Status and Challenges of Nuclear Power Program and Reflections of Radioactive Waste Management Policy

Transcription

1 2009 Advanced Summer School of Radioactive Waste Disposal with Social Scientific Literacy Aug. 3 10, 2009, University of California, Berkeley Status and Challenges of Nuclear Power Program and Reflections of Radioactive Waste Management Policy in Korea August 6 th, 2009 Seong Kyung Cho Myung Ji University Jooho Whang Kyung Hee University Korea Status of Nuclear Power Program in Korea Role of Nuclear Power Installed Capacity(Gwe): Nuclear/Total=17.7/72.5 Electricity Generation: Nuclear/Total~ 36% Capacity Factor: 93.4% Ulchin Units 20 units in operation (16 PWRs + 4 CANDUs) Wolsung 6 units under construction (4 OPR1000s + 2 APR1400s) Yonggwang Kori 2 units under license review (2 APR1400s)

2 Challenges of Nuclear Power Program in Korea National Energy Plan, Aug By 2030 Installed Capacity: Nuclear/Total = 40% Electricity Generation: Nuclear/Total = 59% Requires to build 10~1212 more units and to acquire 1~2 more sites Also requires to secure supply of U and enrichment service in the front-end and to foster alternatives for spent fuel management Challenges of Nuclear Power Program in Korea Enrichment No problem so far relying on long term commercial supply. What about the future in the advent of Nuclear Renaissance? Sites for New NPPs Site selection and acquisition process being studied Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel Saturation begins in 2016 at AR facilities

3 Challenges of Nuclear Power Program in Korea Arising of Spent Nuclear Fuel Accu mulation of S pent Fuel (10 K tones) Direct disposal after AFR Assuming AFR after 2016 for SF exceeding AR capacity 4,000 (PWR) 4,000 (PWR) 4,000 (CANDU) 1 4,000 (CANDU) ,000 1 (PWR/CANDU) 20,000 (PWR) 3 20,000 (PWR) 4 20,000 (PWR) # AFR # HLW Repository By 2050: By 2100: 30,000 MTU PWR + 20,000 MTU CANDU More than 80,000 MTU (Ref 100,000 MTU) Challenges of Nuclear Power Program in Korea Treatment on Spent Nuclear Fuel R&D plan by AEC (Dec. 2008) to reduce volume and toxicity of spent nuclear fuel Requires cooperation with other countries Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel Only basic R&D to setup a reference design concept

4 Challenges of Nuclear Power Program in Korea Addition of Infrastructure Radioactive Waste Management Act (Jan. 2009) - collection of waste fund for disposal of LLW and SNF - establishment of responsible body Public Discussion on Spent Fuel Management Three years of preparation since 2006 Three reports - decoupling of SNF from NPP policy - storage as main issue together with final management at later phase - public discussion process design by potential participants To go or not? Challenges of Nuclear Power Program in Korea Korea-USA Nuclear Cooperation Agreement To be amended in mutually beneficial way reflecting both sides views on future nuclear power program in Korea

5 Summary of Radioactive Waste Policy-Making 1) 1984 Establishment of ground policy 2) Period without strategies or plans 3) Undisclosed development of dual structure 4) Coming out of sole reliance on technological standpoint in policy-making 5) Adoption of Regional-Incentive Policy 6) Adoption of Policy Promotion System 7) Settlement of Policy Promotion System 8) Hiatus in Policy Promotion 9) Period of Learning Effects 10) Period of Unprepared Repetition 11) 2003 Period of Appendix Policies 12) Period for the change based on participation 13) 2005 Period of Promotion of the Policy that Endorses Mutual Agreements Learning Effects 14) Nov Period of Incomplete Success of the 1st Stage and Verification of New Problems (1) 1984: Establishment of Ground Policy Regarding Regulation of Radioactive Waste - First Discussion on Policies of Radioactive Waste : After 6 years of inaction since the opening of the first nuclear power plant in Korea (1978) - The 211th Atomic Energy Commission deliberated & decided : A repository for LILW will be constructed in land out of reactor site *Atomic Energy Commission: The Atomic Energy Commission (by Atomic Energy Act) shall be established under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister in order to deliberate and decide on important matters concerning the utilization and safety of nuclear energy. The Commission shall consist of not less than nine and not more than eleven members including the chairman.

