation in the US, but only

9 Page 9 of November 27 reaches a value of.6% by 22, with a 9 probability of it remaining below 1.3 % of the global total even by 22. For comparison, US economic activity is assumed to be about 13% of the global total in 21 and through the 22 nd century. With regards to non-economic impacts shown in Figure 4, not only is the magnitude of the impact far higher for the US, but so is the relative burden carried by the US. The annual noneconomic impact by the 22 is $3 trillion with a 9% confidence interval of $.3 to $9 trillion. This represents a 1% GDP loss in 22 with a confidence interval of.1% to 3.3%. Mean US cumulative discounted non-economic impacts are $18 trillion over the next 2 s, and still rising steadily in 22, showing that horizon issues are just as important for noneconomic as for economic impacts. Mean US cumulative non-economic impacts amount to about 6% of global non-economic impacts throughout; this is because, unlike economic impacts, there is no temperature below which it is assumed there is complete adaptation, even in rich economies like the US. US discontinuity impacts as presented in Figure 5 show a very similar pattern to non-economic impacts only slightly smaller in magnitude, and delayed in time. Mean discontinuity impacts by the 22 are about $2 trillion with a 9% confidence interval of $ to $7 trillion representing on average.7 of US GDP with a chance of discontinuity impacts in the 22 reaching beyond 2. of GDP. Cumulative discontinuity impacts over the coming 2 s discounted to the 2 amount to a of $1 trillion with a 9% confidence interval of $ to $48 trillion. This is only about half the corresponding value for non-economic impacts, because the discontinuity impacts start later, and, again, these are still growing strongly in 22. US discontinuity impacts are on average 6% of global cumulative discounted impacts; they are not shown before 26 as they are essentially zero before that date. The total economic, non-economic and discontinuity impacts, as presented in Figure 6, show total US impacts in 22 of $5.2 trillion with a 9% confidence interval of $.6 to $14.9 trillion. This represents a total loss in 22 of 1.8% of US GDP with a confidence interval of.2% to 5.3%. The total cumulative impacts over the next 2 s discounted to the 2 amount to $29 trillion with a confidence interval of $3 to $85 trillion, representing on average of global cumulative discounted impacts with a confidence interval of 1. to 8.. In this non-

10 Page 1 of November 27 intervention scenario A2, the US emits about 2% of global emissions between the s 2 and 22, but only suffers, on average, about of global impacts. Although detailed adaptation costs are not included in this report due to their relative long term insignificance, Figure 7 shows the comparison between US adaptation costs and US total impacts to 26. Here we see that adaptation investments of about $2 billion per have been made to reduce the potential impacts of climate change. In the medium term, to about 23, US total impacts are lower, and then afterwards higher, than adaptive costs. In the long-term, US total impacts reach 2 times adaptation costs by 22. For the sake of comparison, Figure 8 shows global total impacts as a percentage of Gross World Product (GWP). The value found for global total impacts by 22 is about 1% of GWP with a 9% confidence interval of 2% to 27%. This is about 5 times as high as US total impacts as a percent of US GDP, and reflects again the higher vulnerability of poor regions to climate change (The Stern report gives an almost identical range, but with a value of just over 11% of GWP (Stern et al, 26); we have not yet been able to identify the reason for this slight discrepancy in the result). The major influences on the value of total global discounted impacts are shown in Figure 9. The most important is the climate sensitivity (the equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO 2 concentration), which has a positive influence (the higher the climate sensitivity, the higher the global discounted impacts). Next come the exponent of the impact function and the non-economic impact for a 2.5 degc temperature rise, both of which also have a positive influence at about thalf the magnitude of the climate sensitivity, and then the tolerable level before a discontinuity has a chance of occurring, which has a negative influence (the higher the tolerable level, the lower the global discounted impacts). For US total impacts in the 21, we find a similar story, but here the US weights factor (impacts in the US as a % of GDP compared to the EU base region) enters in second place as a positive influence, as does the half-life of global warming (the time required for the earth to respond to a change in forcing) in fourth place, as a negative influence (the longer the earth takes to respond, the smaller the US total impacts in 21). All of the influences are in the direction that would be expected a priori.

11 Page 11 of November 27 The pure time preference rate does not appear in either list of major influences, as for this investigation it was fixed at.1% per, as in the Stern report. High-Climate Scenario Figure 2 Mean US impacts by type in the high-climate scenario % of GDP economic non-economic discontinuity As can be seen when comparing the summary results of the high-climate scenario in figure 2 to those of the baseline-climate scenario in figure 1, the main difference between these scenarios is about a 4% increase in impacts for each impact type and for the total within the US and similarly for total impacts globally. Thus by 22, the total US impacts reach about 2.8% of US GDP, and the global total impacts reach about 14% of Gross World Product (The Stern report gives an almost identical range, with a value of 13.8% of GWP (Stern et al, 26)). The major influences remain almost the same across the two scenarios. Figure 11 through to Figure 18 present the various results for the high-climate scenario in the same order and with the same level of detail as for the baseline scenario.

12 Page 12 of November 27 Figure 3 Baseline Scenario US Economic Impact results US Economic Impacts % of GDP US Economic Impacts as % of GDP 6, , -.4 4, 3, , , Economic Impacts Economic Impacts 3,, 1.4 2,5, 1.2 2,, ,5,.8.6 1,,.4 5,

13 Figure 4 Baseline Scenario US Non-Economic Impact results Page 13 of November 27 US Non-Economic Impacts % of GDP US Non-Economic Impacts as % of GDP 1,, 9,, 8,, ,, 6,, 5,, 4,, 3,, 2,, ,, Non-Economic Impacts Non-Economic Impacts 6,, 12. 5,, 1. 4,, 3,, ,, 4. 1,,

14 Figure 5 Baseline Scenario US Discontinuity Impact results Page 14 of November 27 US Discontinuity Impacts % of GDP US Discontinuity Impacts as % of GDP 8,,. 7,, 6,, ,, 4,, 3,, ,, -2. 1,, Discontinuity Impacts Discontinuity Impacts 45,, 12. 4,, 35,, 1. 3,, ,, 2,, 6. 15,, 4. 1,, 5,,

15 Figure 6 Baseline Scenario US Total Impact results Page 15 of November 27 US Total Impacts %of GDP US Impacts as % of GDP 16,,. 14,, 12,, ,, 8,, 6,, ,, -4. 2,, Total Impacts Total Impacts 9,, 1. 8,, 9. 7,, 8. 6,, 5,, 4,, 3,, 2,, ,,

16 Page 16 of November 27 Figure 7 Baseline Scenario Comparison of US Total Impacts and Adaptive Costs to 26 8, Figure 8 Baseline Scenario Global Impacts as percent of Gross World Product (GWP) p 3 % GWP 7, 6, 25 5, 4, 3, US Total Impacts US Adaptive Costs , 1 1, Figure 9 Baseline Scenario major influences on Global Discounted Impacts Figure 1 Baseline Scenario major influences on US Total Impacts in 21 Equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO2.63 Equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO2.477 Impact function exponent.379 US weights factor.367 Non-econ impacts.251 Non-econ impact.283 Tolerable level before discontinuitty occurring Sulfate indirect (log) effect Half-life of global warming Chance of discontinuity Economic impact Std b Coefficients Half-life of global warming Tolerable before discontinuity Sulfate indirect (log) effect impact function exponent Proportion of CO2 emitted to air Std b Coefficients

17 Page 17 of November 27 Figure 11 High-Climate Scenario US Economic Impact results US Economic Impacts % of GDP US Economic Impacts as % of GDP 9,. 8, 7, , 5, 4, , 2, -.2 1, Economic Impacts Economic Impacts 4,, 1.6 3,5, 1.4 3,, 1.2 2,5, ,,.8 1,5,.6 1,,.4 5,

18 Figure 12 High-Climate Scenario US Non-Economic Impact results Page 18 of November 27 US Non-Economic Impacts % of GDP US Non-Economic Impacts as % of GDP 16,,. 14,, 12,, 1,, 8,, 6,, ,, -4. 2,, Non-Economic Impacts Non-Economic Impacts 8,, 12. 7,, 1. 6,, 5,, ,, 6. 3,, 4. 2,, 1,,

