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1 IAEA, Vienna, October
2 SEVERE ACCIDENT ACTIVITIES IN BELGIUM Use of Source Term for Regulatory and Design Applications Technical Meeting on Source Term Evaluation for Severe Accidents October 2013 Vienna International Centre, Austria M. Adorni, T. Van Rompuy, V. Jacques, D. Gryffroy (Bel V) IAEA, Vienna, October
3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Source Term Evaluation for Severe Accidents in the framework of: PSA Level 2 Filtered Containment Venting System Other activities Conclusive remarks IAEA, Vienna, October
4 Nuclear Installations in Belgium and Regulatory Framework INTRODUCTION IAEA, Vienna, October
5 INTRODUCTION Bel V = Subsidiary of the FANC (Federal Agency for Nuclear Control) to carry out the surveillance of the Belgian nuclear installations within the frame of the Belgian laws and regulations In Belgium, FANC and Bel V are considered to constitute together the regulatory body IAEA, Vienna, October
6 INSTALLATIONS UNDER BEL V SURVEILLANCE 7 nuclear power plants (Doel & Tihange) Nuclear Research Centre at Mol (SCK CEN) Waste processing facility (Belgoprocess) MOX fuel (Belgonucléaire) (in dismantling) Isotope production (IRE) Research reactor Thetis (UGent) (stopped) Universities Hospitals IAEA, Vienna, October
7 NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS Doel and Tihange NPP s are operated by Electrabel (GDF-Suez group) IAEA, Vienna, October
8 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK Severe accident issues are dealt with in Belgium within the Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR) since 90 s After Fukushima Daiichi Accident, additional commitment comes from the Belgian Stress Tests Severe accidents are addressed in the Belgian law ( Royal Decree of 30 November, 2011 ) WENRA RLs transposed in Belgian law IAEA, Vienna, October
9 Source Term Evaluation for Severe Accidents PSA LEVEL 2 UPDATE IAEA, Vienna, October
10 LEVEL 2 PSA UPDATE IN BELGIUM Within the context of the 3 rd and common PSR, the licensee updated all the PSA models (only 1 model for PSA level 2) Generic-large Accident Progression Event Tree (APET) for the containment performance and for the source term evaluation developed by the licensee Evaluation by Bel V IAEA, Vienna, October
11 LEVEL 2 PSA UPDATE IN BELGIUM In Belgium Level 1 PSA Initiator Core Core intact Core damaged Level 2 PSA No (significant) releases to environment Releases to environment Containment Level 3 PSA Radiological Consequences Environment IAEA, Vienna, October
12 LEVEL 2 PSA UPDATE IN BELGIUM IAEA, Vienna, October
13 LEVEL 2 PSA UPDATE IN BELGIUM Approach based on large Accident Progression Event Tree (APET) to evaluate the containment performance as well as the release categories for level 1 PSA internal events for full power, low power conditions and shutdown states Generic APET built as a reference APET for a hybrid plant containing a combination of all Belgian NPPs specificities Establishment of basic event quantification methodology, including a specific methodology for Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Engineering judgment and MELCOR used by the licensee to perform the plant-specific quantification of the APET for each representative NPP IAEA, Vienna, October
14 PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES To gain insights into the progression of severe accidents and the performance of the containment To identify plant specific challenges and vulnerabilities of the containment to severe accidents To identify major containment failure modes and their frequencies To estimate the associated frequencies and magnitudes of radionuclide releases To evaluate the impacts of various uncertainties To provide an input into the development of plant specific accident management guidance and strategies To provide input into the development of strategies for offsite emergency planning For more details: IAEA SSG-4 IAEA, Vienna, October
15 APET = Accident Progression Event Tree Representation of the time-line of the severe accident in relation with systems operation, human actions and physical phenomena that influence the course of the accident Differentiation of several time phases (very early, early, vessel failure and late) CP-APET for containment performance Assessment of the containment response to the severe accident progression Global plant end states: Isolation plant end states: to consider any containment isolation defect Structural plant end states: intact, leak, rupture or basemat meltthrough Bypass end states: early direct path from RCS to outside containment IAEA, Vienna, October