6 (2) : The Period Without Strategies or Plans - May, 1986: revised Atomic Energy Act : MOST and KAERI are assigned as the department and the organization that oversee radioactive waste management : selected potential sites for LILW : 3 regions along the eastern seaboard, including Kyungbuk Wooljin, Youngduk, Youngil - December, 1988: conducted site survey on the geological characteristics - February, 1989: strong opposition from the local residents. - May, 1989: officially ceased site survey. (2) : The Period Without Strategies or Plans - No consideration of the locals in the governmental policy-making. - Imprudent selection of the potential sites without appropriate preparations. - Opposition from locals was highly publicized. - Events & scandals amplified by the media - Encouragement of unfavorable predisposition toward atomics. The first instance of negative predisposition toward radioactive waste. This became the source of 19 years drifting

7 (3) : The Undisclosed Development of Dual Structure. - June, 1990: the 226 th Atomic Energy Commission deliberated & decided : The radioactive waste management site is altered to accommodate comprehensive treatment facilities. - Undisclosed site search (with the help of Chungnam province) : covered as the second Atomic Energy Research Facilities - Developed : Yellow Sea Scientific Research Complex in place of a radioactive waste management facilities. - September, 1990: selected Anmyundo as a potential site. - Major newspapers publicized the decision just before the official announcement. - Strong opposition from anti-nuclear organizations and local residents. : blamed Government s undisclosed activities - October, 1991: the 227 th Atomic Energy Commission deliberated & decided : Plans for Yellow Sea Scientific Research Complex are officially withdrawn. (3) : The Undisclosed Development of Dual Structure. - Radioactive waste management policies faced the danger of incredibility - Negative predisposition toward radioactive waste management facilities spread among the people. - Anti-nuclear tendencies and organizations spread and became firmly established. This period calls for a reflection on the sentiments of exclusiveness toward science and technology possessed by experts in the field.

8 (4) : Coming out of sole reliance on technological standpoint in policy-making : invited the local communities to host the site. : Failed to produce notable results. - Another selection of possible sites based on professional opinion. : 4 possible sites, including Kyunbuk Wooljin & Youngil, Cheonam Changheung, Chungnam Taean - Strong opposition from each region. : Opposition is especially stiff from Anmyundo,which was selected for the second time. - Radioactive waste management policies incapacitated. (4) : Coming out of sole reliance on technological standpoint in policy-making - Recognized the need to take a more socio-cultural approach to radioactive waste management. - Government s indiscriminate involvement. - Coordinated opposition by anti-nuclear organizations and local residents. - Radioactive waste policies used as political platforms in elections. It became evident that civil approval is a crucial part of effective radioactive waste policies. i 1992, Korean Nuclear Energy Foundation (KNEF) is founded to this end

9 (5) : Adoption of Regional-Incentive Policy : Some regions voluntarily bid for radioactive waste facilities. : Including Kyungnam Yangsan, Kyungbuk Youngil - January, 1994: Official announcement of Radioactive Waste Management Project Stimulation and Facility s Surrounding Region Law : Announcement of Governmental Incentive for Radioactive Waste Management Facilities Candidate Region Promises 50 billion Won for regional development fund. - Wooljin submitted proposal to host the site (signed by 57% of the voters) - Opposition heated up in the surrounding regions. - Government deemed Wooljin to be incapable to host the site. The government attempted to correct its previous unsuccessful methods but its priorities were placed on the results of the election, rather than true success of the policies. (6) : Adoption of Policy Promotion System - Announced the plan to construct radioactive waste facilities and research facilit ies separately. - Nationwide site survey and screenings were administered nationally. Final group of potential sites selected. : 7 locations in coastal regions and 3 locations in island regions were selected as candidates. Kuleop-do was chosen as the final candidate. - An inter-ministerial ad hoc Radioactive Waste Management Project Stimulatio n Committee, was formed in the government. - Radioactive Waste Management Planning Board staffs the ad hoc committee : Kuleop-do Radioactive Waste Management Facility Development Plan was announced. IAEA experts group conducted preliminary feasibility survey on the region. - June, 1995: Deocjeock Development and Welfare Foundation was founded (50 billion Won fund) : Regional Committee formed to promote efficient execution. -October 1995: further geological survey revealed an active fault zone - December, 1995: the 243th Atomic Energy Commission deliberated & decided : Kuleop-do was voided.

10 (6) : Adoption of Policy Promotion System - The government came to terms with the need to regain credibility regarding the issue. - Establishment of a comprehensive, pan-ministerial system. - Substantial discussion and execution of regional incentive policies. The fact that safety, the most basic and important factor of radioactive waste policies were not secured severely discredited the government. The government attempted to elicit key concepts, such as technological safety, social acceptability, expertise, credibility, and participation. (7) : Settlement of Policy Promotion System : The 245 th Atomic Energy Commission deliberated & decided :Theresponsibilities were moved to Department of Commerce and KEPCO, respectively : NETEC, an organization inside KEPCO that oversees radioactive waste, was launched. -September, 1998: the 249 th Atomic Energy Commission deliberated & decided : Radioactive Waste Management Plans plan for LILW management facilities to be constructed by 2008, facilities for spent nuclear fuel to be constructed by Analysis of the previous failures was neglected. Only structural changes were made. However, changes in the government s degree and method of involvement could be expected, owing to the differences in the new organizations assigned to oversee the policies.

