An Analysis of Governmental Economic Activities on Nonpoint Source Pollution Treatment in Rural Areas in China

Transcription

1 ejbo Electronc Journal of Bology, 007, Vol. 3(): 4-46 An Analyss of Governmental Economc Actvtes on Nonpont Source Polluton Treatment n Rural Areas n Chna Hong Chen *, Shua Sh, Yang Song College of Economcs & Management, Northeast Forestry Unversty, Harbn, , Chna * Correspondng author. Tel: +86 (0451) ; Fax: +86 (0451) ; E-mal: chteacher004@163.com Abstract In ths paper we analyze all levels of government s actvtes n non-pont source polluton treatment n rural areas from the perspectve analyss of economcs by startng from the economc characterstcs of non-pont source polluton n rural areas, besdes, we dscussed the dlemma between the rules and regulatons of the central government when preventng and controllng the non-pont source polluton n rural areas and the producers behavour whch s protected by local governments. Thus we derve the government should reduce the drect admnstratve nterventon, meanwhle by usng more economcal methods and ncentve mechansms whch can control the nput of natural resource and the output of the pollutants n the course of non-pont source polluton treatment n rural areas, the maret prce system of green organc agrcultural products wll be formed, whch wll lead the behavour of producers and consumers to benefcal to envronment. Keywords: Non-pont source polluton; Maret falure; Central government; Incentve-mechansm; Local governments. 1. Introducton The so-called non-pont source polluton s one nd of water envronmental polluton, whch s opposte to the pont source polluton. The Amendment for Amercan Clean Water Act (1997) defnes t as "The pollutant enters the surface and the underground water body n a wdespread, dffused, mcro form." Here mcro refers that the pollutant densty s usually lower than the pont source polluton, but the total loads are extremely huge. At present a more comprehensve defnton s: Non-pont source polluton "refers to the phenomenon that the dssolved and sold pollutants, whch come from the non-specfc place, wth the washng acton of precptaton (or snowmelt), afflux recevng body of water (ncludng rvers, laes, reservors, bays and so on) through the runoff process, and cause the water body eutrophcaton or other forms of polluton". Comparng wth the pont source polluton, the non-pont source polluton has the characters of dspersblty and nvsblty; randomness and uncertanty; not easy to be detectable and spatal heterogenety. In fact, the non-pont source polluton s more closely related wth the agrculture, farmers and the countrysde. Many people use agrcultural chemcals, chemcal fertlzer and the poultry manure of the small scale poultry cultvaton excessvely and unreasonably, as well as agrcultural producton cast-offs, vllage domestc garbage, waste water and so on that haven t been processed n rural areas, all of whch are the drect factors of the non-pont source polluton. Accordng to the statstcs n 004, the amount of chemcal fertlzers appled has already reached 4637 mllon tons n Chna, and the amount of ntrogenous fertlzer occupes nearly 30% n the world. The average amount of chemcal fertlzer that s used n Chna s twce the amount of the safe upper lmt of developed countres, but the average avalablty s only 40% or so. In ths way the amount of chemcal fertlzers n Chna wll ncrease year by year, whch are the man bodes that cause nonpont source polluton n rural areas, besdes the economc loss they create s unable to be counted. At present, due to applyng fertlzer unreasonably n our country, there are more than 10 mllon tons ntrogen lost every year, whose drect economc loss s approxmately 30 bllon Yuan, what s more, the loss caused by the waste of agrcultural chemcals s more than 15 bllon Yuan. In the areas, whch are nfluenced by agrcultural polluton, there are crops underproducton, qualty and taste reducton, flavor reduced, even n some places tradtonal crops are unable to contnue to be produced. The polluton of the poultry-breedng farm wll not only nfluence the areas around but also cause the epdemc transmsson, whch wll mae the cost hgher. The agrcultural polluton also causes economc loss n the fshery and anmal husbandry toursm. In ths paper we analyze all levels of government s actvtes n non-pont source polluton treatment n rural areas from the perspectve analyss of economcs, and explore how the central authortes regulate the protecton behavor of non-pont source polluton producers who are protected by local governments, whch wll gude the producton behavor of the producers and consumpton behavor of consumers. Fnally we can mae the agrcultural clean producton come true and provde the envronment support for the crcular agrculture