16 APET = Accident Progression Event Tree The containment event tree has a large number of possible combinations of event outcomes. Each combination of event outcomes is characterized by a certain probability and a corresponding containment failure mode and timing. Using the fission product event trees (one for each of 8 radionuclide classes), each combination of event outcomes is also characterized by a release amount to the atmosphere for each radionuclide class. Combinations of event outcomes are grouped on the basis of their radionuclide releases to compute the probability of the predefined release categories. IAEA, Vienna, October
17 APET = Accident Progression Event Tree The FP-APET is an enlargement of the CP-APET to evaluate the release categories FP-APET for fission products releases Assessment of fission products releases to the environment Release categories: Global plant end states for consideration of release time and containment failure mode Amplitude of releases = amount of fission products releases: definition of 4 levels in relation with accidental levels of INES scale IAEA, Vienna, October
18 Source Term Evaluation for Severe Accidents FILTERED CONTAINMENT VENTING SYSTEMS IAEA, Vienna, October
19 FILTERED CONTAINMENT VENTING SYSTEM Currently, no FCVS in any Belgian NPP but in the 4 Doel NPPs: non-filtered containment venting possible through manual opening/closure of containment isolation valves Installation foreseen in 5 of the 7 Belgian PWRs (units which will operate beyond 2015) as action of Belgian Stress Tests For Tihange 1 and Doel 1/2 the installation was already foreseen in the framework of the LTO. Then, in framework of stress-tests (end of 2011) feasibility studies on each unit on both sites July 2012: decision on closure of Doel 1/2 (by middle of 2015): no FCVS installations in these units IAEA, Vienna, October
20 FILTERED CONTAINMENT VENTING SYSTEM Reference regulation: Royal Decree published on 30 November 2011 WENRA RL F4.5 Primary objective: The containment shall be protected from slow overpressurization in a severe accident Secondary objective: Limit, when CFVS is used, the radioactive releases as far as reasonably achievable The Fission Products passing through the venting system must be filtered IAEA, Vienna, October
21 FILTERED CONTAINMENT VENTING SYSTEM The evaluation by Bel V of design criteria is currently in progress, including supporting SA studies Codes used by the licensee: MELCOR: analyses to support the evaluation of the venting parameters and source term ASTEC: evaluation of the speciation of iodine in the containment and the mass of iodine released to the CFVS For range of scenarios calculated with MELCOR + ASTEC codes: assessment of radiological consequences for a range of decontamination factors More info in the OECD WGAMA task group of FCVS IAEA, Vienna, October
22 Source Term Evaluation for Severe Accidents OTHER ACTIVITIES IAEA, Vienna, October
23 OTHER ACTIVITIES Participation to the OECD/NEA BIP and BIP-2 projects: iodine behavior in a nuclear reactor containment Development of a MELCOR model of Belgian NPPs: accident progression and source term evaluation Collaboration with universities: mainly for spent fuel pool modeling Pre-licensing of MYRRHA research reactor IAEA, Vienna, October
24 Severe Accident Activities in Belgium CONCLUSIVE REMARKS IAEA, Vienna, October
25 CONCLUSIVE REMARKS Source Term Evaluation for Severe Accidents in the framework of: PSA level 2 update Filtered Containment Venting System OECD activities Development of a MELCOR model of Belgian NPPs Collaboration with universities New research reactor licensing: MYRRHA IAEA, Vienna, October
26 QUESTIONS? IAEA, Vienna, October
27 DOEL SITE 1. Doel 1 (433 MWe) 2. Doel 2 (433 MWe) 3. Doel 3 (1006 MWe) 4. Doel 4 (1046 MWe) IAEA, Vienna, October
28 DOEL SITE IAEA, Vienna, October
29 TIHANGE SITE 1. Tihange 1 (962 MWe) 2. Tihange 2 (1008 MWe) 3. Tihange 3 (1054 MWe) IAEA, Vienna, October
30 TIHANGE SITE IAEA, Vienna, October
31 RESEARCH REACTORS IAEA, Vienna, October
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