OPG s Response to Fukushima Event- Update

Transcription

1 OPG s Response to Fukushima Event- Update Darlington and Pickering Joint Community Advisory Committee Meeting- January 21, 2014 Mark Knutson- Director- Fukushima Support Tho-Dien Le- Projects Design Manager- Fukushima Support

2 Overview Much has already been accomplished at OPG Nuclear Power Plants in response to the Fukushima event Evaluation of event lessons learned completed and will continue when new information becomes available OPG Stations are safe. No significant issues requiring immediate corrective or compensatory measures Projects in place with significant progress to provide additional layer of defense and safety Ahead of schedule in responding to CNSC Fukushima Action Items (FAIs) and World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) Recommendations 2 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

3 Key Lesson Learned Beyond Design Basis Accidents can happen No room for complacency in the implementation of nuclear safety practices Fundamental concepts of defence-in-depth remain valid Provision for dealing with and managing a radiological emergency situation, onsite and offsite, must be planned, tested and regularly reviewed 3 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

4 OPG s Activities Following Fukushima Event Implemented safety reviews of Pickering and Darlington operating reactors and determined they were safe to continue operation: Design basis Events External Hazards and Events Beyond Design Basis Events (e.g. Seismic, Flood, Wind) Severe Accident Management, and Emergency Preparedness and response Additional safety enhancements to better cope with external events and severe accidents have been identified and are being implemented Establish diverse and flexible coping strategies approach to address event initiated by external hazards 4 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

5 OPG Response to Regulatory Directives CNSC issued FAIs Items to each Canadian Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in Feb a total of 101 FAIs for Pickering and Darlington Stations Three updates submitted to CNSC and 78 FAIs successfully closed WANO issued SOERs (Significant Operating Experience Reports) to its members with recommendations WANO recommendations have been reviewed and submitted to WANO in accordance with WANO schedule - Applicable recommendations have been realized or are months away from realization 5 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

6 Number of FAIs OPG Progress in Closure of CNSC FAIs 120 OPG Progress in Requesting FAI Closure (3 stations x 36 FAI = 108 FAI intitially) 100 (1) OPG's Open FAIs CNSC Target for Open FAIs Improved Performance Notes (1): (a) CNSC opened 36 generic Fukushima Action Items (FAIs) for each Canadian Nuclear Power plant. (b) Total FAIs for OPG is 108 ( 3 Stations x 36 FAIs) (c) 7 FAIs were not applicable and 15 FAIs have been submitted for closure 0 Initial Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Status Date (Quarter) 6 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

7 Partnering Across Canadian Utilities Interaction between utilities gives a larger perspective and experience base Encourages challenging and learning Improves capability to respond and to provide mutual assistance Provides credibility and Facilitates regulatory concurrence. CANDU Owners Group (COG) : Candu Industry Integration Team Joining forces to review and assess Severe Accident aspects Regional Emergency Response Support Centre and Mutual Aid Agreement in effect between participating utilities OPG has been recognized as a leader in responding to Fukushima event lesson learned: OPG CEO Tom Mitchell appointed chair of special WANO commission Nuclear Engineering Strategy VP Fred Dermarkar received WANO s Nuclear Excellence Award for his work on the Fukushima Project 7 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

8 Canadian Nuclear Utility Principles for Beyond Design Basis Events One Objective and nine Principles Developed and agreed to by the 3 Utilities (OPG, Bruce Power and New Brunswick Power) Provide guidance for utility decision making to maintain consistency Intended to position Canadian utilities at the forefront of the Post Fukushima Response OPG activities to address Beyond Design Basis Events are consistent with these Principles 8 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

9 Objective of the Principles Practically eliminate the potential for societal disruption due to a nuclear incident by maintaining multiple and flexible barriers to severe event progression 9 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