2 ejbo Electronc Journal of Bology, 007, Vol. 3(): Economc analyss on preventng and controllng the non-pont source polluton n rural areas of central authortes.1 Comparson of government's behavor On the bass of law and regulatons, recently developed countres adopt many nds of economc and management researches and practce n protectng the rural envronment especally n preventng and controllng non-pont source polluton n rural areas..1.1 Drect regulatory approach The rural envronment qualty ndexes establshed by the government wll be enforced through the envronment legslaton. In ths aspect, developed countres are earler than us and they have obtaned. In 1936, US formulated the frst non-pont polluton controlled act. In 1938, 1994, 1960 and 1970 t has been revsed. In 197 Federaton Water Polluton Controlled Act (FWPCA) proposed clearly to control non-pont polluton, and advocated "the best management practce" (BMPs) whch s based on utlzng the land reasonably for the frst tme. On May 13, 00, US have offcally promulgated Farm Securty and Rural Investment ACT of 00. On July 1, 1999 Japan promulgated Fundamental Law of Food, Agrculture, Countrysde, the goal of whch s to accelerate the ntroducton of a hgher longendurng agrcultural methods of producton, guarantee the cooperaton between the agrcultural producton and the natural envronment, and realze the healthy development of agrculture. In the law t made explct provsons for agrcultural producton to use compost and other organc maret materals. Compost Qualty Law was promulgated and mplemented on Aprl 1, 001, accordng to the agrcultural non-pont polluton legal rules, the government also mplemented Law of Bannng Agrcultural Chemcals, Sol Polluton Preventng and Controllng Law and so on one after another, the organc agrcultural actvtes start to be carred out n metropoltan suburbs and the rural areas one after another. In 1975 the European Economc Communty formulated the frst envronmental program of acton, then n the Mddle of 1980s, envronmental polces of European Economc Communty were further mplemented through each program of acton, especally EEA whch became effectve n July1987 provded the legal foundaton for the envronment. Therefore regulatng drectly s always the man and smple method to control the non-pont polluton n rural areas..1. Maret-based ncentve approach Revsed maret mechansm should be used to protect envronment. Although the socal cost and personal cost of envronmental products of nonpont polluton n rural areas are not equal, whch can not mae effectve resource allocaton a realty, but wth the changes of consumpton deas of consumers and the ncreasng demand for green organc foods, the prces are ncreasng; as varous of subsdes and exportaton quantty are on the ncrease, the producers apply less chemcals n producton. Meanwhle as the fertlzer technology and farm manure have been scaled and exportaton rules of agrcultural products n WTO have been changed, producers cost sgnal wll change too. Besdes the producton process won t eep the same as before, whch wll create less non-pont source polluton n rural areas, but we need system nnovaton to solve the problem of maret falure. There are two methods whch may mprove the rural envronment qualty by usng maret mechansm: One s to set up the maret f there are no marets to sell rural envronmental products. And establsh the natural resource maret, whch s solated from the outsde by changng the property rghts. The other s to revse the maret mechansm, and mae the admnstraton secton set the prce whch ncludes the completed socal value of resources. Snce rural areas of our country are n the transformaton perod of system reform, the maret mechansm s mperfect, besdes the non-pont polluton n rural areas orgns from the dverse areas, whch are also dspersble. It s dffcult to dstngush the geography boundary and the exact poston, and the non-pont source polluton also has characters of e randomness, complex reasons and long latent perod. Therefore t s more dffcult to solve the problem of externalty by property rghts defnton. To consder from the practce of preventng and controllng the non-pont source polluton n rural areas of developed countres and the actual stuaton of Chna, we now that t s very dffcult to complete the non-pont source polluton n rural areas by a sngle method. Wth the coordnaton of the maret mechansm and the law, t wll be effectve. The author thns the reform goal of Chna s to acheve resource allocaton on the bass of maret fnally, however, n maret economy the cost of collectng