11 (8) : Hiatus in Policy Promotion - February, 1998: the name of the responsible ministry changes : Department of Commerce becomes Ministry of Industry and Commerce. -Only abstract, ambiguous measures are administered. : Government plans to coordinate with the regional community and aid in regional development in order to ensure the timely construction of a radioactive waste management facilities. Defensive and passive responses, known as NIMT ( not in my term ) tendencies, were prevalent. (9) : Period of Learning Effects - June, 2000: Invitation was open for local communities to host the site. : 46 coastal locations nationwide were screened. Development fund is greatly increased from 50 billion Won to 300 billion Won. - 7 regions proposed to bid for the hosting. : Cheonam Youngkwang, Kangjin, Jindo, Wando, Cheonbuk Kochang, Chungam Boryung, and Kyungbuk bkwooljin propose, but never reached to official ffiilbid.

12 (9) : Period of Learning Effects - Less-developed region s wish for the economical vitalization was proven. - The government responded to it with active promotion. - As a result, unregulated support was induced. - Local citizens formed pros and cons groups, resulting in social conflicts. - Change in the press report attitudes : produce more reports on the radioactive waste facilities themselves, rather than reports on the events and scandals. Provided d an opportunity to change ordinary citizens vague rejection towards the radioactive waste disposal facilities to a small interest for their necessities, etc. (10) : Period of Unprepared Repetition -August 2001, return to selection-first-discussion-later method : Decided to select potential site first. Site characterization and discussion with the local entities later. Then decide final candidate site. - December 2002, Deduction of 4 potential sites : Kyungbuk Youngduk, Wooljin, and Cheonam Youngkwang, Cheonbuk Kochang - April 2003, 252th Atomic Energy Commission deliberated & decided : Radioactive waste management facilities site securing plan, selection of 4 regional potential sites - Simultaneous anti-nuclear demonstration on all four regions. - Another failure of the government s trial for an alternative approach and the policy promotion

13 (11) 2003: Period of Policies with Appendix - April 2003, Presidential Address : We shouldn t put off choosing the site for a national project: construction of radioactive waste management facilities. - April 2003, Ministers i of 10 separate departments t and the president of KHNP issued a joint statement : Government promises to provide special incentives such as, locating the head quarter of KHNP, selfdecision on the use of 300 billion Won of development fund, and direct aid to host Proton-Based Engineering Technology Development Project. - May, 2003: Radioactive Waste Management Facilities and Proton-Based Engineering gtechnology Development Project was posted for hosting. : 4 of the candidate regions were given priority. If no region bids for hosing rights, Site Selection Committee will make the final selection from the four regions. (11) 2003: Period of Appendix Policies - June 2003, Notification on the change on the site selection announcement : Noted that if and when an equally qualified site comes up, the new site will be placed on the equal line of judgment as the previous ones. - July 14 th, 2003, exclusive application by the Cheonbuk Pooan-gun Wiido : 80% of the local citizens petitioned but the Pooan-gun congress resolved to go against it. -July 25 th, 2003, the Ministry of MOCIE made the final decision on the site (Cheonbuk Pooan-gun Wiido) - Large scaled opposition rallies and the conflicts between the local citizens (Continued until the November of 2004).

14 (11) 2003: Period of Policies with Appendix - Pluralistic regional supports and the activation of the administrative power within the moral boundaries. - However, faced with unexpectedly strong oppositions and the government s short-sighted responses. - Mass reproduction of the negative factors. Pooan case, which presented the need for the pre-analysis, preparation for the responses, strategy, specialists, and the network through variety of case scenarios, moved over to the next chapter without clear results. (12) : Period for the change based on participation - October 2003, the Prime Minister issued the organization for Joint Conference to resolve the problem currently presented in Pooan. - November 2003, Joint Conference to resolve the problem currently presented in in Pooan collapsed. - January 2003, the Minister of Industry and Commerce announced Pooan Nuclear plant waste management facilities site selection supplementation plan : Decided to go through the local citizen s voting as the official opinion-hearing process, and to give other applicants the same opportunity of becoming a potential site. When and if there is a competition, Pooan gets priority. - January 2004, Announcement of Popular Sovereignty Act: inhabitants voting - February 4 th, 2004, announced Invitation for the new sites candidates