19 Figure 13 High-Climate Scenario US Discontinuity Impact results Page 19 of November 27 US Discontinuity Impacts % of GDP US Discontinuity Impacts as % of GDP 1,, 9,, 8,, ,, 6,, 5,, 4,, ,, 2,, ,, Discontinuity Impacts Discontinuity Impacts 6,, 12. 5,, 1. 4,, 3,, ,, 4. 1,,

20 Page 2 of November 27 Figure 14 High-Climate Scenario US Total Impact results US Total Impacts %of GDP US Impacts as % of GDP 25,, 2,, 15,, 1,, ,, Total Impacts Total Impacts 14,, 1. 12,, 1,, 8,, 6,, ,, 3. 2,,

21 Page 21 of November 27 Figure 15 High-Climate Scenario Comparison of US Total Impacts and Figure 16 High-Climate Scenario Global Impacts as a percentage of Gross World Adaptive Costs to 26 Product (GWP) 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, US Total Impacts US Adaptive Costs Time 22 9 Figure 17 High-Climate Scenario major influences on Global Discounted Impacts Equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO2 impact function exponent Figure 18 High-Climate Scenario major influences on US Total Impacts in 21 Equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO2 US weights factor Non-econ impact.229 Non-econ impact.253 Half-life of global warming Sulfate indirect (log) effect Tolerable before discontinuity Chance of discontinuity Economic impact Std b Coefficients Half-life of global warming Tolerable before discontinuity impact function exponent Sulfate indirect (log) effect Chance of discontinuity Std b Coefficients

22 Page 22 of November 27 Baseline Scenario with 3 variations As with every model specification, assumptions are made in PAGE22 with regards to the general design of the model, such as the form of the damage function as well as the choice of distribution for the function coefficients. By using distributions as opposed to best guesses to describe, for example, the exponent of the damage function as well as a wide range of other important uncertain parameters, the PAGE22 model sheds light on some of the uncertainty associated with climate change. Sensitivity analysis can also be used to determine which input ranges have the most important effect on key model outcomes. In this section, we present the results for permutations of 3 variations of the Baseline scenario to further describe the model s sensitivity to underlying assumptions. 1. The first variation relates to adaptation. The standard model assumes that at a relatively minor cost adaptation could significantly reduce economic and to a lesser extent non-economic damages. For example, annexe 1 countries are assumed to be able to reduce their economic impacts from climate change by 9% beyond 2 degrees through adaptation. It also assumes that they can absorb the first 2 degrees Celsius of global warming without incurring impacts. In this variation, we have maintained the assumption that economic impacts will not occur for the first 2 degrees Celsius temperature rise, however beyond that, it is assumed that no reduction in economic impacts could be obtained. There is also assumed to be no adaptation to noneconomic impacts. For the sake of completeness, we have also included an alternative version of the first variation, 1 Alt.. This version not only removes the reduction of impacts through adaptation beyond a 2 degrees Celsius temperature rise but it also removes the assumption that adaptation can absorb the first 2 degrees Celsius of warming without incurring economic impacts. 2. The second variation involves the exponent of the impact function. This parameter has been shown to be highly correlated with overall baseline impacts (for example by the sensitivity analysis of Figure 9). In the base line scenario, we assumed that damages are proportional to temperature rise to the power of an exponent with uncertain triangular distribution [1, 1.3, 3]. The distribution has been changed to [1.5, 2.25, 3] in this second variation.

23 Page 23 of November The third variation involves the catastrophic damages caused by discontinuities. Whereas in the baseline scenario we have assumed that the tolerable temperature rise before the possibility of a discontinuity occurring has a triangular distribution of [2, 5, 8] degrees Celsius, this has been reduced in the third variation of the model to a distribution of [2, 3, 4]. Furthermore, in the baseline scenario, the probability of a discontinuity occurring increases for each degree rise in temperature above the tolerable level by a factor with triangular distribution [1, 1, 2] in % per degree Celsius rise. This has been modified to [1, 2, 3] in this third variation. By turning on and off these three variations we can produce nine permutations starting with the Baseline Scenario (all variations off) and ending with two final scenarios where all variations have been turned on. The results for these scenarios are shown in Figure 19. All 3 variations increase the damages as expected, with the third variation having the most important effect. When combining the variations within a single model, the combination of variations 1 & 2 shows similar damages to variations 1 & 3, and 2 & 3, even though the effect of both 1 and 2 individually are about 2% smaller than variation 3. The most plausible explanation for this result is that the first two variations operate on the damage function leading roughly to a multiplicative effect when applied together, whereas the third variation operates on the calculation of catastrophic damages, which, in this model, is not correlated to the standard damage function calculated in variations 1 & 2. Hence combining variation 3 with variation 1 or 2 leads only to an additive effect when applied together

24 Page 24 of November 27 Figure 19 US Mean Impacts as % of GDP for all 8 permutations. % GDP loss US Mean Impacts as % of GDP Baseline &2 1&3 2&3 1&2&3 1Alt&2&3 Table 2 shows the 5 to 9 confidence intervals as well as the values of the total discounted damages under the variations. In the alternative variation 1, there is approximately a 2% rise in discounted damages over the standard variation 1. Each variation alone increases discounted damages from 3 times to between 4.3 and 5.8 times the 2 GDP. When considering all variations together, there is about a 3 fold increase in expected discounted costs over the baseline scenario. Similarly, when comparing the use of 1 Alt. with variation 2 and 3, US discounted aggregated damages are increased from 8.7 to 1.2 times 2 GDP, or an increase of about 17%. The 9 level shows that all variations combined give a probability of discounted damages being over 25 times the 2 GDP level.

25 Page 25 of November 27 Table 2 Discounted US Damages as a Multiple of Year 2 GDP Aggregated to the Year 22 Baseline 1 Alt &2 1&3 2&3 1&2&3 1Alt&2& Mean Table 3 US Damages as a Percentage of GDP (25 results are the average of the 24 and 26 results) Baseline 1 Alt &2 1&3 2&3 1&2&3 1Alt&2& The results of Table 3, also presented graphically in Figure 2, show the forecasted US damages as a percentage of GDP in the 25 and 21 (the results for 25 have been calculated as the average of 24 and 26). These results show the importance that the underlying assumptions can have on the final model results. The ratio between the worst-case scenario (1Alt.&2&3) and the baseline scenario increases from just over a factor of 2 to almost a factor of 4 as we move from 25 to 21, though here the underlying damages have increased dramatically. The difference between the and, and the and 9 levels clearly shows the asymmetry of the damage function, with a 9 level for 21 damages reaching up to 4.38% of 21 GDP. By the 22, this has increased to almost 1 of 22 GDP.

26 Page 26 of November 27 Figure 2 US damages as a percentage of GDP for a number of possible model variations both in the 25 and Baseline 1 Alt. Year 25 US Damages as % of GDP &2 1&3 2&3 1&2&3 1Alt&2& Baseline 1 Alt. Year 21 US Damages as %of GDP &2 1&3 2&3 1&2&3 1Alt&2& Figure 21 compares results for economic impacts alone as a percentage of GDP. Here variation 1, reducing the impacts of adaptation has by far the most significant effect on economic impacts. Variation 2, an increase in the exponent, only has limited effect alone due to the high adaptation assumptions in the baseline scenario. In this model the third assumption relating to discontinuity impacts does not affect economic impacts since they are calculated separately. Figure 22 presents the same results but for non-economic impacts. Here we can see how adaptation has been modelled not to have such a strong effect on non-economic impacts in the baseline model, hence its removal in variation 1 has had a reduced effect. Increasing the exponent in variation 2 is now shown to have a more important effect than decreasing adaptation levels. Finally in Figure 23 we note that variation 3 alone is able to have an effect on the discontinuity impacts. Note the different vertical scale of the figures.