non-pont source polluton nformaton and tang measures n rural areas s hgh, therefore the basc way s not to control drectly, but to regulate by the government who wll correct polces whch do not comply wth the development of envronment and crcular agrculture and mae the maret prce system send out the correct sgnal to the people, thus we can acheve the goal of envronmental protecton.. General balanced model analyss of the best standard of polluton charges Wth the nterventon of governments, the ey to mae the maret prce system send out correct sgnals to the people s that, how the government can formulate the reasonable charge standard of polluton for the producer of non-pont source polluton, on the bass of whch we can mae the Pareto optmalty a realty. Usng welfare economcs,

3 ejbo Electronc Journal of Bology, 007, Vol. 3(): 4-46 we wll analyze the effluent fee of non-pont source polluton below...1 Basc assumptons We suppose that the producton of agrcultural products s of perfect competton, the producton actvtes of general producers of agrcultural products result n non-pont source polluton (for example applyng chemcal fertlzer and agrcultural chemcals excessvely, poultry manure of small scaled poultry farmng and so on) and the recevers are the consumers. The decsons of producers economc actvtes wll nfluence the contamnant extent, whle consumpton behavors, producton actvtes and the geographcal poston wll nfluence the extent of damage. Interpretatons: n the model, s total quantty of agrcultural products of the whole socety; s s nonpont polluton concentraton whch s caused by producer (for example agrcultural chemcals, chemcal fertlzer and so on); Z = s s the sum of all the concentraton of non-pont source polluton; u ( x 1 x, z) s the utlty functon of consumer n ; f ( y 1 yn, s, z) s the set of producton. As the non-pont source polluton s formed by multtudnous producers fnally, the varable z should be nvolved n each consumer's utlty functon and the producton group's producton functon. u ( x 1, L, x, z) and f ( y 1 y, s, z) s n functon of ( x1, L, xm, y1l yn, z). Essental hypotheses on convexty and concavty propertes of functons: consumers consumpton set s both convex and closed, the utlty functon s twce dervable and the pont of equlbrum wll be utlty maxmzaton. Producton functon s twce dervable. The producton functon s a convex set, and the equlbrum s for proft maxmzaton... Fundamental model In order to realze utlty maxmzaton, we choose a 1 representatve consumer: U x x, z) r ( 11 n1 * Constrants: U ( x x, z U, (=,...,n) f m x h = 1 = 1 y 1 n ) ( y 1 y, s, z) 0, (=1,...,n) n r( = 1,..., n) Accordng to the hypotheses, we can use Kuhn- Tucer theory to descrbe the problem of maxmzaton, and the Lagrangan equaton s: * L = λ [ u ( ) u ] µ f ( ) + wr x + y u u = f x f = y In the condton of maret equlbrum: To mae utlty maxmzaton for the consumer equlbrum, Lagrangan equaton s: n = + + [ * L p t α u u ( t s the tax rate of ()] consumer ) To mae utlty maxmzaton for the enterprse equlbrum, Lagrangan equaton s: = L p y t t s β f ( t s the s total value of polluton tax of producer ) The computaton analyss above ndcated the exstence of externalty of non-pont source polluton and maret equlbrum devaton from Pareto optmalty. If Pareto optmalty can be acheved, we must assess a tax from the men who produce external effect, whch wll mae them tae on the responsblty of the socal cost of the effect. Accordng to the computaton analyss value above, f effluent charge of the non-pont source polluton can be determned correctly, we can mae the Pareto optmalty of non-pont source polluton whch has a character of externalty a realty by mprovng the maret mechansm. () s s 3 Game analyss on non-pont source polluton treatment n rural areas between central authorty and local authortes 3.1 Mechansm desgnng The mechansm desgn formulates the gamblng rules. In ths paper we utlze dynamc game model wth complete nformaton to analyze the nfluence of central authorty s behavors on local authorty s. The dynamc game mechansm wth complete nformaton s a staged dynamc game model, and we suppose that there are two partcpatons: the central authorty and the local authorty. In the frst stage, the clent--central authorty desgns a choce mechansm, whose goal s to maxmze hs own expected utlty functon. In ths game model, the obectve functon of central authorty s to mae the rural envronmental protecton come true, and to carry out the green agrcultural producton. We suppose that central authorty chooses to punsh the men (for example the one who uses agrcultural chemcals and chemcal fertlzer excessvely) who produce non-pont