15 (12) : Period for the change based on participation - February 14 th 2004, Installment of Nuclear Plant Project Support Group within the Ministry of the Industry and Commerce - April 2004, attempted to bring the issue to a national public discussion to gain larger positive feedbacks from the public. : Subject boundary and the participating party was not well-specified, so it failed. Can be recognized as the government s first attempt to engage the public in a national public discussion on the matter. (13) 2005: Period of Promotion of the Policy that Endorses Mutual Agreements Learning Effect - December 17 th, 2004, 253th Atomic Energy Commission deliberated & decided : Through the Change in radioactive waste management plan, decided to separate the LILW disposal facilities and the spent nuclear fuel issue. - December 21 st, 2004, formation of the situation examination board conference : Examined the site selection plan and schedule through the cooperation between related departments, such as: BH, MOST, MOCIE, KHNP, etc. - January 2005, Expansion and reorganization of the radioactive waste management department in MOCIE : Command variety of strategies and skills using the network as well as playing the role of the communicational bridge.

16 (13) 2005: Period of Promotion of the Policy that Endorses Mutual Agreements Learning Effect - March 2005, Operation Ruling Party-President s Office-Government discussion session : Discussed a way to minimize the conflicts that can arise while carrying out the site selection plan and schedule. -March 2005, Formed Site Selection Committee. - March 31 st, 2005, Announced Special Act for the LILW disposal facilities hosting region Created a basis that is necessary in going forward with the policy that reflects the zeitgeist. (14) November 2005: the Period of Incomplete Success of the 1 st Stage and Verification of New Problems - April 2005, Activation of Site selection committee : Organized site suitability subcommittee, cooperation subcommittee, public census subcommittee, site selection standards subcommittee. - April 2005, Anti-nuclear organizations started taking active notions. - June 16 th, 2005, Announced Invitation of application for the LILW disposal site candidates : Announced in the names of MOST vice-premier, MPIS minister, MOCIE minister, Site selection committee chair, president of KHNP. The main points involve the host application methods, resident voting, and the support for the hosting region within the legal boundary.

17 (14) November 2005: the Period of Incomplete Success of the 1 st Stage and Verification of New Problems - September 1 st, 2005, announcement on the applicatants : Kyungju, Kunsan, Pohang, Youngduck applied according to the appropriate procedure. - September 16 th, 2005, MOCIE demanded within each applicant inhabitants voting : 4 local autonomous entity chairs responded to it by adopting a fair competition agreement. - September 16 th - October 3 rd 2005 pre-voting campaigns - October 4 th, 2005, announced the inhabitants voting and the date (Nov. 2 nd, 2005) - November 2 nd, 2005, inhabitants voting on all four regions : Kyungju was selected with 89.5% approval rate; Kunsan 84.4%, Pohang 67.5%, Youngduck79.3%. - November 3 rd, 2005, Minister of MOCIE announced the site candidate (Kyungju-si, Yangbuk-Myeon Bongkil-li). (14) November 2005: the Period of Incomplete Success of the 1 st Stage and Verification of New Problems - November 4 th, 2005, announcement of IAEA special assessment team - November 7 th, 2005, issued an official document on the selection of the final candidate site - Success of the 1 st stage.

18 Characteristics of the 2005 the LILW disposal facilities siting policy promotion - Thorough Review : Analyzed the past cases in various angles and used them as the starting point of the policy promotion. - Use of the Specialists : Found and applied the specialized knowledge of not only the atomic energy specialists but also those working in the area of the social equality, public relations, social receptivity, and communication, to form a new outer network. - Aggressive Strategies : Predicted the spectrum of the ripple effects and the responses to prepare plans - Escaped Paper Plan : Understood the practical demands on the vitalization of the local economy and responded by suggesting appropriate measures. Authorized local autonomous administration the subprincipal body in policy-making. Characteristics of the 2005 the mid-low level radioactive waste disposal facilities siting policy-making - The Outline with Details : Arranged directions of the outline and set feasible details. - Timely Alternatives : Created the alternatives with exchange opinions and circumstantial judgment. - Multi-stage strata System : Operated the pan-ministerial system and worked the leadership of core organization. - Hardware < Software : Organization culture played an creative role in policy-making rather then organization power.

19 Success factors of the 2005 LILW disposal facilities siting policy-making For SaTisFacTory PoLiCy (1) Flexibility (2) Suitability (3) Transparency (4) Feasibility (5) Timeliness (6) Potency (7) Legitimacy (8) Consistency New Issues and the Issues to Reconsider : Dual sides of the 1 st stage, Role-model or Burdens - Government s balanced role on reconciling regional conflicts - Feasible discussion and policies decision on spent nuclear fuel disposal plan - Promotion of R&D project on atomic power system that reflects the social demands and the reality. - Advanced d setting of related laws and administrative i ti system.

20 Things are going on.?