10 Canadian Nuclear Utility Principles 1. Actions and defences will focus on stopping accident progression prior to a severe accident 2. Multiple barriers to event progression and multiple means to supply water or electricity will be used to ensure adequate defence 3. Methods and actions to initiate heat transport system cooldown and maintain fuel cooling will be a primary and early priority 4. Actions to maintain Containment integrity will be utilized to minimize radioactive releases 5. Containment venting will be controlled through a filtered system 6. Necessary systems, structures and components will be confirmed to survive rare yet credible conditions for external hazards 7. Irradiated Fuel Bay (IFB) water levels will be maintained sufficiently above the top of the fuel to mitigate high radiation fields, hydrogen production, and fuel damage 8. Emergency Mitigating Equipment will be robust, readily available, easily deployable within required timeframes, and have adequate redundancy 9. Canadian utilities will utilize a common philosophy for the prevention of a Beyond Design Basis Accident (BDBA) 10 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

11 Stopping Accident Progression Robustness of OPG stations confirmed for beyond design basis (BDB) seismic events BDB flooding analysis completed for Pickering and Darlington Flood barriers around essential Systems installed for Darlington and Pickering 11 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

12 Multiple Barriers to Event Progression Multiple barriers to event progression and multiple means to supply water or electricity will be used to ensure adequate defence 12 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

13 Multiple Barriers to Event Progression Diesel driven pumps and generators procured Sufficient number (N+1) of pumps and generators to supply all units at a site simultaneously Multiple different connection points to key plant equipment to add emergency sources of cooling water Design in progress to simplify connections 13 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

14 Maintain Containment Integrity Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners for hydrogen removal 8 of 10 Units complete Study and Design are in progress for: Larger generators to repower most Emergency Power System loads- Phase 2 EME Water make-up to moderator and shield tank to arrest accident Shield tank integrity for severe accidents Additional filtered venting system (beyond phase 2 EME) Committed as part of Darlington refurbishment Under review for Pickering 14 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

15 Maintain Containment Integrity 15 Procedures for Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) developed Staff Training Classroom Practice deploying actual EME equipment SAMG Drills with EME deployment 2 one-day drills for each of PA and PB in September and November two-day drill for Darlington August 2013 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

16 16 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a Darlington Emergency Preparedness Drill Aug 2013

17 17 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a Pickering Emergency Preparedness Drill Nov 2013 (CEOF)

18 Survivability of Equipment Seismic Margin Assessment completed EME Quick connects designed to meet system requirement Impact of seismically induced fires and floods at Pickering and Darlington assessed - No significant incremental impact on station risk Instrumentation and Equipment Survivability Assessment assessed for Pickering and Darlington Diversity and independence of EME connection points included in plan to address extreme external hazards. 18 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

19 Maintain Spent Fuel Cooling Irradiated Fuel Bay (IFB) water levels to be maintained above the top of the fuel to mitigate high radiation fields, hydrogen production, and fuel damage Seismic / Thermal Analysis of IFB confirmed water leakage plus evaporation are much less than EME water make-up capacity Design in progress for portable measurement of level and temperature 19 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

20 Readily Deployed Emergency Mitigating Equipment EME stored at higher elevation, away from station, close enough for timely deployment and accessible following BDBE Deployable by diverse work groups, supported by procedures, training and practice and validated by drills More than one method for deployment (trucks, tractors, security vehicles) Reliability of EME supported by using proven technology, preventative maintenance and routine testing On-site fuel supplies adequate for > 72 hour run time, with provisions for refueling in place 20 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

21 21 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a Readily Deployed Emergency Mitigating Equipment

22 Summary Safety reviews of Pickering and Darlington operating reactors and determined they were safe to continue operation Significant progress on various projects to provide additional safety enhancements to better cope with external events and severe accidents Ahead of schedule in responding to CNSC Fukushima Action Items (FAIs) and WANO Recommendations OPG has been recognized as a leader in responding to Fukushima event lesson learned: OPG CEO Tom Mitchell appointed chair of special WANO commission Nuclear Engineering Strategy VP Fred Dermarkar received WANO s Nuclear Excellence Award for his work on the Fukushima Project 22 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a

23 Question? 23 O P G s R e s p o n s e t o F u k u s h i m a