source producton and were protected by the local authorty at the degree of P, we also suppose the central authorty collect effluent charge of the non-pont source polluton and punsh the polluters who are protected by local authortes to acheve the expected utlty maxmzaton and mprove the envronment. In the second stage, the local authorty chooses the standards of the men who produce non-pont source polluton to be protected, at the same tme; the quantty of the producers who wll be protected should be decded. The local authorty regards the local performance, fnancal revenues and the employment as goals, whch can be realzed through the ndexes of producers gans level, besdes due to the settlement of employment, and the reduced lowest cost-of-lvng allowance whch s pad by local authorty can be another ndex

4 ejbo Electronc Journal of Bology, 007, Vol. 3(): Fundamental model Central authorty's utlty functon s: Max T = πt( Xe Xp) c γxp (1) In the formula, π s the enterprse proft, t s the effluent charge stpulated by the central authorty, Xe s the total number of local agrcultural product producers, and Xp s the number of producers who are protected by local authorty. Accordng to actual stuatons, these producers don t have to pay the effluent charges due to the protecton of local authorty. Assume that the outputs of agrcultural products are n postve proporton to the amount of agrcultural chemcals and chemcal fertlzers used, γ s the rato of the non-pont source polluton whch was produced by the protecton of local authorty, c s the cost of the central authorty s supervson, the assumpton s that central authorty's degree of punshment wll ncrease wth the local authorty s ntensty, whose coeffcent sθ, c = θp, θ f 0.Here we analyze the protecton behavor of the non-pont source polluton of the local authorty only, therefore only the producers who are protected are nvolved n the utlty functon. Local authorty's utlty functon: Max U = t π ( Xp) dxp + L( Xp) dxp pxp () In the formula, where π (Xp) s the proft of a enterprse whch s protected, L(Xp) s the quantty of employment n the enterprse, and p s the punshment the government get for protectng the producers of non-pont polluton. Frst order optmalty condton: t π ( Xp) Xp) = P (3) Meanng that fnancal revenue from producers who are protected by the local authorty plus the lowest subsdy whch the farmers lve on from the local authorty s equal to the margnal producers X who are sutable for central authorty s punshment. Set of value of X : the numbers of X X tπ ( x) X ) tπ ( X ) X ). Obvously, Xp s n { } Xp decreasng for p p 0. For the non-pont p source polluton has the characters of numerousness and randomness, the decreased number of the enterprses beng protected whch s caused by the cost of punshment s less than the ncreased number of producers who have been punshed, therefore the functon curve s convex to d Xp X axs ( f 0 ), When p = 0, Xp = Xe, t means dp all the enterprses of the area are protected, then Xe Xp =,meanwhle, Xp s ncreasng for t, thus 1+ p Xe txe we set Xp = =, whch s the response 1+ p / t t + p functon of local authorty. For the central authorty nows the response functon of local authorty, we txe put Xp = nto (1), and we can get: t + p txe txe maxt = π t( Xe ) θp γ t + p t + p s. t. c p π ( Xe Xp) (4) Frst order optmalty condton: T π t Xe γtxe = θ + p = 0 (5) T Xe( π p γ ) = p = 0 t (6) From (6) we get: γ p =,put t nto (5) can get: π θγ t = π ( πxe θ ) (7) We can see from that the punsh degree s p postvely related to the degree of non-pont polluton caused by protecton of local authorty, s negatvely related to the proft level. Many researches prove that, f the output of the agrcultural products s postvely related to the amount of fertlzers, comparng the organc model of agrculture producton whch doesn t need fertlzers wth the model that need fertlzer, the output wll decrease by 30% at least. In our country, ths rato s much hgher, whch mae the central authorty n trouble, therefore, when the central authorty want to set up the penalty standard, he should call on the farmers to apply fertlzer reasonably, advocate non-pont polluton treatment technology and the green consumpton, set up green consumpton maret of organc agrcultural products, though n ths way the output s not postvely related to the proft level and the ncome of the farmers s negatvely related to the amount of fertlzer appled. Fnally the non-pont source polluton n rural areas can be prevented and controlled radcally. Observng from t, tax rate and supervson cost of central government are postvely related to protecton ntensty of local authortes and non-pont source polluton that caused by protecton, they are negatvely related to the number and proft level of local producers. Proft level of agrcultural products and numbers of enterprses of the area can be regarded as the symbol of economc development n countrysde. So central authorty has fewer penaltes and regulaton on the man regons where agrculture s developed faster, non-pont polluton sn t obvous, and output s hgh, the behavours of local authortes play a leadng role n preventng and controllng non-pont polluton n rural areas

