Second centrifuge hall in use in North Korea

Transcription

1 Jane's Intelligence Review [Content preview Subscribe to IHS Jane s Intelligence Review for full article] Second centrifuge hall in use in North Korea North Korea appears to have brought a second hall of uranium enrichment centrifuges into service at its Yongbyon site. Nick Hansen examines the evidence of operational activity and the implications for Pyongyang's civil and military nuclear programmes. Using satellite imagery analysis of the Yongbyon fuel fabrication plant in North Korea from late 2014 and early 2015, IHS Jane's has concluded that a second hall of centrifuges is now likely to be operational as part of the Uranium Enrichment Workshop. The second hall probably started testing in January 2015, and may have become operational by early February, in line with IHS Jane's estimates since April 2014 that it would come online in late 2014 or early The Yongbyon Uranium Enrichment Workshop has been the source of much speculation, including whether it is Pyongyang's basis for a uranium-based nuclear weapons programme. The site also houses a 5 Megawatt electrical (MWe) plutonium production reactor. Imagery shows the increase in snow melt between January and February 2015 at the centrifuge halls of the Article 1 Page 1 of 8

2 Yongbyon Uranium Enrichment Workshop. ( CNES 2015 Airbus DS/IHS ) Nearly five years ago, North Korea permitted three scientists from Stanford University to visit a building at its Yongbyon Fuel Fabrication Plant that had been converted over a period of 18 months, from April 2009 until November 2010, into a modern hall containing 2,000 operative uranium enrichment centrifuges. Second hall Construction began on a new building adjacent to the first centrifuge hall in March 2013 and it appeared to be externally complete by early November This building has similar dimensions to the first centrifuge hall and is therefore likely to also contain centrifuges. It was also likely to require a similar period of time to bring into operation, approximately 18 months, if it also contained 2,000 centrifuges. This implied a startup date in late 2014 or early Specific information was gleaned from the 2010 visit, including the type and number of centrifuges in the first building, its internal configuration, and the length of time (18 months) it took to remove the old equipment, reconfigure the building, and install the centrifuges and related equipment. Snowmelt indicators One way to detect a heat source inside a building is to observe the evidence of heated air on the building's roof and its surroundings. This requires snow on the building's roof and can be measured by snowmelt. The first good example of this was an image taken on on 10 January 2013 showing the lower roof of the south side of the first 120 m-long centrifuge hall, with the image probably acquired several days after a snowfall. Three melted areas appeared on the roof, with a dark area showing the most melt, a small area between the two-storey additions showing approximately the same, and a lower area appearing to have 10 closely spaced vents pumping heated air onto the roof. Snow had also started to melt along the roof's centreline. Earlier images, before January 2013, showed that there are small windows or vents near the top of the centrifuge hall's southern wall. These vents appear to allow warm air out of the building and melt the snow on the lower roof. This indicates that on 10 January 2013 the centrifuges inside the building were probably operating. In mid-2013, a structure was added to the southwest end of the first hall of the centrifuge building, which masked the vents that had allowed hot air out, as recorded in that year. However, three windows or vents on the west end of the first hall are now used to vent hot air from inside the building. Thermal signature A second means to detect heat from inside a building is to measure the thermal signature of the building. Currently the only satellite data available with adequate resolution in the thermal infrared bands to detect heat from individual buildings is from Landsat 7 and Landsat 8. However, both acquire thermal data at low Article 1 Page 2 of 8

3 resolution (120 m and 100 m resolution, respectively, resampled to 30 m in delivered data products). This low resolution makes it difficult to distinguish individual heated buildings. Landsat 8 had technical problems with its two-channel Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS) and stopped providing products from 19 December 2014 to 3 March The TIRS began providing products again on 4 March The data collected from the two IR bands during the 'down-time' period were reprocessed, with reprocessing starting on 3 February and completed on 18 May. Due to this problem, no thermal imagery from 2015 is available yet for analysis. Materials flow Since late 2010, most - if not all - activities at Yongbyon's fuel fabrication facility have been geared towards producing enriched uranium as fuel for the ELWR and probably for the country's nuclear weapons programme. The centrifuges require UF6 gas feed stock. Production of the feed stock requires two raw materials and five or six different chemicals, and in addition the UF6 gas must enter the centrifuge building and the enriched UF6 gas must egress for further processing (either to make reactor fuel or for increased enrichment). Construction materials to build the centrifuge halls are unloaded at the construction support area, not at this facility. Projected possible enriched uranium production at Yongbyon ( 2015 IHS ) Uranium production Article 1 Page 3 of 8

4 The first hall was operating throughout the period from late December 2014 to early February In addition, some related activities were being conducted in attached buildings to the west. If both halls are now operational, they will double the amount of LEU for reactor fuel and, if this is enriched further to HEU, it could be used for North Korea's nuclear weapons programme. In a single-step enrichment process, 2,000 P2-type centrifuges, developed by Pakistan, could be estimated to make around 40 kilogrammes (kg) of HEU, enriched to 90% per year, while 4,000 centrifuges could produce 80 kg. However, there remains considerable uncertainty over whether North Korea has sought to enrich uranium above the levels necessary for ELWR fuel, or whether the quality of North Korean centrifuges would permit higher levels of separation. Conclusion The first centrifuge hall at Yongbyon has been in operation for approximately three years at a conservative estimate, and probably for longer. It is reported to produce enough LEU annually to operate the ELWR for one year. IHS Jane's assesses that the second centrifuge hall is likely now to have been in operation for around six months, and could potentially double stocks of LEU. However, the ELWR has not yet been tested, and it may require another year to become operational if the testing is successful. Additionally, there have been no reports of construction of other light water reactors in North Korea. This raises the question of the whereabouts of the enriched uranium produced at Yongbyon; it could have been transported to another unknown site for further processing into HEU, or it may have remained in storage at Yongbyon. IHS Jane's assesses that the movement of chemical storage tanks into and out of Yongbyon since 2012 has been consistent. Some of these tanks are designed for the chemicals required to produce the UF6 gas feed material for the centrifuges, but others may be transporting enriched UF6 off site for further enrichment. At the same time, although there is no evidence that the enriched UF6 is being stored somewhere at the Yongbyon site, it would nevertheless be easy to hide. ELWR STATUS North Korea's stated purpose for producing LEU fuel rods was to power the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR), and as of June 2015 the reactor had not been tested or operated. Throughout the winter period of December 2014 to February 2015, IHS Jane's observed little activity at the reactor, although in May and June 2015 a shallow channel from the river appeared to have been dug out to divert river water close to the main cistern. Although an earth dam had been washed away in storms in mid-2014, there was no evidence that engineers were trying to repair it. A current drought in North Korea will almost certainly delay the ELWR start-up if it had been planned for mid-to-late Article 1 Page 4 of 8

5 Copyright IHS Global Limited, 2015 For the full version and more content: IHS Jane's Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre This analysis is taken from IHS Jane s Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre, which delivers comprehensive and reliable country risk and military capabilities information, analysis and daily insight. IHS country risk and military capabilities news and analysis is also available within IHS Jane s Intelligence Review. To learn more and to subscribe to IHS Jane s Intelligence Review online, offline or print visit For advertising solutions contact the IHS Jane s Advertising team Article 1 Page 5 of 8