27 Page 27 of November 27 Figure 21 Comparison of US Mean Economics Impacts as % of GDP for the baseline scenario and variations 1, 2 and 3 apart as well as 1&2&3 together. US Mean Economic Impacts as % of GDP % GDP loss Baseline &2&3 1Alt&2& Figure 22 Comparison of US Mean Non-Economics Impacts as % of GDP for the baseline scenario and variations 1, 2 and 3 apart as well as 1&2&3 together. US Mean Non-Economic Impacts as % of GDP % GDP loss Baseline &2&3 1Alt&2&3-2.5

28 Page 28 of November 27 Figure 23 Comparison of US Mean Discontinuity Impacts as % of GDP for the baseline scenario and variations 1, 2 and 3 apart as well as 1&2&3 together. % GDP loss US Mean Discontinuity Impacts as % of GDP Baseline &2&3 1Alt&2&3-2.5 Figure 24 through to Figure 63 go on to present the same detailed information for variations 1, 2, and 3 alone, as well as 1&2&3 together 2 and 1Alt&2&3 together as the earlier figures did for the Baseline and High-Climate scenarios. 2 detailed information for other combinations can be made available upon request

29 Page 29 of November 27 Figure 24 Baseline Scenario Variation 1 US Economic Impact results US Economic Impacts % of GDP US Economic Impacts as % of GDP 5,, 4,5, 4,, 3,5, 3,, 2,5, 2,, 1,5, 1,, 5, Economic Impacts Economic Impacts 25,, 7. 2,, 15,, 1,, ,,

30 Page 3 of November 27 Figure 25 Baseline Scenario Variation 1 US Non-Economic Impact results US Non-Economic Impacts % of GDP US Non-Economic Impacts as % of GDP 14,, 12,, 1,, 8,, 6,, 4,, 2,, Non-Economic Impacts Non-Economic Impacts 8,, 12. 7,, 6,, 5,, 4,, ,, 2,, 1,,

31 Page 31 of November 27 Figure 26 Baseline Scenario Variation 1 US Discontinuity Impact results US Discontinuity Impacts % of GDP US Discontinuity Impacts as % of GDP 8,, 7,, 6,, 5,, 4,, 3,, ,, -2. 1,, Discontinuity Impacts Discontinuity Impacts 4,, ,, 3,, 25,, 2,, ,, 1,, 5,,

32 Page 32 of November 27 Figure 27 Baseline Scenario Variation 1 US Total Impact results US Total Impacts %of GDP US Impacts as % of GDP 25,, 2,, 15,, 1,, ,, Total Impacts Total Impacts 14,, 1. 12,, 1,, 8,, 6,, ,, 3. 2,,

33 Page 33 of November 27 Figure 28 Baseline Scenario Variation 1 US Total Impacts and Adaptive Costs to 26 12, 1, Figure 29 Baseline Scenario Variation 1 Global Impacts as percent of Gross World Product (GWP) , 6, 4, US Total Impacts 2, US Adaptive Costs Figure 3 Baseline Scenario Variation 1 major influences on Global Discounted Impacts Figure 31 Baseline Scenario Variation 1 major influences on US Total Impacts in 21 Equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO2.632 Equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO2.537 impact function exponent.389 US weights factor.42 Non-econ impact.254 Non-econ impact.289 Tolerable before discontinuity occuring -.18 Sulfate indirect (log) effect.225 Sulfate indirect (log) effect.173 Half-life of global warming Half-life of global warming -.17 impact function exponent.163 Chance of discontinuity.128 Tolerable before discontinuity Proportion of CO2 emitted to air Std b Coefficients Proportion of CO2 emitted to air Std b Coefficients

34 Page 34 of November 27 Figure 32 Baseline Scenario Variation 2 US Economic Impact results US Economic Impacts % of GDP US Economic Impacts as % of GDP 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, , 1, ,, Economic Impacts 1.2 Economic Impacts 3,5, 3,, 2,5, 2,, 1,5, ,,.4 5,

35 Page 35 of November 27 Figure 33 Baseline Scenario Variation 2 US Non-Economic Impact results US Non-Economic Impacts % of GDP US Non-Economic Impacts as % of GDP 16,, 14,, 12,, 1,, 8,, 6,, ,, -4. 2,, Non-Economic Impacts Non-Economic Impacts 9,, 14. 8,, 7,, 6,, 5,, 4,, ,, 2,, 1,,

36 Page 36 of November 27 Figure 34 Baseline Scenario Variation 2 US Discontinuity Impact results US Discontinuity Impacts % of GDP US Discontinuity Impacts as % of GDP 8,, 7,, 6,, 5,, 4,, 3,, ,, -2. 1,, Discontinuity Impacts Discontinuity Impacts 4,, ,, 3,, 25,, 2,, ,, 1,, 5,,

37 Page 37 of November 27 Figure 35 Baseline Scenario Variation 2 US Total Impact results US Total Impacts %of GDP US Impacts as % of GDP 25,, 2,, 15,, 1,, ,, Total Impacts Total Impacts 12,, 1. 1,, ,, 6,, 4,, ,,

38 Page 38 of November 27 Figure 36 Baseline Scenario Variation 2 US Total Impacts and Adaptive Costs to 26 Figure 37 Baseline Scenario Variation 2 Global Impacts as percent of Gross World Product (GWP) 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, US Total Impacts US Adaptive Costs 1, Figure 38 Baseline Scenario Variation 2 major influences on Global Discounted Impacts Figure 39 Baseline Scenario Variation 2 major influences on US Total Impacts in 21 Equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO2.689 Equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO2.532 Non-econ impact.29 US weights factor.363 impact function exponent.283 Non-econ impact.321 Half-life of global warming -.19 Sulfate indirect (log) effect.179 Tolerable before discontinuity Proportion of CO2 emitted to air Economic impact Std b Coefficients Half-life of global warming Sulfate indirect (log) effect.212 Tolerable before discontinuity impact function exponent Proportion of CO2 emitted to air Std b Coefficients

39 Page 39 of November 27 Figure 4 Baseline Scenario Variation 3 US Economic Impact results US Economic Impacts % of GDP US Economic Impacts as % of GDP 5, 45, 4, 35, 3, 25, 2, 15, 1, 5, Economic Impacts Economic Impacts 2,5, 1.4 2,, 1,5, 1,, ,

40 Page 4 of November 27 Figure 41 Baseline Scenario Variation 3 US Non-Economic Impact results US Non-Economic Impacts % of GDP US Non-Economic Impacts as % of GDP 1,, 9,, 8,, 7,, 6,, 5,, 4,, 3,, 2,, ,, Non-Economic Impacts Non-Economic Impacts 6,, 12. 5,, 1. 4,, 3,, ,, 4. 1,,

41 Page 41 of November 27 Figure 42 Baseline Scenario Variation 3 US Discontinuity Impact results US Discontinuity Impacts % of GDP US Discontinuity Impacts as % of GDP 14,, 12,, 1,, 8,, 6,, 4,, 2,, Discontinuity Impacts Discontinuity Impacts 1,, 12. 9,, 8,, 1. 7,, 6,, 5,, 4,, 3,, ,, 1,,

42 Page 42 of November 27 Figure 43 Baseline Scenario Variation 3 US Total Impact results US Total Impacts %of GDP US Impacts as % of GDP 25,, 2,, 15,, 1,, ,, Total Impacts Total Impacts 16,, ,, 12,, 1,, 8,, ,, 4,, 2,,

43 Page 43 of November 27 Figure 44 Baseline Scenario Variation 3 US Total Impacts and Adaptive Costs to 26 Figure 45 Baseline Scenario Variation 3 Global Impacts as percent of Gross World Product (GWP) 12, 1, 8, 6, 4, 2, US Total Impacts US Adaptive Costs Figure 46 Baseline Scenario Variation 3 major influences on Global Discounted Impacts Figure 47 Baseline Scenario Variation 3 major influences on US Total Impacts in 21 Equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO2.69 Equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO2.622 impact function exponent.296 US weights factor.387 Loss if discontinuity occurs.265 Half-life of global warming Non-econ impact.21 Sulfate indirect (log) effect.24 Half-life of global warming Tolerable before discontinuity -.21 Sulfate indirect (log) effect.186 Loss if discontinuity occurs.163 Chance of discontinuity.151 Non-econ impact.144 Proportion of CO2 emitted to air.13 Chance of discontinuity Std b Coefficients Std b Coefficients

44 Page 44 of November 27 Figure 48 Baseline Scenario Variation 1, 2 & 3 US Economic Impact results US Economic Impacts % of GDP US Economic Impacts as % of GDP 8,, 7,, 6,, 5,, 4,, 3,, 2,, ,, Economic Impacts Economic Impacts 4,, 6. 35,, 3,, 25,, 2,, ,, 1,, 5,,

45 Page 45 of November 27 Figure 49 Baseline Scenario Variation 1, 2 & 3 US Non-Economic Impact results US Non-Economic Impacts % of GDP US Non-Economic Impacts as % of GDP 25,, 2,, 15,, 1,, ,, Non-Economic Impacts Non-Economic Impacts 12,, 14. 1,, 12. 8,, 6,, ,, 4. 2,,

46 Page 46 of November 27 Figure 5 Baseline Scenario Variation 1, 2 & 3 US Discontinuity Impact results US Discontinuity Impacts % of GDP US Discontinuity Impacts as % of GDP 16,, 14,, 12,, 1,, 8,, 6,, ,, -4. 2,, Discontinuity Impacts Discontinuity Impacts 1,, 12. 9,, 8,, 1. 7,, 6,, 5,, 4,, 3,, ,, 1,,

47 Page 47 of November 27 Figure 51 Baseline Scenario Variation 1, 2 & 3 US Total Impact results US Total Impacts %of GDP US Impacts as % of GDP 4,, 35,, 3,, 25,, 2,, 15,, ,, 5,, Total Impacts Total Impacts 25,, ,, 8. 15,, 1,, ,,

48 Page 48 of November 27 Figure 52 Baseline Scenario Variation 1, 2 & 3 US Total Impacts and Adaptive Costs to 26 Figure 53 Baseline Scenario Variation 1, 2 & 3 Global Impacts as percent of Gross World Product (GWP) 16, 14, 12, 1, 8, 6, US Total Impacts 4, US Adaptive Costs 2, Figure 54 Baseline Scenario Variation 1, 2 & 3 major influences on Global Discounted Impacts Figure 55 Baseline Scenario Variation 1, 2 & 3 major influences on US Total Impacts in 21 Equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO2.714 Equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO2.626 impact function exponent.277 US weights factor.389 Non-econ impact.247 Half-life of global warming Sulfate indirect (log) effect.211 Sulfate indirect (log) effect.245 Half-life of global warming -.23 Non-econ impact.187 Economic impact.159 Tolerable before discontinuity Loss if discontinuity occurs.149 Proportion of CO2 emitted to air.129 Proportion of CO2 emitted to air.142 Loss if discontinuity occurs Std b Coefficients Std b Coefficients

49 Page 49 of November 27 Figure 56 Baseline Scenario Variation 1Alt, 2 & 3 US Economic Impact results US Economic Impacts % of GDP US Economic Impacts as % of GDP 14,, 12,, 1,, 8,, 6,, 4,, ,, Economic Impacts Economic Impacts 8,, 12. 7,, 6,, 5,, 4,, ,, 2,, 1,,

50 Page 5 of November 27 Figure 57 Baseline Scenario Variation 1Alt, 2 & 3 US Non-Economic Impact results US Non-Economic Impacts % of GDP US Non-Economic Impacts as % of GDP 25,, 2,, 15,, 1,, ,, Non-Economic Impacts Non-Economic Impacts 12,, 12. 1,, 1. 8,, 6,, ,, 4. 2,,

51 Page 51 of November 27 Figure 58 Baseline Scenario Variation 1Alt, 2 & 3 US Discontinuity Impact results US Discontinuity Impacts % of GDP US Discontinuity Impacts as % of GDP 16,, 14,, 12,, 1,, 8,, 6,, ,, -4. 2,, Discontinuity Impacts Discontinuity Impacts 1,, 12. 9,, 8,, 1. 7,, 6,, 5,, 4,, 3,, ,, 1,,

52 Page 52 of November 27 Figure 59 Baseline Scenario Variation 1Alt, 2 & 3 US Total Impact results US Total Impacts %of GDP US Impacts as % of GDP 45,, 4,, 35,, 3,, 25,, 2,, 15,, 1,, 5,, Total Impacts Total Impacts 3,, ,, 1. 2,, 15,, ,, 4. 5,,

53 Page 53 of November 27 Figure 6 Baseline Scenario Variation 1Alt, 2 & 3 US Total Impacts and Adaptive Costs to 26 Figure 61 Baseline Scenario Variation 1Alt, 2 & 3 Global Impacts as percent of Gross World Product (GWP) 25, US Mean Impacts Versus Adaptive Costs % Global GDP 7 Global Impacts as %Global GDP 2, 15, 1, 5, US Total Impacts US Adaptive Costs Figure 62 Baseline Scenario Variation 1Alt, 2 & 3 major influences on Global Discounted Impacts Figure 63 Baseline Scenario Variation 1Alt, 2 & 3 major influences on US Total Impacts in 21 Equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO2.716 Equilibrium warming for a doubling of CO2.612 impact function exponent.265 US weights factor.412 Non-econ impact.238 Half-life of global warming -.26 Half-life of global warming Sulfate indirect (log) effect.233 Sulfate indirect (log) effect.23 Non-econ impact.166 Economic impact.161 Tolerable before discontinuity Loss if discontinuity occurs.151 Proportion of CO2 emitted to air.13 Proportion of CO2 emitted to air.132 Loss if discontinuity occurs Std b Coefficients Std b Coefficients

54 Page 54 of November 27 References Cline, William R., 24. Meeting the Challenge of Global Warming. Paper prepared for the Copenhagen Consensus research program. Retrieved: 15 May, 26 from Hope C, 25, The economics of climate change, House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, Volume II: evidence, The Stationery Office, London. Hope C, 26, The marginal impact of CO2 from PAGE22: An integrated assessment model incorporating the IPCC's five reasons for concern, Integrated Assessment, 6, 1 IPCC, 21a. Climate change 21: The Scientific Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. IPCC, 21b. Climate change 21: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. IPCC, 21c. Climate Change 21: Mitigation. Contributions from Working Group III to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Palisade, advanced risk analysis for spreadsheets, Version 4.5. Palisade Corporation, New York USA Stern N et al, 26, The economics of climate change, HM Treasury, Tol R S J, 25, The Marginal Damage Costs Of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An Assessment Of The Uncertainties, Energy Policy, 33 (16),

Regional Distribution of the Costs and benefits of Climate Change: Adaptation and Mitigation. David Evans. and. Chris Hope.

Regional Distribution of the Costs and benefits of Climate Change: Adaptation and Mitigation. David Evans. and. Chris Hope. DRAFT, FOR COMMENTS ONLY NOT FOR CITATION Regional Distribution of the Costs and benefits of Climate Change: Adaptation and Mitigation David Evans and Chris Hope Background paper World Economic and Social

More information

WORKING PAPER. 3/2012 (Revised February 2016) Temporal Aspects of the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases. Disa Thureson Economics ISSN

WORKING PAPER. 3/2012 (Revised February 2016) Temporal Aspects of the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases. Disa Thureson Economics ISSN WORKING PAPER 3/2012 (Revised February 2016) Temporal Aspects of the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases Disa Thureson Economics ISSN 1403-0586 https://www.oru.se/institutioner/handelshogskolan/forskning/working-papers/

More information

Policy Implications of Stochastic Learning using a modified PAGE2002 Model

Policy Implications of Stochastic Learning using a modified PAGE2002 Model Policy Implications of Stochastic Learning using a modified PAGE22 Model Stephan Alberth 1 & Chris Hope 2 The Judge Business School, University of Cambridge Abstract. We consider the importance of Endogenous

More information

Summary of the DICE model

Summary of the DICE model Summary of the DICE model Stephen C. Newbold U.S. EPA, National Center for Environmental Economics 1 This report gives a brief summary of the DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy) model, developed

More information

Evaluating indicators for the relative responsibility for climate change - alternatives to the Brazilian proposal and global warming potentials

Evaluating indicators for the relative responsibility for climate change - alternatives to the Brazilian proposal and global warming potentials Third International Symposium on Non-CO Greenhouse Gases (NCGG-3) Maastricht, Netherlands, -3 January Evaluating indicators for the relative responsibility for climate change - alternatives to the Brazilian

More information

The Economics of Climate Change Nicholas Stern

The Economics of Climate Change Nicholas Stern The Economics of Climate Change Nicholas Stern 8 th November 2006 1 What is the economics of climate change and how does it depend on the science? Analytic foundations Climate change is an externality

More information

Draft Environmental Impact Statement

Draft Environmental Impact Statement The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Year 2021 2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Draft Environmental Impact Statement July 2018 Docket No. NHTSA-2017-0069 Greenhouse Gas

More information

IAJ The Integrated Assessment Journal

IAJ The Integrated Assessment Journal IAJ The Integrated Assessment Journal Bridging Sciences & Policy Vol. 6, Iss. 1 (2006), Pp. 19 56 The Marginal Impact of CO 2 from PAGE2002: An Integrated Assessment Model Incorporating the IPCC s Five

More information

December Subject: Commission on Carbon Prices Call for Input. Dear Professor Stiglitz and Lord Stern:

December Subject: Commission on Carbon Prices Call for Input. Dear Professor Stiglitz and Lord Stern: December 2016 Professors Joseph Stiglitz and Lord Nicholas Stern Co-Chairs of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition and World Bank Group Subject: Commission on

More information

The Marshall Institute has addressed several issues identified by the Review as pertinent to its analysis.

The Marshall Institute has addressed several issues identified by the Review as pertinent to its analysis. 8 December 2005 Sir Nicholas Stern Stern Review 2nd Floor, Room 35/36 HM Treasury 1 Horse Guards Road London SW1A 2HQ Dear Sir: The George C. Marshall Institute, a nonprofit research organization founded

More information

Earth s energy balance and the greenhouse effect

Earth s energy balance and the greenhouse effect Earth s energy balance and the greenhouse effect Average incident solar radiation 342 W/m 2 Reflection to space by atmosphere, clouds, and earth surface 102 W/m 2 Infrared radiation emitted to space 240

More information

Abatement Costs through 2050

Abatement Costs through 2050 Abatement Costs through 2050 5 In the central Copenhagen Convergence (CopCon) international policy scenario of this chapter, countries adhere to their Copenhagen targets by 2020. Thereafter they follow

More information

Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Past, Present and Future

Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Past, Present and Future Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Past, Present and Future Session 5, Changing Planet Workshop, June 27 30, 2011, Dickinson College, Carlisle, PA Neil Leary, Center for Sustainability Education, Dickinson College

More information

Atmospheric Stabilization of CO 2 Emissions:

Atmospheric Stabilization of CO 2 Emissions: Public Disclosure Authorized Policy Research Working Paper 4352 WPS4352 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Atmospheric Stabilization of CO 2 Emissions: Near-term Reductions and Intensity-based

More information

Economics of the Copenhagen Accord: Analysis from the RICE-2010 Model

Economics of the Copenhagen Accord: Analysis from the RICE-2010 Model Economics of the Copenhagen Accord: Analysis from the RICE-2010 Model William D. Nordhaus Yale University International Energy Workshop Stockholm June 2010 Slides are available nordhaus.econ.yale.edu.

More information

Pathways to climate stabilisation

Pathways to climate stabilisation Pathways to climate stabilisation Bent Sørensen Energy, Environment and Climate Group, Department of Environmental, Social and Spatial Change, Roskilde University, 4000 Roskilde, Denmark. E-mail: boson@ruc.dk

More information

Understanding Sequestration as a Means of Carbon Management. Howard Herzog MIT Energy Laboratory

Understanding Sequestration as a Means of Carbon Management. Howard Herzog MIT Energy Laboratory Understanding Sequestration as a Means of Carbon Management Howard Herzog MIT Energy Laboratory In understanding carbon management options, it is helpful to start with a simple mass balance on anthropogenic

More information

Narration: The presentation consists of three parts.

Narration: The presentation consists of three parts. 1 Narration: In this presentation, you will learn the basic facts about climate change. You will learn about the difference between mitigation and adaptation and the international responses to climate

More information

Evaluations of climate change response measures considering several constraints and multi objectives in the real world

Evaluations of climate change response measures considering several constraints and multi objectives in the real world IPCC WG3 Symposium, Tokyo January 26, 217 Evaluations of climate change response measures considering several constraints and multi objectives in the real world Keigo Akimoto, Systems Analysis Group Research

More information

Greenhouse gas Reduction Pathways in the UN-FCCC process up to 2025

Greenhouse gas Reduction Pathways in the UN-FCCC process up to 2025 Greenhouse gas Reduction Pathways in the UN-FCCC process up to 2025 Partners: LEPII-EPE (coord.) RIVM-MNP ICCS-NTUA CES-KUL Study performed for DG Environment 1 Greenhouse gas Reduction Pathways The GRP

More information

Climate debt A primer

Climate debt A primer 41 Development Dialogue September 2012 What Next Volume III Climate, Development and Equity Climate debt A primer Matthew Stilwell The following climate debt primer was written in the lead-up to Copenhagen

More information

Modelling Global Risks of Climate Change. 10 March 2016 Dr Dmitry Yumashev

Modelling Global Risks of Climate Change. 10 March 2016 Dr Dmitry Yumashev Modelling Global Risks of Climate Change 10 March 2016 Dr Dmitry Yumashev Dr. Dmitry Yumashev, Lancaster University Management School Mathematical modeller focusing on Economics and Climate Science Formerly

More information

CLIMATE CHANGE (EMISSIONS REDUCTION TARGETS) (SCOTLAND) BILL

CLIMATE CHANGE (EMISSIONS REDUCTION TARGETS) (SCOTLAND) BILL CLIMATE CHANGE (EMISSIONS REDUCTION TARGETS) (SCOTLAND) BILL FINANCIAL MEMORANDUM INTRODUCTION 1. As required under Rule 9.3.2 of the Parliament s Standing Orders, this Financial Memorandum is published

More information

Working Paper Series. 5/2011 The Social Cost of CO2 from the PAGE09 Model Chris Hope

Working Paper Series. 5/2011 The Social Cost of CO2 from the PAGE09 Model Chris Hope Working Paper Series 5/2011 The Social Cost of CO2 from the PAGE09 Model Chris Hope Cambridge Judge Business School Working Papers These papers are produced by Cambridge Judge Business School, University

More information

Temperature impacts on economic growth warrant stringent mitigation policy

Temperature impacts on economic growth warrant stringent mitigation policy Temperature impacts on economic growth warrant stringent mitigation policy Figure SI.1: Diagrammatic illustration of different long-term effects of a one-period temperature shock depending on whether climate

More information

A Response to the Manhattan Institute s Critique of Valuing CO2 Benefits in New York s Clean Energy Programs

A Response to the Manhattan Institute s Critique of Valuing CO2 Benefits in New York s Clean Energy Programs A Response to the Manhattan Institute s Critique of Valuing CO2 Benefits in New York s Clean Energy Programs by Peter H. Howard, Ph.D 1 A recent report published by the Manhattan Institute ( Report ) criticizing

More information

Coupling bottom-up & top-down models for simulations of international energy policy

Coupling bottom-up & top-down models for simulations of international energy policy Coupling bottom-up & top-down models for simulations of international energy policy GEMINI-E3 and TIMES within the TOCSIN FP7 project 1 Outline The TOCSIN project The models GEMINI-E3 TIMES Harmonization

More information

Dr David Karoly School of Meteorology

Dr David Karoly School of Meteorology Global warming: Is it real? Does it matter for a chemical engineer? Dr David Karoly School of Meteorology Email: dkaroly@ou.edu Recent global warming quotes Senator James Inhofe (R, Oklahoma), Chair, Senate

More information

PART I. COUNTRY-BASED DATA AND INDICATORS

PART I. COUNTRY-BASED DATA AND INDICATORS PART I. COUNTRY-BASED DATA AND INDICATORS Ch. 2 GHG Emissions and Trends 11 Ch. 3 Emissions Projections 17 Ch. 4 Per Capita Emissions 21 Ch. 5 Emissions Intensity 25 Ch. 6 Cumulative Emissions 31 Ch. 7

More information

Maxwell Climate Change Workshop Background: The Nature of the Problem

Maxwell Climate Change Workshop Background: The Nature of the Problem Maxwell Climate Change Workshop Background: The Nature of the Problem Peter J Wilcoxen Departments of Economics and Public Administration The Maxwell School of Syracuse University September 21, 2010 1

More information

10. GREENHOUSE GASES EAST-WEST TIE TRANSMISSION PROJECT AMENDED ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT REPORT

10. GREENHOUSE GASES EAST-WEST TIE TRANSMISSION PROJECT AMENDED ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT REPORT 10. GREENHOUSE GASES This section describes and summarizes an assessment of the effects of the East-West Tie Transmission Project (the Project) on gases. Greenhouse gases (GHGs) have the potential to affect

More information

19 March Reyer Gerlagh, Tilburg University Professor of Economics

19 March Reyer Gerlagh, Tilburg University Professor of Economics 19 March 2013 Reyer Gerlagh, Tilburg University Professor of Economics Overview History The discovery of global warming The greenhouse effect: basics All greenhouse gases Emissions: population, income,

More information

10 Energy consumption of buildings direct impacts of a warming climate and rebound effects

10 Energy consumption of buildings direct impacts of a warming climate and rebound effects 10 Energy consumption of buildings direct impacts of a warming climate and rebound effects energy for heating/cooling effect on total energy use and GDP Heating energy demand of Swiss households decreases

More information

Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data for submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Key GHG Data

Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data for submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Key GHG Data Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data for 1990 2003 submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Key GHG Data Foreword The Climate Convention has been in force since 1994 for more than 10 years.

More information

World primary energy demand in the Reference Scenario: an unsustainable path

World primary energy demand in the Reference Scenario: an unsustainable path OECD/IEA OECD/IEA - 2008-2008 The context Soaring energy prices to mid-2008, followed by a drop what will it mean for demand? How will the financial crisis & economic slowdown affect energy demand & investment?

More information

The Economics of Climate Change Nicholas Stern. 7 th November 2006

The Economics of Climate Change Nicholas Stern. 7 th November 2006 The Economics of Climate Change Nicholas Stern 7 th November 2006 1 Part 1: The economics of climate change: What is the economics and how does it depend on the science? Analytic foundations Climate change

More information

Chapter 3: How Climate Change will Affect People Around the World. Lawrence Tse Chris Whitehouse

Chapter 3: How Climate Change will Affect People Around the World. Lawrence Tse Chris Whitehouse Chapter 3: How Climate Change will Affect People Around the World Lawrence Tse Chris Whitehouse Outline 3.1 Introduction 1 C 3.2 Water 2 C 3.3 Food 3 C 3.4 Health 4 C 3.5 Land + 3.6 Infrastructure 5 C

More information

The IPCC Working Group I Assessment of Physical Climate Change

The IPCC Working Group I Assessment of Physical Climate Change The IPCC Working Group I Assessment of Physical Climate Change Martin Manning Director, IPCC Working Group I Support Unit 1. Observed climate change 2. Drivers of climate change 3. Attribution of cause

More information

Shares Differences of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Calculated with GTP and GWP for Major Countries

Shares Differences of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Calculated with GTP and GWP for Major Countries ADVANCES IN CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH 4(2): 127 132, 2013 www.climatechange.cn DOI: 10.3724/SP.J.1248.2013.127 GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS Shares Differences of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Calculated with GTP

More information

KYOTO, COPENHAGEN AND BEYOND

KYOTO, COPENHAGEN AND BEYOND BAHRAIN INITIATIVES 2nd Global Environment Conference & Exhibition Al Areen, 7 December 2009 KYOTO, COPENHAGEN AND BEYOND The Likely Impact of Response Measures on Petroleum-Producing Countries By Ali

More information

Area-wide Emissions. Briefing Note 1: Introduction to Greenhouse Gas Estimation May In partnership with

Area-wide Emissions. Briefing Note 1: Introduction to Greenhouse Gas Estimation May In partnership with May 2014 In partnership with Guidance Guidance Note 1: Introduction to GHG Estimation Sustainable Scotland Network (SSN) supports public sector action on sustainable development. This includes programmes

More information

FACTS ABOUT GL BAL WARMING. gogreen. Shop visit An Ekotribe Initiative

FACTS ABOUT GL BAL WARMING. gogreen. Shop   visit   An Ekotribe Initiative FACTS ABOUT GL BAL WARMING Shop Online @ www.thegreenecostore.com Definition The earth is a natural greenhouse and is kept warm by water vapors, carbon dioxide (CO2), and other gases in the atmosphere,

More information

3 Air pollutant emissions

3 Air pollutant emissions 3 Air pollutant 2 23 Key messages An assumed EU objective of 4 greenhouse gas emission reduction by 23 would lead to significant reductions of of air pollutants from fossil fuel. These reductions would

More information

LESSON 9: CONCEPTUALIZING MODULE II Factors Influencing Temperature

LESSON 9: CONCEPTUALIZING MODULE II Factors Influencing Temperature LESSON 9: CONCEPTUALIZING MODULE II Factors Influencing Temperature PURPOSE/QUESTION To understand the need to compare data sets over different parameters thus increasing the strength for students climate

More information

Content 1. Section I: Chile: National Circumstances 3

Content 1. Section I: Chile: National Circumstances 3 DRAFT OF THE INTENDED NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION (INDC) IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 2015 CLIMATE AGREEMENT TO BE ADOPTED AT THE TWENTY-FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES (COP21) OF THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK

More information

The Challenge of Global Warming

The Challenge of Global Warming Perspective Paper The Challenge of Global Warming Robert Mendelsohn Economics, Yale University This paper was produced for the Copenhagen Consensus 2004 project. The final version of this paper can be

More information

TACKLING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE WAY FORWARD TO COPENHAGEN

TACKLING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE WAY FORWARD TO COPENHAGEN TACKLING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE WAY FORWARD TO COPENHAGEN The Center for American Studies The Embassy of the United States of America Roma, February 17, 2009 Corrado Clini Director General Ministry for the

More information

An Unsettling Look at the Settled Science of Global Warming Part 2: Layman s Discussion John Eggert P.Eng.

An Unsettling Look at the Settled Science of Global Warming Part 2: Layman s Discussion John Eggert P.Eng. An Unsettling Look at the Settled Science of Global Warming Part 2: Layman s Discussion John Eggert P.Eng. Introduction This is the second of three papers on the impact of Carbon Dioxide (CO2) on climate.

More information

Modeling Post-2012 Climate Policy Scenarios

Modeling Post-2012 Climate Policy Scenarios Modeling Post-2012 Climate Policy Scenarios Interim Results Elliot Diringer, Director of International Strategies Pew Center on Global Climate Change Leon Clarke, Kate Calvin, Marshall Wise, Jae Edmonds

More information

The PRIMES Energy Model

The PRIMES Energy Model EC4MACS Uncertainty Treatment The PRIMES Energy Model European Consortium for Modelling of Air Pollution and Climate Strategies - EC4MACS Editors: E3MLab, National Technical University of Athens (NTUA)

More information

LONG-TERM GLOBAL ENERGY DEMAND SCENARIOS FOR RESIDENTIAL SECTOR

LONG-TERM GLOBAL ENERGY DEMAND SCENARIOS FOR RESIDENTIAL SECTOR 7-6 LONG-TERM GLOBAL ENERGY DEMAND SCENARIOS FOR RESIDENTIAL SECTOR Masahito TAKAHASHI 1 Gerhard TOTSCHNIG Ph.D 1 Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry, 1-6-1 Ohtemachi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo

More information

Stop and Switch Suicidal Subsidies and The Climate Solution

Stop and Switch Suicidal Subsidies and The Climate Solution Stop and Switch Suicidal Subsidies and The Climate Solution Introduction: the big missing climate solution Today, we are fixed on a world energy economic scenario that will lead to a global temperature

More information

WATER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BOARD

WATER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BOARD ASSESSMENT OF APPROACHES TO UPDATING THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON: PHASE 1 INTERIM REPORT ON A NEAR-TERM UPDATE WATER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BOARD Report Public Release: January 26, 2016 Via WebEx Maureen

More information

Final Draft Summary for Policymakers IPCC WGIII AR5

Final Draft Summary for Policymakers IPCC WGIII AR5 FinalDraft SummaryforPolicymakers IPCCWGIIIAR5 Title: Drafting Authors: Draft Contributing Authors SummaryforPolicymakers OttmarEdenhofer(Germany),RamónPichsMadruga (Cuba),YoubaSokona(Mali), ShardulAgrawala(France),IgorAlexeyevichBashmakov(Russia),GabrielBlanco

More information

The Economics of Climate Change Nicholas Stern. Second IG Patel lecture New Delhi 26 October 2007

The Economics of Climate Change Nicholas Stern. Second IG Patel lecture New Delhi 26 October 2007 The Economics of Climate Change Nicholas Stern Second IG Patel lecture New Delhi 26 October 2007 1 The economics of climate change Impacts, Risks, Costs: Global Possible Impacts on India Planning for Adaptation

More information

John Gale General Manager IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme

John Gale General Manager IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme The role of CCS as a climate change mitigation option, Energy technology perspectives p John Gale General Manager IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme Public Power Corporation Seminar on CCS Athens, Greece

More information

Future emissions of air pollutants in Indonesia: SO 2 and NO x

Future emissions of air pollutants in Indonesia: SO 2 and NO x Future emissions of air pollutants in Indonesia: SO and NO x Armi Susandi Max Planck Institute for Meteorology Bundesstrasse, D- Hamburg, Germany Phone: +9--8- Fax.:+9---98 email: susandi@dkrz.de Abstract

More information

Roskilde University. Pathways to climate stabilisation. Sørensen, Bent Erik. Published in: Energy Policy. DOI: /j.enpol

Roskilde University. Pathways to climate stabilisation. Sørensen, Bent Erik. Published in: Energy Policy. DOI: /j.enpol Roskilde University Pathways to climate stabilisation Sørensen, Bent Erik Published in: Energy Policy DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2008.05.028 Publication date: 2008 Document Version Early version, also known

More information

Radiative Forcing Components

Radiative Forcing Components Radiative Forcing Components Content Definition of Radiative Forcing Radiation Balance Climate sensitivity Solar forcing Forcing due to atmospheric gas Definition of Radiative Forcing In climate science,

More information

COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES AND PUBLIC GOODS Microeconomics in Context (Goodwin, et al.), 3 rd Edition

COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES AND PUBLIC GOODS Microeconomics in Context (Goodwin, et al.), 3 rd Edition Chapter 13 COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES AND PUBLIC GOODS Microeconomics in Context (Goodwin, et al.), 3 rd Edition Overview and Objectives This chapter provides a classification of different types of goods

More information

It is a unique privilege for me to speak before this august gathering at time when

It is a unique privilege for me to speak before this august gathering at time when Distinguished Ladies & Gentlemen! It is a unique privilege for me to speak before this august gathering at time when the world needs to identify and address some formidable new challenges that face us.

More information

Overview of Global GHG Emissions 2.1

Overview of Global GHG Emissions 2.1 Overview of Global GHG Emissions 2.1 Global GHG 1 Emissions by Gas in 21 Based on the 2 year global warming potential 2 Based on the 1 year global warming potential 2 Fluorinated gases PFCs + HFCs + SF6

More information

The Science of Global Warming

The Science of Global Warming The Science of Global Warming Global Warming can be understood qualitatively using the two concepts: Energy Balance Feedback Loops Two important Definitions Greenhouse effect: natural, beneficial consequence

More information

PHY392S Physics of Climate. Lecture 1. Introduction

PHY392S Physics of Climate. Lecture 1. Introduction PHY392S Physics of Climate Lecture 1 Introduction Slides based on material from Prof. K. Strong PHY392S - Physics of Climate Lecture 1, Page 1 Some Definitions Weather the fluctuating state of the atmosphere

More information

9. SCENARIOS FOR DIFFERENTIATING COMMITMENTS:

9. SCENARIOS FOR DIFFERENTIATING COMMITMENTS: Scenarios for Differentiating Commitments 203 9. SCENARIOS FOR DIFFERENTIATING COMMITMENTS: A Quantitative Analysis Odile Blanchard As emphasized in the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

More information

Sectoral Approaches in International and National Policy

Sectoral Approaches in International and National Policy Sectoral Approaches in International and National Policy 2nd International Expert Meeting on Bottom-up Based Analysis on Mitigation Potential Leon Clarke, Kate Calvin October 21, 2008 Acknowledgements

More information

SPE Distinguished Lecturer Program

SPE Distinguished Lecturer Program SPE Distinguished Lecturer Program Primary funding is provided by The SPE Foundation through member donations and a contribution from Offshore Europe The Society is grateful to those companies that allow

More information

Before the Office of Administrative Hearings 600 North Robert Street St. Paul, MN 55101

Before the Office of Administrative Hearings 600 North Robert Street St. Paul, MN 55101 Rebuttal Testimony Anne E. Smith, Ph.D. Before the Office of Administrative Hearings 00 North Robert Street St. Paul, MN 0 For the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission Seventh Place East, Suite 0 St.

More information

Overview of GCAM (Global Change Assessment Model) Sonny Kim JGCRI PNNL/UMD November 4, 2010

Overview of GCAM (Global Change Assessment Model) Sonny Kim JGCRI PNNL/UMD November 4, 2010 Overview of GCAM (Global Change Assessment Model) Sonny Kim JGCRI PNNL/UMD November 4, 21 The Integrated Assessment Framework MAGICC/SCENGEN ATMOSPHERIC COMPOSITION CLIMATE & SEA LEVEL Atmospheric Chemistry

More information

Implication of Paris Agreement in the Context of Long-term Climate

Implication of Paris Agreement in the Context of Long-term Climate Supporting Information for Implication of Paris Agreement in the Context of Long-term Climate Mitigation Goal 1. Regional and sectoral resolution of the model... 2 2. SCM4OPT... 3 3. Emissions constraint

More information

Overview of EPA Analysis of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 H.R in the 111 th Congress

Overview of EPA Analysis of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 H.R in the 111 th Congress U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Atmospheric Programs Overview of EPA Analysis of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 H.R. 2454 in the 111 th Congress September 11, 2009 Reid

More information

Indicators for monitoring global action to address climate change. in the context of sustainable development goals (SDGs): The WMO-UNFCCC proposal

Indicators for monitoring global action to address climate change. in the context of sustainable development goals (SDGs): The WMO-UNFCCC proposal Indicators for monitoring global action to address climate change in the context of sustainable development goals (SDGs): The WMO-UNFCCC proposal Context: In the present format of sustainable development

More information

Catalyzing carbon markets globally to realize the promise of Paris: The power of markets to increase ambition

Catalyzing carbon markets globally to realize the promise of Paris: The power of markets to increase ambition Catalyzing carbon markets globally to realize the promise of Paris: The power of markets to increase ambition EDF Submission to the Talanoa Dialogue Platform April 2018 Summary It is widely understood

More information

Negligible Climate Effect of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey Climate Bill)

Negligible Climate Effect of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey Climate Bill) Negligible Climate Effect of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey Climate Bill) A PowerPoint Presentation by Paul C. Knappenberger SPPI Reprint Series! June 25, 2009 Greenhouse

More information

An Empirical Study on Impact of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Indian Economy

An Empirical Study on Impact of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Indian Economy An Empirical Study on Impact of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Indian Economy P.Prema 1 Dr.D.Elango 2 1 Ph.D.Research Scholar, Government College of Arts and Science, Coimbatore, Tamilnadu, India. 2 Associate

More information

Climate Policy. Michael Springborn. Department of Environmental Science & Policy. springborn.faculty.ucdavis.edu.

Climate Policy. Michael Springborn. Department of Environmental Science & Policy. springborn.faculty.ucdavis.edu. Climate Policy Michael Springborn Department of Environmental Science & Policy springborn.faculty.ucdavis.edu mspringborn@ucdavis.edu [image: USGCRP, 2010] The intensity of CO2/GDP is falling but not fast

More information

Climate Stabilisation Intensity Targets

Climate Stabilisation Intensity Targets Climate Stabilisation Intensity Targets A new approach to setting corporate climate change targets Chris Tuppen Chief Sustainability Officer Summary The majority of worldwide greenhouse gas emissions result

More information

Demand Data Evaluation

Demand Data Evaluation Working Document of the NPC Global Oil & Gas Study Made Available July 18, 27 TOPIC PAPER #3 Demand Data Evaluation On July 18, 27, The National Petroleum Council (NPC) in approving its report, Facing

More information

WWF IPCC WG3 Key Findings

WWF IPCC WG3 Key Findings WWF IPCC WG3 Key Findings April 2014 The world should more than triple investments in sustainable, safe lowcarbon energy sources (like renewable energy) as the main measure to mitigate climate change WWF

More information

GROWTH AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY Macroeconomics in Context (Goodwin et al.)

GROWTH AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY Macroeconomics in Context (Goodwin et al.) Chapter 18 GROWTH AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY Macroeconomics in Context (Goodwin et al.) Chapter Overview This chapter examines ecological challenges and their implications for macroeconomic

More information

Comparability of Annex I Emission Reduction Pledges

Comparability of Annex I Emission Reduction Pledges KELLY LEVIN and ROB BRADLEY World Resources Institute Working Papers contain preliminary research, analysis, findings, and recommendations. They are circulated to stimulate timely discussion and critical

More information

Biomass & Wood Pellets National Policies

Biomass & Wood Pellets National Policies Energy consumption patterns have strongly changed during the last decades. The increase on industrial production of goods, the high mobility of the population and the dependency on fossil fuels for energy

More information

Climate change risks and vulnerability of Uzbekistan s energy sector Workshop briefing note 1. Introduction

Climate change risks and vulnerability of Uzbekistan s energy sector Workshop briefing note 1. Introduction Climate change risks and vulnerability of Uzbekistan s energy sector Workshop briefing note 1. Introduction The energy sector is sensitive to changes in seasonal weather patterns and extremes 1 that can

More information

Understanding the Causes of Global Climate Change

Understanding the Causes of Global Climate Change FACT SHEET I: Attribution Environment Understanding the Causes of Global Climate Change Average air temperatures at the Earth s surface have increased by approximately 0.6 o C (1 o F) over the 20 th century.

More information

AVOID Avoiding dangerous climate change

AVOID Avoiding dangerous climate change AVOID is a DECC/Defra funded research programme led by the Met Office in a consortium with the Walker Institute, Tyndall Centre and Grantham Institute. AVOID providing key advice to the UK Government on

More information

Critical thinking question for you:

Critical thinking question for you: Critical thinking question for you: http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/12/us/weather-cities-inundated-climatechange/index.html ATOC 4800 Policy Implications of Climate ATOC 5000/ENVS 5830 Critical Issues in Climate

More information

Tuesday Dec 2nd TOPIC # 13 Global Warming Wrap Up TOPIC #14 IMPACTS & ISSUES

Tuesday Dec 2nd TOPIC # 13 Global Warming Wrap Up TOPIC #14 IMPACTS & ISSUES Tuesday Dec 2nd TOPIC # 13 Global Warming Wrap Up TOPIC #14 IMPACTS & ISSUES SIT WITH YOUR GROUP TODAY ANNOUNCEMENTS: LINKING-TO-LIFE PROJECT PART A Your Ecological Footprint DUE in class TODAY! PART B

More information

Introduction to Climate Change. Rodel D. Lasco Professor University of the Philippines

Introduction to Climate Change. Rodel D. Lasco Professor University of the Philippines RD Lasco 1 Introduction to Climate Change Rodel D. Lasco Professor University of the Philippines Outline The climate system What is climate change? Evidence for climate change Predicted change in climate

More information

A note on New Zealand s methane emissions from livestock

A note on New Zealand s methane emissions from livestock A note on New Zealand s methane emissions from livestock August 2018 This report has been produced pursuant to subsections 16(1)(a) to (c) of the Environment Act 1986. The Parliamentary Commissioner for

More information

Chapter 7 Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions

Chapter 7 Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions Chapter 7 Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions In the coming decades, actions to limit greenhouse gas emissions could affect patterns of energy use around the world and alter the level and composition

More information

The Impact of Development and Growth on CO 2 Emissions

The Impact of Development and Growth on CO 2 Emissions The Impact of Development and Growth on CO 2 Emissions A Case Study for Bangladesh until 2050 Bernhard G. Gunter, Ph.D. Bangladesh Development Research Center (BDRC) and A. Atiq Rahman, Ph.D. Bangladesh

More information

Special request, Advice May 2013

Special request, Advice May 2013 9.3.3.1 Special request, Advice May 2013 ECOREGION SUBJECT Widely distributed and migratory stocks NEAFC request to ICES to evaluate the harvest control rule element of the long-term management plan for

More information

A Perspective Paper on Methane Mitigation as a Response to Climate Change

A Perspective Paper on Methane Mitigation as a Response to Climate Change COPENHAGEN CONSENSUS ON CLIMATE A Perspective Paper on Methane Mitigation as a Response to Climate Change David Anthoff COPENHAGEN CONSENSUS ON CLIMATE A Perspective Paper on Methane Mitigation as a Response

More information

Fossil Fuel Production and Net Exports of Indonesia as Impact of International Emissions Trading

Fossil Fuel Production and Net Exports of Indonesia as Impact of International Emissions Trading Fossil Fuel Production and Net Exports of Indonesia as Impact of International Emissions Trading Armi Susandi, Abdul Mutalib Masdar Max Planck Institute for Meteorology Bundesstrasse, D-0 Hamburg, Germany

More information

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOME FORECASTING METHODOLOGIES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS PROJECTIONS

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOME FORECASTING METHODOLOGIES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS PROJECTIONS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOME FORECASTING METHODOLOGIES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS PROJECTIONS Author: Roxana Ivan Politehnica University Timisoara 0. Summary 0.1. Introduction, [1 29] Climate change

More information

Exploring Climate Models: C-Learn

Exploring Climate Models: C-Learn S YS T E M S E N R I C H M E N T E X E R C I S E Exploring Climate Models: C-Learn Students use an online climate model to explore ways to address global climate change. Objectives After completing this

More information

Scientific Facts on. Climate Change Assessment

Scientific Facts on. Climate Change Assessment page 1/8 Scientific Facts on Climate Change 2001 Assessment Source document: IPCC (2001) Summary & Details: GreenFacts Context - The Earth's climate has changed over the last century and by 2001 there

More information

SACN Programme: Sustainable Cities Document Type: Guideline Document Status: Final Date: June 2014

SACN Programme: Sustainable Cities Document Type: Guideline Document Status: Final Date: June 2014 A guideline for the development of a Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory for municipalities A step by step description on how to develop a carbon footprint SACN Programme: Sustainable Cities Document Type:

More information

Greenhouse Effect. The Greenhouse Effect

Greenhouse Effect. The Greenhouse Effect Greenhouse Effect The Greenhouse Effect Greenhouse gases let short-wavelength radiation come into the Earth s atmosphere from the sun. However, they absorb and re-radiate Earth s long-wavelength radiation

More information

Revision confidence limits for recent data on trend levels, trend growth rates and seasonally adjusted levels

Revision confidence limits for recent data on trend levels, trend growth rates and seasonally adjusted levels W O R K I N G P A P E R S A N D S T U D I E S ISSN 1725-4825 Revision confidence limits for recent data on trend levels, trend growth rates and seasonally adjusted levels Conference on seasonality, seasonal

More information