5 ejbo Electronc Journal of Bology, 007, Vol. 3(): Predcament analyss on non-pont source polluton treatment between behavours of local authortes and central authorty n rural areas Though n our country from central authorty to local authortes, the governments at all levels and envronmental protecton department all attach great mportance to envronment protecton and polluton treatment, besdes the efforts of each regulaton and acton s beng strengthened constantly, however, the problem of non-pont source polluton treatment n rural areas stll moves slowly, from the perspectve of economcs, the effcency of governments depends on the arrangement of admnstraton structure and whether the targets are ncentve compatble for offcers, whether the desgns of admnstraton structure could encourage and restran the behavors of the offcal selfshness to reflect publc nterests. The roles of authortes n non-pont source polluton are as below: (1) Macro-control legslaton, plannng and coordnaton functons. () Publc rules and regulatons functon. The governments nfluence self-nterest behavors of other man bodes by usng permts and formulatng qualty and techncal standards, n ths way they can protect the publc envronment n rural areas fully. (3) Resource dstrbuton functon, meanng that publc products for non-pont source polluton are provded, but because of fnancal decentralzaton of authorty pattern and the model for performance apprasal of local authortes and so on n our country, the admnstraton structure of local authortes and ncentve mechansm are not compatble, then the ncentves of local authorty s behavors from control mechansm of central authorty are twsted. Wth the nfluence of prmtve development vew, especally " nomnal green GDP", regardng GDP as the center and advocatng " Development means economy", producers' polluton behavors n rural areas don t do bad to the offcal achevements, on the opposte, the more fertlzer they use the greater ther fnancal achevements are, for the output of applyng fertlzer s more than that of organc fertlzer, comparng the non-pont polluton wth the achevements, the local authorty and producers of non-pont source polluton agree on ths pont, whch provdes the foundaton for the two. 4 Conclusons The Systematc defects of non-pont polluton n rural areas suggest that the government s nsuffcent ablty of controllng the maret. In order to control non-pont polluton n rural areas and mae the development goal of crcular agrculture come true, the central authorty has to change tradtonal nterventon, fnd the root of maret vacancy, correct Performance Indcator System of local authortes that s calculated by the ncrease of output and mplement the green ncentve mechansm. Besdes to reform dsadvantages for envronmental protecton rules and regulatons and pay attenton to the scence and techncal nvestment are ndspensable. The government should reduce the drect admnstratve nterventon, meanwhle by usng more economcal methods and ncentve mechansms that can control the nput of natural resource and the output of the pollutants n the course of non-pont source polluton treatment n rural areas, whch wll lead the behavor of producers and consumers to be envronmental frendly and push the development of recyclng agrculture. References [1] Zhang Fan (1998) Envronmental and natural resources economcs, Shangha People's Press, Chna, 10: [] Chen Hong (005) A game theory analyss on economc subects nterests of the crcular economc ncrease model. Academc Exchange, 10: [3] Huang Tao (004) Study course of game theory - Theory Method. Captal Unversty of Economcs and Busness Press, Chna, 1: [4] Hong Dayong, Ma Fangxn (003)Reproducton of Dual Socal Structure: A socologcal analyss of non pont source polluton n Chnese countrysde. Study of Socology, 3: [5] Investgaton department n rural socal economy of State Statstcs Bureau (006) Rural Development Research Insttute of Chnese Academy of Socal Scences, Stuaton analyss and predcton of rural economy, Socal Scentfc Lterature Press, 5: 7-3. [6] L June (005) Systematc orgn of local government's short-term economc behavors. Macroeconomcs Research, 10: